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ABSTRACT
HOLDING ON TO WHO THEY ARE:
PATHWAYS FOR VARIATIONS IN RESPONSE TO TOXIC WORKPLACE BEHAVIOR
AMONG U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

Greta E. Creech
Graduate School of Leadership & Change
Antioch University
Yellow Springs, OH

The U.S. intelligence community is a critical mission industry responsible for protecting lives and
safety in ways that impact the global security environment. Research on the deleterious impact
of toxic workplace behavior on other critical mission fields, such as health care and the U.S.
military, is robust. However, intelligence scholars publishing within the unclassified arena have
been silent on the phenomenon, how personnel respond to it, and how it may impact the
intelligence function. This lack of scholarship has afforded an opportunity to understand what
constitutes toxic behavior in the intelligence environment and how it may affect U.S. national
security objectives. This study presents a theoretical model of response to toxic workplace
behavior among intelligence officers in the U.S. intelligence community that centers on a single
goal: Holding Self. Using grounded theory methodology and situational analysis in two
segments, the study examines how intelligence officers responded and the role that efforts to
hold onto self-concepts played in those responses. The findings included three psychological
dimensions, three action dimensions, and two inter-dimensions of response. The findings also
included identification of the broader ecological situation conditioning response and how those
choices operationalized into the business of being intelligence officers. The final model serves
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as a foundation for future empirical research on the topic. This dissertation is available in open
access at AURA: Antioch University Repository and Archive, https://aura.antioch.edu/, and
OhioLINK ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/.
Keywords: toxic workplace behavior, toxic leadership, grounded theory, situational analysis,
intelligence community, national security
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines how intelligence analysts and operations personnel
(intelligence officers) 1 respond to toxic workplace behavior (TWB) and how those responses
impact their function within the work environment. Scholars first adopted the term toxic to
describe a set of counterproductive and abusive leadership behaviors in the 1990s (Whicker,
1996) when globalization, technological change, and workforce diversification began to reorient
existing frameworks for power and relationships toward more systemic treatments. In this early
period, researchers evaluated toxic organizational dynamics through the narrow lens of
hierarchy (Ashforth, 1997; Tepper, 2000) before expanding to nonhierarchical frameworks for
status and power beginning in the mid-2000s (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Padilla et al., 2007;
Pearson & Porath, 2005).
Research has demonstrated the corrosive impact of TWB organizational success, with
abusive forms of power as a central component (Coccia, 1998; K. R. Williams, 2019). No
identified research has challenged this finding, although research accounting for situational
factors elevates ontological differences in whether and when behaviors become toxic. The TWB
research landscape has touched nearly every operational framework, with a significant body of
research addressing the behavior’s detrimental impacts on lives and safety within health care
and military environments (Felblinger, 2008; R. A. Taylor & Taylor, 2017). Thus, toxicity in
organizations is not just about hurt feelings; it is about organizational failure.

While the term intelligence officer applies to any employee of the U.S. intelligence community, the terms
intelligence analyst, operational personnel, and support roles refer to specific categories. This study is primarily
concerned with responses to TWB among analysts, operations, and their support teams. For readability, I use the
term intelligence officer to generalize across these groups.

1

2
The U.S. intelligence community (IC) is arguably one of the most heavily examined
operational frameworks in the American organizational system, with a robust library of research
on the roles of history (Hitz, 2007; Troy, 1981), policy, operations, tradecraft (Fingar, 2011a;
Lowenthal, 2014), and cognition on the success and failure of critical intelligence missions
(Arkes & Kajdasz, 2011; Heuer, 1999). However, on the issue of TWB—or, any relational
factor—and its impacts in that organizational environment, the IC has not been part of the
dialogue. A review of research has identified no theory or empirical research into the impact of
TWB on U.S. intelligence organizations. One cannot necessarily extrapolate impacts across
industries due to the importance of industry-specific factors in measuring outcomes. However,
the harm to organizations and outcomes identified in other operational environments focused on
lives and safety (critical mission environments) would make findings that the behavior is not
destructive to IC operations notable. Nevertheless, whether TWB among colleagues and peers
has the same destructive impact on intelligence operations cannot be known until the question
is asked and outside a better understanding of how personnel respond to the dynamic. Thus,
my study will explore how and why intelligence officers respond to TWB in the ways that they do
and how those responses might impact how they function in the operational environment.
Study Purpose
This study neither determines nor takes a position on the prevalence of TWB in the IC.
Rather, the study seeks to understand how and why intelligence officers respond to TWB when
it occurs and how the dynamic may impact their functioning in the operational environment. As
subsequent sections will demonstrate, elements of power (formal, informal, and derived); silent
and overt forms of voice; and situational factors are fundamental to toxic events. This interaction
has been particularly acute in critical mission environments in which personnel must navigate
ambiguous structures of power, expression, and context amid crises. While scholars have not
conducted similar research on TWB in an intelligence environment, its similar critical mission
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function and parallel ambiguities of power, voice, and context would make understanding the
dynamic within the IC environment of interest (Creech, 2020).
This section will establish why understanding TWB in the intelligence environment is
critical. The section will begin with a brief introduction to power, voice, and context in their
relationship to TWB. While research on the topic in the IC is absent, its impact on the
intelligence function is not entirely unknown. Thus, the section will include an example of how
fear and destructive power underlying TWB contributed to intelligence failures surrounding the
1973 Yom Kippur attack on Israel. The section will close with a return to the discussion on the
impact of the behavior in other critical mission environments to establish the value of
understanding of the phenomenon in the IC.
Power, Voice, Context, and TWB
Theory and empirical research on TWB will be explored more deeply in Chapter 2.
However, understanding TWB’s connection to power, voice, and context are central to the
purpose of the study. TWB is a systemic phenomenon that manifests itself in human behavior.
The locus of the behavior is the power-over instead of the power-to. Scholars began to research
destructive power within formal leadership in the mid-1990s and early-2000s, including toxic
leadership (Lipman-Blumen, 2005a, 2005b; Whicker, 1996), petty tyranny (Ashforth, 1997), and
abusive supervision (Tepper, 2000, 2007), all linking power to formal hierarchy. Concurrent with
these treatments of abusive power, scholars began to explore bullying (Einarsen, 1999, 2000),
mobbing (Leymann, 1990), and incivility (Andersson & Pearson, 1999) as behavioral
frameworks that extended the scope of destructive power to informal status roles. This research
laid an important foundation to extend the locus of Weberian power (Weber, 1968) to anyone
with the ability to impose their will on others regardless of formal role.
Current research has broadened the exploratory scope beyond the study of toxic
interactions between individuals into examinations of the situational factors and actors that
systematize the behavior. In their study of North American leaders, Kusy and Holloway (2009)
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demonstrated that the shaming, hostility, and sabotage to individuals and teams underlying the
phenomenon were not reliant upon formal power and emerged into a form of toxic memory that
sustained its effects even after the toxic personality was no longer physically present in the
situation. Although their units of analysis remained on toxic leaders, Padilla et al. (2007) and
Lipman-Blumen (2005b, 2005a) extended responsibility to enabling followers.
In his conceptualization of transformative learning theory, E. W. Taylor (2001) argued
that memories serve as guides for how to respond to and live in the world. Thus, memories
imprint through meaning. In his memoir, former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and deputy attorney general, James Comey (2018), explored the impact that memories of
childhood bullying played in his dealings with adult experiences with TWB:
I would spend a lot of time assessing threats, judging tone of voice, and figuring out the
shifting dynamic in a hallway or locker room crowd. Surviving a bully requires constant
learning and adaptation. It instilled in me a lifelong hatred for bullies and sympathy for
their victims. (p. 37)
Both targets and witnesses to TWB gather meaning from the phenomenon, which
reverberates back onto the environment through enactments of voice and silence. However,
forms of voice may depend on how individuals in the phenomenon perceive their relationship to
it. For instance, in his mixed methods study of students and working adults, Pelletier (2010)
found that targets of TWB were more likely to respond to fear of security and safety impacts,
while witnesses were more likely to notice the marginalization effects toward the target. The
nature of those responses and how voice engaged depended on assessments by individuals of
their positions within the toxic situation.
Responses to TWB and impacts to voice exist on an array. Targets may react through a
prism of silence through fear of reprisal or loss (Tepper, 2007). Conversely, they may attempt to
regain power by becoming abusive toward the toxic personality or others in the situation (Lee &
Brotheridge, 2006) in a form of reactive-toxicity. How targets enact voice may also emerge from
the interaction of present toxic events with memories of past experience as in the example
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above, how targets perceive the toxic personality, or perceptions of how others see them as a
result of being targets (Assad, 2018).
The link between TWB, power, and voice intersects through fear in interaction with a
confluence of positional and situational factors. The remainder of this section will introduce the
relationship between power, fear, and TWB in the intelligence environment. I will begin with a
review of scholarship on intelligence failures surrounding the Yom Kippur War in 1973, to
demonstrate the ways in which impacts to voice and fear from TWB traversed the personal into
function and outcomes. Then, I will explore the implications of this phenomenon as an
underexplored research opportunity for IC scholars.
Fear and Failure
In October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces executed the Yom Kippur attack across the
Golan Heights and Suez Canal into Israel. Lore has framed the attack as a surprise to Israeli
intelligence forces, although academic case analyses of the attack have also concluded that
Israeli intelligence analysts had advance indicators of the attack (e.g., Bar-Joseph, 2005;
Ben-Zvi, 1990; Chorev, 1996). In addition to these indicators of Egyptian and Syrian intent,
these analyses suggest that Israel also had something else—toxicity within its analytic
operations.
Although many Israeli analysts concluded that the country’s adversaries had capabilities
superior to standing estimates, the country’s two most senior authorities on Egypt and Syria,
Major General Eli Zeira (director of military intelligence) and Lieutenant Colonel Yona Bandman
(Israel’s lead analyst for Egyptian issues), had concluded that neither Egypt nor Syria had the
air support nor the ballistic missile capability to mount an attack (Arkes & Kajdasz, 2011).
Expertise can be an elixir in an environment bound by uncertainty, disagreements, and
ambiguity, which are common in intelligence organizations (D. D. P. Johnson & Tierney, 2009).
Thus, senior analysts and others who have reputational expertise may carry significant power to
control the analytic narrative. This responsibility can foster effective critical thinking practices
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and rigorous assessments when managed appropriately. However, to protect their positional
influence, Zeira and Bandman abused their power through fear and the silent subjugation of
dissent. According to Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski (2003):
Both exhibited a highly authoritarian and decisive managerial style. Both lacked the
patience for long and open discussions and regarded them as “bullshit.” Zeira used to
humiliate officers who, in his opinion, came unprepared for meetings. At least once he
was heard to say that those officers who estimated in spring 1973 that a war was likely
should not expect a promotion. Bandman, although less influential, . . . used to express
either verbally or in body language his disrespect for the opinion of others. He was also
known for his total rejection of any attempt to change a single word, even a comma, in a
document he wrote. (p. 83)
Intelligence operations occur within a complexity of elements, sources, interpretations,
and potentialities that unfold both temporally and spatially. Thus, establishing causality between
the specific conditions, properties, and consequences of intelligence failures is problematic.
However, one is not required to track destructive discourse to its origins to understand its power
because the dynamic has meaning wherever it exists (Foucault, 1972). Zeira and Bandman
used their reputational power as subject matter experts (SMEs) to control discourse, structure,
and norms, as well as to threaten analysts who defied them by warning against attack. In short,
they weaponized fear.
Their behaviors fell within standard models for TWB (Doty & Fenlason, 2013; Kusy &
Holloway, 2009; Lee & Brotheridge, 2006; Lipman-Blumen, 2005b; Tepper, 2000). However,
their power lay in their abilities to leverage the ambiguity, uncertainty, politicization, and
complexity in the operational framework to foster a dynamic of situated essentialism. In turn, this
situated essentialism enabled toxicity to infect cognitive practices, collaboration, and a
willingness to speak. The result was catastrophic for Israel. Rather than leaving Israel better
positioned for attack, the failure cost the country between 2,688 and 2,838 lives in 20 days
(Warshal, 2009).
Most striking about the above analyses of the Yom Kippur attack is the focus on
cognitive breakdowns as the fundamental cause of the failure rather than the behavior affecting
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cognitive processes. Bar-Joseph and colleagues (Bar-Joseph, 2005; Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski,
2003; Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2010), as well as Chorev (1996), have reached similar
conclusions that the missed cues, the failure to connect relationships between elements of the
data, and the failure to consider alternative assessments were instrumental to the outcome.
While they recognize the roles played by fear and destructive power in diminishing voice, they
center the locus of their explorations on the cognitive failures, per se, rather than on the
relational failures underlying those cognitive deficiencies. Thus, they address TWB as a
tangential factor, but without a deep exploration of the factorial weight that the behaviors may
have had on overall operations.
Research Opportunity
The health care, U.S. military, and intelligence fields have significant similarities. They
foster and protect human lives, operate in unpredictable crisis environments (Antai‐Otong, 2001;
Reed, 2015; Roter, 2011), and function amid significant psychological stress, moral distress,
and ambiguity (Betts, 2007; Kortje, 2016; Mastroianni, 2011). As already noted, research
indicates significantly deleterious effects from TWB in health care and military environments
(Coccia, 1998; Dagless, 2018; Holloway & Kusy, 2010; The Joint Commission, 2008; Reed,
2015), making a similar understanding of the phenomenon in intelligence critical. However, no
identified studies have explored TWB in the IC. Rather, as with the Yom Kippur example above,
analyses of intelligence failures skim across the surface of operational breakdowns, exploring
the roles of cognitive closure (Heuer, 1999), poor collaboration, structure (9/11 Commission,
2004), competitive intelligence (Davies, 2004), and uncertainty (J. Davis, 2003b) without
questioning the role of underlying behavioral factors in success and failure.
The reasons for the absence of research into the phenomenon in the IC are unclear.
However, this research opportunity may stem from a broader minimalism related to research on
the human dynamic in the intelligence space. A review of literature reveals only minimal
scholarship on IC culture and relational dynamics, much of it produced by outside scholarship
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(e.g., Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Bean, 2014, 2009a, 2012; Callum, 2001; Nolan, 2013, 2018). As
of this writing in March 2021, the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence online archive shows
no scholarship on the impact of relationships on intelligence outcomes beyond promoting
broader collaboration and sharing (Operations Subject Index—Central Intelligence Agency,
2019). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) regularly reports progress on
goals ranging from diversity and inclusion to ethics; however, the ODNI publishes no analyses
of how relational phenomena may impact those issues (Office of the Director of Intelligence-How We Work, 2019). The Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) “Director’s Reading List” for
2020 recommends 189 books. Of the 58 on “Leadership and Development,” only one deals
directly with group or relational dynamics, Coyle’s (2018) group dynamic theory on the “culture
code.” Major (2014) has produced two comprehensive editions on communicating intelligence
findings effectively; however, neither discusses how to manage a toxic communication
environment. Intelligence is a decidedly relational endeavor, with individuals and teams involved
throughout the intelligence process from collection to final production. As this study will
demonstrate, TWB is fundamentally a relational dynamic. Thus, understanding how relational
factors, particularly those that negatively affect collaboration and team functioning, may impact
those processes would be significant.
Research Question and Methodological Approach
This section explores my research focus and the methodological approach used in the
study. I will begin the section with an explanation of my research question and its relevance to
my study population, the challenges encountered in identifying moments of response and
change, and the ontological challenges associated with understanding the phenomenon through
participant meaning. Although Chapter 3 includes an in-depth discussion of the study’s
methodological approach and design, this section will conclude with a brief explanation of both
and their suitability for the research question.
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Research Question
Grounded theorists term sensitizing concepts as those assumptions and beliefs about
the phenomenon that may drive their research (Blumer, 1969; Kelle, 2007). I began this study
with an interest in how intelligence officers responded to TWB among colleagues and peers
based on a sensitizing concept that intelligence officers would respond differently to TWB
among peers and colleagues than among formal leaders. My initial research question reflected
this interest. However, a theoretical direction emerged relatively early in the study that led me to
abandon the focus on peer relationships as a critical element and look more closely at other
factors that might influence response. This new direction changed my research question to the
following:
How do intelligence officers respond to TWB, what influences differences in those
responses individually and longitudinally, and what are the impacts of those responses
to how they function as professionals in the operational environment?
The question required that I traverse a complex dynamic of individual meaning. For
example, a theoretical model of this phenomenon would require that I understand individual
responses in interaction with ambiguous micro-, meso-, and macro-conditions within an
environment framed by paradoxical requirements for collaboration, competition, secrecy, and
trust (Busch & Weissman, 2005). The question also confronted ontological challenges on the
nature of toxicity in an intelligence environment. How did intelligence analysts and operations
personnel recognize TWB in an environment of significant stress, uncertainty, ambiguity, and
risk? How did they make meaning of the dynamic among coworkers, colleagues, managers, and
senior leaders? What were the relationships between TWB and how intelligence officers
exercised voice to collaborate, innovate, and challenge disagreements? In other words, where
did toxic relationships and tradecraft intersect to impact the quality of produced intelligence?
Responses to ongoing events are not static (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Thus, the question
relied upon being able to identify junction points in which responses and impacts changed,
along with what contributed to the change. What was the scope of responses to TWB in that
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operational environment? What conditioned them? What elements of the analyst’s “situation”
influenced response and choices? What triggered the transitions between responses?
Methodological Approach
The theoretical model to be discussed in Chapter 6 is the key outcome of this study. The
purpose of a theoretical model is to develop an empirically based framework to guide effective
measurement decisions within future research (Torraco, 1997). Without a foundational model,
crafting future research decisions on which variables and relationships to measure, which
methodologies to use, and how to design the structure of the research would be tantamount to
navigating without a compass. Thus, by developing a theory grounded in a study of intelligence
officers, my research did not address every aspect of this research opportunity but began
constructing a path for doing so.
Theory and methods cannot be separated (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). My research
question required a methodology robust enough to surface individual meaning within a complex
environment, identify moments of change within that system of meaning, track them temporally,
link meaning to function, and understand the role of context in shaping both meaning and
function. Further, the method of inquiry encountered a relatively uncultivated field in which TWB
has not been empirically explored. To manage this complex research environment, I chose two
related methodologies: grounded theory methodology and situational analysis.
Grounded theory is a qualitative method of inquiry that uses rigorous collection and
sampling methods to understand a social process through participant meaning of a
phenomenon (Holloway & Schwartz, 2018). Unlike quantitative methods, in which sampling
decisions are made prior to the initiation of the study, sampling choices in grounded theory are
ongoing, flexible, and adaptable as dimensions and themes emerge (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
Thus, emergent processes of coding and analysis that become more complex and abstract over
the course of the study continue until no new dimensions and themes emerge (saturation).

11
Then, the researcher constructs a theoretical model of that social process (Birks & Mills, 2015;
Charmaz, 2014).
Grounded theory requires researchers to be reflexive about their sensitizing concepts. I
began the study with a sensitizing concept that situational complexity shaped response and
action within it. Charmaz (2000), who founded the constructivist school of grounded theory, 2
argued that the methodology assumes the discovery of a participant’s reality as it interacts with
cultural, temporal, and structural elements. However, grounded theory is not designed to map
the broader contextual frame (Glaser & Holton, 2004). To document and analyze situational
factors, I used situational analysis, a methodological tool linked to grounded theory’s pragmatist
school, to map the various social, relational, and situational elements (Clarke, 2003, 2005) that
influenced responses. Although situational analysis was not designed specifically for model
development (Clarke, 2012), the methodology added more depth to that model.
Researcher Positionality
Qualitative research proposals commonly place a section on researcher positionality
toward the end of the document after the foundational concepts have been discussed. However,
my research goals, my professional history in which I have held both formal and referential
power, my experiences as an intelligence officer, and my individuality cannot be separated from
the epistemological and ontological assumptions in the study. These paths framed sensitizing
concepts I brought to the study and what I believed to be relevant. They are also integrated into
the intellectual mix through which I conceptualized and designed the study. A similar set of
sensitizing concepts among readers will govern how they interpret the study’s assumptions and
findings, their assessments of its trustworthiness, and how useful they find the results. Thus, I
have placed this positionality section toward the front of this chapter because understanding my
own position at the outset may provide context for the remainder of the chapter.

2

A discussion of the various schools within grounded theory methodology will appear in Chapter 3.
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My early career introduced me to TWB, although I recognized the phenomenon as the
normal state of operations rather than toxic. Prior to joining the IC, I had a career in national
politics, which tapped my desire for a larger mission and leveraged my youthful enjoyment of
adrenalin-infused crisis environments. However, survival in that work environment came with a
price. In Washington politics, political “tribes” defined my relationships, allegiances, adversaries,
and work identity. Thus, in the all-consuming routine 16-hour days, boundaries between my
work and personal identity, as well as colleagues and personal friends, were porous.
Research indicates that marginalizing others into in and out groups is a common
element of TWB (Ciuk, 2011; Pelletier, 2010), with the effects remaining acute regardless of
whether those in the environment recognize the behavior as toxic (R. A. Taylor, 2016). To lose
one’s tribe, as I did in the early 1990s, when a politician for whom I worked thought his five-point
victory was not large enough, resulted in a toxic form of marginalization that affected every
element of my life. Thus, although I framed the events as merely the cost of doing business in
Washington politics rather than “toxic,” the detrimental impact to my relationships, identity, and
practice sustained long after memories of the specific event began to fade.
I moved from politics into national security roles, first as an aide to the director of a
federal agency. He was all charisma, vision, vigor, and plans. Every day working for him was
defined by unfettered hope and discovery. He also ruled by hammer, with major transgressions
and small slights carrying the same risk that one would be marginalized. Research has
identified multiple permutations of toxic enablers (further discussed in Chapter 2) as contributors
to the phenomenon’s systematization, even when well-meaning (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Padilla
et al., 2007). I was never his target; rather, I attempted to use the status that I derived by my
position with him to act as a buffer between his toxic leadership and his targets (Follett, 1924).
However, while my intent was to protect others, my efforts enabled the phenomenon by also
shielding him from accountability.
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As I will discuss in depth later in this chapter, TWB is fundamentally about power
(Pearson & Porath, 2005) as an omnipresent and multifaceted element that everyone in the
dynamic—including targets—use to gain and hold advantage. However, even when power is not
the intent, the behavior can be catastrophic for organizational climates, placing even
nonhierarchical relationships within a shifting power dynamic as toxic personalities, targets, and
others in the dynamic battle for position (Yamada, 2000). This toxic positioning reveals itself in
overt and passive behaviors to capture and/or recapture position when organizational support is
ineffective or nonexistent (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Lee & Brotheridge, 2006; Li et al., 2016;
Rayner et al., 1999).
I joined the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2001 as a GEOINT
analyst. My transition to the IC introduced me to this complex relationship between TWB and
power through two other permutations, the roles of peer-to-peer TWB and reactive-toxicity. As I
grew as an analyst and power differentials changed, I experienced passive forms of TWB in the
form of extreme micro-management and marginalization by one coworker and overt bullying by
one of their allies. However, my route of response to the behavior was long and uneven,
transitioning through placating, resistance, and immobilization. After a long and unsuccessful
period of trying to engage leadership support, I parlayed my perceived isolation into reactivetoxicity as a means of survival. I finally departed the team when I realized I was becoming
something unrecognizable even to myself.
In her study of health care teams, R. A. Taylor (2016) found that each person in the toxic
dynamic is both empowered and victimized in unique ways. I observed in those instances that
individuals engaged in their own trajectories of response. I have conducted this study as an
effort to understand the antecedents and temporal nature of responses to TWB among
intelligence officers, how they translate into action, how they are conditioned and dimensioned,
and what their consequences are. I have also sought to understand how the unique IC
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“situation” is constitutive of how responses flow back into the system as new sets of conditions
(Corbin & Strauss, 1996) to normalize toxicity.
Research Environment
In her description of situational analysis, Clarke (2003, 2005, 2007) rejected the concept
of “context” because the term implies an entity surrounded by a set of events and the individuals
experiencing them. Rather, she adopted the term “situation” to describe a set of elements that
exists around, within, and coterminous to its elements. Thus, a phenomenon does not exist
within a context; rather, they are constitutive of each other. Whichever term one prefers, the
idea of a situation in which analysts develop individual meaning through a collective social
space (Baszanger & Dodier, 1997) framed by structure, power, ambiguity, and uncertainty fits.
TWB, as a phenomenon that defines relationships through destructive use of power and voice,
is constitutive of the broader social dynamic while also shaping that environment. To understand
whether TWB exists in the IC situation, one must first define the situation.
Popular culture is a safe place for intelligence officers. Jack Ryan always gets the
submarine, and Carrie Mathison always gets her terrorist. Analysts and operational personnel
do live at the proverbial “tip of the spear.” They confront intractable problems on a global scale,
in real time, and often at great risk. They must often navigate significant ambiguity and data
unreliability to produce expert analysis in support of policymaker questions, which routinely
demand more certainty than available intelligence provides (Betts, 2007; J. Davis, 2003a,
2003b). The work is not ordinary, and few ordinary people work there. However, as a former
senior intelligence official once remarked to me, “I asked for analysts. God gave me people”
(anonymous, personal communication, 2007). Thus, they function in an environment in which
scientific approaches to problem-solving are prized, but one in which power, institutions,
relationships, and situational factors shape outcomes.
The IC is a hydra that began as a single entity when the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) was established in 1947 as the country’s first civilian intelligence agency (National
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Security Act, 1947). Prior to the CIA’s establishment, the World War II-era Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), and the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy’s military intelligence activities conducted
intelligence collection and analysis within clandestine operations. Civilian intelligence became a
“community” in 1955, when President Dwight Eisenhower designated the Director of the CIA in
a dual role with the director of central intelligence and as the first-among-equals among other
intelligence chiefs (U.S. Department of State, 1955). 3
Since the IC became a “community, the environment has expanded to 18 entities (ODNI,
2021) around specializations that use specific tools, methods, and tradecraft (Hammond, 2007).
A description of each entity can be found at Appendix B. The so-called “Big Six” of CIA, NGA,
NSA, NRO, FBI, and DIA contain 81.6% of the IC workforce (Annual Demographic Report,
2018). Intelligence is defined as information gathered outside of the U.S. related to its property,
interests, or people; weapons of mass destruction; or “any matter bearing on the interests of the
U.S.” (What Is Intelligence?, 2019). As the IC’s fundamental service line, intelligence analysis
evaluates, integrates, and analyzes data to provide insight into the situatedness of foreign
strategic postures, foreign leader psychological frames, and policy intensions (Fingar, 2011a).
Ten IC agencies fall under the administrative control of the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD), 4 with the remainder under independent administration (Members of the IC, 2021).
Reforms after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon
sought to strengthen cohesion and oversight within the IC by eliminating the DCI and creating
an independent director of national intelligence (DNI; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism

Prior to the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence in 2004 as part of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Director of the CIA also served in the role of the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the DCI role was designed to be the chief
advisor to the U.S. president on intelligence programs and policy, as well as the coordinating mechanism for
intelligence among the various IC agencies (Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004; National
Security Act, 1947).

3

The following IC entities fall under the administrative control of DoD: NGA, NSA/CSS, NRO, DIA, ONI, the
intelligence units of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Space Force.

4
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Prevention Act of 2004). Reforms gave the DNI power to establish objectives but little control
over the administrative and budgetary operations to execute them. Thus, while the DNI has
significant authority over intelligence requirements, approximately 80% of the IC’s budget
authority resides within the agencies reporting to DoD (L. K. Johnson, 2015; Lowenthal, 2014).
While external to the IC in structure, political prerogatives and the U.S. election cycle
intrude on the analytic process through Congressional oversight and the demands of national
policymakers within the executive branch. At its extreme, overt political pressure for specific
intelligence outcomes may cast doubt on the intelligence process, both shaping and reactive to
public opinion on politically charged issues (J. Davis, 2003a). Allied partners, who must navigate
their own layers of complexity, participate in intelligence production but are subject to their own
segmented compartmentalization in access to U.S. intelligence. They have equity in U.S.
intelligence outcomes, even in those circumstances in which they do not have access. This
impact without voice relegates them to implicated and silenced actors (Clarke, 1991) in the
intelligence dynamic. Surrounding the ecological landscape are unanticipated and/or inevitable
geopolitical events that may reshape the intelligence environment in real time.
The complexity and ambiguity within the IC ecology privilege intelligence officers who
embody the political acumen to maneuver within them. They operate within a paradigm of
“INTs”—HUMINT (human intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence), GEOINT (geospatial
intelligence), MASINT (measurement and signature intelligence), and OSINT (open-source).
Each requires specialized collection methods and skills to interpret, analyze, and integrate them
into final intelligence products. Tradecraft and scope elevate technology as a nonhuman actant
in this ecological space (Latour, 1996), giving power to those who can traverse its complexities
but also mediating voice when relationships are transmitted through virtuality.
Each INT is also managed by its own agency-level framework within an array of
inter- and intra-agency directorates, occupations, and intelligence requirements. While agencies
have functional leadership for a specific capability, intelligence officers specializing in those
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collection methods may be in multiple organizations throughout the IC (Members of the IC,
2021), each with their own specialized language, discourse, and cultural practices (Nolan,
2013). Thus, team members must contend with complex layers of meso- and micro-cultures
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998), modes of expression and representation (Goffman, 1959), loci of
power (Maras, 2017), and discursive norms (Bean, 2012).
This diffused nature of analysis and operations—even within single
agencies—challenged relationships and my ability to assess toxic events within them. While
qualitative research often produces findings that inform research in other contexts (Ospina &
Dodge, 2005), generalizability gives way to situated meaning as a goal. Nevertheless,
understanding the nature of TWB within analytical and operational contexts benefited from the
perspective of participants in disparate areas of the IC. Finding participants with rich data to
share in such a dispersed population was complex and iterative. However, the challenges of
finding participants paled in comparison to the complexities of being able to identify junction
points of response and change (Glaser, 1978) in their stories. To identify these transitions
required that I distinguish between the interpersonal and the diffused micro- and meso-cultural
arenas influencing them (Strauss, 1978). I also had to identify the nodes in which single toxic
events became structural (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007).
The diverse mission specialization of IC entities is intended to ensure that key
intelligence issues benefit from a diversity of mental models, technical tools, and sources so that
policymakers can make the best decisions with what is known in the moment (Callum, 2001)—
or, in the words of one of my participants, to give policymakers the “space to make decisions”
(Gwen). However, specialization also impedes the development of a community-wide analytic
identity and challenges an ability to rigorously identify discrete elements in the situation. For
example, Fingar (2011a) segments the analytic role into the following requirements: provide
warning, monitor targets and look for new ones, develop analytical products, participate in
developing IC production plans, collaborate with other analysts, and guide collectors. However,
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even this occupational perspective fails to capture the cultural and functional differences
between HUMINT analysts who are relationally and physically separated from collectors, and
SIGINT or GEOINT analysts who routinely engage with their collection systems (Schum, 1987).
The complexity reaches down into the subsystem level, where macro- and
meso-environments converge. For example, an unclassified recruiting site for IC entities details
49 occupations within 18 separate career fields within the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA), alone (“NGA Careers” 2019). NGA is the functional manager for GEOINT.
However, while most positions fall under the management of NGA, GEOINT exists within a
National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSGI). According to a 2015 review, the NSGI is
composed of 17 organizations, including 13 IC entities, the Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the various U.S. military service
intelligence agencies, and the U.S. military commands. Additionally, six interagency committees
are associate members, along with the Allied System for Geospatial Intelligence (ASG)
composed of the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand as “Five Eye”
allied partners. The addition of the U.S. Space Force as an eighteenth IC entity in January 2021
may have changed this configuration. However, I was unable to confirm this change by the time
of this publication (National System for Geospatial Intelligence, 2015).
While intelligence officers become situated into the normative, discursive, and functional
cultures of their home agencies, they must navigate the unique terrain of partner engagement
rules. These engagement rules can be marginalizing in such a fluid operational environment.
While each entity within the IC serves the overarching mission to enable a “stronger, safer
nation” (Intelligence Community Mission, 2019), each also has a unique core, structure, and
micro-culture (Vaughan, 2003). Opportunities for unproductive relational conflict (Jehn, 1995,
1997) at the micro-level can metastasize into a system-wide phenomenon when multiple
practices, vantage points, cultures, and methods collide on one critical intelligence issue.
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Thus, understanding the nature, responses to, and functionalization of TWB among
intelligence analysts and operations personnel cannot be divorced from an understanding of
their unique environments. However, viewed through the prism of Clarke's (2005, 2015)
conceptualization of the phenomenon and its situation as co-constitutive, there is no central
analytic or operational context. Rather, there is an analytic situation, consisting of individualized
(e.g., social, familial, and professional), micro-processual, and fluid elements factoring into
choice and response. This array flows back into the system as a set of conditions for future
responses and action (Clarke & Star, 2008). To understand responses to TWB among
intelligence officers, I first had to identify these elements, including how they mediated power
and voice. The epistemological and ontological underpinnings of these concepts will be
explored in Chapter 2, as well as relevant sections on methodology and design in Chapter 3.
Research Design
As noted, my study explores how intelligence analysts and operational personnel
respond to TWB and how the behavior affects their functioning in the work environment. This
question required a methodological design to track responses over time, transition points
between responses, and why those shifts occurred within a complex dynamic of individual and
situational elements. I also needed to develop a theoretical model of response to TWB to guide
future research. Thus, my methodological choice had to be able to manage this complexity. My
design combined grounded theory and situational analysis. For the purposes of this section, I
will provide a summary of each and how they were appropriate to explore my research question.
Grounded Theory Methodology
Grounded theory methodology is a rigorous qualitative method that begins inductively,
then moves through emerging processes of deduction and abduction to develop a theory of
meaning and action grounded in the data (Reichertz, 2007). With epistemological foundations in
Dewey (1909) and Mead’s (1934) treatment of the “self,” as well as Blumer’s (1969) symbolic
interactionism, the methodology is designed to assist researchers in surfacing individual
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meaning within complex situations. Grounded theory’s ultimate purpose is to develop a
theoretical model grounded in rigorous data collection and analysis as a foundation for future
research, not merely to describe meaning (Stern, 1994). The grounded theory portion of my
study relied predominantly on semi-structured interviews with current and former members of
analytical and operational intelligence officers. Data collection and analysis transitioned through
multiple, emergent rounds, each driving the research toward greater levels of abstraction until a
theoretical model of the phenomenon emerged.
Depending on the research question and their epistemological perspectives, grounded
theorists may combine participant interviews and other data modalities or just rely upon
interviews alone (Charmaz, 1990). However, the “why” within my research question arrived
loaded with a series of interacting individual and ecological elements influencing participant
meaning and response. While grounded theory surfaced some elements of the situation within
the participant’s perspectival “field of view,” overt and tacit forms of power, as well as forms of
voice among actors in the dynamic impacted toxic events. Thus, interviews lent a partiality to
the data. I used situational analysis as a companion to grounded theory to identify and analyze
these elements.
Situational Analysis
I adopted situational analysis as a companion to grounded theory to develop a datadriven understanding of the larger environment constitutive of the phenomenon. Based on the
root metaphors of Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism, Foucault’s (1972, 1980, 2002)
theories of power and discourse, and Strauss’s (1978) Social Worlds Arenas Theory (SWAT),
situational analysis extends grounded theory (Clarke, 2012) to understand complexities through
analyses of ethnographic, discourse, and historical datasets. Data modalities typically include
documentation, personal communications, images, music, and any forms that the researcher
finds endemic, and thus constitutive, of the situation. From this analysis, the researcher
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develops a series of maps representing the broader situation. Analyses often include, but are
not limited to, varieties of situational, relational, project, and positional maps (Clarke, 2003).
Researchers commonly combine grounded theory and situational analysis, although one
may be dominant. Grounded theory, in particular, requires researchers to minimize (as much as
possible) preexisting assumptions about where the research may lead so that modeling remains
emergent from the data and not dominated by sensitizing concepts (Charmaz, 2008; Glaser,
1978). Although situational analysis permits researchers to develop design-phase situational
maps as a check on preconceived assumptions at the start of data collection (Clarke, 2005;
Clarke et al., 2017), that methodology also emphasizes allowing the data to drive mapping
choices and design. Therefore, while I began my study under the assumption that both
methodologies would carry equal weight, data analysis elevated grounded theory as slightly
dominant in answering the research question.
Scope and Framework
This dissertation is published in unclassified channels. This decision is based on two
considerations. One, I departed the IC in 2013, no longer carry a security clearance, and do not
have access to classified publishing channels. Second, I believe that academic research must
venture outside of industry-bounded and academic bubbles by designing and publishing
research so that it has the largest possible impact on practice. Otherwise, the usefulness of the
research is limited to the intellectual echo chamber and diminishes its value to those who could
most benefit. Publishing my research in unclassified channels not only makes the findings
available to members of the IC but to researchers in other disciplines.
Similarly, relevance and impact required that I gather my analysis into some discernable
form, while allowing me to understand TWB within a situation residing in an operational
environment. Thus, I have limited data collection on intelligence officers who identify as
analysts, operational personnel, and those who directly support analysis. Limiting my scope to
this social world has maintained the locus of my research on personnel who are most closely
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tied to providing strategic warning, informing policymaker decisions, and shaping the
decision-making of allied partners—the IC’s core mission. Conversely, the situational analysis
portion of the data collection was wide in scope, including, but not limited to, historical
renderings of intelligence events (successes and failures), memoirs, case studies, analyses of
the intelligence environment, and primary and in situ documentation.
Some limitations on data collection shaped the outset of this study. I relinquished my
security clearance when I departed the IC in 2013. Thus, any relevant classified data was not
available to me. Additionally, the grounded theory portion of the data collection relied primarily
upon participant interviews. Even when participants were discussing ongoing toxic events in
their situations, those renderings were memories by the time they reached me. Thus, I did not
observe TWB in the analytic environment in real time. However, this boundary was only in
access. Because my research question was focused on individual meaning, any observations I
might have gained in a field experiment would not have added to that question in a material
way. In other words, their responses were outcomes of their meaning, not my observations of
their meaning. Additionally, I triangulated participant meaning using multiple sources through
the situational analysis phase of the research.
Chapter Outline
This section provides a brief overview of the dissertation’s structure. The first five
chapters are the introduction, literature review, methodological design, and research findings.
Chapter 6 will explore the theoretical model and propositions to support future research. This
chapter will also include a brief section to discuss implications for leading change in practice for
the IC. Each chapter is discussed below.
Chapter 1—Introduction
Chapter 1 has established my study purpose and the research question within the
framework of relevant epistemological and theoretical constructs. I have intentionally limited
discussions on the nature and impact of TWB, as well as ecological discussions related to the
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intelligence “situation” to ground the epistemological and methodological discussions. However,
scholars have produced a significant body of literature on TWB, as well as on IC mission,
operations, failures, and successes. That review appears in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2—Literature Review
Chapter 2 is divided into three sections:
Section 1 includes an expanded discussion of power and voice. Although I have devoted
most of the chapter to discussions of theory and research on TWB, permutations of power and
voice are fundamental to the behavior and the environment that emerges from it. Additionally,
power and voice figure heavily in the meaning inherent in grounded theory studies, particularly
in the participant/interviewer relationship (Collins, 1998; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009; Stephens,
2007). Continuums of power and voice are also foundational concepts within situational analysis
(Clarke, 2005, 2015). Thus, understanding the role of power and voice links TWB and my
methodological design.
Section 2 explores current theoretical models and empirical research on TWB. I begin
the chapter with a discussion and comparison of related constructs, such as abusive
supervision, bullying, and incivility before exploring toxicity in workplaces. The section on TWB
includes relevant literature on toxicity within hierarchical and nonhierarchical power frameworks,
responses, the nature of and supporting elements within the toxic system, and the role of the
situation.
Section 3 explores theoretical models and empirical research on the intelligence
community. The scope of this research is limited to what is available in unclassified channels.
Because the elements of ambiguity, uncertainty, and binary bottom-line environments are
known situational contributors to TWB in other contexts and are also inherent artifacts of the IC
operational framework, I have structured this section to explore the IC situation through these
subtopics.
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Chapter 3—Methodology and Design
Chapter 3 discusses the purpose and applicability of the methodological choices
underlying the study in greater depth than has occurred in this chapter. Because my
methodological design has included two related approaches, each is explored separately, with
relationships between the two integrated where appropriate. The chapter consists of two
sections.
Section 1 examines the nature and applicability of grounded theory and situational
analysis to my study. The section begins with a discussion of grounded theory’s epistemological
and ontological underpinnings, its developmental journey, and its methodological fit with my
research. The preponderance of this first section engages with grounded theory’s main
concepts, including sampling and saturation; coding and analysis; memoing; constant
comparison; and theoretical sensitivity.
The section concludes with a discussion of situational analysis. Blumer's (1969) theories
of symbolic interactionism, Foucault’s (1972, 1980, 1990) on power through discourse and
voice, and Strauss’s (1987) SWAT are foundations (root metaphors) for situational analysis.
Thus, I briefly reintroduce these constructs as an entry point for a more in-depth discussion of
the methodology. Because I used that methodology as a framework to analyze the situational
aspects of intelligence officers in toxic events, I follow with a brief description of the tool before
exploring the methodology’s reconceptualization of context as “the situation.”
The second section in Chapter 3 explores my study’s design. The section includes a
reintroduction of the research question as a foundation for how I integrated grounded theory and
situational analysis. I also explore my choice of study participants and the challenges
associated with studying intelligence officers as a collective; how data was collected; how I
conducted the analysis; and ethical considerations.
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Chapter 4—Findings for Grounded Theory Segment
While grounded theory and situational analysis will be integrated in chapter 6, the
findings for each segment are in separate chapters to facilitate the reader’s understanding of the
model. This chapter explores the findings of the grounded theory portion of the study through
the words and insights of 20 intelligence officers who participated in the study. The focus of the
chapter will be eight dimensions of Holding Self as trajectories of response to TWB in the
intelligence environment: three primary psychological dimensions and their properties; three
primary action dimensions, along with their conditions, processes, and consequences; and two
interim dimensions of action with their conditions and processes. These findings form the
foundation of the theoretical model.
Chapter 5—Findings for Situational Analysis Segment
Chapter 5 reviews the findings of the situational analysis segment of the study. The
chapter focuses on identifying cartographically the elements of the intelligence situation that are
relevant to choices of response to TWB. Maps were constructed using multimodal data
collection processes designed to surface the various actors, actants, collectives, discourses,
and structures at play in the phenomenon. These maps will be integrated into the theoretical
model.
Chapter 6—Implications for Leading Change and Future Research
This chapter explores the theoretical model emerging from the study. The model and its
discussion reflect an integration of the grounded theory and situational analysis findings.
Following the model discussion, the chapter provides five propositions to support future
research. Finally, the chapter discusses the implications of the study’s findings for leading
change within IC analytic and operational teams.
Summary
This chapter has established the purpose, theoretical foundation, and research problem
supporting my research question of how and why U.S. intelligence officers respond in different
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ways to TWB. Power, ambiguity, uncertainty, and bottom-line environments are inherent in the
intelligence environment. Research in other contexts has demonstrated that these elements are
related to toxicity within organizational systems without effective mechanisms to maintain
healthy relationships—or worse, systems that embody elements that actively promote TWB.
However, no body of literature has integrated these ecological artifacts into a study of how they
may or may not relate to TWB in the IC, or even if TWB exists within the IC. The following
chapter will explore these conditions and their relationships to TWB as identified in extant
research.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The challenge of any literature review is striking a balance between comprehensiveness
and parsimony. Grounded theory studies also have challenges associated with debates over
when to conduct a literature review—before data collection, emergent with the data, or after
data collection is complete and an overarching theory has emerged—as well as how far afield to
venture in choosing which existing theories to engage (Charmaz, 1990; Glaser, 1998). Even
absent a deep dive into extant theory, careers and other life experiences create knowledge and
assumptions that form the theoretical foundations for the choices researchers make about their
fields of study. Blumer (1954, 1969) described these assumptions as sensitizing concepts,
arguing that they function as tools enabling us to make sense of the world. Thus, without some
understanding of extant theory underlying main themes in the literature, a researcher can be so
theoretically unmoored that the research becomes unnavigated. Conversely, grounding oneself
too tightly to existing theory may leave that same researcher anchored to irrelevant concepts
that do not inform theoretical growth.
I have framed my literature review in this chapter around three sensitizing concepts
based on foundational theory and research on TWB and the IC:
•

Power, its impact on voice, and situational factors that enable TWB in other
industries likely also enable the phenomenon in an intelligence environment.

•

The unanticipated risks to life and safety with which unaddressed TWB has been
associated in other critical mission environments may pose similar threats in the
intelligence environment.

•

Prevailing literature indicating that contextual or situational factors are formative of
toxic events and their impacts in other industries suggests that similar relationships
may exist between those elements and TWB in the IC.

I have structured the literature review into three sections. First, I explore foundational
and current theories on power and voice. These topics will surface again in tailored form in
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Chapter 3 when I review the “root metaphors” (Clarke, 2003, 2005) or foundational theories
supporting situational analysis. Second, I leverage treatments of power and voice in a
discussion of extant theory and relevant research on TWB. This section include a brief overview
of related constructs of counterproductive behavior for comparison. The final section is a
discussion of unclassified theory and research on the intelligence environment with particular
emphasis on the roles of ambiguity, uncertainty, and collaboration versus competition.
Power
In his earlier writings, Foucault (1965, 1972) linked power to discourse and its
representation in voice. However, his thinking evolved over time, not abandoning the
importance of discourse, but in reconceptualizing power as inhabiting every relationship, vocal
frame, and structure (Foucault,1980). Researching critical theories and empirical research on
power carries the same complexity, a sense that power is everywhere, infused in multiple
constructs either directly or grounded tacitly in the relational or structural implications for that
concept. Thus, where to begin a discussion of power and what to include can be a challenge
unless the discussion is confined by a distinct set of relationships in its impact.
Although I introduced the significance of power and voice to TWB in Chapter 1, the
following section will engage these concepts more deeply. The section begins with a discussion
of the major ontologies of power, followed by an exploration of micro-politics as the structural
catalyst for power through discourse. The final section reintroduces power and voice, focusing
on literature related to who holds the power of discourse but also the role of silence as a form of
voice. These themes will reemerge in the discussions of TWB and the intelligence situation.
Ontologies of Power
Ontologies of power place the construct on a continuum of traditional forms established
through hierarchy, history, and structure at one end, and relationally atmospheric phenomena at
the other. Defining power as the ability to influence concomitant with psychological change,
French and Raven (1959) identified five loci of power in coercion, reward, legitimacy, expertise,

29
and reference. However, each is contingent upon the perception of others in the system and
distinctions between them may be ambiguous. Thus, power may be positional, relational, or
some integration of the two (Jeffrey Pfeffer, 1993).
Power both enables and limits agency. In its coercive form, Weber (1968) defined power
as a bilateral relationship in which one imposes her will on another through hierarchical, legal, or
charismatic means. Traditional power limits agency within the confines of rules, structures, and
the fear of sanction. Charismatic power as a form of relational power infantilizes by creating a
false dependency between the one holding the power and the subject (Bion, 1961). However,
charismatic power breaks down an arbitrary distinction between coercive power and power as a
form of influence (Raven, 1964). Both traditional and charismatic power require subjugation,
either through structure (legitimate) or perceived power imbalances (relational). Charismatic
power survives by promoting a false narrative, not only related to its own agency, but also about
the lack of agency by the subjugated. Even when the source of relationally based charismatic
power also holds legitimate power, subjects become complicit in building and promulgating the
very structures, discourses, and norms that maintain their own subjugation (Emerson, 1962). In
this way, power is self-perpetuating.
A separate set of constructs frames power as relationally interactive. Framed within
ontologies of leadership, power to lead is not embodied in a person but in a collaborative
emergence between people, regardless of whether the relationship is hierarchical or non-status
(Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Drath, 2001; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Thus, the meaning derived
in this collaborative space fosters the emergence of rules and values (Giddens, 1991), as well
as asymmetric forms of reputation, networks, access to information, symbolic representations,
and the power to influence (Bolman & Deal, 2017). Thus, even within this collaborative power to
drive change, power imbalances from outsized social status and outsized abilities to influence
outcomes are inherent elements of the collaboration. However, as with more traditional sources
of power, both parties participate in sustaining it.
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A final set of constructs strips power away from individuals into an emerging
phenomenon of structures, relationships, institutions, discourses, and norms. Foucault (1980)
figures heavily here in his definition of power as omnipresent and inescapable: “Power is always
already there. You are not inside it or outside it. It is out, in, and through” (p. 141). Thus,
individuals do not have power. They share space within in it, with even those who are
subjugated to it able to assert power situationally through fluid, relational, and emergent
interactions (Blau, 1964).
Power becomes insidious within this dynamic. The locus of power embeds itself through
tacit structures, routine practices, and the emergence of dominant individuals as its symbol
(Foucault, 2002). Collectives, as symbols of the dominant frame, develop and legitimize the
existence of others by controlling resources and membership (Strauss, 1982). The competition
for domination over resources and opportunities situates tacit forms of structure and discourse,
fostering its perpetuation (Clarke, 2005). However, a systemic locus of power is agnostic and
ontologically neutral. Even this form of power may cultivate a landscape in which healthy or
toxic forms emerge, normalize, and situate themselves in everyday practice.
Micro-Politics
Even in his earlier writings, Foucault (1965) argued that the locus of power revealed
itself in practice rather than the knowledge produced. However, Foucault’s perspective on
where power resides transitioned significantly between his earlier writings on discourse
(Foucault, 1972), his middle treatments on institutions and structures (Foucault, 1977, 1979),
and finally, tacit and local frames in the form of micro-politics. In this latter frame, the origins of
power in local and micro-political interactions metastasize into meso-structures. From this
emergence, interactions and competition politicize routine practices, which operationalize into
individual agency (N. Rose & Miller, 1992). Thus, power develops memory by reproducing
prototypical agents (Hogg, 2001), localized hierarchies (Blau & Scott, 1962), and
marginalization processes (L. A. Bell, 2016).
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Discourse (statements and structures of collective communication) at this practice level
reveals who is entitled to define “truth” (Foucault, 1980). At the most basic micro-political level,
team heuristics as group-level rules form local discursive practices (Yamagishi et al., 1998). A
desire to remain aligned with those in closest proximity immerses into notions of the self (Mead,
1934). In this interactive process, discursive rules emerge into routine practice—Foucault's
(2002) “gaze”—and disperse rules and structures (Rucker et al., 2012). By extension,
frameworks for truth simultaneously define deviance (Becker, 1963), including what constitutes
expertise. Because the normative value of micro-defined truth becomes tacit, meso-universes
are less likely to question them because of assumed truth and expertise (Briñol, et al., 2007).
Thus, the use of the term micro to define this locus of power becomes loaded through its
implications of how power sustains and shifts over time. Within this conceptualization, power
becomes micro-dynamic, where small changes in the rhythm of tasks and processes have
outsized influence over direction and outcomes. Power is also microbiological, in that it lives in
the small things such as the dialogic practices of leadership (Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011) and also
in the enactment of voice (including silence as one form) as a representation of perceived
empowerment (Avey & Van Dyne, 2009). The relationship between power and voice is the
subject of the next section.
Power and Voice
A key element within systems theory is the notion that systems continually transform in
search of equilibrium (Cilliers, 1999, 2001). Within Foucault’s (1980, 2002) conceptualization
that power is everywhere, this systemic search for equilibrium manifests itself within a continual
rebalancing of collectives. His primary interest was in how individuals became subjugated rather
than dominant. In their conceptualization of the relationship between time and organizational
change, Crossan et al. (2005) argued that both the dominant and subjugated have power but
with different forms of agentic voice, particularly as the dynamics of power shift individually and
organizationally over time. Thus, boundaries within systems of power enslave voice for both the
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dominant and subjugated, with responses (including resistance) following the same discursive
rules as the system of domination being rejected. This ongoing tension between rules of
discourse and structure as mechanisms for equilibrium and voice as a mechanism for
innovation and change is a fundamental element of Clarke’s (Clarke, 2005; Clarke et al., 2017)
situational analysis methodology, which I will emphasize in Phase 2 of my study.
The power over voice from existing structures and norms carries significant implications
for outcomes, particularly when discursive rules are not healthy. In unhealthy systems, such as
those enabling unaddressed TWB, notions of voice and power can become upended. However,
even when systems of power foster healthy forms of voice for those who embody either
legitimate or relational forms, members of marginalized groups may define and opt for altered
permutations of voice. In her essay on the nature of voice in marginalized groups, Parpart
(2010) argued that even definitions for agency as synonymous with having voice are biased
toward systems of male domination. An example of this domination bias may be Hirschman's
(1970) foundational exploration of voice as overt and its opposite being exit. This model for
voice only works for those who have the power to leave, a privilege more readily available to
those in dominant groups.
Thus, empowerment and subjugation are key elements in any discussion of power and
voice; however, neither are so easily distinguished. As already noted, Foucault argued that no
object in the system is entirely without voice. However, even an expression of voice may be
situationally dependent and ambiguous in its meaning for the agent. Foucault (1965) introduced
the concept behind what Clarke and Montini (1993) ultimately termed “implicated and silenced
actors.” Implicated actors may exert voice, not as individuals and collectives directly within the
phenomenon, but with equities in the outcome. As silenced actors, individuals or collectives may
be directly impacted but without voice in the dynamic (Clarke & Montini, 1993).
Harkening back to the C. S. Lewis quote from Chapter 1 on the situatedness of
perception, how the individual perceives his or her relationship to the systems of domination—in
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or out, represented or secondary—influences method of voice. Those who perceive themselves
to be powerless may engage overt voice as a form of deviance against a repressive system.
However, silence is a nonverbal form of expressing desires (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998). Thus,
choosing silence rather than participation in a toxic system of domination may be passive
resistance (Fivush, 2010), a form of subjugated silence. Additionally, cultural norms related to
power, obligations to the collective, and time horizons may influence distinctions between
expressions of power and the meaning of silence (Hofstede, 2003). Thus, understanding the
role of power in any phenomenon relies upon the ability to understand where the individual or
collective “sits” in space and time as well as the meaning they assign to that space.
Thus, voice is a form of power (Islam & Zyphur, 2005) and an expression of meaning
(Charmaz & Mitchell, 1996). Understanding this intersection of power, voice, and TWB within
the intelligence situation will be critical to understanding responses to the dynamic. Major
theories and research related to TWB and its relationship to power, voice, and context among
peers and colleagues are the subject of the next section.
Counterproductive Workplace Behavior
This section will establish a foundation for TWB by reviewing significant nomenclatures
and related concepts of counterproductive workplace behavior (CWB). CWB frameworks are
numerous and broad. However, this discussion will be concise in order to limit the scope to
definitions and units of analyses as frameworks for comparison during the subsequent
discussions of TWB. Their relationships to ontological approaches to power and related systems
will be a primary theme of the section.
CWB as a theoretical model is diffuse. In a correlational study of five U.S. organizations,
Spector et al. (2006) defined CWB as intentional behavior designed to harm organizations or
their members through five behaviors: abuse of others, production deviance, sabotage, theft,
and withdrawal. Using a review of literature, Lau et al. (2003) expanded the included behaviors
to 11, ranging from excessive absenteeism to theft. Thus, behaviors covered relational
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frameworks (in the Spector study) but also anti-organizational behaviors with legal implications.
The assumption of purposeful action (Fox et al., 2001) is the link between the definitions, even
though specific behaviors might vary in underlying motivations (Spector et al., 2006).
The wide swath of behaviors included in definitions of CWB makes the construct
unwieldy and agnostic on the impact that organizational contexts may have on the efficacy of
certain behaviors. Significantly, Lau et al. (2003) argued that CWB is directed at the
organization rather than fellow employees, framing impacts to others in the organization as
by-products. However, the role of intent is simplified. In their instrumental model of CWB, Fox
and Spector (2010) argued that individuals engage in behaviors that they perceive will help
them achieve their goals, thus normalizing negative behaviors when individuals believe they are
productive. In these roles, the perpetrator, team members, and organization become passive
feedback systems to perpetuate and sustain the behaviors. While the Lau team addressed
extant literature on theft and other forms of deviance as expressions of silent voice (e.g.,
Altheide et al., 1978; Hollinger & Clark, 1983), broader conceptualizations of CWB largely
ignored research into the nature of power at multiple levels and systemic impacts.
Although CWB attention to the role of power has been scant, parallel constructs of
destructive behavior have centered their research on hierarchy, with models differentiating
between behavior, intent, and in some cases, disposition. For instance, Tepper (2000) framed
abusive supervision through the behaviors of verbal and nonverbal hostility, including tantrums
and public criticism. Neuman and Baron (1997) viewed workplace aggression through intent to
harm, either as a terminal goal or instrumental toward a separate outcome. Ashforth (1997)
straddled the boundary between disposition and behaviors when he described petty tyranny as
the small-minded (disposition) exercise (behavior) of power and developed a Petty Tyranny in
Organizations (PTiO) scale to measure underlying behaviors. Similarly, Reed and Bullis (2009)
took a hybrid behavioral/outcome approach by using Ashforth’s PTiO to identify significant
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relationships between what they framed as toxic leadership behaviors and job satisfaction
(outcome) among uniformed and civilian personnel. 5
Although these scholars did not address counterproductive behaviors outside of
hierarchy, ontological discussions into destructive leadership formed a microcosm of broader
epistemological debates over the nature of power in an increasingly fluid organizational
environment (Knight, 2009). In the late-1990s to late-2000s, theories began to emerge on
hermeneutic leadership (Ladkin, 2010), relational leadership (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000),
and discursive exchange between leaders and followers (Cunliffe & Eriksen, 2011). Notions of
followers as conduits of shared (Avolio et al. 1996; Klein et al., 2006) and emergent (Carte et
al., 2006) leadership also gained interest, along with the still nascent exploration of followers as
leaders (Baker et al., 2016; Emery et al., 2013; Hannah & Lester, 2009). These debates also
intersected with broader discussions on social integration amid globalization (Bandura, 1999),
corporate sustainability (R. M. Locke, 2002), and the diminishing distinctions between humans
and technology (Latour, 1996).
Within this fluidity, a separate set of scholars widened the net on the locus and impact of
counterproductive behaviors beyond formal power. Leymann and colleagues (Leymann, 1990;
Leymann & Gustafsson, 1996) conceptualized the veritable gang warfare of mobbing as the
sustained targeting of one individual by one or more others until the person became
defenseless. In a comparative study with two test groups and one control group, Zapf (1999)
took a more systemic approach, identifying victim blaming, organizational factors, and
marginalization as contributing factors to mobbing.

One might wonder why Reed and Bullis chose to use Ashforth’s PTiO to assess the impact of toxic leadership on
job satisfaction, rather than Schmidt's (2008) Toxic Leadership Scale (TLS) published the year before. While the
authors do not indicate the data collection period for their study, the TLS may not have been available to them at
the time of measurement. They may also have not been aware of the TLS because it was so new.
5
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As with hierarchy-based constructs of counterproductive behavior, distinctions between
constructs not defined by formal power can be ambiguous. For instance, mobbing has been
depicted as group abuse toward one or a smaller number of victims and bullying a more binary
interaction, where one individual attempts to subordinate another (Einarsen, 1999, 2000;
Einarsen et al., 2011). However, Zapf and Einarsen (2005) have argued that distinctions
between the terms are more regional than factorial. Both have been conceptualized as
multi-stage (Leymann, 1990; Zapf, 1999), multi-causal (Einarsen, 1999; Hauge et al., 2007,
2009; Leymann, 1996), systemic (Zapf, 1999; Zapf et al., 1996), and strategic, whether
perpetrated within a framework of informal power (Einarsen et al., 2011) or legitimacy (Ferris et
al., 2007).
Broadening the scope further, additional scholars have explored the insidious impact of
less overt incivilities, such as tone of voice, failures to say please and thank you, and eye-rolling
(Andersson & Pearson, 1999). Although ambiguous to identify and often unintended, research
indicates that low-level incivilities, such as silent treatments and unprofessional tone of voice
(Pearson & Porath, 2005), diminish intellectual firepower and collaboration through avoidance
behavior (R. A. Taylor, 2019), distract from core missions, and contribute to personnel losses.
Formal and informal power frame interactions, with targets typically lower in status than the
instigator, even if there is no direct reporting relationship (P. R. Johnson & Indvik, 2001). As will
be discussed further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, these ambiguous power frameworks hold
significance within the IC because power emerges in complex mixes of hierarchy, expertise, and
reputation.
An evolving recognition that the behavior systematizes its effects regardless of the locus
of power has linked much of the contemporary research across CWB constructs. Thus,
research removing singular responsibility for toxicity from formal leaders and assigning shared
accountability to conducive followers (Lipman-Blumen, 2005a), context (Walton, 2007), and
ambiguity (Ashforth, 1997) has become more robust. Padilla et al.'s (2007) foundational model
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of the Toxic Triangle (Figure 2.1) depicts this expanded conceptualization, unique in that it
assigns equal accountability to destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive
environments. As I will discuss in the next section, this systemic framework is foundational to
research on TWB.

Figure 2.1
The Toxic Triangle

Note: Adapted from Padilla, A., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2007). Toxic triangle: Destructive leaders,
susceptive followers, and conducive environments. The Leadership Quarterly, 18, 176–194.

The relationship between the systematized nature of CWB, responses to it, and
outcomes is fundamentally about power, because anyone with the ability to influence the
behavior of another has power over them. Additionally, power divides, forming rationing
structures by which personnel must divide their time between jockeying for positions on the right
side of power and focusing on the core mission (L. A. Bell, 2016). As I discuss in the next
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section, concurrent research into TWB, its relationship to ambiguous dichotomies of power and
victimhood, and its ontologically systematized nature have followed a path through intersections
of status, situational factors, and impacts.
The Evolution of TWB as a Construct
This section of the literature review will review the origins and evolution of the
scholarship on TWB. A review of the literature indicates that permutations on the locus of power
in toxic environments have evolved over time so that interest has expanded in the impact of
TWB among peers and colleagues, the primary interest within my study. Thus, this historical
review will serve as a foundation for subsequent sections on the role of power, voice, enablers
in the toxic system, responses to the behavior, and the role of culture and the situation.
In their study including 400 North American business leaders, Kusy and Holloway (2009)
conceptualized a model of TWB as a systemic phenomenon that manifests itself in individual
behaviors, including hostility, shaming, and sabotage. The fault line between the occasional
“bad day" and TWB is the sustained nature of the behavior. Over time, the corrosive behavior
affects relationships among team members, colleagues, and external stakeholders. These
relational impacts ultimately impact organizational outcomes as the behaviors flow back into the
enabling system (Chu, 2014; Frost, 2003).
Early conceptualizations of workplace toxicity were singularly focused on formal
leadership rather than recognizing the existence and impact of the behaviors at any level. As a
construct, TWB originated in the mid-1990s by Whicker (1996), who defined toxic leaders as
those who were “maladjusted, malcontent, and often malevolent and malicious” (p. 66).
Lipman-Blumen (2005a, 2005b) brought the concept of toxic leadership into the mainstream
nomenclature but also created an important junction point toward its conceptualization as a
systemic phenomenon by implicating enabling followers as supports to the behavior. Frost
(2003, 2004) had identified one such enabling follower two years earlier in the form of “toxic
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handlers,” depicted in almost heroic fashion as well-meaning souls acting as buffers between
the toxic leader and others.
Academic interest in TWB increased in the mid-2000s, particularly in identifying how the
elements of TWB were situated and systematized within unique environments. Aforementioned
analyses of TWB in critical mission environments were robust during the period. Research by
Reed and colleagues (2004, 2010; Reed & Bullis, 2009) linked toxic leadership in the military to
failed operations, and by extension, threats to human lives. Similarly, The Joint Commission,
(2008) linked power to toxic health care systems, which threatened patient care by enabling
intimidating behaviors. Already noted, Padilla et al. (2007) created the first theoretical model of
the toxic system in the depiction of a “toxic triangle” consisting of destructive leaders, conducive
cultural and operational environments, and susceptible followers. Kusy and Holloway (2009)
changed the narrative around TWB into a non-status frame when they demonstrated that toxic
behavior originated as a systemic phenomenon that metastasized into destructive toxicity at all
levels, regardless of where the toxic personalities resided in the hierarchy. Kusy (2017)
developed the first mathematical formula by which organizations can calculate the costs
associated with unaddressed TWB. This formula quantified losses for organizations based on
resource investments, seniority, and longevity.
Power and Toxic Workplace Behavior
The purpose of the following section is to review literature on TWB through the
ontological prism of status. Distinctions will be made between treatments of formal status (toxic
leadership) and informal status in the form of peer-to-peer toxicity; as well, implications for voice
will be explored. After reviewing literature on responses to TWB, its presence as a systemic
element will be further explored by identifying actor-based and situational enablers in the toxic
system.
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Status in the Toxic Dynamic
TWB relies upon a series of enablers, including personality, target, behavior, motive, and
values as separate objects of power, which can only be understood in their interaction (Blumer,
1969). Unlike other constructs of counterproductive workplace behavior, the organization as a
separate object is a fifth interactive unit of analysis in TWB because of its systemic frame.
Theoretical models and empirical research on TWB frame conceptualize power along two
primary axes: formal and informal status.
Formal Status. Status-oriented scholarship on TWB associates the behavior with formal
position. Notably, Kellerman (2004) argued that the concept of a toxic leader is a misnomer
because toxic personalities cannot lead. Thus, leadership for Kellerman was in the action and
not in the being, with toxicity being a disqualifier. However, she was an outlier in her timeframe,
as multiple scholars reduced TWB within formal status to a typology of stand-alone traits and
motives. While producing the Toxic Leadership Scale (TLS), Schmidt (2008) crossed the
threshold between traits and behaviors when he validated abusiveness, self-promotion,
authoritarianism, unpredictability, unprofessional (morality or ethically based) behavior, and
narcissistic leadership. Kusy and Holloway (2009) identified 12 underlying behaviors in their
three-pronged model. D. F. Williams (2005) used an analysis of literature on TWB to produce 18
characteristics and 10 “types” of toxic leaders (e.g., the Paranoid Leader, the Incompetent
Leader). Williams’s study was one of the few to segment toxic leaders into multiple
subgroupings. Pelletier (2010) expanded the typology to 22 specific toxic behaviors for toxic
leaders.
Follow-up scholarship attempted to identify interactions between specific behaviors,
traits, motives, and outcomes that formed a gestalt of TWB among formal leaders. One of the
first scholars to elevate the discussion within the mainstream, Lipman-Blumen (2005b) defined
toxic leaders through a process in which destructive behavior and trait deficiency interacted to
harm their organizations and external stakeholders. In a mixed methods study of U.S. Army
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personnel, Steele (2011) linked ethical lapses and a lack of interpersonal skills, along with
placing self-interest above the unit, with creating a toxic operational environment. He also found
significantly negative relationships between toxic leadership and the willingness of military
personnel to follow that leader into life-and-death situations. Appelbaum and Roy-Girard (2007)
and Reed (2004, 2010, 2015) identified a trajectory between self-interest (motive), indifference
to subordinates (behavior), and poor organizational climate (outcomes). All of Reed’s research
has been in critical mission, military environments. Other scholars also began to move the unit
of analysis beyond a formal status framework.
Informal Status. As noted earlier, scholarship in the early-2000s began to expand
theories of organizational power to include informal status through reputation, political acumen,
and expertise (Bolman & Deal, 2017; Huberman et al., 2004; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). As
agency became reconceptualized away from wiring diagrams and into perceived relationships of
power (Daugherty et al., 1998; Pfeffer, 1993), the locus of workplace harm as an instrumental
and terminal goal also became status neutral (Anderson & Bushman, 2002). This turn toward
power to harm outside of hierarchy was a critical juncture in realigning TWB away from a strict
focus on the traits, behaviors, and intentions of toxic personalities. Within this more systemic
frame, scholarship began to appreciate the array of methods that toxic actors with relational
power have at their disposal to influence their environments (Hodson et al., 2006). This
academic recognition of the power behind peer-to-peer TWB and how team members respond
to it forms the basis for my research question.
Hierarchy satisfies a human need for order, structure, and transparency
(Frenkel-Brunswik, 1951; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Scholars have explored the nature of
TWB as fulfilling a constellation of human needs, including those of followers.
Reconceptualizing victim accountability as a form of mutuality between toxic leaders and
victims, Lipman-Blumen (2005a, 2005b) framed the psychological, psychosocial, external,
heroic, existential, and self-visionary needs of followers as co-objects in the system. Further,
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Padilla et al. (2007) argued that susceptible followers were complicit through either collusion or
conformity. Aquino and colleagues (Aquino, 2000; Aquino & Bradfield, 2000; Aquino & Lamertz,
2004) identified traits and triggers enacted by victims to generate their own victimization.
However, in his exploration of the treatment of lepers and the mentally ill in Middle Ages France,
Foucault (1965) referenced the pattern in which those responsible for creating systems of power
and privilege blamed those on the margins for their own victimization. Thus, toxic victim blaming
raises interesting ontological debates about the systems of domination in which scholars
function.
Ridgeway and Walker (1995) defined status as the degree to which one is admired or
liked by others, raising the question of how a toxic personality can achieve status. However, the
way informal status empowers depends on organizational prerogatives, culture, and norms.
Toxic personalities rarely see themselves as toxic. Additionally, as will be discussed in depth in
a subsequent section, outcome-focused—so-called bottom-line cultures—breed TWB at all
levels without supports in place to counteract the effects (Holloway & Kusy, 2010; Kusy, 2017;
Kusy & Holloway, 2009). Thus, cultures that overvalue expertise and undervalue relationships
may tolerate toxicity more readily than those that see strong links between relationships and
outcomes. However, sustainability and effects on outcomes can distinguish between situational
moments and toxicity. In a review of the literature on abusive supervision, Tepper (2007)
warned that situationally neutral labeling of broad sets of behaviors as destructive risked
disincentivizing the types of behaviors often needed during crises.
Lacking awareness into their own behavior ultimately inhibits the toxic personality’s
ability to reflect on their impact. However, contemporary scholarship on TWB acknowledges the
outsized impact that toxic personalities without formal status can have on outcomes. Kusy and
Holloway (2009) defined the toxic personality as “anyone who engages in counterproductive
work behaviors that debilitate individuals, teams, and even organizations over the long term” (p.
4). Their aforementioned behavioral model of shaming, hostility, and sabotage also aligns with

43
standard definitions of bullying (Einarsen, 2000; Felblinger, 2008; Tracy et al., 2006). However,
unlike the behavioral-typology approach of prior status-based research on toxic leadership,
Kusy and Holloway identified the management, team communication, and practice
misalignments—Foucault's (1977) “gaze”—that transform organizations into toxic
meso- systems.
Foucault (1990) argued that power can only survive if it is masked as something else,
giving those with relational status deceptive power. In their study of horizontal violence among
nurses, R. A. Taylor and Taylor (2017) identified the three enactor types of non-status toxic
personalities: the unempathetic, pathological bully seeking power; the self-justified bully
engaging in “tough love”; and the unprofessional coworker engaging in low-level incivilities (e.g.,
eye-rolling and condescension). Thus, TWB manifests itself in different ways within an array of
motives, some of which are misguided attempts to further organizational goals. However, toxic
personalities effectively contextualize their behavior to the situation (Kusy, 2017; Kusy &
Holloway, 2009), which privileges those who understand how to leverage organizational norms
to reach their goals.
The contextualization element returns the discussion back to the question of where the
origins of TWB lie. If toxic personalities can effectively contextualize their behavior to mask their
impacts situationally, then who or what is the origin of the toxicity? The toxic personality, the
organization, or the situation that enables the behavior to be valued? The answer is yes to all
three. Contextualization is a manifestation of toxic privilege. Toxic privilege becomes particularly
insidious when the personality has a reputation as prototypical within that organizational culture
(Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Terry, 2000). This normalization of TWB reveals itself in the emotive rules,
values, and practices within the organization (Giddens, 1991), as well as standards for
marginalization (Anjum et al., 2019). Thus, organizations may not hold toxic personalities who
they view as prototypically accountable when their behavior reflects a normalized framework for
how to project power.
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Responses to Toxic Workplace Behavior
Looked at through the frame of Foucault’s (1980) gaze, TWB operationalizes as a form
of toxic memory by flowing back into the system at the micro-level as a set of sustained,
normalized behaviors that transcend time, place, and position (Lammers et al., 2013). Left
unaddressed, toxic organizations follow a trajectory of unproductive emotion management (Chu,
2014), disengagement and distrust (Fitzgibbons, 2018), lost talent, and ultimately,
organizational failure (Kusy, 2017). Embedded within each of these outcomes is the potential for
an array of responses as expressions of power and voice, which may change over time as the
behavior intersects with individuality and the situation.
In a 2019 interview, R. A. Taylor argued that TWB creates four levels of victims: targets,
witnesses, those who learn of the events later, and external stakeholders. Responses began
with emotions that are internal and manifest themselves in an array of conditions. Research in
multiple industries links TWB to physical, psychological, and emotional reactions, including
depression, burnout, frustration, negative affect, physical illnesses (Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Li et
al. 2016), higher rates of suicide, diminished morale (Reed, 2010), and post-traumatic stress
disorder (Antai‐Otong, 2001). Organizational and dispositional factors may moderate these
relationships (Webster et al., 2014). However, the causal path between behaviors, moderators,
and outcomes has not been clearly identified in the literature. Additionally, the trajectory
between experiencing behavior, the onset of symptoms, and outcomes is iterative (Goldberg &
Huxley, 2001), which complicates the ability to directly link behavior and outcomes (Henderson
et al., 2011). These outstanding questions remain significant research opportunities.
This macro-environment experiences the effects of TWB through responses, such as
behavioral changes toward peers, colleagues, and families, including tolerance; adjustments of
standards, motivation, and communication patterns; and avoidance. Reconfiguration of
responsibilities and decision processes are common tactical and survival responses that
emerge into a series of toxic strategies (Bhandarker & Rai, 2019; Kusy & Holloway, 2009;
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Webster et al., 2014). In fact, across multiple studies of incivility in the workplace, Pearson and
Porath (2005) found that 70% of participants admitted to “venting” to family and friends.
While responses may be complex, how individuals within the toxic phenomenon react
rests on power. In their mixed methods study of business leaders, Kusy and Holloway (2009)
identified a response calculation that was simultaneously complex and simple. When
participants had positional or other forms of power over the individual, they reconfigured
processes to moderate the impact of the behavior. Pelletier (2012) found that follower
perceptions of whether they were favored by the formal leader or whether the target was in their
favored group influenced perceptions of whether behavior was toxic, although not necessarily
their willingness to challenge behavior. Conversely, responses to toxic personalities who were
either superiors or peers were similar to each other; participants either adjusted their own
behaviors or they departed from the organization. The challenge for leaders and organizations
is in locating the origins. TWB’s systemic nature makes identifying a direct path complex. For
example, research into the related construct of horizontal violence (hostility and aggression)
within the critical-mission nursing environment found that reactions were typically
disproportionate to and more widely experienced than the original incident (Taylor & Taylor,
2017, 2018), which could challenge timely and effective measures to address it.
A binary conclusion might be that individuals choose to leave toxic environments when
other responses are not proving to be adequate. However, multiple studies have found that
complex individual and situational factors influence decisions to “stay or go,” including
perceptions of affective and normative commitment, clarity on objectives (Ghosh et al., 2013),
risks of remaining versus leaving (Vardaman et al., 2008), and perceptions of how unique or
interesting the job is (Beecham et al., 2008). Perceptions of mobility may also play a role. In a
study of uniformed and civilian U.S. defense personnel who likely had few mobility options (i.e.,
power over where they worked), K. R. Williams (2018) found that 51% of the participants
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reported adopting avoidance tactics in response to TWB. None of these studies tracked whether
responses changed over time.
Returning to Kusy and Holloway’s (2009) identification of power as the key factor in
response, departure may also be empowered voice through one final act of resistance
(Hirschman, 1970). This relationship is key because multiple studies have identified
mechanisms by which TWB strips individuals of that voice, including Hodson et al.'s (2006)
multi-analysis of organizational ethnographies and Taylor & Taylor's (2017) descriptive study of
peer-to-peer TWB among nurses. Both studies identified enactments of silence as voice and
subjugated silence. Thus, as with power in general, toxic privilege is Newtonian in its ability to
generate its own resistance (Foucault, 1972, 1980). However, that resistance may emerge as a
enactment of team voice that systematizes TWB as members engage in avoidance behavior
and refuse to collaborate (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; R. A. Taylor, 2019; R. A. Taylor & Taylor,
2017, 2018).
Returning to Foucault’s (1980) locus of power in micro-political processes, responses
may originate in the individual, but rapidly metastasize into the meso-system. If an organization
depends upon fluid team structures for success (as exists in most IC entities), this reactive form
of voice may even operationalize into the macro environment. In fact, multiple empirical studies
have identified a spiraling effect from TWB that transcends the wider organization into
relationships with families and friends as well (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Pearson & Porath, 2005;
Webster et al., 2014; K. R. Williams, 2018)
The nature of status as objectified through voice raises interesting questions in
relationship to responses to toxicity. One might expect that the lesser span of control that those
outside of formal status positions have would invoke a stronger response to TWB than among
those with formal status, due to perceptions of vulnerability, fear of marginalization, and the
potential for losing the position entirely. However, many organizations also have more
transparent regulatory frameworks for dealing with counterproductive behavior by those in
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recognized leadership positions, leaving TWB from team members in a regulatory gray area.
Thus, what other factors may mitigate the role of status? If status influences response to TWB,
then do quasi-status titles, such as “team lead” and “senior analyst,” provide ambiguity to
status-based responses and redress mechanisms?
Supporting Objects within the Toxic System
A collection of supporting elements nurtures the toxic system. Narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy have framed much of the research seeking more clinical
explanations for the behavior. Additionally, three objects have power in the toxic system: the
toxic personality (already discussed); toxic enablers; and toxic buffers. Cultural and
meso-dysfunction inhabit their own place in the toxic situation as simultaneous contributors to
and recipients of the behavior. Each is discussed below.
Toxic Protectors and Buffers as Enablers. Toxic protectors and buffers present
another layer that traverses other elements of TWB within the framework of power. Toxic
protectors are individuals, generally with formal status, who shield the toxic personality from
accountability because they gain advantage from the individual’s TWB, typically either through
one or more relational frames: nepotism, derived power, or functional advantage from the
individual’s productivity. Literature suggests that the fundamental intent of the protector to gain
from behavior (i.e., to increase their own power) is a key variable in the toxic system (Kusy &
Holloway, 2009). However, research indicates that the ability of toxic personalities to manipulate
relationships to their advantages (Jonason et al., 2012) through contextualization may also
create passive enablers who are unaware of the magnitude of the individual’s impact and the
consequence of the protector’s support (Kusy & Holloway, 2009).
The intent behind the toxic handler/toxic buffer is more complex. Early depictions of the
toxic handler by Frost (2003, 2004), as well as Appelbaum and Roy-Girard (2007)
conceptualized the role as an empathetic individual, either with formal or informal status, who
absorbs the impact of the TWB to shield the organization. Kusy and Holloway (2009) adopted a
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separate term to describe the role—"toxic buffer”—and reframed the quasi-positive depiction
from Frost and Appelbaum and Roy Girard as a contributor to the toxic dynamic by helping to
shield and enable the toxic personality.
Much like toxic personalities, buffers may differ in their motivations. Additionally,
depending on where protectors and buffers align in their own statuses, they may straddle the
roles. For example, someone who has the relational power to garner the toxic personality’s trust
and uses that trust to buffer the impact of the behavior is enabling by buffering. They may gain
relational power, not only from the toxic personality, but also from the hero image they gain as
the one who absorbs the blows. However, by shielding toxic personalities from accountability,
they create silent subsystems that bind practice (Foucault, 2002) to toxic power. Rather than
use their power to advocate for those marginalized and implicated by the TWB, they shift
accountability for navigating the dynamic to victims (Foucault, 1965).
Kusy and Holloway’s (2009) array of supporting objects extends Padilla et al.'s (2007)
Toxic Triangle into a broader framework by softening distinctions between enabling followers
and conducive organizations. The triangle extends even further when one integrates Foucault's
(1965,1977, 2002) arguments that toxic systems hold victims partially responsible for their
subjection through the linking of systems of domination to voice and practice. Finally, Padilla et
al.’s model obtains additional heft when R. A. Taylor’s (2019) three victims (targets, witness,
and learners) are placed within it. In a reformulation of the concept at Figure 2.2, Padilla’s
colluders and destructive leaders are toxic actors in the system, deriving voice and power from
relationships to other systemic elements in gray. Conformers in the form of Taylor’s three
victims may not overtly engage in TWB. However, they lose power in favor of subjugated
silence. Kusy and Holloway’s (2009) buffers and protectors as toxic enablers inhabit each level
of the system. Multiple permutations of protectors are possible in each position, dependent upon
relationships to actors and actants throughout the system. Situational actants that are tangible
and more organizationally controllable are below the triangle. Actants less within the span of
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control by organizations and actors in the system float in the center. These less predictable
actants inhabit a power space in which the dominant voice becomes the singular voice of
domination for the rest of the system.
Figure 2.2
Voice, Power, Actors, and Actants in the Toxic Triangle

Note: Adapted from Padilla, A., Hogan, R., & Kaiser, R. B. (2007). Toxic triangle: Destructive leaders, susceptive
followers, and conducive environments. The Leadership Quarterly, 18, 176–194; Kusy, M., & Holloway, E.
(2009). Toxic workplace! Managing toxic personalities and their systems of power. John Wiley & Sons; and
Taylor, R. A. (2019, May 21). Horizontal violence and organizational climate [Video]. Used by permission.

Even in this more robust form, Padilla’s et al.’s (2007) Toxic Triangle is limited by its
two-dimensional structure. If one accepts the systemic nature of TWB, then one also accepts
that a shift in one segment will contribute to changes throughout the system, including far-flung
regions not visibly exposed to the dynamic (Cilliers, 2001). However, a triangle cannot represent
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the flow between the elements and how they influence changes in each other. The triangle also
does not accurately depict another set of concepts in the study of TWB: the roles played by the
traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy.
Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy. As noted earlier, attempts to
identify elements of TWB have typically delineated traits, behaviors, and dispositions. A
segment of research has taken a clinical approach to typing toxic personalities and behaviors by
exploring the roles of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy as behavioral
underpinnings. Narcissism consists of an excessive need for enhancement, admiration, and
power; an inclination to view feedback as envy; and a lack of empathy toward others (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). In the workplace, narcissism has been associated with
increased productivity (Doty & Fenlason, 2013) but also organizational cynicism (Dobbs & Do,
2019). Research has also shown time plays a role in perception, with leaders high in narcissism
receiving early, passionate support but losing that support over the long term (Ong et al., 2016).
Reed (2015) devoted a full chapter to narcissism in his book on toxic leadership, identifying
seven “habits” used to spot them. D. F. Williams (2005) denoted the narcissism as one of her 18
traits of toxic leaders. Additionally, Schmidt (2008) identified the trait as part of his TLS.
Individuals find meaning in their interaction with other social, physical, and abstract
objects, which function as self-concept symbols (Charon, 1989). Thus, narcissism as a trait
would be relatively benign if it were isolated from behavior in interaction with others. However,
the trait accompanies a series of destructive behaviors affecting people, organizations, and
values. Using the “Dark Triad” of narcissism, Machiavellianism (ends justifying the means), and
psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) as their theoretical lens, Jonason et al. (2012)
delineated the traits between hard (e.g., open threats and building alliances) and soft (e.g.,
joking and ingratiating) tactics across genders. The Jonason team found that psychopathy was
more strongly associated with hard tactics, narcissism more strongly associated with soft
tactics, and Machiavellianism bridged the two. While they found no significant gendered
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differences related to being a toxic personality, they found males were more likely to adopt hard
tactics, and females, soft tactics.
A limitation of applying narcissism, Machiavellianism, and other “isms” to toxic behaviors
lies in the clinical nature of diagnosing narcissism and psychopathy, along with the contextual
framing of Machiavellianism. For instance, while Schmidt (2008) identified narcissism in the
development of his TLS, his purposeful study population consisted of U.S. Army personnel and
their families. While clinical experts may have been included in the participants, he did not
document them in the study findings.
Contextual factors are also critical when evaluating the impact of “isms,” particularly
Machiavellianism. In his 2007 literature review mentioned earlier, Tepper warned against
arbitrarily condemning traits that may enable bold action during crises. Similarly, the impact of a
Machiavellian “win-at-all-costs” approach can be situationally positive in critical mission
environments, in which the preservation of human life is the primary goal (Reed, 2010; R. A.
Taylor, 2019). The question of context will figure heavily in my study of TWB in the critical
mission environment of the IC. Thus, are the traits and behaviors normally associated with TWB
considered toxic in that environment? If they are, then how do analysts and operations
personnel respond over time? If not, are there traits and behaviors unique to the IC situation
that are considered toxic and how do personnel respond to them?
Culture and Meso-Dysfunction. TWB cuts a swath through questions related to the
role of norms, the nature of deviance, and the juxtaposition between outcomes and the methods
used to obtain them. Thus, TWB links micro-behavior to meso-dysfunction. However, as the
literature indicates, TWB’s systemic frame challenges any ability to locate the origination point
for the behavior.
Group norms are implicit expectations of behavior and standards that develop
longitudinally (Sherif, 1936) as individuals observe, interact, and conform to the dominant group
(Thibault & Kelley, 1959). Group understanding becomes normative as it systematizes into
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practices, structures, and institutions. This systematization has a significant carryover effect, as
individuals transfer norms of cooperation, conflict, and behavior endorsed in one context to
others (Bettenhausen & Murnighan,1991). Norms become elements of culture and identity
through repeated endorsement (or sanction) of action and attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980).
Voluntarily violating these norms in ways that harm the organization constitutes deviance
(S. L. Robinson & Bennett, 1995). However, because norms are socially constructed and
defined within how behaviors and standards contribute to outcomes (Kaplan, 1975),
organizational norms can become misaligned with “hyper norms” of ethics and morality (Warren,
2003).
Research suggests that excessively focusing on organizational outcomes without
aligning organizational structures to higher values are antecedents to TWB. In a two-year study
of bullying behavior between sales executives, Lloyd (2019) found that systemic endorsement of
bottom-line profit as a normative value without a concomitant commitment to ethics led to a
“bailiff system” of special behavioral privileges for high-producing sales agents. This system not
only endorsed subterfuge between coworkers to drive competition but created a parallel system
of marginalization toward those who did not fit the bailiff system. This toxic dynamic is not
limited to profit-producing organizations. Research related to TWB in nonprofits (Hitchcock,
2015) and federal workplaces (K. R. Williams, 2018) indicated that misalignment between
outcomes and values was also an antecedent to TWB in those frameworks.
Culture reflects higher norms when they penetrate all levels of the system. However,
research also suggests that this disconnect between communicated norms (espoused theories)
and practice (theories-in-use; Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1996) is a primary linkage between microtoxicity and meso-dysfunction as the behavior systematizes (Kusy & Holloway, 2009). This
disconnect can create a toxic, triadic reciprocal effect (Bandura, 1986) in which the behavior
influences processes, discourse, and values at the meso-level, which then provides a reciprocal
influence of future micro-processes, discourses, and values that revolve back into the system
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(Dreyfus et al., 1983; Foucault, 1980, 2002). The behavior may be internalized as symbolic of
having devalued victims (R. A. Taylor, 2019), as rewarded (Lian et al., 2012), or as a reflection
of organizational incompetence (Roter, 2011).
Thus, micro-toxicity emerges into the meso-level through toxic decision-making as tacit
practice. Maitlis and Ozcelik (2004) argued that this emergence occurs through three primary
phases: tabooed topics, emotional contagion, and broken cohesion between management and
team members. Ultimately, team climate declines, a dynamic that remains after the person
departs (Holloway & Kusy, 2010; Kusy, 2017; Kusy & Holloway, 2009). Once systematized, the
TWB may no longer be considered deviant because norms, values, and culture have moved
into alignment (Tepper, 2000).
The literature in this section suggests that the toxic system relies upon multiple sets of
motives and positions. However, TWB victimizes more than merely the target, thus raising
significant questions about whether research on responses to the behavior should take a
broader perspective on who the respondents are. I anticipated that stories of toxic events I
received during data collection for my study would reveal IC personnel playing these roles.
Within the IC context, how do choices (either passive or active) to become a buffer or protector
constitute responses to TWB? If they are part of the response array, then could the motives of
those adopting those roles be more complex than merely power, benevolence, or simple
unawareness? In crises when events are moving quickly, are buffers and protectors viewed as
necessary short-term elements to drive critical mission outcomes? Can individuals move in and
out of the roles of toxic personality, protector, buffer, and victim in context, particularly if
narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy are not limited to the toxic personality in that
environment? Further, what is the role of the situation in a system in which the behavior is either
tolerated, or at the extreme, has become a normative value?
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Situated Toxic Workplace Behavior
Generalizations about situations are difficult to make because organizations function
under interacting sets of common and unique factors. For example, this literature review has
already explored linkages between TWB and specific traits, behaviors, and motivations.
Additionally, as will be discussed in a subsequent section, excessively outcome-focused
cultures have also been associated with the behavior (Appelbaum et al., 2007; Appelbaum et
al., 2006; Holloway & Kusy, 2010; Lloyd, 2019). However, research also suggests that the
situation is a critical variable when evaluating the impact of having a rigid outcome focus. Even
typically destructive behaviors, such as directing profanity at group members, may not only be
normative but incentivizing in some environments (Martens et al., 2015). Thus, identifying toxic
leaders and coworkers is a complex, constructive process reliant upon the situatedness of
history, relational factors, individual perspective, and organizational norms.
Using standard TWB typologies is particularly complex in military and intelligence
environments because hierarchy and discursive rules found destructive in some contexts are
necessary and even cohesive, particularly during crises (Tepper, 2007). For critical mission
organizations, the outcomes may be existential. A significant body of research exists on the
impact of TWB in military command environments, with the U.S. Army as a significant focus. Of
the 15 studies on toxicity in the military cited in this literature review, 13 used the U.S. Army as a
backdrop and the remaining two focused on the U.S. Air Force.
While commercialized profit is not an outcome variable within the U.S. military, hierarchy
in that environment may support outcomes that value saving some lives over others. Dagless
(2018) and Reed (2010) have rejected the demonization of command environments as wholly
destructive, but rather, necessary for unit cohesion. As Reed (2010) said:
When the enemy is in the wire and you are down to the last rounds of ammunition, it is
not the time to call for a focus group. It is rarely appropriate, however, to use humiliating,
demeaning, and belittling behavior” (p. 60).
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Additionally, in a study of civilian and uniformed defense personnel, Aubrey (2013) found no
support for “commanding” in his Toxic Pyramid of Traits, but rather, ineffective power
management. Most interestingly, he found that perceptions of TWB remained consistent across
home-base, forward-deployed, and combat environments.
Research on the role of the command environment in incentivizing TWB in health care is
more ambiguous. Coccia (1998) argued that strict hierarchy in health care organizations is an
indicator of a toxic work environment. Conversely, R. A. Taylor (2019) argued that health care
and military environments function within similar frames. Health care workers execute critical
mission objectives within crisis environments that often require more rigid forms of hierarchy to
maximize efficiency and minimize mistakes. Toxicity depends on the manner in which this
dynamic is managed in situ. Similarly, in their study of health care workers, Holloway and Kusy
(2010) found that the ability to manage the human dynamic constituted the dividing line between
hierarchy and TWB. Thus, hierarchy may not be an antecedent to TWB in critical mission
situations, but rather an intervening variable between intent, behavioral management, and
outcomes.
Failure to recognize situational factors may result in unidentified latent effects when
measuring the impact of TWB across organizational and cultural frameworks. For example,
studies of military, civilian, and multicultural populations have conflated methods and results
validated outside of those environments. Schmidt’s (2008) TLS was validated using a
predominantly military test sample but is commonly used as the measure or to define the
construct in civilian environments (e.g., R. M. Bell, 2017; Hadadian & Sayadpour, 2018; Tavanti,
2011). Conversely, military theorists commonly use definitions developed in civilian
environments, such as Dagless’s (2018) adoption of Padilla et al.'s (2007) Toxic Triangle model.
Although Mueller (2012) addressed TWB in civilian and military contexts in his dissertation on
the behavior, he used Kusy and Holloway’s (2009) civilian-based research findings in his
discussion of TWB in the military. Aubrey (2013) developed his own definition of toxic behaviors
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using a sample consisting of uniformed and civilian U.S. Army employees. Finally, TWB was
validated as a construct in low-power-distance/low-collectivist North America. While it has been
applied in numerous high-power-distance/high-collectivist environments (e.g., Hadadian &
Sayadpour, 2018; Özer et al., 2017), the toxicity of specific traits and behaviors has not been
validated in those works, just assumed. Thus, we have a series of instruments that have been
used across organizational environments for which they have not been validated. If situational
factors might affect the validity of instruments to measure the behavior, how might they also
need to be considered when evaluating responses to it?
Summary
As the literature in this section demonstrated, TWB traverses complex frameworks of
power-based status as a vehicle for voice. This enactment of voice may reveal itself as overt,
silent as a form of subjugation, or silent as a form of resistance. While some elements of voice
are imposed (such as subjugated silence), forms of voice become part of the feedback system
in the toxic environment to normalize the behavior. Meso-dysfunction follows as its own form of
silent voice to drive the phenomenon back into the micro-system at the practice level as
teammates align their own behaviors either with systems of power or in resistance to them. This
path of response lies along a trajectory of broken collaboration and failed outcomes.
The next section will apply TWB constructs and research to the U.S. IC. Many might
view the IC as this fantastical place operating in the shadows. However, the community faces
many of the same cultural, organizational, and leadership challenges as more traditional work
environments, merely on a more complex scale. Because no available research has explored
the nature, typologies, or impacts of TWB within the IC, the rest of the literature review will have
to settle for the absence of an integrative pathway between them. Thus, the remainder of this
chapter will concentrate on the purpose and operating context for the IC as a foundation to a
discussion of how what is known about the behavior that might affect responses to TWB in that
environment.
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Toxic Behavior and the Intelligence Community
A comprehensive exploration of the structures and challenges encountered by the 17 IC
entities lies beyond the scope of this study. However, scholars have produced a significant body
of unclassified theory and analysis on the business of intelligence and the role of
meso-dysfunction within the IC. Although intelligence officers hold a multitude of occupations
essential to national security, the preponderance of this literature explores the analytic and
operational functions as being the focal point of the information affecting national security
decisions. Because of this narrow research focus, the following sections will contain a similarly
narrow discussion on the complex human and organizational dynamics affecting intelligence
officers to explore how TWB might impact overall operations.
Systemic Ambiguity in the IC
The macro-level framework of the IC resembles military contexts in some ways and not
others. IC agencies are not combatant forces, although some agencies are codified into law as
combat support agencies and have significant numbers of uniformed personnel. Others have
either strategic intelligence, financial, law enforcement, or hybrid missions. Thus, IC entities
support diplomatic, national security, and military operations as part of a macro-environment
that is ambiguous and fluid. I will explore this ambiguity through a discussion of the
systematization of micro-politics; the challenges of failure-induced reform efforts; and conflicting
post-9/11 identities in the IC.
Systematization of Micro-Politics in the IC. This portion of the literature review has
been a complex process for me to research because I needed to be mindful of how my history
in the IC may bias me. However, I have also been challenged by a body of scholarship that
explores mission, processes, and cognitive impediments to intelligence analysis without
effectively capturing the situatedness, and often unboundedness, of intelligence as a practice.
This research opportunity may stem from multiple factors. Many scholars have never had
practical intelligence experience and underappreciate the IC’s cultural complexities that “being
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in it” would offer them. Conversely, the opportunity may also reflect the tabooed nature of topics
that highlight human imperfection on intelligence outcomes (Bean, 2009b). Security
impediments to writing and publishing research on these topics within the scholarly community
may also limit research interest (S. S. Taylor, personal communication, June 23, 2019). Nolan
(2019) theorizes that the fear of the “big black Sharpie” of redaction also warns off many
scholars inside the IC from producing unclassified research.
I have made the argument that the IC mirrors other mission critical environments in their
ambiguities, complexities, and crisis environments. However, Turner (2004) argued that
intelligence analysts also face normative uniqueness from having to balance legitimate national
security needs for secrecy versus the desire for democratic transparency. At the micro-political
level (Dreyfus et al., 1983), this national mission acts out within teams and working groups.
Hastie (2011) further framed this unique landscape by identifying six specific elements: its size
and diversity; the breadth and scope of data; uncertainty created by adversarial denial and
deception (D&D) activities; the unpredictability and outcome magnitude of low-probability
events; the challenge of predicting policymaker desires filtered through a political lens; and the
ability of national politics to bias intelligence findings.
The functional manifestation of this complex macro environment occurs at the
micro-political level. Tirmizi (2008) defines a team as a group of people, either in formal or
informal organizations, that interact around a shared purpose that links to the larger mission.
However, as noted, the concept of a team may resemble any number of inter- or intraorganizational forms. The fluidity of this landscape interacts with codified structure to bias
norms-in-practice at the team level, often based on relational proximity (Griffin, 2015) but also
as intelligence officers often must adapt in real time to unanticipated events. In this situation,
even approved intelligence production processes becomes alienated from in situ requirements
(Richards, 2010).
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The data environment’s fluidity exemplifies this dynamic. Information management has
historically been challenging for intelligence teams. However, Fingar (2011a) argued that the
post-9/11 landscape has changed through the addition of non-state (terrorist) and asymmetric
threats (e.g., climate change and cyber) that are fluid and mobile. Transitioning from a Cold War
framework established to monitor state actors to one that is equally effective against non-state,
state, and asymmetric threats has been disruptive to teams, inter-team collaboration, and
practice. Additionally, the IC has added four more entities since 2004, including those with
financial and law enforcement missions operating under different legal authority and norms.
Collaboration among intelligence officers is critical to mission success (Lemyre et al.,
2011). However, the collaboration environment has challenges at each level of the system. I
discuss collaboration challenges associated with conflicting collaboration and competition
requirements at the micro-level in a subsequent section. For the purposes of this section,
systems designed to foster collaboration have created a data explosion at the team level
(Nolan, 2013), adding to the challenges that intelligence officers face in separating good data
from bad or irrelevant data (Arkes & Kajdasz, 2011; Wohlstetter, 1962). Further, the emergence
of social media as both instrumental data source and as operational networks for adversaries
(Lowenthal, 2014) has created an entirely new data pool.
Institutional mechanisms designed to protect sources and methods also challenge the
broader data-sharing environment, often by framing sharing through institutional power.
Intelligence is defined as anything collected through clandestine means. However, intelligence
officers are controlled in their access to it through a stratified subsystem of compartments (L. K.
Johnson, 2015). While post-9/11 reforms attempted to transition the culture from a “need to
know” to a “duty to share” (9/11 Commission, 2004; McConnell, 2007), compartmentalization
continues to create in-groups and out-groups through perceptions of psychological ownership
(Davies, 2004; Van Dyne & Pierce, 2004). This phenomenon is micro-political in that many
compartments are managed at the sub-group level. While she does not link the phenomenon to
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TWB, Maras (2017) has conceptualized excess compartmentalization in the IC as impeding
access and collaboration as a “paradox of secrecy” that threatens trust and incentivizes abuse
of power. Thus, while necessary, compartmentalization as a gatekeeper function normalizes
systems of domination (Clarke, 1991) by objectifying into turf battles, specialized language and
skills associated with specific INTs, and tools (Nolan, 2013) that resystematize through the gaze
of routine practice and discourse at the micro-political level (Dreyfus et al., 1983; Foucault,
1972, 1977; Johnston, 2005).
The challenges outlined in this section pose significant relational implications for
intelligence officers, and by extension, the nation’s security. Ambiguity has been associated with
bullying between team members (Hauge et al., 2009), harassment (Bowling & Beehr, 2006),
and toxic decision processes (Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004). Additionally, perceptions of being
overwhelmed by workload have been associated with counterproductive workplace behavior in
high-stakes (The Joint Commission, 2006) and more routine (Hadadian & Sayadpour, 2018)
work environments. Data is an intelligence analyst’s primary resource, and power over
resources has been linked to toxic team processes (R. A. Taylor & Taylor, 2017). The
relationship between misuse of power and TWB has been documented, particularly in
excessively outcome-focused work environments (Appelbaum et al., 2007, 2006; Holloway &
Kusy, 2010; Lipman-Blumen, 2005a; Lloyd, 2019). Ever-present reform efforts in reactions to
failure add another layer to this ambiguous environment.
Reform and Complexity. Literature suggests that reform efforts are common reactions
to intelligence failures, with each challenging missions, organizational and individual identities,
relationships, perceptions of order, and meaning (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012; Bean, 2009b).
Kindsvater (2003) documented six sanctioned reform recommendations between 1955 and
1996, while Warner and McDonald (2005) detailed 14 between 1950 and 1996. While the two
studies contained overlap, the inability of scholars to agree on the number of reform
recommendations is indicative of the complexity of the topic. Research in commercial and
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nonprofit organizations has found that role conflict and ambiguity, overload, and perceptions of
undue constraints (Bowling & Beehr, 2006) upend status and generate excessive levels of
political gamesmanship (Gilbert et al., 2012), all of which incentivize TWB (Carlock, 2013). One
might also ask at what point continual reform evolves into a normative value in their own right,
normalizing counterproductive behaviors in response.
Reform recommendations can also be epistemologically different. Dahl (2013) outlined
three divergent approaches to reform over the IC’s history: the traditional school arguing that
failures are always the result of cognitive breakdowns; the reformist school linking failure to
broken bureaucracies; and the contrarian school framing failures as breakdowns in collection,
not analysis. For example, Jervis (2010) and Davis (2003, 2016) took traditional approaches in
arguing for better use of analytic methodologies. Lester (2015) took a reformist approach in
arguing for better transparency, accountability, and oversight. Other perspectives have
straddled theoretical lines. Heuer (1999) took a hybrid approach in calling for more attention to
cognitive limitations, the role of sensory frameworks, and the constructed realities of analyst
interactions. The 9/11 Commission (2004) took a traditionalist-reformist approach in blaming
failures to share and making incorrect inferences for the 9/11 attacks.
These epistemologically different approaches may reflect broader ambiguities
associated with the functional necessities of the various INTs. Highly technically oriented INTs,
such as MASINT and GEOINT, function within positivist frames of discreet data-gathering and
statistical analyses, although understanding the human behavior behind D&D efforts is critical.
Conversely, HUMINT analysis relies on human sources, where identities, personal agendas,
language in context, and even momentary mood affect gathered intelligence. Thus, acquiring
and analyzing these data sources moves more interpretivist data-gathering and analysis
methods of assessing meaning to the forefront (Nolan, 2013). These diametrically opposed
epistemologies operating within the same macro context challenge collaboration and the
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development of a core intelligence identity (Turner, 2004) and could enable TWB when
structures and norms are not adequate to manage relationships.
The differences may also stem from perspectives on culture. Using a more interpretivist
approach, (Bean, 2009b, 2012) argued that the circular and self-perpetuating nature of reform
designs represents a lack of understanding about IC culture and a failure to embrace broader
ways of knowing, including explorations of discursive and relational dynamics. Discourse
symbolizes institutional myth, meaning (Blumer, 1969), and boundaries for change (Foucault,
1980; V. M. J. Robinson, 2013). Sensemaking occurs when novel events and accompanying
social interactions drive altered identities (Weick, 1993, 1995). Thus, global events have shifted
meaning and sensemaking for the IC in ways that have challenged identities, relationships, and
processes (Croft, 2006) and in ways that many may find hard to decipher. Much like IC reform
efforts, global events that change intelligence priorities also upend power bases through access,
budgets, office space, and personnel, potentially triggering TWB when changes are poorly
managed.
Dueling Meanings. The multifaceted nature of identity and meaning have trifurcated
intelligence officers as perceived guardians of the country’s security, as citizens and as covictims of global events. For example, a single use of the simplistic phrase “connect the dots” on
page 408 of the 9/11 Commission Report (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 408) has become a
banner for intelligence failure and a discursive symbol among the public of IC ineptitude,
negligence, or cultural misalignment (Dahl, 2013; Diamond, 2008; Gladwell, 2003). Croft (2006)
argued that this new meaning has also shifted identity for the American public as both a victim
recovering from harm and a collective hero who has persevered and fought back. This public
identity has reflected into the collective meaning of the IC through an embedded sense of crisis,
suspicion, and blame that has framed intelligence and military operations since the attacks
occurred.
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While Croft (2006) does not link this defensive climate to TWB, research indicates that
environments framed by suspicion (K. R. Williams, 2018) and blame (Bowling & Beehr, 2006)
are antecedents of the behavior. Although specific personnel and budget data on the IC are
classified, former deputy director of the CIA, John McLaughlin (2016) has stated that the IC
experienced a reduction in personnel of 23% during the post-Cold War 1990s, when the
dissolution of the Soviet Union created a political environment supporting the shift of intelligence
and military funding to other purposes (Davoodi, 1999; Gleditsch et al., 1996). However, within
six months after the 9/11 attacks, the IC had received an influx of 2,000 new intelligence
analysts on counterterrorism accounts alone (McLaughlin, 2016).
Although I have identified no research exploring how this transition has impacted
collaborative relationships, this shift in meaning from an older IC that “won the Cold War” to a
younger one after the IC “let 9/11 happen” is likely significant to the situatedness of the
contemporary intelligence analyst. Today, most Cold War-era intelligence officers indoctrinated
into the glory days of the IC’s past are likely near or beyond retirement age. However, a 24 year
old who became an analyst in 2002 and who developed a professional identity in an
environment of blame and defensiveness would now be 41 years old and have significant
influence on culture and meaning as either a subject-matter expert, middle-manager, or senior
leader.
Several questions remain at this juncture. Do the roles of perseverance and risk as
necessary artifacts of the business of intelligence moderate their relationships to TWB within the
IC situation? Do individual analysts and operational personnel respond differently to peerrelated TWB depending on whether the behavior occurs within the framework of co-located or
matrixed team environments? How do inherent epistemological and sensemaking differences
among personnel working within the various INTs influence responses to TWB, particularly
inter-organizationally? Methodologically, how do researchers engage intelligence officers guided
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by these different ways of knowing in such a way that a theoretical construct relatable to both
can be constructed?
Collaboration and Outcomes
I have discussed the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent to intelligence production in an
environment in which an intelligence officer knows she does not know everything—but what
exactly she does not know, she cannot know. The diversity of resources, expertise, and
capabilities applied to significant intelligence is designed to close intelligence gaps to the degree
possible. However, using those resources most effectively requires a set of elements that are
directly tied to traits, behaviors, and intent that, when managed poorly, can incentivize TWB.
The following section will explore these elements: challenges to collaboration; the singular focus
on “getting it right” and the consequences of failing; and risk aversion.
Collaboration. Intelligence officers have areas of individual responsibility but produce
analysis within the bounds of teams and in collaboration with peers sharing similar
responsibilities. Tirmizi (2008) identified six types of work teams: formally structured groups;
task forces limited in scope and lifespan; committees around specific tasks with varying levels of
organizational formality; self-managed, autonomous; and virtual. Analysts and operational
personnel can simultaneously serve in multiple types of teams, making the notion of what
constitutes a team fluid and situationally dependent (Strickland & Whitlock, 2016).
Cialdini (2008) argued that power within scientific organizations privileges those with the
reputational status to influence alliances, structures, and discourse. However, a fault line of
managed relationships runs through this dynamic. On one side of the fault, the breadth of skills,
expertise, and tools brought to bear against the geopolitical environment’s most challenging
problems can produce groundbreaking analysis when power and other aspects of the human
dynamic function well. However, complex interrelationships and inherent conflicts between
collaboration and competition (Maras, 2017) can create a cannibalistic atmosphere when
destructive. Expertise and experience (longevity) bestow power in a bottom-line environment
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where failure harms U.S. geopolitical objectives, and possibly lives (J. Davis, 2003b), even if
neither has a measurable impact on quality of intelligence outcomes (Creech, unpublished
manuscript, 2010).
The 9/11 Commission (2004) found that organizational and cultural dichotomies
contributed to failures to predict the attacks. Thus, the IC has created a subsystem of incentives
and mandates to promote collaboration by encouraging personnel to rotate into other
operational environments. This framework creates matrixed personnel who must straddle
complex cultures, relationships, and requirements between their detailed locations and their
home organizations (Nolan, 2013). Thus, this well-intended deployment system within the IC
may create paradigms of relational powerlessness (Hodson et al., 2006) when intelligence
officers feel alienated (Anjum et al., 2019) from their home offices but also marginalized
(Pelletier, 2010) as the designated outsiders at their matrixed site. Effective performance
management processes are key to addressing TWB (Reed, 2004). However, matrixed
personnel also may not have effective redress mechanisms available to them in the deployed
location. Additionally, the micro-politics of matrixed teams serve as a viral component for TWB
into the meso- and macro-environments when the behavior is not addressed to support healthy
collaboration.
Chasing the Bottom Line. Literature has linked outcome-centered, so-called
“bottom-line” environments to multiple counterproductive behaviors. Tourish (2013) has argued
that transformational leadership traits (Bass, 1990; Burns, 2007) have become overvalued and
distorted, with Khurana (2002) arguing that this distortion has contributed to a conflation of
toxicity with charisma. Appelbaum and Roy-Girard (2007) argued further that the emergence of
TWB has redrafted organizational survival rules into a risk-averse series of “nevers”—never
commit mistakes, never violate the leader’s turf, never trust anyone but oneself, never act in a
way that violates the leader’s image of the organization, and never challenge the leader’s
perception of reality. A social environment in which risk-aversion is based on fear of personal

66
loss of standing rather than a focus on the mission may have a detrimental impact on the IC’s
primary function: warning.
Reduced to its most basic purpose, the IC’s role is to prevent intelligence “surprise” by
minimizing uncertainty about adversarial intentions, capabilities, plans, and activities (Fingar,
2011b). This role implies a responsibility not to make mistakes (Nolan, 2013). However, this
singular focus frames the IC as the ultimate bottom-line environment, an operating framework
that has been associated with TWB when the human element of performance is ignored
(Holloway & Kusy, 2010), perceived as benign, or even as the privilege of high-producers
(Lloyd, 2019).
I have documented the relationships between excessive bottom-line cultures and TWB.
One study linked excessively bottom-line environment to masculinized cultures. Framed within
Barrett's (1996) “masculine context culture” (MCC) of risk-taking, perseverance, and endurance,
Matos et al. (2018) found that high-MCC cultures moderated the negative impact of TWB on
outcomes in both genders, while low-MCC cultures did not. I have been unable to identify
research into levels of perseverance and endurance among intelligence officers. However,
research would suggest that their ability to function effectively in danger zones while exposed to
inhumane images, data, and behavior would suggest that they embody significant resilience
(L. K. Johnson & Wirtz, 2004; Nolan, 2013). The IC as a risk-focused environment is more
complex and will be discussed further below.
The Matos et al. (2018) findings related to gender are worth noting. Women have led at
least two of the IC’s most successful (publicly documented) operations, the hunts for and
capture of CIA analyst and Soviet spy, Aldrich Ames (Grimes & Vertefeuille, 2012) in the mid1980s, and Osama bin Laden, who planned and executed the 9/11 attacks (Windrem, 2013).
However, women comprised only 38.8% of the IC workforce in 2018, the latest public figures
available. However, the trendline has improved from previous years, with women comprising
41.2% of all new hires that same year (Annual Demographic Report, 2018). As already
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discussed, research has found no significant relationship between gender and the prevalence of
TWB, but rather, in the behavioral tactics used by male and female toxic personalities and
targets. Thus, the Matos study raises two important questions: assuming the IC can be defined
as an MCC, does culture moderate the impact of TWB for female IC officers? Conversely, does
the MCC culture impact tactics used by female toxic personalities within the IC such that they
might mirror toxic behaviors in males?
Risk-aversion and the Bottom-Line. Literature suggests that the ability of the IC to
embrace the benefits of an MCC culture to moderate the impacts of TWB would be mitigated by
fissures over risk, power, and fear. Dagless (2018) argued that effective intelligence analysis
requires the space to be wrong. However, Fingar (2011b) argued that the very nature of
preventing intelligence surprise has built risk aversion into IC processes and the analytic psyche
through demands for prevention-focused, rather than forward-leaning, analysis. As Nolan (2013)
argued:
The analysts are expected to navigate this sea of chaos with no mistakes, and since
they are conscientious patriots who want to do the job well, they naturally have difficulty
navigating the gap between what is expected (from others as well as themselves) and
what is realistic. (p. 26)
Research indicates that excessive focus on perfectionism is associated with toxic
environments through the fear of failure, humiliation, marginalization (Appelbaum & Roy-Girard,
2007; Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Pelletier, 2010), as well as feelings of being controlled,
pessimism, disengagement, and minimized trust (Ciuk, 2011). In turn, TWB has been
associated with reduced performance (Dunlop & Lee, 2004; Andrew A Schmidt, 2014),
diminished quality (K. R. Williams, 2018), and productivity (Hubbard, 2018). The outlying
question is to what degree do these responses occur among intelligence officers in toxic events
and how might they influence operations?
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Limitations of Intelligence Analysis
Just as competing epistemologies challenge intelligence production, perspectives on
TWB and responses to the behavior might also be significantly different. However, these
challenges are not limited to ambiguity and culture. Research also indicates that cognitive and
operational limitations inherent to analysis challenge the business of intelligence even within the
best operational climates. The following section discusses functional limitations and
impediments that intelligence officers encounter, including overestimation and cognitive
uncertainty, the “warning paradox,” and tensions between incentives to compete and
requirements to collaborate (coopetition).
Overestimation and Cognitive Uncertainty. Intelligence production lies in a paradox
between the need to, but futility of, predicting human behavior with precision. While valuing
scientific methods and rationally applied tradecraft (J. Davis, 2003a), critical thinking processes
and scientific methods often conflict with the innovation needed in an environment of data
uncertainty (Richards, 2010), compartmentalization, and unanticipated crises (Johnston, 2005).
As Arkes and Kajdasz (2011) noted:
There is an important difference between the analyst and the other professionals when
an atypical situation occurs. The experienced nurse or firefighter is likely to have
encountered such a situation before, allowing them to draw on experience. The
experienced intelligence analyst, some might argue, is more likely to deal with a turn of
world events that has no precedent. (p. 163)
Research indicates that the level of certainty within intelligence findings and the relative
inferiority of U.S. adversaries depicted in popular culture are unrealized ideals. As noted earlier,
intelligence failures spur reform efforts, often failing to address the social, power, discursive,
and cognitive fundamentals behind failure. For example, the 9/11 Commission (2004)
addressed perceived cognitive failures behind the attack by calling for institutional and
collaborative restructuring. However, the commission provided no remedy for the most basic
impediment associated with the inability of intelligence officers to predict the fluidity of
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unprecedented human intent with any accuracy. Cognitive and methodological limitations faced
by intelligence analysts in reading adversarial minds remain in place.
Heuer (1999) argued that policymakers and the public often underestimate the
ambiguous nature of intelligence information, leading to overconfidence in the ability of analysts
to provide meaningful probability estimates of their findings. Taking a broader theoretical stance,
Arkes and Kajdasz (2011) framed this overconfidence through five, false intuitive theories:
•

We can predict behavior, particularly when we believe we know a target well

•

The level of confidence in a prediction is equivalent to the likelihood that it is right

•

Accuracy is improved with expertise

•

Accuracy is improved with a higher quantity of data

•

Rapid cognition in prototypical circumstances is typically accurate.

Some scholars have argued for greater attention to structured analytic techniques and
better critical thinking skills to overcome certainty (L. K. Johnson, 2015). However, Zohar (2013)
argued against positivist approaches to intelligence analysis, comparing it rather to a
constructivist-grounded theory method in which findings are based on an interaction between
the analyst’s truth, the analyst’s perception of the target’s truth, and data emerging out of
fragmented, situated moments in time.
Warning and the Policymaker. Heuer (1999) described analysis as occurring on a
spectrum in which data and theory are integrated in small segments as parts of a puzzle, which
eventually leads to a picture. However, the clarity and accuracy of that picture depends on the
value of the underlying data, which cannot be assessed with certainty unless the analyst has
insight into the data that she is missing—in which case, the data would no longer be missing.
Additionally, accurate estimates require surfacing accurate assumptions, which typically rely on
comparisons to past activity (J. Davis, 2003b). However, an element of that missing data may
be the key piece of the puzzle to indicate that either intentions, capabilities, or plans have
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changed (Richards, 2010). Finally, accurate findings rely on defeating D&D efforts by
adversaries intended to prevent access to and deceive intelligence officers about the nature of
that data (Hastie, 2011).
The warning process illustrates this limitation. The primary purpose for intelligence is to
provide warning, which (J. Davis, 2003b) defines as, “applying all-source information, expert
insights, and specialized tradecraft to help policy officials prevent or limit damage from threats to
national security” (p. 2). However, Callum (2001) argued that warning relegates analysis as
either “failed” or “irrelevant,” depending on when analysis is produced. While he did not use the
term, he is describing a variation on the juxtaposition between the intelligence mission and an
artifact of the analytic environment, referred to as the “warning paradox” (J. Goldman, 2006).
The “warning paradox” reflects an incongruence between analytic capabilities and
policymaker expectations. The greatest opportunity policymakers have for affecting adversarial
behavior is at the beginning of an activity when data is least robust and uncertainty is highest.
However, the analyst is less likely to be believed at this juncture because of these
limitations—thus, failing. Additionally, if U.S. action early in the event cycle either intentionally or
unintentionally drives a change in the adversary’s plans, the original analysis may be viewed as
incorrect, even if it represented adversarial intent in that moment in time. The analyst is most
likely to be believed at the end of an event cycle when data is greatest and uncertainty has
diminished; however, the analyst may be deemed irrelevant at this juncture because the
intelligence is no longer timely enough to affect outcomes. Thus, the warning paradox
challenges the ability of analysts to produce findings that can withstand an absence of reflexivity
on the temporal and spatial elements in the situation.
Scholars and IC officials have debated on how and whether to hold individual analysts
accountable for intelligence failures (Bean, 2009b; Croft, 2006; Diamond, 2008; Lester, 2015).
One practical impediment to individual accountability is the “many hands” nature of intelligence
findings. A second practical impediment lies with common lack of “feedback” available to

71
analysts on many of their findings. Unlike the firefighter who receives accurate performance
feedback when the fire is eliminated, analysts often never definitively learn whether they were
correct (Arkes & Kajdasz, 2011). Multiple factors contribute to lack of feedback, including media
disclosures that have clued adversaries into the indicators that intelligence officers rely upon
(enabling adversaries to reconfigure practices) or an absence of confirming or disconfirming
data, resulting from either a lack of collection or successful D&D efforts (Hastie, 2011).
Rovner (2011) argued that the ideal in which uniformly objective, data-rich intelligence
arrives on the desk of a highly rational policymaker, who then makes an objective decision
based on that intelligence is in contravention to reality. Intelligence officers and policymakers
are not immune from the human desire for permanence (Arkes & Kajdasz, 2011) and the need
to fill information gaps (Kahneman, 2011). Thus, policymaker demands for accurate probability
estimates amid ambiguous or missing data can encourage analysts to reach premature
conclusions. Maras (2017) argued that policymakers’ demands for finite probability estimates
may actually be inversely related to the level of certainty that analysts have about available
data, a dynamic framed by a clash of mental models between public-opinion driven politicians
(J. Davis, 2003b) and uncertainty-driven analysts (Betts, 2007).
Borrowing from Foucault's (1979) concept of governmentality, the breadth of institutional,
discursive, collective, and structural arrangements within the IC form complex power
arrangements designed around one set of objectives: prevent an intelligence failure. However,
misalignments between institutional (Lester, 2015) and discursive (Bean, 2009b) norms, what
policymakers and the public expect of intelligence officers, and what they actually can do (Betts,
2007) enhance uncertainty, risk aversion, and micro-politicization at the inter- and intra-team
levels. Policymakers, members of the broader national security arena (such as the warfighter
and diplomatic corps) become designated implicated actors in the situation, while the public is
reduced to the role of silent actor (Clarke, 1991, 2003, 2005).
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Intelligence officers and policymakers function in a situation in which their shared and
separate social worlds continually interact with expectations of each other’s needs, even when
they are not directly communicating (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Clarke, 2005; Clarke et al.,
2017). How politically charged intelligence environments impact the interaction between
individual behavior and relationships may depend partially on how team members feel about
“the game” (Hochwarter, 2003). This phenomenon can become internalized when fear of
marginalization intrudes upon the ambiguous and collectivist frameworks for intelligence
production, leading estimates to be under- or over-sold (Bar-Joseph & McDermott, 2010). 6
Thus, absent more overt forms of TWB, the environment and decision processes around
politicized intelligence issues may become toxic (Maitlis & Ozcelik, 2004). The influence of this
dynamic may be particularly influential within the competitive intelligence and peer review
processes discussed in the next segment.
Competitive Intelligence, Peer Review, and “Coopetition.” While agency
requirements may differ, intelligence officers typically are assigned an account of responsibility
but function as part of holistic or matrixed teams (Strickland & Whitlock, 2016). Additionally,
intelligence officers approach their accounts using methods, tools, and strategies that are
normative for that analyst’s profession; however, personnel in other agencies may follow the
same account area from their own unique vantage points (L. K. Johnson, 2015). Co-located
analytic teams may be similarly diverse in skill and expertise, with teams led by SMEs, who
mentor more junior personnel and non-analytic personnel supporting the analytic function.
Similar to academic research, intelligence findings undergo intra- and inter-team peer
review prior to being published in order to benefit from specialization and moderate cognitive

A well-publicized example of this phenomenon occurred when ex-Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet
reportedly misrepresented to President George Bush that intelligence overwhelmingly supported the existence of
an active weapons of mass destruction program underway in Iraq, although IC analysts were divided in their
conclusions (J. Davis, 2003a). His reported use of the phrase “slam dunk” (Woodward, 2004) not only overstated
conclusions, but also violated discursive norms in framing accuracy levels for policymakers.
6
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bias through competitive analysis (Colby, 1981). Peer review is a micro-, meso-, and
macro-level social process (Hastie, 2011) that can take days or months depending on the level
of criticality and disagreement. The process includes the publication of competing studies or
merely the opportunity to review and edit others’ products before publication. This process is
instrumental in establishing confidence levels (Tetlock, 2017) and surfacing alternative
hypotheses that are designed to refine perceived accuracy (Johnston, 2005). A final product
may have a single name. However, it has been constructed from intra-team, interagency, and
individual processes that traverse structure (Archer, 2003; Blumer, 1969).
IC peer review relies upon cohesion, collegiality, and effective conflict management
(Heuer, 1999). However, much like academic peer review, a process designed to get the best
product inherently relies upon peers who are also competitors (Bloch, 2002; Hastie, 2011).
Using structural equation modeling to measure mediating effects on competition/cooperation
(coopetition) on virtual IT teams (VTs), Baruch and Lin (2012) also found that levels of shared
vision, social interaction, and trust significantly mediated knowledge sharing. Team performance
also relied upon emotional intelligence levels and competence. The study has some limitations
in its transferability because participants represented one industry in a virtual niche. However,
matrixed IC teams resemble VTs in their limited physical access between members and their
reliance upon technology to communicate (Arney et al., 2004; McIntyre et al., 2009).
Additionally, while research demonstrating that collaboration affects intelligence accuracy is
limited due to a lack of confirming feedback, examples where failures to collaborate contributed
to intelligence failures are robust (9/11 Commission, 2004; Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski, 2003;
Dahl, 2013; Shlaim, 1976). However, Baruch and Lin separated knowledge sharing and
performance as independent outcome variables. Nevertheless, the study raises relevant
questions about the criticality of relational factors as mediators to cognition and team
problem-solving in IC coopetition.
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The lack of feedback can present as a wild-card variable in coopetition. The uncertainty
over the accuracy of certain findings contributes to norms in which bonuses and promotions are
tied to production quantities (vice accuracy) and impact, creating an incentive to produce and be
the first to do so. Additionally, competition and uncertainty-driven fear of failure encourages
intelligence officers to transform even minor issues into a debate (Nolan, 2013) because
intelligence officers must produce duplicative and contradictory findings (Davies, 2004) while
also finding consensus. Thus, the intelligence process includes a need for consensus and
collegiality, but also a hostility towards it. This tension may contribute to TWB when poorly
managed.
Psychological ownership of key intelligence issues may increase coopetition tensions.
SMEs and senior analysts have informal status within the competitive intelligence and peer
review processes due to perceived experience, expertise, and reputation (Arkes & Kajdasz,
2011). However, research indicates that expertise impedes accuracy through cross-situational
misassumptions (Mischel, 1973) and the misattribution of cause and effect anchored to past
events (L. K. Johnson, 2015; C. G. Lord et al., 1979). SMEs may perceive psychological
ownership (Pierce et al., 1991) when favored issues become extensions of their self-concepts
(Belk, 1988). Further, research has associated psychological ownership and territorialism with
abuse of power (Tavanti, 2011), self-promotion at the expense of others (Dobbs & Do, 2019),
and marginalizing others with TWB (Ciuk, 2011).
Emotion Management
The interaction between TWB and response to the behavior likely segues through
emotional reaction for the toxic personality and the target. Emotion in the intelligence
environment plays multiplicative roles in the intelligence environment. They may be a byproduct
of the empathic connection or sense of ethos (Voronov & Vince, 2012) with the mission or
something to be managed in emotionally laden intelligence operations (Nolan, 2013). In toxic
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environments, emotions may emerge differently depending on whether one perceives that they
are the target or a witness to the behavior (Pelletier, 2010).
Gilbert et al. (2012) argued that a lack of empathy is related to the prevalence of
narcissism in TWB. Additionally, Appelbaum and Roy-Girard (2007) argued that feeling empathy
plays a role in decisions by team members to become toxic handlers. Bowling and Beehr (2006)
found moderately significant relationships between exposure to TWB and depression. Left
unaddressed, TWB may emerge into a climate of toxic emotions that are recurring, disengaging,
and exhausting (Chu, 2014). Thus, toxicity may raise significant implications for accurate
intelligence by elevating opportunities for unhealthy emotion management.
The intelligence team environment raises important questions about what facilitates
toxicity and how it impacts climate. Team climate is a function of emotion, organizational factors,
and psychological states (Burke & Litwin, 1992), which aggregate into a group-level perception
of the work environment (Glisson & James, 2002). Climate and emotion reciprocate within team
environments through a contagion effect as a function of mimicking, biological and affective
feedback, and the spread of emotion to others (Hatfield & Rapson, 1998). I identified no
explorations of the role of climate within the IC.
The role of emotion in intelligence operations remains relatively unexplored. However,
existing research has centered on the need for analysts to minimize it. Heuer (1999) argued that
emotion management was key to accurate analysis. Nolan (2013) identified the role of
emotional detachment as a psychological survival mechanism for intelligence officers exposed
to troubling behavior, choices, and images, a form of self-manipulation that reveals itself in
discursive ways (e.g., the target is never dead or destroyed—it is “neutralized”). Given the
earlier discussion of how TWB contributed to the Yom Kippur failure and the critical role that
toxic fear played in that event, this lack of research focus is curious. However, it may also be
understandable when considering previous discussions related to risk aversion, uncertainty, fear
of intelligence failure, and the ideal of competitive intelligence versus the potential toxic reality of
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it in practice. Although it is speculative, the ideal of analysis as a solely rational exercise
(Rovner, 2011) and a possible underappreciation for the role of emotion in cognitive processes
(Frijda, 1986, 2004) may have contributed to this research opportunity.
The aforementioned literature indicates that positive emotions may enhance a
constructive work environment, while negative emotions from TWB may threaten cohesion.
Within an environment also framed by inherent uncertainty, a lack of outcome feedback, and the
tensions between peer review and competition, TWB may rob intelligence officers of the
psychological safety to express uncertainty and take risks, which effective intelligence requires.
However, the highly rationalized operational environment in which many personnel function may
raise questions about levels of whether individuals feel the safety to express even healthy levels
of emotion if they perceive that doing so may violate tacit functional norms.
Summary
The IC faces macro-complexities and pressures for perfection that transcend 17
agencies, including a web of ambiguous intra- and interorganizational dynamics. Analysts and
operational personnel must often work without a proverbial net to meet policymaker demands
for certainty when the only things of which they are certain is that they are just not sure. Peer
review relies upon the very collegiality that competition and the fragmented security clearance
system resists. This complexity amid uncertainty can breed fear of failure, psychological
ownership over issues and products, and political gamesmanship, all antecedents to TWB.
From multiple epistemological vantage points, the research in this section has
demonstrated the degree to which this complex relational environment has been
intellectualized. Scholars have explored the efficacy of cognitive, methodological, tradecraft, and
structure with only a small group of researchers endeavoring to understand the cultural,
relational, and emotional management influences on those processes. In fact, it is a point of
irony that many scholars who have never been formally part of the IC have called for greater
focus on relational and cultural factors affecting intelligence teams, while seasoned intelligence
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officers approach such issues as on the periphery and as impediments to effectiveness that
must be managed.
This over-intellectualized framing likely reflects the macro-identity of the IC in which
differences are rationalized, emotion rules devalue things “felt,” and the only acceptable clashes
are over ideas in the pursuit of accuracy. However, not only has the mythical dichotomy
between cognition and emotion been debunked, research indicates that they interact as
elements within a mutually reliant whole (Frijda, 1986, 2004). How individuals feel about
coworkers and the organization when they are confronting TWB plays a significant role in
subsequent choices. Thus, not only is the IC’s relegation of emotion and the constructiveness of
relationships to backbench status futile, it may be robbing the analytic process of a key
ingredient for problem-solving.
In sum, the IC has the trappings necessary for TWB, which makes the absence of
research into TWB and other destructive relational frameworks in that environment more
notable. However, no identified research has explored TWB within the IC, leaving a significant
research opportunity open on the nature and impact of the phenomenon in an intelligence
environment. Research related to a diverse array of industries, including other critical mission
environments, has found the behavior to be a significant detriment to climate and outcomes.
Thus, taking advantage of this relatively unexplored research line could provide more depth to
the understanding that IC scholars have on what contributes to, rather than impedes, accurate
intelligence. The remaining question is how to engage this opportunity in what we know about
the responses to and the impact of TWB on intelligence teams. My choice of methodologies and
study design for exploring this topic is the subject of Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This study explored why intelligence analysts and operations personnel respond to toxic
workplace behavior (TWB) and how the phenomenon affects how they function. This question
fundamentally relates to individual meaning within a situation and requires methodologies
designed to surface them. I used grounded theory and situational analysis as methodological
tools to inject rigor and systematization into emerging theory that is grounded in qualitative data
(grounded theory) and to identify the various temporal, historical, social, positional, and
relational elements in situations (situational analysis). The two methodologies are related
historically, temporally, and quasi-ontologically, if not in scope. Snow's (2001) warning about the
futility of understanding co-constructed interaction within social action without simultaneous
attention to “webs of relationships” (p. 369) validates bridging the two methods.
I considered the suitability of other methodologies. For example, I considered whether a
phenomenological study would burrow more deeply into the question because of its purpose in
understanding the lived experience of subjects within a particular situation (Moustakas, 1994).
Similarly, I considered narrative inquiry because of its purpose in understanding the cultural,
social, and identity frames of the storyteller (Lieblich et al., 1998) through the narrator’s
self-interpretation (Riessman, 1993). However, I rejected both as lending a partiality to my
question, which relates less to “what” than “why.” Grounded theory and situational analysis can
work together to explore these questions in more breadth, even within a framework where some
interpretive partiality is inevitable (Clarke, 2012).
While the two methodologies are synergistic, I address each in separate sections in this
chapter for the purposes of readability. I begin each section with a discussion of their major
theoretical underpinnings. Following the methodological discussion, I explain my proposed
research design. Finally, I discuss ethical considerations related to my methodological choices
and unique to intelligence officers as study participants.
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Grounded Theory Methodology
The first section of this chapter explores grounded theory methodology. The discussion
begins with a section on the origins and scope of the methodology that traverses controversies
in epistemologies and the methods emerging from them. This discussion is more than a history
lesson. With three grounded theory schools to understand and navigate, researchers must first
ground themselves in their own epistemological and ontological underpinnings before they can
know what to do. Thus, using grounded theory is a challenge before the first interview is even
conducted.
The following section begins with a discussion of the origins and scope of grounded
theory schools through the lens of its dueling epistemologies. Grounded theory applies rigor to
collection and analysis using specific tools to ensure that the integration of qualitative data and
theory is explicit. Thus, the middle section focuses on these tools, their purposes, and, where
relevant, how they link to their epistemological origins. The section also includes a brief
discussion of a concept steeped in controversy among grounded theorists: theoretical
sensitivity. I conclude the section with a discussion of grounded theory’s approach to
understanding elements of the participant’s broader situation.
Origins and Scope
Bernie Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1965, 1967) developed grounded theory
methodology unexpectedly while collaborating on a study of death and dying. Their
collaboration brought together an unlikely pair of Columbia University-trained quantitative
(Glaser) and University of Chicago-trained qualitative (Strauss) scholars at a time when
qualitative research was attempting to muscle its way into acceptance as a mode of scientific
inquiry (Stern, 2009). The collaboration would be short-lived, as fissures emerged between
Glaser’s positivist and Strauss’s pragmatist epistemologies (Charmaz, 2009). These differences
revealed dramatically different perspectives on the role of the researcher, theory development,
context, and the fit between grounded theory and other disciplines (Glaser, 1992, 1998; Glaser
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& Holton, 2004). The drama would be public, harsh, and create separate grounded theory
identities (Charmaz & Bryant, 2010) that today have taken on a specter of tribalism.
The controversy over what legitimate grounded theory “is” has not been settled;
however, everyone has seemingly withdrawn to their respective corners. Scholars have
characterized the differences as an evolutionary continuum (Charmaz, 2014), a methodological
spiral (Mills et al., 2006),

Figure 3.1

or as a mere

Holloway & Schwartz’s Emergent Flow of Grounded Theory
Research

disagreement over
procedures and the
timing of steps (Walker &
Myrick, 2006). I do not
relitigate the controversy
here. Rather, I explore
grounded theory as a
“family of methods”
(Bryant & Charmaz,
2007, p. 11), first through
a discussion of major
methodological
procedures common to
the various perspectives,

Used by permission.

and second, within a discussion of major points of disagreement.
As depicted in Figure 3.1, grounded theory methodology moves through an emergent
flow of conceptualization, coding, analysis, memoing, categorizing, connecting, and theoretical
sampling, with the researcher revisiting each step until no new ideas emerge (saturation) and a
relevant theory of the phenomenon is constructed (Holloway & Schwartz, 2018). Both
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conducting and describing grounded theory methodology is complex. Effective methodological
practice requires the researcher to juxtapose the ambiguity, flexibility, and abstraction needed
for innovation (Charmaz, 2008; M. L. Jones et al., 2005; Strauss, 1969) with rigor. Additionally,
linear written text is feeble when attempting to describe the simultaneity and complexity of
grounded theory procedures (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004).
Epistemologies of Identity and Meaning. Grounded theory’s history and evolution has
been dynamic, if not tortured. As depicted in Figure 3.2, contemporary approaches to the
methodology have branched into three overarching frameworks, each with its own
epistemological and ontological anchors challenging professional relationships and practice:
•

Classic (green)—Reliant upon “discovery” of theory, objective truth through
abstraction, situational agnosticism, and verification by a neutral observer (Glaser,
1978, 1992, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

•

Straussian-Corbinian (orange and gray)—Reliant upon the emergence of theory,
objective-but-problematized identification of truth, abstraction through meaning
surfaced using structured processes, and researcher bias bracketed through
acknowledgment of assumptions and guiding theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998).

•

Constructivist (purple)—Reliant upon theoretical construction, problematized reality,
co-construction of meaning between participant and researcher, and embrace of
researcher positionality as an element of that co-construction (Charmaz, 1990, 2000,
2006, 2014; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Corbin, 2009).
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Additionally, Clarke and colleagues (2003, 2005; Clarke et al., 2017) founded situational
analysis methodology as an extension of grounded theory in 2003. With roots in epistemological
pragmatism (gray), Clarke has since adapted the methodology to remain relevant to
postmodernism (yellow) and interpretivism (blue). I discuss the origins and methods of
situational analysis in a subsequent section.
Figure 3.2
Methodological Evolution and Epistemological Origins of Grounded Theory and Situational
Analysis

Methodological choices must align with one’s epistemological and ontological
assumptions, as well as the purpose of the study (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Stern, 1994).
Although the purpose behind all three approaches is to develop theory of a phenomenon,
grounded theorists may traverse methodological identities in doing so. For example, Strauss
and Corbin moved through an epistemological flux from post-positivism to more
interpretivist/constructivist approaches between their first and third editions of Basics of
Qualitative Analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Mills et al., 2006; Rieger, 2019; Strauss & Corbin,
1990, 1998). However, Strauss passed away in 1996 (Dicke, 1996), two years before the 1998
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edition was published. Therefore, questions remain as to how far his perspectives may have
evolved prior to that publication and how much of the constructivist approach within the 2008
edition reflects his epistemological journey, given that it was published 12 years after his death.
Corbin (2009) has since written about her own epistemological transition to constructivism, the
nature of multiple truths, and the fluidity in how her approach to meaning and methods has
transitioned.
Despite their differences, the three grounded theory frameworks have remained
committed to the original conception of the methodology as a theory/methods package (Clarke,
2012) designed to understand a problem from the perspectives of those experiencing the
phenomenon (Glaser, 1992). In grounded theory, meaning is constructed through iterative and
interactive methods (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Charmaz, 2012; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to
develop “middle-range” theories grounded in data (Charmaz, 2008, p. 2). Thus, unlike narrative
inquiry where story is the central unit of analysis (Lieblich et al.,1998), the method fractures and
reintegrates story elements among categories as symbols of the phenomenon of interest;
surfaces underlying properties, dimensions, conditions, and consequences; and seeks
understanding at increasing levels of abstraction in theory development (M. L. Jones et al.,
2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998).
Grounded theory’s tools to surface underlying conditions, junction points, and
consequences using participant interviews (Field & Morse, 1985; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) has
yielded an effective approach to understand intelligence officer response processes to TWB.
However, participants diverged in what constitutes a condition of TWB, a consequence (Corbin
& Strauss, 2008), and the relevance of situational factors (Atkinson et al., 2003). Thus, the
foreshadowing research and interview questions in grounded theory studies are open-ended to
establish a general direction while opening the space for new meaning to emerge (Charmaz,
1990; Corbin, 2009). This space allows participants to engage “voice” on their own terms
(Lempert, 1996). Conversely, ceding significant control to participants requires a comfort with
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ambiguity, dual modes of rationality and playfulness (K. Locke, 2007), and the ability to engage
in unpredictable processes of induction, deduction, and abduction (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007)
until no new meaning is emerging from the data.
Sampling and Saturation
Methods of sampling and the concept of saturation are unique to grounded theory. Much
like the meaning that grounded theory is intended to surface, sampling methods are inductive
and emergent; this point is an area of rare agreement by grounded theorists. However,
definitions of saturation as the emergent process of exhausting new areas to sample and
analyze are ambiguous and debated. The one point of agreement seems to be that a
researcher must achieve saturation to develop theory. The following section reviews both
methods as critical paths within the methodology.
Sampling. Unlike quantitative studies designed to answer narrowly focused research
questions using samples representative of a population, grounded theory begins with purposeful
samples of participants chosen because they are perceived to have experience with the
phenomenon (Stern, 2009; Vogt et al., 2012). My interest was confined to response processes
among intelligence analysts and operations personnel. I began with a purposeful sample of
intelligence officers who I believed had experienced TWB, who could explore the problem, and
to whom I had access. Also, unlike quantitative studies where all sampling decisions are made
during study design, grounded theory sampling decisions continue throughout the life of the
study. The researcher leverages previous participants in an “intensity sampling” (Patton, 2002,
p. 243) process of following leads to enrich data and meaning.
Deeper meaning, new connections, and conceptualizations constitute the development
of key categories and concepts necessary for theory development. As categories emerge,
innovative ideas spur abductive leaps that ultimately narrow into abstract theory (Charmaz,
2014). Data collection and sampling terminate when no new concepts and pathways are
emerging, a process referred to as saturation (Adler & Adler, 2012; Janice M. Morse, 1995).
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Saturation. Grounded theory descriptions of saturation have taken on the specter of
late-Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s description of pornography: “I know it when I see it”
(Jacobellis v. Ohio, 1964). Glaser and Strauss (1967) originally characterized this process as
sampling until core categories were exhausted and nothing new emerged. Wiener (2007)
defined saturation as an ambiguous judgment where no more data is needed, while M. L. Jones
et al. (2005) characterized the process as a tautology where the researcher mines for data until
new data provide no new data. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argued that redundancy equaled
saturation. Holloway and Schwartz (2018) argued that saturation is found in theoretical
conceptualization linked to emerging theory, not in discrete categories. Selden (2005) applied a
discursive approach, tying it to the end of new things being said. Partington (2000) offered a
processual approach where constant comparison (discussed below) of incidents gives way to
the constant comparison of properties within them under a given category.
Aside from their breadth, most of these perspectives err in describing saturation of
process while giving few clues on how to saturate understanding. One can reach a point at
which no new concepts are emerging. Abstracting those concepts into theory is a different
matter (Urquhart et al., 2010) and subsumes both process and outcome (Charmaz, 2001). In
alignment with Holloway and Schwartz (2018), I reached saturation in the study when
theoretical conceptualization exhausted into a definable, relevant theory of meaning and action.
Saturation requires more than sensing the data. Saturation and the ability to elucidate meaning
through the linkage of properties, conditions, and junction points (Hennink et al., 2016) rely upon
systematic coding and analysis techniques.
Coding and Analysis
Rigorous coding of qualitative data is fundamental to grounded theory. Like the sampling
that generates data, its coding is also emergent. The following section discusses the coding
strategies; the role of memoing to track emergent themes, new directions, and positionalities;
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the role of constant comparison; and controversies surrounding the concept of “theoretical
sensitivity” in reference to the role of extant literature and preexisting knowledge.
Initial Coding. The various grounded theory paradigms use different terminology for the
coding phases, often reflecting nuanced distinctions. For example, Charmaz (2000, 2006, 2014)
uses the term initial coding to denote the first phase of data collection and analysis. Clarke,
Strauss, Corbin, and Glaser (Clarke, 2012; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998)
prefer the term open coding. I will adopt Charmaz’s (2006, 2014) use of the term initial coding,
which begins the researcher’s relationship with the data and participants (Star, 2007). Initial
coding is a process designed to explore action, process, sequence, and outcomes. The
researcher immerses herself into the content by delimiting action into discrete meanings (Corbin
& Strauss, 2008). Meaning is betrayed by metaphor, intonation, and structure. Thus, in vivo
codes of exact words and phrases illuminate situations or experiences as discursive symbols
when writing the final product (Charon, 1989; Holloway & Schwartz, 2018). Adopting codes in
gerund form freezes action in time and space (Glaser, 1978), places a check on earlier
presumptions (Charmaz, 1990), and removes the intellectual distance between the researcher,
the participant, and action (Charmaz, 2014).
Maneuvering through a morass of codes is the challenge during initial coding. I
perceived that the intellectually reflective population, combined with the uniqueness of working
within a secretive environment in which relational influences on operations are underexplored,
would create an elevated demand for “voice” (Nolan, 2019). Therefore, I expected most
participants to have “a lot to say,” resulting in a significant number of codes to be analyzed
line-by-line and segment-by-segment (Charmaz, 1990). I began analysis simultaneously with
coding in order to grasp meaning around processes relevant to the phenomena (Glaser, 1978),
although my symbolic interactionist frame accepted the interweaving of participants and my
meaning into a co-constructed form. However, staying true to the methodology’s systematic way
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to sift, sort, and conceptualize toward abstraction was fundamental (Martin & Turner, 1986).
Memos were a critical element of that process.
Memoing. In grounded theory, the term memoing not only demonstrates the
immersive-action form of initial coding using gerunds, but also references a critical
methodological tool (Birks et al., 2008). Memos link coding and writing (Charmaz, 2002a) to
“create social reality for the researcher” (Richardson, 1998, p. 349). If initial coding immerses
the researcher in the data and away from their own presumptions, then memoing pulls the
researcher further into the distance of abstraction by stimulating conceptualization, prioritization,
positionality framing, and categorization (Birks et al., 2008; Lempert, 2007).
Memos spur and are spurred by the inductive, deductive, and abductive leaps within
grounded theory through questions and abstraction (Charmaz, 2014). What is happening here?
Where are the gaps? What do conditional and dimensional variations mean for developing
theory (Clarke, 2012)? In my study, they formed an analytical tracking system (Uwe Flick, 2018)
as I contended with new directions. I had already begun memoing at the proposal stage, which
had generated theoretical questions, surfaced formerly unrealized sensitizing concepts behind
my study, and finalized design decisions.
Focused Coding. Focused codes synthesize and explain data on broader levels. This
intermediate phase of coding reintegrates data within emerging categories, abstraction, and key
situational factors. Processes revolve around more directive coding, conceptualizing, memoing,
and sampling emerging categories. As codes emerge more frequently across data sets, the
preponderance of initial codes should be subsumed under a smaller number of more refined
and abstract focused codes interpreted through constant comparison (Charmaz, 2000).
The variable terminology that grounded theory frameworks use in this intermediate
phase may confuse the nascent researcher. However, what the grid does not convey is the way
in which the variations symbolize epistemological messiness as a fault line between paradigms.
For example, Charmaz (2006, 2014), a constructivist, and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998), in
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their post-positivist phase, conducted focused coding and axial coding, respectively, during the
intermediate phase. While both processes were designed to categorize relationships,
properties, and their dimensions, the procedures (rigid versus flexible) represent the
assumptions about the researcher positionality and the role of an external “truth” that distinguish
them.
Arguments also exist over which coding phase various procedures represent. Birks et al.
(2008) placed Glaserian selective coding around an emerged category within the intermediate
phase, while Walker and Myrick (2006) argued that the process is the final element of
first-phase coding. Even accepting the Birks perspective, Glaser's (1978) use of selective
coding and Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) axial coding are not only different in purpose and
process—the differences reflect the core of the public dispute between the practitioners (Glaser,
1992). Finally, Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) used selective coding to discriminate, refine,
and sample around the emerging abstracted theory in the final stage of a study. Charmaz
(2000) would argue that arguments over where to place what procedure risks sapping grounded
theory research of critical flexibility. Also, as implied by Holloway and Schwartz’s (2018)
emergent flow of research, the arguments are untethered from the methodology in practice,
which relies upon evolving (and revolving) sampling, coding, and analytic strategies as the data
and emerging theory demand.
Constant Comparison. Constant comparison, in which accumulated data—code to
code, category to category, participant to participant, condition to condition—leverages
substantive memos to stimulate the emergence of abstract patterns. I interpreted the
emergence of more centralized themes and categories throughout data collection and coding.
Thus, constant comparison established the foundation for my theoretical model by sustaining
data immersion, inhibiting overinterpretation, and mitigating errant linkages (Dey, 2007;
Duchscher & Morgan, 2004; Stern, 2009). Interpreting linkages between categories and
emerging theory occurred through a process of theoretical sensitivity.

89
Theoretical Sensitivity. Theoretical sensitivity is the ability to project beyond the mass
of codes and categories into higher levels of abstraction. The concept is a tenant of all schools
of grounded theory and fundamental to decisions on theoretical saturation (Janice M. Morse,
2004). Theoretical sensitivity is also central in debates over the roles of the researcher and prior
theoretical knowledge as they constitute “what is” grounded theory. The debates have been
public and raw, leading Glaser to repudiate grounded theory’s links to symbolic interactionism,
reject its methodological fit with other qualitative disciplines (Glaser & Holton, 2004), and
question the “morality” of Straussian-Corbinian frameworks (Glaser, 1992, p. 5).
The melodrama is less important here than what the arguments say about the
epistemological and ontological undercurrents between them. The divisions relate to the role of
prior theoretical knowledge and how this impacts whose voice is heard in the theory. The classic
grounded theorist approach relies upon objective immersion in the data and the bracketing of
researcher bias away from the analytical process (Glaser, 1978). The Straussian-Corbinian
approach assumes the existence of researcher bias and theoretical framing, contending that
emerging theory can be scrubbed clean by form and process (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The
constructivist approach assumes that reflexive co-construction of meaning between researcher
and participant, along with prior knowledge, is an element of the analytical and interpretive
process (Charmaz, 2007).
Dey (1999) famously argued that an open mind is not the same thing as an empty head.
In fact, classicists do not argue that researchers are without bias. The pivot is over whether
preconceived notions and researcher bias can be controlled. Even within their post-positivist
frame, Strauss and Corbin (1990) adopted the view that prior theoretical and professional
knowledge of the phenomenon under study are required to develop theoretical sensitivity. The
IC is a social world with innumerable subworlds. Each contains unique norms, practices, and
language that would challenge the ability of an uninitiated researcher to understand the interplay
of relational factors and outcomes within the situation. Thus, my experience in intelligence was
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a guidepost to spur theoretical sensitivity (Charmaz, 2002a). Without this knowledge to ignite
theoretical sensitivity, I would have been left casting about, trying to abstract emerging
concepts, but with nothing to navigate understanding.
Knowledge can be a lifeboat or anchor. Bowen (2006) distinguished between sensitizing
concepts as general guides and definitive concepts as narrowing the field of view. The chore is
knowing the difference. Thus, memoing and reflexive practices aided my theoretical sensitivity
by pulling me back from the data and tracking how my thinking traversed intuition, memory,
experience, and heuristics (Cutcliffe & McKenna, 1999; Kelle, 2007). In this way, prior
knowledge made saturation more efficient, and better enabled me to evaluate theoretical fit with
the data (Padgett, 2004).
Grounded Theory and the Situation
Chapter 2 demonstrated the complexities inherent in the IC environment. Boundaries
diverged and overlapped, reflecting relationships between referents (Ashforth et al., 2016), as
well as personal and professional values that may not have always aligned (Pache & Santos,
2010). Additionally, intelligence officers’ professional lives are steeped in broader social,
political, historical, and material conditions. While practice may originate at the micro-political
level and emerge upward (Foucault, 1977), their institutionalization at the meso-level may
metastasize into macro-environments and mask the exact junction points between them (Corbin
& Strauss, 1996, 2008).
Grounded theory’s systematic methods to understand participant meaning makes the
methodology particularly suited to identifying action at multiple structural levels. However, the
role of the situation has been controversial in grounded theory. Classicists have argued that
situational factors are superfluous when theory is sufficiently abstract (Glaser, 1992; Glaser &
Holton, 2004). However, Straussian-Corbinians and constructivists have recognized the
partiality of developing theory without understanding the temporal, spatial, and structural
elements that influence meaning (Charmaz, 2000, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998).
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Bridging these frameworks, Corbin and Strauss (2008) rejected clear distinctions between
multiple levels of social structure, mirroring the integrative and fluid constructivist approach to
grasping situational influences on meaning.
Drawings and other aids act as visual memos to help researchers conceptualize and
depict abstract theory (Lempert, 2007). However, depicting the location and interaction of
complex situational factors at the

Figure 3.3

foundation of the theory in standard

Strauss and Corbin’s Original Conditional Matrix

two-dimensional text and
visualization tools is a challenge. For
instance, as demonstrated in Figure
3.3, Strauss and Corbin (1990)
attempted to capture the ambiguous
multilevel forces constitutive of
action. However, this original,
hierarchical depiction of concentric
circles appeared step-wise and rigid.
Therefore, it fails to capture the

Note: Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative
research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques (1st
ed.). SAGE. Used by permission.

integrative impact as situations and individual variances longitudinally shift (Clarke, 2005). In
alignment with their epistemological flux during the 1990s, they revised the conceptualization of
situational elements in a spiral form, as seen in Figure 3.4 (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), which
decentralized action in a more fluid depiction of conditions and consequences. However, the
new depiction still did not account for time, simultaneity, value, or partialities. Situational
analysis is a method uniquely positioned to capture these elements.
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Situational Analysis Methodology
Chapter 2 explored the IC’s structural complexities and the way TWB in this environment
may systematize the behavior into discourse, practice, and outcomes. The previous discussion
of grounded theory methodology
explored its fit as a set of tools to

Figure 3.4
Strauss & Corbin’s Revised Conditional Matrix

surface meaning in relationship to
TWB and the trajectory of responses
that intelligence officers may have to
events. However, the “why” of
response is a key interest in my
research. I anticipated at the outset
that a set of personal, organizational,
and situational factors would act as
conditions to response. Grounded
theory surfaced many of these
elements. However, the individual

Note: Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. (1998). Basics of qualitative
research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques (2nd
ed.). SAGE. Used by permission.

meaning emergent in participant interviews also siloed my understanding of the social,
relational, and situational influences remembered as part of the event. To move beyond
individual meaning and add rigor to the representation of situational factors in my theory, I used
situational analysis methodology.
The following section explores the methodological fit that situational analysis has in
relation to my research question. I begin by framing the methodological discussion through an
analysis of the situatedness of response to TWB. Epistemologies as ways of knowing are not
fungible from the methods used to produce that knowledge (Clarke, 2015). As with the
methodological discussion on grounded theory, I next explore epistemological and ontological
underpinnings of the methodology—Clarke’s (2003, 2005) “root metaphors”—before turning to a
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review of the method’s techniques and tools. As fundamental philosophies to situational
analysis, theories related to power, voice, the self, and meaning figure heavily in this section.
Root Metaphors of Situational Analysis
Epistemologies and ontologies of power, voice, and social interaction are fundamental to
situational analysis methodology. As noted, Clarke (2003, 2005) has termed these
underpinnings root metaphors. I explore the three root metaphors below: Blumer’s (1969)
symbolic interactionism; Foucault’s (1965, 1972, 1980, 1990) conditions of power through
discourse and practice; and Strauss’s (1978, 1982) SWAT. As a pretext for this more
methodologically refined discussion, I begin with a brief overview of scholarship related to
aspects of the “self.”
Self and Self-Concepts. Situated amongst late nineteenth-century and early
20th-century modernization and reform movements, James (1890) conceptualized multiple
material, spiritual, and social selves engaged in an ongoing internal social process to establish
roles and status (Musolf, 1992). The complex layers of the internal “self” interact with the
external selves of referent groups and individuals (Cardwell, 1971). This interaction creates a
“looking glass self” (Cooley, 1902) in which one’s self-perception forms at least partially from
how we interpret others’ perceptions of us. Mead (1934) depicted this process as an internal
conversation between the directive, intentional “I” and the interpretive, reflective “me.” In this
way, the development of the “self” is both reflexive and emergent, but also dialectical, because
building one’s self-concept is a tension-filled process of immersion and conflict (Gecas, 1982).
Symbolic Interactionism and the “Self.” Individual meaning becomes emergent, fluid,
and situational within self-concept and identity building (Strauss, 1969). Although this interaction
is intrusive, it is also stabilizing as the reflexive conduit for the I-Me social process (Gecas,
1982). A presented “self” (Goffman, 1959) reflects meaning about the individual’s perceived
place in the world. Blumer (1969) further defined social processes between individuals and the
external world as a symbolically interactive process linking the past, present, and future into one
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sense of meaning. Within Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, meaning was not just handed over
from the past. Rather, it was handed over, reformed, integrated with other objects and
situations, and returned to an external world in which it no longer resembled its original form.
Understanding this interaction is critical when exploring how intelligence officers within
toxic environments respond to the dynamic. If James, Dewey, Mead, and Blumer were correct,
the meaning intelligence officers ascribe to TWB does not emerge from a set of universal truths,
but from the interaction between their internal conversations, perceived situations, and similar
processes in others. They function within an array of referents and collectives as they
collaborate, compete, produce, and present. Actions and interactions may be a group
phenomenon; however, meaning as a symbol would drive individual choices in fundamentally
discursive ways (Denzin, 2016) within the bounds of the situation. In this way, the delineation
between micro-, meso-, and macro-processes would blur (Corbin & Strauss, 1996, 2008;
Strauss, 1987) and knowledge itself would become situational (Dewey, 1909; Haraway, 1988).
Appraisals of “Self” and Self-Concepts. Two integrated aspects of self-concept are
central to grounded theory methodology and symbolic interactionism. The internalized “self” is
represented by “self-appraisals” and “reflected appraisals.”
Self-appraisal. The “self-appraisal” most closely resembles Mead’s (1934) “I” as a
reflection of the traits one perceives as independent of others and situation. This element of
self-concepts represents the sum of thoughts and feelings an individual may have about
themselves as an object (Rosenberg, 1979). While the internalized “self ‘may be referenced as
representing one point in time, this time stamp is a longitudinal subset of the self-perceptions
that a person may have. This subset includes what they remember about their pasts, how they
see themselves in the present, and their vision for a future “self” (E. E. Jones & Gerard, 1967).
Self-concepts are the meanings one attaches to oneself (Gecas, 1982). An individual
may develop an identity as a situated self-concept (Alexander & Lauderdale, 1977), which may
include both public and private personas (Rhodewalt, 1986). Consequently, self-concepts are
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fluid in time but also dependent on who one is interacting with in the moment. This emerging
self-concept becomes a working hypothesis of the “self” because current events resembling
memories of the past will integrate those experiences with the present.
Others develop identities about who we are as we also bestow identities on others.
Situated identity theory postulates that experiences are encoded in the moment; however,
meanings are longitudinal in that they create expectations that may carry over into future
interactions with others in the social environment or in which circumstances are similar. We
develop schemas about the kind of people they are. In turn, these schemas become working
hypotheses of how others will behave in the future, as well as how we will feel and respond
when they do (Alexander & Knight, 1971; Alexander & Rudd, 1984).
Reflected appraisals. As components of self-concepts, reflected appraisals are the
theoretical offspring of Mead's (1934) and Blumer's (1969) dialogic and reflected “self” and
Cooley’s (1902) theory of the “looking glass self.” Sullivan (1953) developed the term to
represent the notion of “self” derived from perceptions of how others perceive us as we interact
with the world (Epstein, 1973). In this way, self-concepts form through interactions between selfappraisals and reflected appraisals that challenge efforts to delineate between them.
Research on the role and value of reflected appraisals intersects with self-esteem, risk
evaluation, and status. Early research showed alignment between individuals’ self-perceptions
with their reflected appraisals. Reflected appraisals may also represent other self-concept
domains (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1979), such as personality dimensions, values (Olver &
Mooradian, 2003; Rios Morrison & Wheeler, 2010), self-esteem, risk, and how these complex
aspects of “self” interact with ethnic, gender, and other forms of identity (Watson & Barone,
1976). Therefore, our reflected appraisals may not be accurate depictions of how others actually
perceive us because they cannot be distinguished from how we see ourselves (Felson, 1985).
Meaning in Social Worlds. C. S. Lewis (1955) wrote, “What you see and what you
hear depends a great deal on where you are standing” (p. 125). Reflecting this concept, social
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worlds theory argued that social life around fluid forms of discourse linked action, practice, and
technologies. This theory was situated in the postmodern epistemological turn in the 1980s and
1990s (A. I. Goldman, 1999; Hicks, 2004). Building on Foucault’s “universes of discourse,”
decentering of the “knowing subject” (Foucault, 1972), and Rousseau’s (2016) rejection of
traditional order, postmodernists sought to discredit the search for a universal truth. Concurrent
with this turn, the “pragmatist school” within the University of Chicago leveraged its roots in
Mead, Dewey, and Peirce’s conceptualization of abduction (Joas, 1993; Peirce, 1931) to
explore universalism as confined to action within communities of practice (Lorino, 2018).
Two theories of meaning within social worlds emerged within this confluence of thought.
Shibutani (1955,1986) depicted a social world as a calibration tool that individuals used to align
current meaning with the situation; when the two fell out of alignment, the individual recalibrated
meaning to the social world. He leveraged Mead-ian and Blumer-ian thought by situating
meaning in relationships and social action, rather than within an objective reality. Taking the
argument further, Star (2007) referred to this confluence of individual meaning and the situation
as the “between-ess of the world” (p. 90).
In a reconceptualization as social worlds/arenas theory (SWAT), Strauss (1978) built on
Shibutani by reorienting social worlds theory away from individual meaning. Rather, Strauss
placed the unit of analysis on action, conflict, and process as conveyances of power. Any area
bound by specific beliefs, goals, and agendas created a social world that was in constant flux as
subworlds formed, splintered, and ceased to exist. For Strauss, social worlds within the situation
were the result of conflicts, negotiations, wins, and losses. Arenas of discourse often
intersected, others were coterminous, and some interacted only by implication. Clarke (2005)
argued that Strauss’s (1978) conceptualization of SWAT drew on Blumer's (1958) “collective
positionalities” in which social worlds emerged from the perceived collective position of
adversarial groups. Within these worlds, the locus of power was betrayed by practice and
structure, and by who had the power to authenticate and marginalize.
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Within the context of SWAT, the existence of any set of behaviors betrays universes of
discourse, structures, and those who have the power to legitimize them (Blau,1964). In turn,
these authentication practices form a rationing system for marginalization and endorsement for
future acts (L. A. Bell, 2016). However, individuals traverse multiple social worlds. Fluid
boundaries within the situation allow action and norms within one or more social worlds to flow
into others (Clarke, 1991; Strauss, 1978), giving a simultaneity to cause and effect.
This conceptualization of social worlds is relevant to the question of how intelligence
officers respond to TWB. The IC is functionally ambiguous and fluid by design so that it remains
nibble in response to unpredictable geopolitical events. This complexity leads to a functional
reality of co-constructed, overlapping, interactive, and coterminous social worlds. Research
indicates that organizational complexity and ambiguity incentivize TWB (Dagless, 2018; Hodson
et al., 2006) when policies, reporting structures, and practices misalign with the need to
establish order within the system (Carlock, 2013; Kusy & Holloway, 2009). Thus, without
structures and discourse conducive to healthy relationships, TWB might emerge into a tacit
norm within L. A. Bell’s (2016) rationing system.
Blumer (1969) argued that interactions between individuals take on a “singleness” where
each individual’s meaning cannot be understood apart from the other. A similar gestalt effect
occurs when attempting to delineate between primary and secondary social worlds in the
phenomenon. Thus, attempting to extricate specific elements as conditions versus
consequences within these social worlds inherently linearizes relationships that may not be
possible to capture in two-dimensional form. How does the researcher follow these
interrelationships to find the center of power within these social worlds?
Clarke (2003, 2005) founded situational analysis methodology as an extension of
grounded theory that elevates the broader situation as the primary unit of analysis. The method
explores biographical, historical, discursive, and material/nonhuman influences on common
meaning and its variations by leveraging Blumer's (1969) symbolic interactionism, Foucault's
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(1972, 1980) centrality of power in discourse, and Strauss’s (1978) SWAT as “root metaphors”
(Clarke, 2003, 2005; Clarke et al., 2017). As with grounded theory, conceptualizations of the
“self” as interactive and situated (Dewey, 1909; James, 1890; Mead, 1934) are key concepts.
In segment two of this study, I used situational analysis to examine and visualize this
broader participant situation. Representative of grounded theory’s pragmatist wing, situational
analysis methodologists reject traditional notions of context (and the use of the term context) as
surrounding social processes; rather, social processes are constitutive of context (Clarke, 2005,
2012; Clarke et al., 2017). Situatedness reveals itself within the salient structures and conditions
related to action. By identifying the variations and conditions along with how they translate into
action (Vasconcelos et al., 2012), situational analysis assumes that time, space, and structure
are fundamental to meaning. While grounded theory surfaced participant meaning relevant to
how they responded to TWB, situational analysis identified the conditional, relational, and social
elements constitutive of meaning.
The methodology uses grounded theory techniques to map decisions, junctions, and
major pivots in action to support the development of maps of the phenomenon under study
(Clarke et al., 2017). For example, in their study of the communication trajectory of young
people experiencing long-term illnesses, Sen and Spring (2013) developed multiple “messy,”
relational, situational, positional, and social worlds/arenas maps, each on a continuum of refined
structure and depth. Not only did these maps enable participant stories to be abstracted to
broader frames, they visualized relationships and their paths of connectivity (Corbin & Strauss,
2008). The flexibility of the methodology enables researchers to use some mapping conventions
and not others, as well as to develop innovative map forms unique to their studies. As is
explored in Chapter 5, my study relied on unordered, ordered, and social worlds/arenas maps to
convey the situation relevant to responses to TWB among intelligence officers.
Consequences at one point in time may evolve into underlying conditions of another
(Corbin & Strauss, 1996). Because of this confluence, the methodology leans away from linear
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causality in social processes (Dey, 2007); rather, it depicts variegated relationships at all
structural levels. Additionally, although the method is more typically aligned with
pragmatist/interpretivist/postmodern approaches evolving from Strauss’s work in particular
(Charmaz, 2014), I argue the method also complements constructivist grounded theory’s need
to maneuver through ambiguous levels of situatedness to construct robust theory.
Mapping Voice and Meaning Through Situational Analysis
I have explored epistemological approaches to voice, its ontologies, and how it is
enacted in the intelligence environment. A return to the concept is appropriate here. Voiced
representations of action within a situation are the primary representations of meaning in this
study. Language is a primary way of representing social processes and conveys shifts of
meaning over time (Milliken & Schreiber, 2012). However, voice is not always overt (DeHaene
et al., 2010). Silence may function as a mechanism to exert power over a past situation in which
the participant felt powerless. Also, some social worlds value silence over overt communication,
rendering the former a method of group belonging. Even in vocal cultures, the choice of silence
over overt communication may be subject-dependent (Ghorashi, 2008; Poland & Peterson,
1998) and historically or politically situated (Charmaz, 2002a).
Charmaz (2008) argued that situational analysis interweaves with grounded theory’s
focus on the core concept through mapping discourses, silences-as-voice, and choices. Using
interviews to understand the broader situation of the phenomenon aligns with Strauss’s (1978)
depiction of “universes of discourse” in which groups continually evolve (Mead, 1934) within
their own social worlds and in their boundaries with others. Therefore, interviews will surface
meaning on participant stances and claims (Charmaz, 2008; Clarke, 2012). The roles of power
and nonhuman objects, such as technology (Foucault, 1980, 1995), tacit versus intentional
knowledge and practice (Dreyfus et al., 1983), and the presence of silent actors and actants
(Clarke, 2007) will be key data points to situate meaning.
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Tracking overt and silenced voice in participant experiences has been integral to data
collection and analysis in the study. As is explored further in Chapters 4 and 5, participants
represented responses through efforts to speak as a form of self-advocacy, sanctions for doing
so, moments of choosing silence as forms of self-defense, and efforts by others to subjugate
them to silence. Additionally, as is discussed further in Chapter 5, silence can be a form of
dissent that accompanies action, representing structures and micro-systems not present in the
discourse, but real nonetheless.
Research Design—Integration of Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis
As discussed, this study uses situational analysis and grounded theory as an integrative
design. Chapter 5 explores the situation through a series of empirically developed maps to
represent the role of situational elements affecting the phenomenon under study. Grounded
theory and extant resources provided the data for mapping processes. Rather than representing
only participant meaning from the grounded theory segment, the theoretical model explored in
Chapter 6 will represent participant meaning of, in, and surrounding the situation.
Data Collection
Data in my study consists of two forms: participant interviews and multimodal analysis of
extant data. This section discusses my data collection design. I begin with a discussion of who I
recruited to participate in the study, how that population informed my research question, and the
challenges associated with locating and working with them on the research. I conclude the
section with a discussion of how I conducted interviews, crafted the interview questions,
constructed the recruitment package, and engaged multimodal sources.
Role of Sensitizing Concepts. Sensitizing concepts may challenge research without
effective mechanisms to manage them. My experience in the IC, along with my understanding
of TWB models and research, have outfitted me with a set of sensitizing concepts (Blumer,
1954, 1969) related to power and voice that have guided my research. As discussed, the role of
preconceived notions and prior theoretical knowledge has been a source of controversy
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amongst grounded theorists (Glaser, 1978, 1992). However, Charmaz (2000) argued that
sensitizing concepts aide the researcher in developing a more efficient and informed design.
Rigorous coding, producing and analyzing 66 memos, and reflexivity have been primary
methods to ensure that my sensitizing concepts remain grounded in the data.
Participants. I used a purposeful sample of study participants who have experienced
TWB while serving as active intelligence analysts or operational personnel. As noted in Chapter
1, I hold a sensitizing concept that the experiences of my participants and guiding theory on
TWB are linked to power and the situation because research in other environments has strongly
indicated this relationship (e.g., Aquino & Lamertz, 2004; Carlock, 2013; Kusy & Holloway,
2009; Lian et al., 2012). My approach to purposeful sampling also aligns within Schatzman and
Strauss’s (1973) definition of “selective sampling” as a framework in which sampling begins with
a specific theoretical frame.
My research question centers on how and why intelligence officers respond to TWB and
how the behavior impacts how they function in the work environment. All members of the IC are
intelligence officers, regardless of occupation. However, I have focused this study on IC
professionals most acutely associated with the core mission. For the purposes of my study, I
defined the term intelligence officer as an analyst or other operational professional supporting
and critical mission operations during routine or crisis situations while a government employee
of one of the 18 IC entities. Because all experiences were relayed through memories, even for
ongoing events, active and inactive (e.g., retired) intelligence officers were relevant study
participants.
I limited participants to those who were civil servants within the toxic situation. Although
current workforce numbers are classified, declassified data between 2009 and 2013 indicated
that contractors composed approximately 20% of the IC workforce during the period (Halchin,
2015; ICD 612—Core Contract Personnel, 2015; Nemfakos, 2013). Like their civil service
colleagues, IC contractors hold critical roles within social worlds that cross team and institutional

102
boundaries. They inhabit a social space in which they are legally and socially subordinate to civil
service team members, while also members of social worlds within the commercial firms that
employ them. Thus, they inhabit an intersectionality consisting of the government arena shaped
by mission and the commercial arena driven by a mixture of mission and profit. Including
contractors in my study would added seemingly infinite layers of complexity as I attempted to
delineate the meaning of TWB experienced in these bounded spaces. In other words,
contractors would deserve their own dissertation. Confining data collection to civil servants also
engaged complex social worlds and arenas, but in ways that confined them to a more
manageable theoretical space.
Recruiting Among Sensitive Populations. I departed the IC in 2013 and no longer
hold a security clearance. Because intelligence officers function within a semi-closed framework
of security classifications, occupational sensitivities, and secure facilities, identifying and
contacting potential participants presented unique challenges. I maintain social relationships
with former IC colleagues. While they are private citizens and accessible through known contact
information, they do not necessarily disclose their relationships to the IC through their social
media accounts. Consequently, obtaining study participants required a more intentional
strategy.
Intelligence officers are not included among the categories of sensitive populations in the
Belmont Report (The National Commission, 1979) or the World Medical Association’s guidelines
for ethics in medical research (64th WMA General Assembly, 2013). However, I assessed that
potential risks of harm are likely greater than other non-covered groups due to the specialized
nature of the work and the damage that the individuals, their entities, and national security
objectives might experience if participant identities were disclosed. Further, those of us who are
no longer active maintain the same obligations to protect sources, methods, and information as
when we were employed by the IC. The following recruitment strategy was designed with these
sensitivities in mind.
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Recruitment Strategy. The random sampling that is critical for empirical validity in
quantitative studies (Vogt et al., 2012) was not appropriate for my qualitative, situational
analysis/grounded theory-based study because the analysis would have gained no value from
exploring the meaning of those outside of the phenomenon under study (Denzin, 2009;
Holloway & Schwartz, 2018). Simply, those who have not experienced the phenomenon could
provide no meaningful insight into variations and response to it. I designed a purposeful
recruitment strategy to narrow the data-collection scope to intelligence officers who had
experience with TWB as targets, witnesses, and/or learners. I attempted to design a sample
diverse enough to ensure occupational and socio-demographical breadth while limiting
recruitment to my primary interest. Appendix C includes my full recruitment letter. My selection
criteria are summarized below:
•

Either a current or former IC analyst, operations professional (those in occupations in
direct support to intelligence production), or manager of these occupations. Retirees
or former professionals were eligible if the insights related to experiences while
serving in that former IC role.

•

Government civilian in a component of the U.S. intelligence community during the
time they experienced the behavior. Current contractor-versus-civilian status was
unimportant.

•

Experience with TWB in the IC while in those capacities.

I would ultimately expand the occupational scope when early analysis indicated that I had
imposed unnecessary limitations on the sample. I address this dynamic in the subsequent
Sample Description section.
Researchers must consider what is pragmatic and appropriate within their research
during the design phase (Clarke, 2005). With nearly 25 years in the broader national security
environment, the potential for valuable data among known relationships was high. The expected
biasing effect associated with interviewing known relationships and environments can benefit
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understanding that adds depth to the study of specialized environments. However, a study
sample too heavily populated with known relationships without sufficient reflexivity may also
narrow understanding toward a subset of phenomena that fails to account for broader
relationships (Charmaz, 2014). I intentionally limited known relationships to an arbitrary 25% of
the total sample.
I collected data from a cross-section of the IC within diverse age, gender, and ethnic
groups. Although responses to TWB may or may not have a sociodemographic component,
participants representing a broader array of sociodemographic social worlds might have provide
more breadth to my understanding of the key question of what is “happening” (Charmaz, 2002a;
Glaser, 1998). I took advantage of more wide-ranging connections through LinkedIn and other
professionally based social media sites to invite a broader representation of participants into my
study. I also actively targeted recruitment of African American women midway through the study
to increase their representation in the sample.
Two situational elements challenged my ability to recruit participants: the sensitivity of
the population and the Coronavirus Virus Disease 19 (COVID-19) pandemic emerging in late
2019 into 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic challenged recruitment because I began contacting
potential subjects in the spring during the time in which intelligence officers—like the rest of the
globe—were adjusting to new professional and personal operating frameworks. Trust through
network “snowballing” is a necessary element to recruiting among sensitive populations (Sadler
et al., 2010). My outreach consisted of three strategies:
Network Utilization. For the grounded theory portion of the study, I contacted current
and former intelligence officers. I began recruitment by using friend-and-colleague networks
(FCNs) from my approximately 25-year career in national security. I initiated outreach using
direct messaging capabilities available through common social media platforms (discussed
below) because I commonly used these methods to communicate with former colleagues. Using
an Institutional Review Board (IRB)-approved text, I explained the study purpose and
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procedures, invited them to participate if they had experiences that might contribute to the
study’s goals, and asked if they could inform others who might participate.
Snowball Sampling Recruitment. Snowballing is a purposeful sampling process that
consists of using primary-, secondary-, and third-order networks to build participant samples for
qualitative studies. As noted, the strategy is commonly used among qualitative researchers
studying phenomena among sensitive populations (Sadler et al., 2010) or among groups for
which structural boundaries challenge access to them (Browne, 2005). The method is also an
efficient way to narrow recruitment to those with specialized knowledge of a phenomenon and to
establish trust with participants through network cosigning (Shaghaghi et al., 2011).
Participants in my study emerged as beneficial recruitment resources for additional data
collection. Participants represented nine of the 18 IC entities. Participants in the grounded
theory segment recruited 10 of my 20 grounded theory participants. Two of the five situational
analysis participants recruited the remaining participants in that segment. FCN members who
were not study-eligible, but who had an interest in the study’s findings, also assisted in
recruiting. Two senior executives who did not participate recruited participants for the study from
two IC entities. One FCN participant recruited three individuals from two entities. One participant
outside of my FCN, who I had met through an IC social organization, participated and brought
two other participants to the study. A third non-FCN associate, who was a former intelligence
officer I had met through a non-IC network, participated and recruited an additional participant.
While situational analysis leans heavily upon extant data sources, interviews with
individuals who could explore that multilevel ecological space surrounding and constitutive of
TWB were a valuable tool. I recruited a cadre of seven participants in the study’s second
segment to provide perspective on the situation and to help guide further data collection. Their
recruitment also followed a snowballing process in which participants played a valuable role in
identifying and facilitating connections to others who might have valuable insights.
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Use of Social Media. Using Facebook’s Messenger platform, I contacted intelligence
officers with whom I maintained ongoing social relationships. I also used LinkedIn as a
recruitment site. LinkedIn is a professional networking platform designed to connect users
across occupations, professional interests, and relevant content (What Is LinkedIn and How
Can I Use It?, 2020). The site is a common networking platform for non-covert intelligence
officers and unclassified intelligence-related content produced by civilian, military, and
contracting personnel with a professional interest in national security issues. I began expanding
my list of IC connections on the site one year before recruitment began to create a foundation
for outreach during recruitment.
As a direct recruitment approach, LinkedIn was only moderately successful. I obtained
one participant using this method, who recruited one additional participant. That relationship
also recruited a third participant.
In addition to reaching out to individual connections, I also leveraged established
LinkedIn groups focused on intelligence and national security issues, including the following:
•

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance—a closed group producing content
relevant to this specialized intelligence focus area

•

Intelligence and National Security Alliance—a closed group including a broad array
of professionals in the intelligence and national security arenas

•

The Intelligence Community—a closed group of IC stakeholders

•

Intelligence and Security—a closed group of content providers on an array of
intelligence-related topics.

I recruited three participants using this method.
Grounded Theory Segment Participants. Grounded theory studies commonly provide
information on each participant to reveal elements of positionality in the data. Because I
consider intelligence officers to be functionally sensitive, I have chosen not to provide this level
of granularity in the study. Where necessary, I discuss a basic level of detail during the

107
discussion of the model to provide context to quotes and other data. However, to ensure
anonymity, I have included neither generalized biographical information nor connections
between participants and their IC. Additionally, each participant used a pseudonym.
Table 3.1 is a description of the sample. The sample was equally divided between ten
self-identified females and ten self-identified males. The sociodemographic breakdown was:
•

12 Caucasians—seven females and five males

•

Seven African Americans—three females and four males

•

One biracial male.

While the six situational analysis participants contributed data on broader contextual and
situational factors, they occasionally volunteered their own experiences with the phenomenon.
Because they were not recruited for the grounded theory portion, I have not included them in the
sample description in Table 3.1. However, I coded those portions of their interviews using
grounded theory procedures. I included critical insights from those interviews in where
appropriate. Their pseudonyms are Vickie, Lisa, Kate, Chris, Jason, and Liam. Each was a
member of the senior intelligence service (SIS).
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Table 3.1
Grounded Theory Segment Participant Sample
Pseudonym
Aedan
Ben
Celine
Christina
Dana
David
Eve
Finn
Gwen
Joel
Kelly
Kit
Lamar
Loess
Margaret
Maria
Mike
Natalie
Rico
Zeke

Age Range
27-32
45-50
39-44
39-41
45-50
57+
45-50
27-32
45-50
33-38
45-50
45-50
33-38
57+
57+
51-56
45-50
33-38
57+
51-56

Ethnicity
Bi-racial
African American
Caucasian
African American
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
African American
African American
Caucasian
Caucasian
African American
African American
Caucasian
Caucasian
African American

Gender
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Male

Occupation
Operations
Analysis
Operations
Analysis
Analysis
Operations
Operations
Analysis
Analysis
Operations
Analysis
Analysis
Analysis
Analysis
Analysis
Operations
Analysis
Operations
Analysis
Operations

No participants identifying as disabled or with ethnic groups except Caucasian, African
American, and biracial responded to the study. Additionally, three external stakeholders with
strong relationships within the IC’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and
asexual (LGBTQIA) populations marketed the study among their connections. However, no
participants who identified as LGBTQIA responded to requests for participants.
I limited age information on participants to six-year categories as another method to
reduce the risk of unintentional disclosure. What constitutes “middle age” has been thrown into
a state of flux as life expectancies and a growing body of research has explored the role of
attitude and perception on age self-categorization (Sanderson & Scherbov, 2008). However, a
slight majority of the sample fell into what is commonly considered to be “middle aged.”
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Therefore, age factors related to responses to TWB and whether one chose to participate in the
study at all may have played a role in the research findings.
Interviews. The choice of a collection method is a purposeful exercise of integrating
what the researcher seeks to know, her epistemological and ontological foundations, and the
practical tensions between the researcher’s ideal and what is doable (Edmondson & McManus,
2007). The dominant data source in the grounded theory segment was one-on-one participant
interviews as effective tools to capture and interpret participant meaning (Charmaz, 2002a). The
situational analysis segment benefited from six participant interviews and a breadth of extant
sources. All but two interviews were recorded over Zoom video conferencing, with the remaining
two conducted as phone interviews. Each interview was professionally transcribed. Only the
audio portion and the pseudonym were available to transcribers. I was prepared to edit from the
recordings any inadvertent disclosures of sensitive information prior to submitting the interviews
for transcription. However, no such disclosures occurred.
Interview Questions. The challenge of any qualitative study lies in remaining focused
on the study’s purpose without guiding stories (Chase, 1995) into an analysis more relevant to
the researcher’s meaning than the participant’s (Meyerhoff et al., 1992). Directed questions may
impose researcher meaning onto that of the participants. To give grounded theory participants
maximum space to convey their own meanings behind their responses, I used the standard
grounded theory practice of asking open-ended questions (Lempert, 2007; Strauss, 1969). My
initial, open-ended question was: “Please tell me about your experiences with toxic workplace
behavior.” Follow-up questions emerged from participant comments and were emergent within
the interview. Because situational analysis interviews were conducted as part of wider
data-collection strategies, questions were more directive but also emergent.
Multisite/Multimodal Analysis. Data for the situational analysis segment included
primary and secondary texts, recordings, and visuals as data sources for enhancing
understanding of the broader situation (Clarke, 1991, 2005; Vasconcelos et al., 2012). Access
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to participant journals and agency documentation were not available due to the classified nature
of the work. To add breadth, I used analyses (secondary), memoirs (primary), historical
accounts (secondary), and archival data (primary and secondary) of publicized intelligence
events to mine for critical situational gaps presented during the interviews.
Recruitment Package. Lay definitions of toxicity can span a seemingly infinite number
of situations that make a workplace uncomfortable. For example, a friend once remarked that
his workplace was toxic because his supervisor would not accept any of his ideas (anonymous,
personal communication, March 27, 2019). This definition of toxicity was meaningful to him but
does not align with research typologies on TWB noted in Chapter 2. To maintain
phenomenological coherence, my recruitment letter (Appendix C) and participant consent form
(Appendix D) provided transparency about my working definitions for TWB to enable
participants to make an informed decision on whether to participate and to support my effort to
develop a meaningful theory.
Analysis
I conducted analysis through two primary methods: detailed coding of qualitative
interviews and mapping processes. This section reviews the coding and mapping processes
used in the study. While situational, relational, and social worlds maps are common in
situational analysis studies, findings made unordered, ordered, and social worlds/arenas maps
most relevant to the research question. I have included a description of each map from in the
discussion.
Coding Interviews. Coding and analysis began with the first interview. I used coding
schemes aligned with constructivist grounded theory, including the initial coding of segmenting
meaning, line-by-line, and in vivo “exact words” (to capture important metaphors and discursive
moments); focused codes representing emerging themes from the initial coding; and theoretical
coding to integrate emerging hypotheses as focused codes begin to present possible theory
(Charmaz, 2014). I used NVivo software to maintain and process codes. Finally, I enlisted a
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coding team consisting of other researchers to enhance credibility of findings and to ensure
emergent theory remains grounded in the data,
Unordered and Ordered Maps. Situational analysis researchers design maps early in
the research process (including during the design phase) and update them throughout data
collection and analysis. Throughout the process, concepts that may have seemed significant
early in the study may not emerge as significant over time. I produced unordered maps at the
outset of the situational analysis segment and updated them throughout the data collection and
analysis. I then produced an ordered map to frame of the major human, nonhuman, and
discursive elements and their relationships (Clarke, 2003, 2005; Clarke, et al., 2017).
Social Worlds/Arenas Maps. Social worlds/arenas maps are cartographic
representations of the various collectives, material-technological elements, and social
commitments present in a situation (Clarke & Friese, 2007). They represent the intersectionality
of collective commitments and social groupings present in a situation (Vasconcelos et al., 2012)
and better reflect the ambiguous distinctions between micro, meso, and macro elements than
the conditional matrixes developed by Strauss & Corbin (1990, 1998). I developed a social
worlds/arenas map to answer questions related to the placement of social action within broader
situations. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the map addressed primary actors, social groupings,
structures, and discursive formations in the situation constitutive of response to TWB. I also
integrated King's (2007) “discursive repertoires” concept to represent dominant messaging in
the situation among the social worlds. I discuss King’s concept more fully in Chapter 5.
Ethical Considerations
Research involving humans carries heightened responsibility for the welfare of subjects.
The Belmont Report (The National Commission, 1979) establishes guidelines for research
involving humans related to respect, beneficence, and preventing harm. However, even a wellintentioned interaction can result in harm toward participants when insufficient attention is given
to how the information may be used, unintentional disclosure (Bold, 2012), the sensitivity of the
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situation within the participant’s social world (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004), and the potential for the
ethical landscape to change mid-study (Josselson, 2007).
Several ethical considerations existed within the framework of my study. I addressed
risks inherent in the interview processes at the informational stage through the transparency
procedures already discussed. However, even using pseudonyms, audio-only transcriptions,
sanitizing of transcripts for organizational and individual identifiers, and the fractured nature of
grounded theory coding and analysis, a risk exists that others will recognize the participant in
the disclosed events (Chase, 1995). Each participant had a five-day window to review the
transcript for inaccuracies and information that might disclose their identities or that of others
involved in events. They also had the opportunity to strike any comments they chose.
Intelligence officers in the study incurred a unique risk. Title 18 of the U.S. Code governs
the disclosure of classified information (Title 18 U.S. Code, 1948), authority to which I remain
accountable although I am no longer an active member of the IC. Under this authority, I am
prevented from willfully and knowingly disclosing classified information relating to my former
profession. Additionally, I am obligated to report unauthorized disclosures by others if I become
aware of them. While no unauthorized disclosures occurred, each of us would have been
responsible for proper handling of that event.
Summary
This chapter explained the rationale and design for my study to understand variations in
response to intelligence officers, why they differ, and the impacts of those responses on how
they function in the operational environment. Research in other critical mission industries has
demonstrated the significance of power and situatedness as underlying factors in the
phenomenon. The next chapter reviews the grounded theory findings of the study through the
words, memories, and experiences related to responses to TWB among 20 intelligence officers.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR GROUNDED THEORY SEGMENT
The primary research question for this study endeavored to identify why intelligence
officers responded differently to toxic events and how those responses impacted the mission. I
chose grounded theory and situational analysis as multi-methods for this study to develop a
model that represented individual response and the situational factors constitutive of them. This
chapter will explain the research findings of the grounded theory segment of the study. The
primary mode of data collection in this segment was exploratory interviews. The findings
resulted in a theoretical model based on a core dimension of Holding Self as a companion to the
social worlds maps generated by the situational analysis segment discussed in Chapter 5.
I begin with a broad overview of the model nomenclature and structure as conceptual
frameworks for the reader. Subsequent sections explore the specific model elements.
Consistent with the grounded theory focus of this chapter, I center the discussion on the
relationship of personal meaning of response.
Structure of the Discussion
Table 4.1 provides a matrix of the elemental terms to be discussed within this chapter.
Grounded theory models are constructions of dimensions (themes of action) with
conditions (influencing factors), properties (identifying elements), social processes (loci of
action), and consequences (impacts; Charmaz, 1990). However, models are rarely linear. They
are emergent and dynamic around a set of phenomena (Birks & Mills, 2015). The core
dimension is the overarching beacon around which all elements, processes, and
consequences intersect. I have defined each element below.
Core Dimension
Grounded theory is designed to develop a theoretical model of a phenomenon. The
methodology is designed to identify the significant actions within that phenomenon and what
influences them. Within grounded theory, dimensions are frameworks for action (Charmaz,
2007; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). Thus, the core condition is the primary action or process
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with which all other elements of the model intersect. The core dimension may also be viewed as
the primary goal of the actor. Therefore, within my model, the core dimension is the central
process around which all responses to TWB center to support.
Table 4.1
Structural Elements of Model of Holding Self
Core
Dimension
Core
Dimension

Conditions

Primary
Psychological
Dimensions

Core
Conditions

Primary Action
Dimensions

InterDimension

Categories

Conditions

Conditions

Properties

Processes

Processes

Consequences

Core Conditions
Conditions are the contextual and situational factors that catalyze a set of dimensions
within a social process. In my model, core conditions are those catalyzing factors that trigger
and make possible the choices and actions of response in which participants engage within the
core dimension. Therefore, while primary dimensions (discussed below) have their own
micro-conditions, they also function within the core conditions of the core dimension.
Primary Dimensions
Primary dimensions are loci for action within a social process. In my model, primary
dimensions will function as trajectories of response to TWB. However, not all dimensions are
external actions. The model includes three psychological dimensions that function as loci for
cognitive work, which is then expressed through the three primary action dimensions. The
psychological conditions are constructions of categories and the properties of those categories.
Primary action dimensions are constructed upon conditioning factors, processes to activate
them, and consequences of those actions. Dimensions are also communications processes; the
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participant uses the psychological dimensions to communicate with themselves and the action
dimensions to communicate with the external environment.
Inter-Dimensions
TWB is emergent, making responses longitudinal and fluid. As the model discussion will
demonstrate, participants may function primarily within one dimension during the toxic events
but move between two or more primary action dimensions over time. As shown in Table 4.1, two
inter-dimensions functioned as transitional offramps between primary action dimensions. Each
inter-dimension has a set of conditions and processes. Consequences are not silent within this
inter-dimensional framework. Rather, they consist of decisions to return to a previous primary
dimension or to move to a new primary dimension and are thus inherent in the conditions of
those dimensions.
This next section explores a constellation of self-concepts, response, and outcomes
through the words and actions of 20 individuals who have lived the model. As with any research
study based on a qualitative methodology, the findings do not claim to be generalizable. Rather,
the model provides a grounded foundation for future research. The following section will explore
and explain the model of Holding Self in Responding to TWB among U.S. Intelligence Officers.
The Flow of the Model Discussion
My goal to understand response to TWB centers the inquiry on the complexities of
human nature. My primary outcome in the study is to produce a theoretical model of response.
Figure 4.1 establishes the main elements explored in the forthcoming discussion and how they
relate with one another. The model begins with TWB as the instigating factor. Core conditions
are the central elements influencing response throughout the toxic dynamic. The core
dimension is the primary range of behaviors around which all of choices and actions pivot.
Primary psychological dimensions are the cognitive work of assessing choices and possibilities.
Primary action dimensions are these choices projected upon the external environment. Inter-
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dimensions facilitate movement between the primary dimensions. Consequences are the
outcomes of choices for how to respond to TWB.
Figure 4.1
Conceptual Flow of Holding Self in Response to TWB Among U.S. Intelligence Officers

The Core Dimension—Holding Self
The transition from “what” to “why” falls upon dimensions of social life (Katz, 2002). My
foreshadowing research question is why intelligence officers respond to TWB in different ways
and how those responses affect how they function in the workplace. For the 20 grounded theory
participants in my study, toxic events challenged self-concepts. Thus, responses pivoted around
a core dimension of Holding Self processes to solidify self-concepts. Participants first
established relationships between TWB and the “self” by naming or describing what that “self”
was and was not:
Your good performers, part of the layer that goes in is their self. (Gwen)
You are not your profession. (Lamar)
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How these intelligence officers responded to the dynamic centered around tactics and
strategies to hold onto that sense of “self”, which consisted of cognitive work: As one participant
related, “I always have to reframe how I approach things. ‘Okay, this project didn't work so well’”
(Kelly). However, the core dimension of Holding Self did not emerge within a toxic vacuum. A
core set of conditions—some unique to the IC environment, some elements of human
behavior—catalyzed the interaction between the behavior and the participant’s efforts to hold
“self” as a response to TWB. Some grounded theory studies explore dimensions for action prior
to discussing these core conditions. However, I have chosen to discuss core conditions of
Holding Self first to facilitate a better understanding of what influences the eight primary
dimensions when they are

Table 4.2

explored later in the study. The

Core Conditions, Categories, & Properties of
Holding Self Amid TWB

next section discusses the core
conditions of Holding Self in the
words of intelligence officers who
have experienced TWB in the
intelligence environment.
Core Conditions of Holding
Self
Within grounded theory
methodology, conditions are

factors in the environment that catalyze the phenomenon under study. Core conditions are
central in the dynamic and permeate each level of the model. In this study, core conditions
acted as prisms through which participants viewed work behaviors. Categories and properties of
conditions acted as fractals in these prisms, which shaped perceptions of TWB and catalyzed
responses. Table 4.2 includes a matrix of the core conditions of Holding Self Amid TWB: Table
4.2 includes a matrix of the core conditions of Holding Self Amid TWB: “If You Weren’t Paying
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Attention,” “I Felt,” and “Upside Down.” The table also include categories and properties for
each. The following section will discuss each core condition and its properties. I include a
graphical inset within each subsection to assist the reader and illustrate the relationships
between conditions, categories, and properties.
Core Condition: If You Weren’t Paying Attention
As conditions of Holding Self, participants described typologies of overt bullying and
passively hostile behaviors consistent with typologies of TWB discussed in Chapter 2. Targets
identified TWB through its impact, which contributed to individualized definitions:
Individuals with narcissistic behavior, jealously, bigotry, and those individuals which are
directed by a political agenda. (Aedan)
Micromanagement, flippant comments or rude, antagonistic statements made almost
daily in some cases. (Christina)
Core conditions of Holding Self emerged from a confluence of the participant’s individual
needs, institutional boundaries, and the broader environment. However, the preponderance of
the experiences aligned with passive hostility that one might not recognize “If You Weren’t
Paying Attention”:
If you weren’t paying attention to what was going on, then you wouldn’t know because
she was very good at covering. (Christina)
He really wrote some long emails using as much passive aggressive language as he
could. (Finn)
The interpretive nature of passive TWB challenged intelligence officers through three complex
categories of the core condition illustrated in Figure 4.2: “Who They Are,” “He Had Fans,” and
“Silence.” One category, “Silence,” had three properties that reflected critical nuances: being
subjected to others’ “Arctic” silent treatments; the subjugated silence of unseen subterfuge
through “Badmouths and Backdoors”; and a second form of subjugated silence in being framed
as “Like a Private.” This remainder of this section will discuss these categories and properties.
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Category of Who They Are. Intelligence officers interpreted differently whether
behaviors or environments were toxic based on how significant the toxic personality was in their
goals. Therefore, the same behaviors originating from superiors and peers might be interpreted
as more or less toxic depending

Figure 4.2

on the expectations for trust

Core Condition, Categories, & Properties—If You
Weren’t Paying Attention

and power that the participant
had for that person. In this
context of relational
significance, toxic leadership
with its less ambiguous span of
control was no more destructive
than toxic peer relationships.

The span of control from formal power reflected the toxicity of abusive supervisors for some:
I've had relatively few experiences, especially in the last 15 or 18 years of my career,
where I've worked in a toxic environment with peers. I’ve always wanted to be in
leadership. There's only so hard I believe you can push back at power and authority
where I could shove . . . back at a peer group and not necessarily have to worry about
the consequences for stopping bad behavior. (Gwen)
For others, the impact of team trust elevated the significance of toxic peers:
I think just given the way that I operate, it's easier for me to deal with a supervisor that's
creating that environment rather than a teammate. With teammates, I feel like there's
supposed to be some level of trust, camaraderie, working together and so forth. (Jason)
Thus, typologies of behavior identified in prior studies do not apply outside of the
relational power between the two people. Critically, that perception of relational power may be
perceived differently between the individuals and may problematize identifying toxicity outside of
what each expects from the relationship. Therefore, rank and position became functionally
impotent when relationships with subordinates took on outsized influence over other
relationships and outcomes. The following passage from Finn, a manager, in relationship to
toxic team leads frames this dynamic:
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I didn't have the opportunity to speak face-to-face [to] people. Team members were
getting their very best communication from their team leads who are there face-to-face
with them all the time. The team leads would promote on their teams the idea that
management didn't really care about them, that management did not have their best
interests at heart. Really divisive behavior (Finn)
Equally important, toxic events stabilized the relational dynamic between intelligence officers
longitudinally despite career movements, postings, and return engagements with each other.
I hadn't had to work with him since he was my team lead, when I forgot about how that
person operates. Several promotions later, I'm sitting here, like, ‘Oh God, this
organization has created a monster.’ (Christina)
Or, as Liam stated even more succinctly:
What if she comes back and is above me, or whatever is viewed above me? (Liam)
This hierarchical agnosticism in favor of “Who They Are” was instrumental in the
evolution of my research question from one solely focused on responses to peer-related TWB to
one in which I explored variations of toxic power across relational variations. As such,
participants revalidated the power underpinnings of TWB, but in a way that stripped away the
artificiality of wiring diagrams, positions, or loyalty. The relationship was tantamount to a third
partner in the dynamic. The next property of “He Had Fans” suggests that participants not only
assessed TWB in relation to their own relationship with the toxic personality. They also
assessed the behavior through the lens of the toxic personality’s relationships with others.
Category of He Had Fans. Overt and passive TWB were each destructive to team
cohesion, mission focus, and organizational commitment. However, participants framed passive
hostility as particularly destructive because its interpretive nature shifted the burden to targets to
justify its existence and impact, even when the toxic personality was more junior:
My boss's boss was a fan of this person, and I had to convince that person. (Ben)
This man who was junior to me seemed to have so much more cache. (Margaret)
Toxic personalities commonly are among an organization’s higher performers and
effectively contextualize (manage up) their behavior (Kusy & Holloway, 2009). Thus, “He Had
Fans” emerged into a micro-phenomenon in which participants struggled for power with the
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toxic personality. This power imbalance challenged participants in their abilities to hold “self” as
high performers and integral to the mission in their own rights.
Category of Silence. “Silence” in the intelligence context emerged through three
properties, which functioned as a weapon and as a threat to collaboration and sharing. “Arctic”
represented silent treatments, which challenged participants’ abilities to function as in the
collaboration-forward intelligence environment. “Badmouths and Backdoors” emerged in the
form of shadowed conversations, plans, and power. “Like a Private” diminished participant
voices by diminishing them as individuals. Each of these properties are discussed below.
Property of Arctic. As the term implies, “Arctic” was an environment of cold isolation in
which team members, team leads, and senior analysts used the power of silence to marginalize
them and others:
No one called me a snitch. That's just, you know, the rules of engagement in the office.
But, oh, I would say that the working environment became arctic. (Christina)
He wouldn't talk to me for about six months. (Celine)
In this framework, silence was a passive weapon of control and marginalization. Lack of
communication became a way of informing the target and others in the environment about the
target’s relative lack of worth and the cost of challenging the toxic personality’s power. In the
collaboration-focused IC, “Arctic” environments denied targets analytic currency. In the following
property, silence took on overt properties in the form of “Badmouths and Backdoors.”
Property of Badmouths and Backdoors. The second property of “Silence” manifested
itself two ways. “Badmouths” referenced an environment of airing grievances away from the
target, often in the operational shadows. IC environments are commonly mixtures of
government civilian, contract, and uniformed personnel. Eve argued that passive forms of
confrontation-turned-toxic emerged more among civilian team members in her workplace than
among other groups:
They did it in a much more passive way. People would verbally bash other people
behind their backs. (Eve)
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Participants also framed passive TWB through “Backdoors” in the form of subterfuge
and gamesmanship. As weapons of silence, backdoors hid “truths” and agendas, destroyed
transparency, and diminished targets to those “in the know.” However, relative levels of formal
power between the toxic personality and target seemed unimportant in the data with both
groups engaging in the behavior:
I kept just getting passive-aggressive roadblocks, but I didn't really want to see it that
way. I was like, "Oh, they don't like this, so I'll modify it and keep trying.” So just after
enough of those disconnects, I just had to conclude that it was intentional. (Natalie)
Supervisors also contended with “Backdoors” in which subordinates attempted to remain
on the right side of power by communicating directly with leaders, who used them to undermine
identified processes:
People would send her texts at night or emails. She would act on them the next day,
whether they were true, whether they were rumors. It caused a lot of problems in the
workforce because nobody knew what the right pathway was to share and communicate
information. (David)
“Badmouths and Backdoors” constructed environments in which participants felt
implicated by unheard conversations and unseen plans. Like “He Had Fans” and “Artic” they
were interpretive, easily excused, and convenient frameworks for leaders and institutions to
avoid holding toxic personalities accountable. Another property of “Silence,” referred to as “Like
a Private,” used subjugated silence to subordinate targets.
Property of Like a Private. “Like a Private” constructed an environment in which petty
incivilities functioned to reduce participant voice, self-advocacy, and value. Rather than overt
bullying behavior, “Like a Private” reflected condescension and using humor to diminish as
mechanisms to stratify voices in the toxic environment between those who were valued and
those who were not:
I come to this place, and it’s like I'm a private [in the Army] or something. [He] was
ridiculously condescending to me. (Eve)
He never really raised his voice at me, but he'd be condescending to me. (Zeke)
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Humor was a disarming and interpretive form of incivility that often was directed
at an intelligence officer’s social arena rather than directly at the individual.
Another [senior analyst] I worked with . . . kind of said that [redacted] analysts are like
mushrooms. They just sit in the dark and eat shit. (Kit)
The way the behavior followed a circuitous route to land on the target blunted
participants’ sense of self-efficacy to respond when the toxic personality could claim the
comment was only in fun.
Summary. The previous discussion of “If You Weren’t Paying Attention” has delineated
its properties to provide a granular understanding on what each one entails. Constructing the
discussion in elemental form was necessary to explain each property fully. However, the
discussion has also fractured a dynamic experience in which the various properties interacted
and intersected to catalyze a series of responses. Kelly’s framing of her experience with TWB
provides cohesion to the discussion by demonstrating how multiple conditions and properties
interrelate:
I had another individual . . . who just talked over the top of us [Like a Private]. He was
talking about [events occurring] decades ago with what that country was doing. And,
then I'd get back to the analyst, but he would complain about me [Badmouths and
Backdoors] because I didn't stroke his ego—"Oh, you're so wonderful and thanks for all
your input.” I was asked to then apologize to that guy because he felt like I was being
adversarial to him. I told my boss, "No way. I am not apologizing to him." Then, I gave
my boss an example of where he was standing there when something like this happened
[to me]. He and this other [redacted] didn't even notice that this guy said something
snippy to me. I was like, "There's no way I'm apologizing to him." So, I just constantly felt
like I was on the defensive [He Had Fans]. (Kelly)
Thus, “If You Weren’t Paying Attention” was an interactive toxic whole. Central to those
elements as conditions of the Holding Self core dimension was how those interactions made the
participants feel about themselves, others in the environment, and their relationships to the
mission. The next section, “I Felt . . .,” discusses a second core condition of Holding Self.
Core Condition: I Felt . . .
Emotion and feelings were integral to responses to TWB among the participants.
However, the actual emotions and feelings were unavailable in the data because events and
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participant responses consisted of memories. This remembered nature of the data also applied
to ongoing events because
representations were memories by the
time they were relayed to me.

Figure 4.3
Core Condition and Properties—I Felt

Therefore, emotions and feelings
manifested within a core condition of “I
Felt . . .” as interpretations of
remembered moments, responses,
cognitive work, meaning making, and
feeling as action. As depicted in Figure
4.3, the core condition “I Felt”
consisted of two categories: “Onset Emotions” and “Feeling as Meaning.” “Feeling as Meaning”
was further divided into three properties: “Worst Fears,” “Stress, Exhaustion, and Agitation,” and
“Non-Person.”
Category of Onset Emotions. Participants represented onset emotions as pivotal
moments in toxic events. The findings paralleled prior literature on emotive response to toxicity
in other industries (see Bloch, 2002; De Jordy & Barrett, 2014) in that the manner in which
participants articulated emotions varied by individual. However, onset emotions generally
existed on a spectrum of four elements, such as shock and disbelief:
I was a little shocked and in disbelief. (Ben)
I was shocked. (Celine)
Sadness:
Heartbreaking. Heartbreaking. (Maria)
Sad. (Lamar)
Anger:
I was livid. (Kelly)
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Furious. (Lamar)
And physical assault:
I felt like I was suffocating and being electrocuted at the same time. (Margaret)
It felt like a purposeful slap in the face, repeatedly. (Dana)
It was soul crushing. (Kit)
Emotive memories jolted intelligence officers into an awareness that the environment
had shifted. Thus, they reflected these emotions as authentic to the moment and without the
self-judgment of analyzing how they “felt about” those feelings in retrospect. This cognitive work
related to meaning making, judging, and sustaining would be an element of the next property of
“I Felt . . .”: “Feeling as Meaning.”
Category of Feeling as Meaning. The systemic and sustained nature of TWB
transforms survival strategies into longitudinal processes. Participants in the study described
coping strategies in interaction with shifting emotions, meaning, their relationships to their
workplace (both the people and the mission), and their self-concepts. Thus, “Feeling as
Meaning” followed onset of emotions as sustained perspectives on “self” and agency:
Property of Worst Fears. Participants described shifts in which their workplaces
suddenly seemed threatening. Many described meaning transformation in which anger,
sadness, and physical assault transitioned to sustained periods of siege and hostility:
I was just backed into a corner, like somebody's worst fears. (Eve)
It places me in a corner, it makes me feel threatened. (Mike)
However, the threat became bidirectional as they perceived others now saw them as the threat.
Well, it felt as if it I was . . . an unnecessary threat to my counterpart, as well as my team
lead and senior analyst. (Christina)
Thus, “Worst Fears” placed targets into dynamics in which they feared being blamed for their
own victimization. Over time, the emotional dynamic became psychologically and physically
taxing as depicted in the next property: “Stress, Exhaustion, and Agitation.”
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Property of Stress, Exhaustion & Agitation. Participants also described sustained
periods of stress, exhaustion, and agitation as heightened states of siege. These felt responses
were represented emotively and physically:
So, that did cause a lot of stress for me as I had to handle that because I know what was
at stake. (Aedan)
People were behaving in a hostile way and that that put a lot of stress on me. (Finn)
[I was] agitated all the time by the environment. (Christina)
Property of Non-Person. “Feeling as Meaning” linked to the meaning of the “self”
among these intelligence officers through a sense of voicelessness, powerlessness, and defeat.
They had become invisible:
I felt like I had no voice. My pain wasn't relevant. I'm a non-person here. Got it.
(Margaret)
I felt powerless. (Rico)
The challenge of being a “non-person” was not in the singular disregard. Rather, ceasing
to exist as a property of “Feeling as Meaning” gained its power through a comparison of “selves”
across time and space. The toxic personality or personalities in the environment existed in ways
that the target did not. This comparison process evolved into sense of isolation:
For a period of time, I had made an effort to be more personable, and likable, and warm.
It took me many, many years, and an assignment in another organization for me to
recover myself, and again show who I am again and be open about it. (Gwen)
For some participants, “Feeling as Meaning” ended on a trajectory of blame and selfjudgment:
I felt dumb. I never saw the writing on the wall. I had been completely bamboozled.
(David)
It then made me feel as if it was my fault that we were in this situation to begin with.
(Mike)
Summary. A foundational concept in grounded theory is the role that consequences
play as conditions for the next set of responses to a phenomenon. Thus, as conditions, “If You
Weren’t Paying Attention” and “I Felt . . .” transitioned into consequences for self-concepts and

127
relationships as meaning evolved. However, those conditions emerged as core conditions of
Holding Self because they played a navigational role in enabling participants to see TWB as
antithetical to a positive work environment. “Upside Down,” a third core condition of Holding
Self, also played a role in this meaning making through an unconstructive disorientation of
normalcy.
Core Condition: Upside-Down
As noted in Chapter 2, TWB has three victims: targets, witnesses, and learners.
Intelligence officers participating in the study related experiences within each of the three
frameworks. However, my study adds to that research by identifying a core condition of
“Upside-Down,” in which participants confronted onset moments of disorientation within those
identities that challenged self-concepts so that how they perceived their workplaces and their
“place” within them upended. This disorientation catalyzed an unconstructive dynamic in which
participants described suddenly perceiving teams, supervisors, and cultures as perverse.
The name for the condition, “Upside Down,” derived from Margaret’s depiction of her
moment, when as a government civilian intelligence officer, she realized that her leadership was
targeting her because she filed a formal complaint against the favored contractor who was
sexually harassing her:
Like I was in crazy world. It was a poisonous, upside-down environment where black
was white, and I just didn't . . . the pieces didn't fit together. (Margaret)
Relating these “upside down” moments during the interviews revealed a time dynamic of
shifting between past and present with memories taking on the power of something still ongoing:
I felt like I had wandered onto a different planet because that was not what I knew of
how this agency behaved. I'm trying to be honest, I'm letting people know where . . . and
you see another set of behaviors that you're not exactly sure about. (David)
As depicted in Figure 4.4, “Upside Down” consisted of three categories: “Everything Stopped,”
“Just So Wrong,” and “Shifts.” Each category is explored below.
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Category of Everything Stopped. “Upside down” moments surfaced self-concepts in
vivid form as the self-appraisals, reflected appraisals, and values held by participants no longer
neatly fit. Instead, disorientation became a mindset in which anything was possible:
Everything stopped for a few
seconds. I don’t really know
how else to explain it. (Celine)

Figure 4.4
Core Condition and Properties—Upside Down

Research indicates that shock
is an intermediary state between
unexpected social exclusion or
rejection events and more longitudinal
emotional responses (Bernstein &
Claypool, 2012a, 2012b; DeWall et al.,
2009). Celine’s use of the term “shock”
to describe witnessing TWB directed at
an African American coworker reflected moments of shifting realities away from old beliefs
about what was appropriate at work. Holding Self in these moments required that she rehome
her values into a work environment incongruent with her personal values. Further, this rehoming
process would exile her to an awareness that, while this new environment was upside down to
her, that same environment was right side up for marginalized coworkers.
Category of Just So Wrong. The core condition of “Upside Down” was a moment of
sensemaking in which participants reconciled what they believed “should” be in their work
environments with what was. These moments of denial and disappointment manifested within
the property of “Just So Wrong”:
It was just so wrong from the beginning. (Natalie)
However, these moments also recalibrated expectations:
Once that happened, I knew exactly what I was dealing with. (Ben)
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This sensemaking reaction was particularly acute among late-career intelligence officers who
felt vested, not only in their organization, but in a set of norms:
I thought, “It doesn't have to be this way.” (Rico)
“Just So Wrong” came at a cost as participants expressed a sense of being unmoored in
formerly respected work environments. In these moments, a sense of belonging in the
organization gave way to feelings of alienation and being unprepared:
It was not something I really was well prepared for. It's just not the organization I
experienced for 14 years. (David)
He made a reference towards, “Do you like fried chicken and watermelon?” I was, like,
what do I even have to do? (Mike)
Category of Shifts. “Upside Down” moments culminated into events in which
participants sensed changes in their perspectives on their positions in their organizations, as
mentors, or in some cases, in the IC. However, they also viewed their own pasts differently:
It was a point where I made a conscious decision to almost step away from looking at
things through my lens but try and also look at how different things were affecting and
impacting different people? (Celine)
And they would say, "Did you get this?" It made me think more retrospectively, "Yeah, I
get that a lot.” I didn't fully absorb it at the time. (Maria)
Shifts were fluid, which gave them an elastic power over how these intelligence officers
perceived themselves and others in the toxic environment because who toxic personalities were
could no longer be unseen:
Once I’ve seen who you are . . . (Ben)
Summary. As core conditions, “If You Weren’t Paying Attention,” “I Felt,” and “Upside
Down” catalyzed how intelligence officers responded to TWB. Each condition intersected with
some aspect of relationships—either the human beings inhabiting them, or the integral role
relationships play in mission accomplishment in the IC. As already discussed in Chapter 2,
relationships in the form of teams, customers, and stakeholders are inseparable from the nature
of being an intelligence officer. Because they are reflective of the “self” and functional tools in
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support of the mission, they are inextricably linked with Holding Self in that environment.
Holding Self is an action framework for response. To understand intelligence officer responses
to TWB, one must first decipher potential action frameworks and how they impact the
intelligence environment. These action frameworks are the subject of the next section on the
primary dimensions of Holding Self.
Primary Dimensions of Holding Self
Dimensions establish ranges for variation among a category’s properties (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this study, dimensions are loci for conditions,
processes, and consequences for responses to TWB and mechanisms for acting on choices. As
depicted in Table 4.3, Holding Self consisted of six primary dimensions divided into three
psychological and three action dimensions. Additionally, two inter-dimensions form pathways
between the three

Table 4.3

action dimensions.

Primary Psychological, Action, and Inter-Dimensions of Holding
Self

The primary
psychological
dimensions of Holding
Self are frameworks in
which the intelligence
officer’s experiences
with TWB interact with
notions of the “self”:
•

Who I Am: The
progression of claiming self-concepts through self-appraisals, reflected appraisals, and
personal values as forms of “believed” selves.

•

Who and What I Know: The identification of networks and social relationships
instrumental to managing toxic events.
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•

What I Can: Claims of the ability to affect their circumstances (agency).
Three primary action dimensions of Holding Self function as the expression of the

psychological dimensions onto the external environment.
•

Seeking Subliminal: Strategies and tactics to manage toxic events in ways least
disruptive to the participant’s performance, and possibly, to leverage the behavior into
enhanced opportunities to sustain the mission.

•

Folding In: Strategies and tactics in which damaged self-concepts contributed to
decisions to withdraw from others in the environment so that their contributions to the
mission were diminished.

•

Reinforcing Style: Strategies and tactics in which participants imposed self-concepts in
ways that disengaged them from the mission.
TWB is a longitudinal phenomenon in which actors may change strategies and tactics

over time. Two inter-dimensions represent intersections between the primary action dimensions:
•

Seeking-Folding: A bidirectional pathway for movement between “Seeking Subliminal”
and “Folding In.”

•

Folding-Reinforcing: A bidirectional pathway for movement between “Folding In” and
“Reinforcing Style.”

I have identified no inter-dimension directly linking “Seeking Subliminal” and “Reinforcing Style”
because no data emerged indicating that participants moved between them without passing
through “Folding In.” This finding is not surprising. The maneuverability inherent to “Seeking
Subliminal” and the steadfast rigidity of “Reinforcing Style” are opposite and incompatible
mental frameworks. I will begin the discussion with the primary psychological dimension of “Who
I am.” I will follow with a discussion of “Who and What I Know” and “What I Can.”
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Psychological Dimension of Holding Self: Who I Am
As depicted in Table 4.4, intelligence officers represented the “Who I Am” primary
psychological dimension of Holding Self through three self-concept categories: self-appraisals,
reflected appraisals, and personal values as the “believed self.” Self-appraisals represented
ways in which participants articulated internalized views of who they believed they were—
Mead's (1934) internalized “I”— in ways that supported responses to TWB. Reflected appraisals
emerged as representations of what participants believed others thought they were or would
do—the “I” created through interaction with one’s social environment (Blumer, 1969; Mead,
1934). Personal values formed a predictive and regulatory “believed self” (R. G. Lord & Brown,
2001) in responding to TWB. As co-equal aspects of self-concepts, each category represented
a fractal in a single prism.
Participants reflected selfconcepts predominately through

Table 4.4
Categories and Properties of Holding Self Primary
Psychological Dimension—Who I Am

direct self-appraisal (301 expressions
across the 20 participants), followed
by reflected appraisals (91
expressions) and personal values (88
expressions). All participants
reflected self-concepts; however,
they weighted those explorations
within self-concept categories in
individualized ways. For example,
Natalie only reflected self-concepts though self-appraisals, while reflected appraisals from
others were significant in David’s self-concepts. Lamar was the most balanced, with selfappraisal, reflected appraisals, and personal values emerging in his interviews almost equally.
While no generalizable conclusions can be reached due to sample size, the distinctions
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illustrate the way in which individuals may view themselves through what they believe they are,
what they perceive others believe they are, and the values they hold.
Choosing a category to express self-concepts became internal processes within Holding
Self as boundaries around what they would do within toxic events, what they expected from
others in the dynamic, and what they would tolerate. These processes of articulating
self-concepts were the initial choices of response TWB that transcended longitudinally
throughout the experience as mechanisms to reestablish equilibrium of position and power.
These choices will be explored in
the following section through three
categories and their properties.

Figure 4.5
Category and Properties of Who I Am—Self-Appraisal

Category of Self-Appraisal.
As illustrated in Figure 4.5,
participants constructed selfappraisals through four properties—
“Am and Can,” “Not that Person,”
“Leadership Nerd,” and “Adapter”—
in which they staked claims on who they perceived they were in the intelligence environment.
Property of Am and Can. Participants communicated self-concepts most directly
through claims of who they were using phrases beginning with “I.” Claims of “self” surfaced
variations of “I am,” “I can,” and other statements in which the “I” captured a characteristic:
I am who I am. I got comfortable in my skin many years ago, and frankly, it's
served me well. (David)
I try to be careful with my words. (Zeke)
Expressions of “I” in the context of “Am and Can” centered the conversations on
characteristics about themselves that they perceived most central to how they responded to
toxic events. Participants explored self-appraisals as sources of pride:
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I'm a pretty driven person and have been driven my whole career, both to do a good job,
very confident in my abilities. (Gwen)
I knew my value and my worth. (Eve)
In some cases, they used the “Am and Can” property to make meaning of experiences by
recreating themselves as the heroes or of their own stories ( McAdams, 1993; McAdams &
Jones, 2017;):
I am perseverant. I have grit. I can take the heat. I’m determined. (Kelly)
Some people . . . this is all that they are. I think that's probably what separates me from
a lot of other people. (Ben)
In other cases, they took ownership of their shortcomings:
Maybe that's a pettiness of my own personality, where I just love to prove people wrong.
(Maria)
“Am and Can” as a property reflected the most basic representation of what they were
in the intelligence environment. These self-concepts were central to how they believed they
represented themselves toxic events. Another property surfaced similar permutations of “self”
but in claims of who they were not: “Not That Person.”
Property of Not that Person. As participants staked claims of who they were through
the property of “Am and Can,” they also expressed who they were not. The rejected “selves”
functioned as boundaries around what they valued in themselves, what they tolerated in others,
and what they could do in toxic environments. “Not that Person” formed an unacceptable
alternative “self” in reaction to stereotypes of who others thought they should be:
I'm not that person that kind of curtsies and looks up and says, may I please speak, may
I please ask a question that's relevant to this topic? (Margaret)
Intelligence officers also made claims of “self” as boundaries for tolerance:
I learned early in my career, there's only so much BS that I'll take from anyone. (Ben)
I can't just be silent. I just can't curl up in a ball and disappear. I'm living this reality, too. I
should have a valid place in whatever environment that I'm in. (Kit)
Bounded “selves” also staked claims on what they expected from others:
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I just continued to stay consistent with my message and very clear with my supervisor,
my supervisor’s supervisor. (Ben)
And, when they needed to show themselves self-compassion:
I also gave myself a lot of self-compassion. (Finn)
Finally, “Not that Person” surfaced as modeling behaviors for others for whom they were
responsible:
If somebody is saying something or somebody's doing something, is it a battle worth
fighting, and what's your expected outcome? It's something I still talk to my kids or talk to
my coworkers about when things come up. (Dana)
The concept of the “self” as responsible for others extended to another property of “Who
I Am.” These reflections required that they balance who they believed they were versus what
they owed to others, particular among participants who were supervisors. Thus, intersections
with their self-concepts as leaders were seamless. The following section will discuss this
dynamic within the property of “Leadership Nerd.”
Property of Leadership Nerd. Eighteen of the 20 participants were either senior leads,
first-line supervisors, or organizational managers. Thus, a duality of shared responsibility for
“self” and others surfaced in the interviews. Intelligence officers explored synergies and tensions
within this dynamic through their self-concepts as formal and referential leaders:
I like to think of myself as a little bit of a leadership nerd. I embody the servant leader
model. (Dana)
I've done a fair amount of reading on leadership literature myself. I had a pretty good feel
for how I should handle that situation to be a good manager. (Finn)
Stewardship and leadership modeling were integral to these self-concepts, which
intersected with approaches for dealing with even healthy conflict on teams. This modeling also
integrated with “Not That Person”:
I worked really hard to instill that really early with my team. I said, "Look, we can talk
about anything on this team, but as soon as you get emotional, it stops." (Lamar)
Participants linked “Leadership Nerd” to advocacy as a form of leaderly “self”:
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If I'm not paying attention to my team, then I'm going to encounter an issue at that time
of operation. I know what was at stake. (Aedan)
For Caucasians, activating the leadership nerd meant understanding one’s own privilege:
When people bring these problems to me, it's difficult for me because I'm not in a
marginalized group. For all intents and purposes, I would consider I've had a fairly easy
life. (Joel)
As noted, intelligence officers explored self-concepts through the lens of past
experiences with TWB. Not everyone was the hero of their own story. Because some perceived
themselves as having been victimized, stories included being unrewarded or even rejected:
The dirty little secret is that all that black people do is work hard. The only legacy we
have is our name, which probably isn't even our name. This whole country is built on the
fact that black people work hard, and we don't get credit for the work that we do. (Kit)
Property of Adapter. When referencing an individual, an “adapter” reflects an ability to
construct and alter a plan to changing circumstances (E. Z.-Liu et al., 2001). The property of
“Adapter” emerged early in the data collection and surfaced throughout the grounded theory
portion of the study as a self-concept defined by maneuverability:
I have rear guard actions. (Loess)
And disciplined toward desired outcomes:
I adapt. I do a lot of compartmentalizing. I always have to reframe how I approach
things. (Kelly)
Participants also referenced being “adapters” as a source of peace amid toxic
circumstances:
Good, now I don't have to deal with you people anymore. It's like having a bad neighbor
and one of you moves. It just got to the point where the juice wasn't worth the squeeze,
so I just let it go. (Rico)
As well as self-concepts as change agents:
If I see something wrong, I'm going to fix it. It's just, probably, the way I've been raised.
(Joel)
For some, parlaying that self-concept into being the change agent carried risk to career
trajectories. However, they felt positioned to withstand the risk:
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I'm retirement eligible. So, there is no risk. I'd probably still [have] done the same thing.
I'd probably done it the same way. (Rico)
I feel like I don't have anything to lose now because I'm not really striving for another
promotion. So, I'm noisy now. (Kelly)
Others reflected on tempering approaches as mechanisms for self-protection:
I try not to be as outspoken as I normally am because it carries retribution. I'm not in
position to have any power and influence. Regardless of where I am, it doesn't dictate
my desire to address this issue. So, I think that sense of being connected with fellow
black IC professionals is the input on that. (Mike)
The intersection between self-concepts as an “Adapter” linked directly to the IC mission
through a “purposed self”:
Most days, I can't wait to get to work. I love the people I work with. I love the mission. I
love all everything about being at work. (Dana)
This “purposed self” linked directly to work as an embodied patriotism:
I feel a patriotic duty to go to work. Hopefully, I'm protecting the nation. (Gwen)
You don't want to ever devalue yourself because . . . lives are at stake, and decisions
are made that eventually roll themselves up. (Mike)
Properties within the “Self-Appraisal” category defined characteristics and
self-concepts that intelligence officers perceived were relevant to how they responded to
TWB. Thus, the primary action dimension of “Who I Am” relied partially upon an image of
what one believed they were and were not, even as those self-concepts did not always
contribute to best outcomes. A second category focused the lens on the “Reflected
Appraisals” category. Within “Reflected Appraisals,” self-concepts were defined by what
participants believed others thought they were. The next section will explore properties
within the category of “Reflected Appraisals.”
Category of Reflected Appraisals. Within “Reflected Appraisals,” intelligence officers
constructed self-concepts partially through perceptions of what others in the environment
thought of them. This transition from personal claiming to asserting self-concepts through the
reflected “self” revealed itself in the narrative. Whereas the “Self-Appraisal” category included
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assertions beginning with “I” and depersonalized “you” statements, reflected appraisals more
commonly referenced “me” and depersonalized “they” or “others” as participants defined
themselves as the social selves theorized in Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969). Within this
confluence, properties reflected nuanced permutations of select properties within the
“Self-Appraisal” category. The following section will outline four properties of the “Reflected
Appraisals” category illustrated in Figure 4.6: “Lines,” “Approachable,” “Valued,” and “Dad’s
Voice.”

Figure 4.6
Property of Lines.

Participants explored

Category and Properties of Who I Am—Reflected
Appraisal

boundaries for tolerance within
the “Not that Person” property
of the “Self-Appraisal”
category. The theme also
surfaced in the “Reflected
Appraisal” category through
perceptions on what others in
the social environment knew about their “Lines” for tolerance:
There will be a line drawn, and people will know not to cross it. (Ben)
To be relevant to how intelligence officers responded to TWB, both the “Lines” and the
penalties for crossing them had to be visible. This visibility transpired experientially as
participants connected their boundaries for appropriate behavior with others’ understandings
about them as social beings:
I think that there aren't that many people in my peer group who know me well who would
try to mess with me very much. It’s at least believed in the peer group that I wouldn't
tolerate it and would stop it in its tracks. (Gwen)
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However, “Lines” were not always based on experience; reputation was also integral.
Second-hand experiences that one’s colleagues shared about them with others became forms
of lore that ultimately shaped valued self-appraisals.
During that time, I also developed a no-nonsense type reputation. (Maria)
Although self-appraisals often included being the heroes of their own stories, self-concepts
emerged around being the heroes in others’ stories, as well:
I snapped. I told him, I said, "Look, I don't know what you want me to do, but I followed
the process.” I want to say it was legendary, but people heard about it, because I didn't
let him push me. (David)
However, “Lines” of demarcation also occurred when reflected and self-appraisals conflicted:
I care what other people think, but I don't care what they think if I know I'm doing the
right thing or let that kind of stuff eat at me. (Dana)
For some, “Lines” emerged as porous because they perceived that the rules for managing
perceptions were different depending on one’s power in the social environment:
The expectation of me before people really get to know me is, "This guy, he's a big, fit,
black dude who has a pretty stern look on his face. He's probably aggressive,"
something like that, right? (Lamar)
That the whole game the way it's set up, it isn't meant for someone like me to play. (Kit)
“Lines” formed boundaries for what intelligence officers believed others knew about their
expectations, which partially mapped how they functioned in the intelligence environment.
“Lines” were both reputational and experiential guides for others, while also shaping
self-appraisals when the “Lines” complemented what participants believed about themselves.
The next section discusses a second property of the “Reflected Appraisal” category,
“Approachable,” in which they saw themselves as liked and valued by others.
Property of Approachable. “Approachable” as a property of the “Reflected Appraisal”
category reflects participant perceptions that others liked them, trusted them, and found them
approachable as social beings:
They're just comfortable coming up and talking to me. I'm a nice guy, at least, I think I
am. (Joel)
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As with “Lines,” being approachable not only surfaced as reflections of others but in the
validation of what those “others” were telling their “others”:
People in other branches have said, "Hey, you get an opening in your branch, let me
know. I'd like to come up there." (Rico)
When participants explored the property of “Approachable,” reflected appraisals in which
others trusted and respected them emerged in compelling ways through perceived expectations
of transparency and quality work:
Where I worked before I was respected, and my work spoke for it. (Eve)
Perceiving that others trusted them served as validation to continue confronting toxic events:
I think the reason why I've been able to maintain my sanity and a sense of drive is
because the subordinates recognize the efforts that I do and at least respect the
professionalism. They know that I will always be their advocate. (Mike)
Mike staked a position as an advocate for others, which intersected with the
self-proclaimed advocacy referenced as part of the “Leadership Nerd” property of the
“Self-Appraisals” category. However, being adopted as an advocate also carried risk:
At any point [if] I feel like I'm being a hindrance to their career just because of the
relationships, then I will do what's appropriate. Whether it's removing myself from that
dynamic as much as I can [while] still maintaining my position as a manager or redirect.
(Mike)
Therefore, even as they reflected upon the trust that others had bestowed, they weighed the
risks to those relationships if they mishandled managing toxic environments:
It was really important to me that I didn't jeopardized the trust that at least most people
were willing to give me in that position. (Finn)
They also imagined alternate realities of post-trust work environments if they failed:
They probably wouldn't trust me with issues. They'd go to somebody else, or they'll just
completely brush it off and ignore it. (Joel)
“Lines” and “Approachable” primarily addressed coworker and subordinate perceptions
of who they were as liked and trusted human beings. A third property of “Reflected Appraisals”
surfaced when intelligence officers discussed how supervisors and others with formal power
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perceived them. Within that framework, “Lines” and being “Approachable” gave way to being
“Valued.”
Property of Valued. Intelligence officers gain value by providing intellectual space for
policymakers to make decisions in furtherance of U.S. national security goals (J. Davis, 2003b;
Fingar, 2011a). Individuals with formal supervisory responsibilities produce performance
appraisals for achieving those objectives; however, one’s perceived value as an analyst or
operational staff member emerges from relationships at multiple levels of hierarchy. Participants
reflected upon others’ perceptions of them as high performers and valued intelligence officers.
I was recognized . . . by seniors for building teams, not just team building, actually
building and formulating teams. (Maria)
I had worked with this senior executive in the past, and he was like, “This is who I need
to help clean things up.” (Ben)
“Valued” defined participants as more than merely good. They perceived that they were
singled out for specialized skills that few others could match. In another permutation on
“Advocacy,” this reflected value emerged in stories of how their leadership advocated for them
against the toxic personality:
"Why in the world would we get you out of here? We do need your talents." So, at the
office level, the office chief brought me up. I had had good relationships with all my office
directors. (Dana)
And, when they related efforts to persuade their leadership that subordinates were creating toxic
environments:
To his credit, once he heard it from me, he started trying to do something about it. (Zeke)
Reflected appraisals of “Valued” emerged most pointedly as participants aligned what
they valued in themselves with what their leadership also valued in them:
I do know a fairly high executive said afterwards, "Well, we learned that when Loess tells
us there is a problem, we ought to listen to him.” (Loess)
However, when they did not feel valued, reflected and self-appraisals became misaligned:
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I just kind of felt like I was just kind of the worker bee, like they just wanted the work out
of me and over time, I felt like they wanted me to die. I felt like they didn't accept me for
who I am, and they just wanted me to disappear. (Kit)
This misalignment became most acute when participants perceived that their leadership teams
found them to be a threat:
It struck me that could also have been a result of my growing influence with first line
supervisors, and through them, to the rest of the subordinate supervisors in the
workforce. (David)
Reflected appraisals of leader esteem contributed to self-concepts as valued members
of the mission. As the comments above illustrate, the misalignment between self and reflected
appraisals lent a fragility to self-concepts when the need to deconflict the two emerged in toxic
events. However, leaders within the IC were not the only ones to contribute to reflected
appraisals as “Valued.” The final property of the “Reflected Appraisal” category concerned
another form of leader who emerged as central to this aspect of the “self”: “Dad’s Voice.”
Property of Dad’s Voice. As noted elsewhere in this study, participant insights are
reflections on memories rather than some objective recounting of details. Additionally,
researcher interpretation of participant words and meaning further shaped the study’s findings.
However, at multiple points in this study, participants detoured from remembered toxic events
into more contemporaneous analyses of why they responded to TWB the way they had in the
past. One detour occurred as participants reflected upon their fathers’ voices as signposts for
acting appropriately:
If we go directly to how I approach problems, my dad. He would listen to books on tape
about leadership, and about people, and about conflict management just for years to try
and better himself in that area. (Celine)
My dad was very confrontational, but not in a bad way. It's just that he wouldn't shy away
from things. (Joel)
Reflected appraisals form self-concepts through comparison. Thus, reflected appraisals
became aligned with what we believe others expect us to be and create conflict when they are
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not. Within “Dad’s Voice,” participants perceived their own responses to TWB as appropriate in
alignment with the father’s challenges:
When he was a child, he watched his cousin get lynched because a woman told a story
that he didn't get off the sidewalk fast enough when she was walking. I always remember
thinking about my dad, if he is not racist, if he's not holding on to that, no one has any
excuse. He always reminded us several things. You're not your possessions, you're not
the color of your skin. Your accomplishments are great, but they're not who you are. You
have a responsibility to be a good person. (Lamar)
Because the property represented reflected appraisals on what their dad would think of
their responses to TWB if he were here, “Dad’s Voice” approached the boundary between selfconcepts reflected in others’ perceptions and notions of the “self” as representative of a larger
set of values. The next category of the “Who I Am” primary psychological dimension confronts
the role that personal values played in holding self-concepts amid TWB. The next section will
discuss personal values as elements of “believed selves.”
Category of Who I Am—
Personal Values. Participants in
the study referenced

Figure 4.7
Categories and Properties Who I Am—Personal Values

self-

concepts through personal values
as “believed selves.” Like the
claims-staking within

self-

appraisals, intelligence officers
claimed ideals that they perceived
as relevant to how they
responded to TWB. The following
properties illustrated in Figure 4.7
emerged: “Sense of Patriotism” and “Stoplight.”
Property of Sense of Patriotism. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the
intelligence mission is central to the “purposed self.” Thus, within the “Personal Values”
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psychological dimension, intelligence officers reflected on their responses to TWB as
expressions of patriotism:
Like a sense of patriotism . . . if the ideals that we take an oath for are being challenged,
ultimately the right thing to do is to still push in that direction, to get where we need to
be. (Mike)
The ideal acted as a navigational tool when evaluating how to respond to toxic coworkers but
also a sense of stewardship:
When you leave, make sure it's no worse, maybe better than when you took over. (Rico)
“Sense of Patriotism” also reflected an acceptance that the sacrifices they would make
as intelligence officers would be largely invisible to an American public. This same public would
thrive because of their successes and blame them for failures (preventable and unpreventable,
alike) in a complex world over which they exerted little control. These values were freely
chosen:
I think the self-compassion is a side effect of being purpose-driven, being able to see
that the day-to-day stress is meaningful. It matters to people who will never know it, but
yeah, just to be able to do the mission and keep things running. Then, you've got things
like this that come along. That's really not even close to taking me away from this
purpose that's driving me to be in this organization in the first place. (Finn)
These “believed selves” placed them in a collective whole enabling them to transcend
petty incivilities:
I think your good performers, part of the layer that goes in is their “self.” I think many of
the people, especially if you're looking for people in the intel community who have
substantive experience, who in a crisis you can pick up from one job and put in another
to surge, that the passion for the higher calling and how that translates to performance, I
think the people who have that higher calling are good performers. (Gwen)
Within a “Sense of Patriotism,” the “self” became so synonymous with work purpose that
purpose and outcomes were inseverable. The question remained as to how these ideals would
thrive when they were challenged by toxic personalities and enablers. Participants reflected on
those questions in the next property of “Personal Values”: “Stoplight.”
Property of Stoplight. “Personal Values” emerged as a theme to shield the “self,” as
well as an ethos of what was and was not appropriate in the intelligence workplace:
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Where's the stoplight? Where's the boundary for professional behavior? I should never
be having conversations about the word horny at work. (Margaret)
Concepts of what “should” be part of the work environment and what “should not” intersected
with how participants viewed themselves as professionals and stewards:
Do we want young people to see hostility and toxicity in this organization, or do we want
them to see something better? (Finn)
Misalignments between their entity’s approach to the “Stoplight” and their own personal
values emerged within disillusionment and decisions to change career trajectories:
I'm at a point in my career where I want to be considered for senior, and if that was the
behavior which was tolerated . . . it wasn't with my programming. I would just rather wait
it out. (Ben)
Do you want to be part of a leadership team that makes it okay to be rude, nasty, and
unprofessional to its employees? You don't really know because it's a club that you have
to get into, you don't really know if that's pervasive. (Gwen)
Accountability to respect the “Stoplight” emerged as both an organizational responsibility
but also one that they owned as professionals:
It's one thing to send an email to reply a memo back but there has to be a follow-up
response. [Otherwise] the people who are the culprits, that are treating us unfairly, won't
be held accountable. (Mike)
Accountability was more than just a commitment to confront behavior. The commitment was
integral to how they saw themselves as leaders. However, embodying leadership emerged as a
set of traits and skills one had to develop:
It's traits that . . . you may have been born with, but they're honed skills over time.
They're learned behaviors, and you have to be a caring person in the first place. (Dana)
Summary. As categories of “Who I Am,” “Self-Appraisals,” “Reflected Appraisals,” and
“Personal Values” formed variations on how the “self” intersected with claimed boundaries,
leadership, and commitment to the mission. Each frame of reference was integral to
perspectives on why they responded to TWB in the ways they did. How aligned their personal
values were to the perceived values of their IC entity became inherent to those discussions as
well. These claimed, reflected, and believed selves within “Who I Am” as a psychological
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dimension formed an internal set of actions in which they assessed who they were in their
environment and the relationship of that “self” to the behavior. However, staking claims to who
they were was not sufficient to resource those responses. They also needed to take stock of
other available resources in the form of networks and knowledge. That stock-taking is central to
the next primary psychological dimension of “Who and What I Know.”
Psychological Dimension of Holding Self: Who and What I Know
As participants shared their stories of TWB, they described internal processes of Holding
Self in which they inventoried who each character was in the plot. They also inventoried the
knowledge, skills, and abilities available to them in managing the toxic environment, as well as
what they lacked. As depicted in the matrix at Table 4.5, “Who and What I Know” fell into four
larger categorical themes—"Learning the Zoo,” "I Had Mentors,” “Not Just Me,” and “Owning the
Other.” While some categories
were confined to the single

Table 4.5
Categories and Properties of Who and What I Know

property of its overall category,
three properties surfaced within “I
Had Mentors” and two within
“Owning the Other.” Each of these
elements are discussed below.
Category of Learning the
Zoo. Global events cast IC mission
requirements into a state of flux,
which imposed an instability onto
who and what participants knew at any given time. They associated their responses to TWB
with their ability to navigate who and what they knew in the intelligence morass. The IC’s
organizational diversity, micro-missions (e.g., conventional naval forces versus counterterrorism
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versus strategic capabilities, etc.) increased these challenges as participants rotated among
agencies with significantly different cultures:
You have to kind of learn the temperature of the room and learn
who's-who-in-the-zoo and all those other catchphrases that they like to roll out. I
know how to do that. (Margaret)
Participants described fault lines between military, contracting, and government work
roles created by the ability of personnel to move between them; a set of governing structures
proscribing what can be said to whom and in what context buttressed these complexities. Being
former military was the cost of doing business as an intelligence officer in some organizations
—with higher relational fees for those formerly associated with the wrong service:
He will talk to the Air Force members differently than the other services. (Joel)
The outcome for many participants was a professional solitude, an untenable situation in a
profession that is fundamentally about teams, sharing, and collaboration.
I was shocked because it was just during that time I was getting up and running where I
really didn't have a way to prove myself. That's how it affected me. I just didn't have
anybody to talk to. (Eve)
Participants described relationships to powerful others and to the larger organization as
hard currency needed to function as intelligence officers. Thus, “Learning the Zoo” required
learning the organization, but also establishing legitimacy. When they felt unable to establish
legitimacy, the availability of healthy mentoring and networks as navigational and sensemaking
tools became integral to response.
Category of I Had Mentors. The availability of mentors played a significant role in how
intelligence officers responded to TWB. However, the IC’s commitment to mentoring to build
continuity, competence, and stewardship is often found more in the core values of
micro-organizations than in formal structure. Figure 4.8 shows three properties for “I Had
Mentors” in which: “Navigating the Field,” “Sensemaking the Behavior,” and “How I Got Here”
played inventorying roles for Holding Self within “Who and What I Know”:
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Property of Navigating the Field. Because open access to information on the IC is
limited, new employees have minimal opportunity to learn the cultures and structures of their
agencies prior to arriving unless they served in a select number of college-level internships.
Thus, mentoring relationships were integral to learning how to “navigate the field”:
If I had not had
these mentors, I
would definitely not
have been able to
navigate this field.
(Natalie)

Figure 4.8
Category and Properties of Who and What I Know—I Had
Mentors

I always had
mentors and
branch chiefs who
taught me. They
put me in a
position to
succeed. (Dana)
Relationships with mentors became more than just how to build competencies and skills.
These relationships established early self-concepts as valued members of the community who
would contribute to the core mission even if they were not sure how to do so. Mentors would
also provide something more critical: a sense of safety and deserving of respect from coworkers
and supervisors. Thus, mentors enabled voice:
I think having strong mentors who will not only show you the way, but also show you
how to disagree professionally, helped to bolster that voice. (Ben)
While generalizable conclusions are not possible, a trend emerged during the coding of
the interviews: Participants who had mentoring relationships to help them hold their
self-concepts voiced greater success in managing toxic events than those who lacked them.
Alternatively, an absence of mentoring contributed to self-concepts as not being supported in
general. As the next section shows, mentoring relationships solidified early and remained
foundational throughout their careers as calibration tools for sensemaking in toxic events.
Property of Sensemaking the Behavior. While mentoring helped establish
professional self-concepts early, intelligence officers linked stable, long-term relationships to the
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ability to make sense of toxic events. Therefore, mentoring relationships not only played the role
of navigating “what I know” as IC professionals. They also established an inventory of support
structures defined by “who I know” that enabled them to stabilize their responses to TWB.
I had some pretty awesome mentors that would literally take my call . . . pretty much any
time of day or night to listen to me trying to make sense of this person's behavior.
(Christina)
Mentors calibrated participant expectations for what “should” be happening in the work
environment. As a form of sensemaking about the behavior of toxic personalities, mentors
bolstered participant efforts to “hold self” by providing perspective, guidance, and support.
Career decisions, including whether to continue in the profession, influenced participant
decisions on promotion opportunities and longevity. Sensemaking about when enough was
enough was key:
He shared a very candid statement with me. “You know, there's going to be a point in
your career when you're going to be tired of eating shit, and you're going to know when
that point is.” (Ben)
Property of How I Got Here. Participants drew connections between the role of
mentoring, how they “got here,” and how they have confronted TWB. However, mentors also
instilled values in relation to their obligations to coach others experiencing similar challenges:
As long as I'm there, there are certain things that I'm going to make [sure] branch
members know how to do and do them well. It's not like I want to lose sleep over it when
I leave, but it would bug me if I thought, "Jesus, I'm going to leave and half the guys
don't even know how to do this simple function." No, that's not going to happen. (Rico)
Cross-cultural mentoring also emerged as a dynamic in the interpretation of cross-cultural TWB:
Everybody around me was an older, white male. I thought to myself, "Oh, my God, here I
am, this little brown girl. They're all going to hate me.” They dedicated their time, they
welcomed me with open arms. They taught me everything that I knew. (Maria)
As her career progressed, Maria parlayed this navigational and sensemaking role into advising
other young women on how to confront TWB in the Caucasian- and male-dominated IC:
I [would say], "Hey, think about this, talk to this person. This is how I got here. This is the
course that I took. This is what I had done." (Maria)
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Thus, “I Had Mentors” left an indelible mark in the form of lessons to rely upon as
participants assessed “Who and What I Know.” An absence of those relationships also left
marks on participants who lacked them. However, mentors were more than simple counseling
resources. For these intelligence officers, their counsel created a sense of experiential
camaraderie in toxic events in the form of “Not Just Me”:
Category of Not Just Me. Participants juxtaposed moments of feeling isolated with
moments in which they had support. As discussed earlier, most of the TWB experiences
surfaced during the grounded theory portion of the study were passive behaviors instead of
overt aggression. Because others often relegate passive forms of TWB to “interpretation,”
intelligence officers related periods of isolation as the burden shifted to them to explain and
justify the effects. Knowing that mentors and others in their networks had similar experiences
were seminal moments in Holding Self:
I had a mentor from another agency who was familiar with this particular guy who then
told me a ton of other things that he had been involved in. That was just like, "Well, that's
obviously the situation." (Natalie)
Camaraderie and support were not always overt but shadowed expressions from those who
feared they might be next:
The rest of the leadership team, my other branch chief peers at the time in that division,
they were all in my court. (Dana)
Participants who were targets of TWB related the preponderance of experiences
with “Not Just Me.” However, participants also explored seminal moments while
witnessing toxic events directed at others:
It came from all of the team. It came from so many people across all the team, people
that had only worked with him one time, maybe, in the last three months. (Joel)
The bolstering effect that “Not Just Me” had on the ability to address the behavior was
significant. Thus, “Not Just Me” within the dimension of “Who and What I Know” was also a
reflection of how the critical mass of others may affect response:
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Everybody finally woke up that this is an issue, and it's not just a bunch of people being
adolescent about what's happening in the unit. (Zeke)
“Not Just Me” changed the dynamic in how intelligence officers responded to TWB. As
will be discussed in a subsequent section, participants who explored this kinship of toxic
experiences also claimed a stronger ability to “hold self” in the situation. For the purposes of this
discussion, “Who and What You Don’t Know” emerged as another aspect of this inventorying
process affecting those unable to leverage these resources. This dynamic was particularly acute
for ethnic and gendered minorities and is the subject of the next element of “Who and What I
Know”: “Owning the Other.”
Category of Owning the Other. “Owning the Other” referred to perceptions of being
perceived as anomalies in
the toxic environment. As
with “I Had Mentors” and

Figure 4.9
Category and Properties of Who and What I Know—Owning
the Other

“Not Just Me,” “Owning the
Other” calibrated who they
were in relation to the toxic
personality, support
networks, and systems of
redress. As illustrated in Figure 4.9, “Owning the Other” consisted of two properties: “Factional
Dynamic” and “Big and Black.”
Property of Factional Dynamic. “Factional Dynamic” included an awareness of
whether participants were on the right or wrong side of power in relation to cliques and favorites:
[It was] more of a similar factional dynamic. But rather than it having a mindset
dimension, it was more just politics of one clique, trying to make sure they get taken care
of. If you're not part of that clique, then it can be a toxic environment for you or others.
(Loess)
Empirical research indicates that targets of TWB become marginalized within
organizations even when isolating the target is not the terminal goal of the toxic personality
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(Ciuk, 2011; Hodson et al., 2006). Inter- and intra-organizational factions intersected with
complex group identities related to sociodemographic status in this study. Because “Factional
Dynamic” formed self-concepts at least partially around being on the relational periphery, the
element also minimized access to resources to confront TWB. Thus, the Caucasian female and
African American participants of both genders perceived that owning their “other-ship” was
central to efforts to “hold self” amid toxic factions:
It wasn't until recently when I was called an “old dog,” when I wasn't able to even
compete or interview for a position that only had a handful of candidates, that it made
me understand and realize that maybe the objective was not about diversity or even
having the most competitive environment for a position. (Mike)
Women of both ethnicities took stock of how their roles as patriots became minimized
because they were outside the “bro club,” a sentiment that also recalled “Not Just Me”:
I think that the paramilitary culture influx had a negative impact on our culture. I started
hearing everybody start to call, "Hey, brother, what's up brother?" Then that's how the
men all started to address each other. So, you would get that label, "Oh, mom is here."
(Maria)
Being in the wrong faction extended into practical impacts on bonuses and salaries as the lack
of female leaders inhibited the ability to promote women:
I have seen it with my own eyes that women . . . are penalized for the same behaviors
that men are rewarded for. It's making a difference in our promotions and our pay.
(Margaret)
How do you overcome that in an organization where [so few] division officers are
female? (Gwen)
Property of Big and Black. “Owning the Other” destabilized permission norms for
responding to TWB when simply being “Big and Black” incurred assumptions about whether one
was a threat. For African American male participants in the study, self-advocacy amid TWB
required sidestepping, lateral maneuverability, and subtlety they perceived as unrequired of
their Caucasian counterparts.
A supervisor of mine made disparaging comments that went like this. “When you talk to
people, you look at them in the eye.” Where am I supposed to look at them? “Well,
you're a big guy.” This is something I can't control. But it's like, why are you talking to me
about somebody else's shortcomings that someone else can't deal with? (Ben)
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At the extreme, African American males perceived that even remaining silent carried risk.
Self-advocacy included the mantra, “Don’t react while black”:
I knew that I should not react in any way. I know that because of the perception of what I
should or could be, the full weight of administrative action will be thrown at me if I were
to fit the mold. (Lamar)
“Big and Black” also included the co-signing process of within-group advocacy, support,
warning-systems, and vouching. Participants described these processes as forms of inclusion
that had to be crafted carefully:
There's only so much of each other's offices we're going to go to, because people start
talking. What we did was go to lunch and just talk outside of work. (Ben)
Summary. Inventorying “Who and What I Know” shaped how participants assessed
resources, networks, and positioning, which became fundamental to Holding Self within TWB.
These processes also worked with “Who I Am” categories and properties to formulate
self-concepts. However, participants surfaced a third set of inventorying processes: taking stock
of their own agency to affect their circumstances. This final psychological dimension of “What I
Can” is the subject of the next section.
Primary Psychological Dimension of Holding Self: What I Can
“What I Can” was the most compact of the primary psychological conditions with only
two overarching categories. However, the dimension was no less powerful because it provided
a framework in which participants assessed agency in responding to TWB. Consequently,
“What I Can” leveraged the self-concepts of “Who I Am” and the acumen of “Who and What I
Know” to create frameworks for affecting their own circumstances using voice and action.
However, perceptions of agency relied upon what they knew of themselves as well as
competing levels of agency by others in the toxic environment. “What I Can” not only
determined how much control that participants believed they had; functioning within this
dimension affected how they felt about themselves in those circumstances (Roseman, 1984).
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As illustrated in Table 4.6, the following description will discuss “What I Can” through two,
overarching categories: “Work as Voice and “Sensing Opportunities.”
Category of Work as Voice. Participants framed voice as a mechanism for
communicating who they were in relation to the mission and how they confronted toxic
environments. Working hard and performing well were tools for communicating to others who
they were. Thus, voice was not only an auditory form but action:
The way I approach being a [redacted] analyst—because it is a very solitary sort of
experience—I came in thinking, just work hard, and I'll get rewarded for the work that I
do. (Kit)
However, work as a form of voice and agency had a catch because competition over intellectual
space, performance, and recognition elevated the toxic personality’s voice over their own, even
in silence:
I wasn't getting a clear affirmative reply. But I
think after maybe doing it one too many times, I
got a bit of a . . . it wasn't really directly verbally
expressed. But it was just a body language in a
posture of like, "Well, why do you keep bringing
this up?” (Loess)

Table 4.6
Categories of What I Can

Levels of agency emerged within a complex set of
organizational, interpersonal, and situational factors.
Thus, “Work as Voice” flexed as a muscle developed
over time:
When you reach a certain degree of success, you have much more leeway to voice your
opinions and push back on what you know to be the case and what you know to be fact.
(Maria)
A tenant of constructivist grounded theory is that the meaning of remembered choices
and impact will continue to emerge within the interview (Charmaz, 2002b). This dynamic
revealed itself in the study as “Work as Voice” became a reference point for reflecting on
imagined career impacts to confronting the TWB at different points in their careers. One element
included positioning themselves as “different now”:
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It took me 20 years in a career to have a really bad experience, but if you have that bad
experience in year one, or year three, or year five, to lose your fire that early, it would
almost be, “Why keep going?” (Gwen)
“Keeping going” through barriers to “What I Can” interacted with ethnic and gendered
identities. African American participants explored the interaction between reflected appraisals of
their ethnic identities, what they could do, and how the responded to TWB. These reflections
also included their perceptions of how resources differed from those available to Caucasians:
I've seen in other places where a minority, out of frustration of just having to live in this
box all the time, finally reacts. Even if it's not some type of administrative leave, you
absolutely see it at the end of the year in your performance appraisal. (Lamar)
Caucasian and African American women how “Work as Voice” became diminished when
others silenced their work by talking down and over them. They also observed others using
silence as a way of survival:
I had a deputy who was a woman, and she just kind of went along with whatever, and
then the [GS-]15 in charge of our group was a man. (Natalie)
“Work as Voice” translated into what participants perceived that they could do within
toxic events. However, expressing voice relied upon having an instrument for projection. Being
able to speak up relied upon leveraging knowledge of the organization through who and what
they knew so that they could sense opportunities to use voice productively.
Category of Sensing Opportunities. “Sensing Opportunities” reflected the ability to
exact rewards for organizational acumen (“Who and What I Know) in direct and circuitous ways:
So, I saw this as an opportunity. "You guys want this so bad, it's all yours. Hey, be
careful what you ask for, because now I'm handing it to you.” I’m paid to manage. This is
just another aspect of me managing. (Rico)
You just maybe say, "Well, if this is how it's going to be, I'm going to end-run you by
producing at such a level that it’s almost above reproach, and it'll make it very hard for
you to take me down. Second is to produce enough that they would really, as one of
them even said once, "It would really smell bad if they took you down." (Loess)
Grounded theory-based studies seek to understand participant meaning of a
phenomenon. In a metaphorical sense, interviewing participants is a symbiotic process in which
the participant is carrying the researcher on a journey; however, the destination must be a place
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the researcher finds value in visiting. In studies related to traumatic or abusive experiences,
participants may detour into discussions of others’ actions and motives. The researcher must
guide the interview back on course when rhetorical side roads emerge. However, “Sensing
Opportunities” was a category in which participants’ descriptions of the toxic personality’s
motives and opportunities became revelatory about their own:
I think this person . . . well, we all know how to play office politics to supervisors and
manage up. You know, he knew how to play the game. (Christina)
How they framed responses to TWB relied partially upon reflected appraisals,
perceptions of who and what the toxic personality knew, and what the participant could do in
comparison to others. This collective hall of mirrors led them to size up memories within
expectations of future interactions:
They were in with the senior, and when you're in with a senior, you ride that coattail. (Kit)
The ability to shape relationships with superiors and others with referential forms of
power constitute currency in the IC; these skills are one reason that “Who and What I Know” is
so powerful as a dimension of Holding Self when intelligence officers show equal levels of skill
in using them through the agency of “What I Can.” Thus, meaning of response to TWB for
intelligence officers included judging the toxic personality’s superior ability to contextualize as
attractive to a wider array of likeminded relationships:
She was able to find protection and found a way to stay. (Eve)
These relationships constituted more than simple access. They represented
endorsement by the power structures surrounding them. For these intelligence officers, the toxic
personality’s ability to attract likeminded peers into a closed orbit around them hampered
participants’ abilities to use opportunities. At time, the outcomes were subtle messages in which
participants perceived their place on a periphery. Other times, the outcomes were blunt-force
trauma to careers and self-concepts:
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These were people who saw an opportunity to empower themselves, and she welcomed
it. I never saw the writing on the wall. I certainly realized that I didn't understand my
environment as well as I needed to. (David)
Summary. As dimensions of Holding Self, “What I Can” interacted with “Who I Am” and
“Who and What I Know” to psychologically position the participants in the toxic environment.
They functioned within the core conditions that defined boundaries around the toxic environment
and responses to it. Responding to TWB in the intelligence environment required projecting that
dynamic onto the external environment through action dimensions. The following section will
discuss the three action dimensions and two inter-dimensions of Holding Self.
Primary Action and Inter-Dimensions of Holding Self
Primary action dimensions of Holding Self consisted of strategies and tactics for
confronting TWB so that self-concepts remained intact, and the participant could continue to
function effectively. Returning to Figure 4.1 and its depiction of the flow of the model, the
primary psychological conditions were internal processes as preparatory for primary action
dimensions and two inter-dimensions as loci for social action with identifiable conditions,
processes, and consequences. The explanatory matrix in Table 4.7 depicts three primary action
dimensions, two inter-dimensions, and related elements of Holding Self, including conditions,
processes, consequences associated with each framework.
Tactics for Holding Self were as diverse as the self-concepts they were designed to
protect. However, unlike the psychological dimensions in their qualitative agnosticism toward a
positive outcome, action dimensions differed in how effective they were in maintaining
self-concepts and fostering the intelligence mission. How positive responses were toward the
mission pivoted around which response trajectories the participant followed.
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Table 4.7
Primary Action Dimensions of Holding Self and Related Elements

One note of caution: The theoretical model reflects the meaning of responses
participants provided during the interviews. As noted in Chapter 3, the response trajectories
were conveyed through memories. While no participant remained on each path consistently
during the interviews, each chose a single, dominant dimension to explore their response. The

159
following section will explore each action dimension, related conditions and consequences, and
inter-dimensions that triggered movement onto another response path.
Primary Action Dimension: Seeking Subliminal
As depicted in Figure 4.10, the primary action dimension of “Seeking Subliminal” is a set
of strategies and tactics that participants adopted to maneuver around or alter the toxic
circumstances so that they could continue to hold “self,” as well as support the intelligence
mission without compromising performance, goals, or self-concepts. The name for the
dimension emerged from Aedan’s approach to TWB during intelligence operations.
By identifying
what's triggering
their behavior and
then using it to
control one's
environment and
behavior or simply
be a good listener
and respond with a
subliminal solution.
(Aedan)

Figure 4.10
Primary Action Dimension of Seeking Subliminal

Twelve of the 22
participants spent a portion
of the interview within this
dimension, which they
represented through narrative terms that reflected an interaction with their psychological
dimensions, as well. Therefore, “Seeking Subliminal” was an action dimension in which the
psychological dimensions of “Who I Am,” “Who and What I Know,” and “What I Can” could
balance their ideal states while Holding Self in response to TWB so that the mission sustained.
The following sections will explore two conditions, three processes, and three consequences for
“Seeking Subliminal.”
Conditions for Seeking Subliminal. Conditions are factors catalyzing responses and
processes within a dimension (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Two significant conditions emerged
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within “Seeking Subliminal.” “The Game” related to perceptions of how politics and power
influenced the toxic personality and their behavior. “What’s Worth It” emerged as a perception of
whether responding in various ways was worth the likely outcome. These conditions for action
also constituted psychological processes. The conditions in this section are told in processual
narratives because recognizing them as conditions created the catalyst for response.
Condition of Seeking Subliminal—The Game. Participants referenced “The Game” as
a dynamic in which inhibiting bureaucracy and toxic power were the norm. TWB was merely a
microcosm of this phenomenon:
There's always just some politics or whatever, bureaucratic frictions between different
interests. It's not realistic to think you'll have just a Nirvana work environment with no
level of noise or friction or conflict. (Loess)
Within “Seeking Subliminal,” “The Game” was played on a large field with many players.
The participant was one. How they perceived “The Game” established boundaries, allies, and
within the core condition of “Sensing Opportunities,” what they could do:
The first thing you do is you never let them know what you're thinking. They see, "Okay,
I can come to this guy again because he's actually trying to protect me so I can achieve
my goal." (Aedan)
“The Game” was not static but shape-shifting, as personnel changed on teams, new
superiors emerged, and the IC formed and reformed organizations. Thus, “The Game” was a
set of ordinary rules played within extraordinary circumstances:
Who else might see this note? How long is this going to trail me? Is there harm to an
individual? And sometimes just let it go if there was no clear strategic reason to continue
to push. (Maria)
Embedded in Maria’s insight was a second condition of “Seeking Subliminal,” one in which “The
Game” interacted perceptions of power and risk: “What’s Worth It.”
Condition of Seeking Subliminal—What’s Worth It. The condition of “What’s Worth It”
references the risk associated with some outcome over others. “What’s Worth It” was a process
of comparing the participant’s power to the toxic personality’s:
So eventually it just got to the point where the juice wasn't worth the squeeze. (Rico)
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Is the point really worth it? Or is it more of an inconvenience? (Maria)
However, judging whether responding was “worth it” also placed boundaries on the toxic
personality, which created situational awareness for the participant about how to protect
themselves:
I didn't give him the opportunity to turn that ire on me. (Celine)
While “What’s Worth It” defined power, it also defined levels of risk to that participant’s
career and life choices. This awareness not only impacted responses to TWB but also how one
would position themselves in relation to toxic personalities in the future. Less risk translated into
assessing “What I Can.” The next section will explore processes for “Seeking Subliminal” that
enabled them to project this power.
Processes for Seeking Subliminal. Processes for “Seeking Subliminal” included
methods for maneuvering around toxic personalities and their enablers. Using strategies and
tactics such as “Adapting and Soldiering,” “Walking It Off,” and “Finding Others,” intelligence
officers described processes designed for agility and goal accomplishment in which they often
used the TWB to their advantage. The following section will discuss these processes.
Process for Seeking Subliminal—Adapting and Soldiering. As a process for
“Seeking Subliminal,” “Adapting and Soldiering” included tactics in which participants
maneuvered and shifted to remain in their ideal mission state. The process was dispassionate
and a calculated enactment of “What I Can.” However, adapting relied upon the participant’s
ability to understand the toxic personality’s goal:
To me, being able to understand how that person operates allows me to adapt for that. I
can manage my expectations. (Jason)
The process was not limited to understanding and managing the toxic personality.
“Adapting and Soldiering” required activating “Who I Am” and “What I Can” to choose the
optimal time to respond:
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I held back on supporting the transformation in my prior role for fear of dealing with the
toxic personality. I quietly advocated for it until I got into this role. I altered my tactics.
(Kelly)
“Adapting and Soldiering” also included shifting the circumstances of the toxic
personality toward some optimal state for the mission. This process revealed itself in two
nuances of “What I Can,” including out-maneuvering the TWB:
It was like, "Well, I beat her to the punch." (Loess)
We just provided that person an opportunity to excel elsewhere and made it seem like it
was their idea. (Ben)
Maneuverability within “Adapting and Soldiering” relied upon effective use of the acumen
inherent in “Who and What I Know” to soldier on to maintain their own performance:
You just soldier on, I guess. I probably was more involved in the more prominent topics,
so I had to navigate through the swamp. I personally checked out of the situation
mentally. (Loess)
“Adapting and Soldiering” enabled participants to hold “self” by shifting their circumstances.
Analysis of the interview data also a showed a complex balance in which participants minimized
the impact of the emotions within “I Felt . . .” and the shock of “Upside Down” through an
efficient and dispassionate management of choices. “Walking It Off” was key to calculus.
Process for Seeking Subliminal—Walking It Off. “Walking It Off” reflected physical
and psychological separation from the toxic circumstances in the “moment” to sustain
self-concepts and optimal performance. Efforts to manage the “I Felt . . .” and “Upside Down”
core conditions were prominent in this process:
I would take walks to cool down if I needed to. In a few situations, I would just hold onto
an email I knew I needed to respond to for a day, maybe two just so I made sure that I
wasn't responding from a position of anger or frustration. (Finn)
“Walking It Off” was not a process in which participants stored away toxic events into
some compartmented denial. Rather, they compartmented them into forethought and action:
Think about it, go eat, maybe have a glass of wine. Try to sleep if I could, and maybe I
couldn't sleep. But think on it, ruminate. (Maria)
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If you didn't stop to do that a couple of times a day if needed, you could find yourself in
trouble because you'd just boil over. (Lamar)
“Walking It Off” included management of internal reaction as precursor to external
response. As with “Adapting and Soldiering,” “Walking It Off” activated assessments of agency
to hold “self.” A third process of “Seeking Subliminal” relied upon “Who and What I Know” most
prominently as the foundation of response to TWB: “Finding Others.”
Process for Seeking Subliminal—Finding Others. Within the primary psychological
dimension of “Who and What I Know,” participants reflected on the importance of networks in
choosing how to respond:
I would use whatever network I have to try to get moved from where I'm going [redacted]
to a different place. I would try to pull something like that. (Joel)
Finding others also relied on the acumen to play “The Game.” However, “Finding Others” also
included intentionally aligning with like-minded others:
Those people tended to sort of find each other, or people would reference each other.
(Ben)
“Finding Others” also included forward-leaning decisions to help the organization
manage TWB more effectively:
The ultimate reason why I started that women's group was because there were two
majors standing in the hallway complaining to each other. I had gotten to know each of
the two majors individually, but I just stopped to see how they are doing, and they were
both complaining about this similar thing. So, I had my own networking. (Kelly)
“Adapting and Soldiering,” “Walking It Off,” and “Finding Others” leveraged use of the
primary psychological conditions to maximize control over toxic circumstances. The goal for
participants within this dimension was to maneuver effectively to steady the mission. The
following section will explore consequences of “Seeking Subliminal.”
Consequences of the Seeking Subliminal Dimension. Within grounded theory,
consequences reflect causality within the theoretical model. They are the outcomes from action
within conditions unique to that dimension (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As an ideal state, “Seeking
Subliminal” generally related to outcomes that were positive for the participant and potentially
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steadying for the mission. This section will discuss the following consequences: “Learned
Lessons,” “Mission Gets Done,” and “Don’t Have to Be Here”:
Consequence of Seeking Subliminal—Lessons Learned. As an ideal state of Holding
Self, the “Seeking Subliminal” primary dimension required the perspective to assess threads of
victory within losses as participants recognized positive lessons and outcomes from
experiences with TWB. In many cases, they parlayed the ability to observe the toxic
personality’s behavior to evaluate their own:
My very first branch chief, I don't have a lot of positive things to say about, not because
she was a terrible person or anything. I try to take a lesson from everybody. I think that
it's one of the things. (Dana)
Others drew on lessons learned from their own unproductive behavior in the past:
Earlier in my career, I had gotten myself into some trouble with just blasting out emails
when I felt a particular way. I really didn't want that to happen again. (Finn)
Participants also gained empathy from having been the targets of TWB. In these
circumstances, they reflected Mead’s (1934) “I versus me” in an ability to see their pain in
others.
If I ever saw anybody treated like that, I don't care what it would cost me to be the one to
stand up for them. I would not let anybody be treated like that. (Dana)
“Learning Lessons” as a consequence of “Seeking Subliminal” gifted greater awareness
and empathy, which supported Holding Self. Holding onto self-concepts becomes a simpler
process when they are identities and self-images that one accepts. To paraphrase Dana (2020),
the “hard point” in her career made her better. The more fundamental question is what did these
lessons mean for the mission? As discussed in the next section, the mission moved forward, at
least in the short-term.
Consequence of Seeking Subliminal—The Mission Wins. During the interviews,
participant commitment to the mission was a palatable consequence of “Seeking Subliminal.”
Adapting, soldiering, maneuvering, walking away, and building networks were tactics for
success:
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I don't want to spend a lot of time talking about, if we got to build a widget, let's build a
widget. So, let's figure it out and try to find something that's workable for both of you, and
if it's not, workable for both of us. (Rico)
Some were able to draw a direct link between consequences and processes:
I just keep moving forward like, “Oh, that didn’t work. Let’s try something else.” Being
emotional wasn't going to improve the Chief’s leadership ability. (Kelly)
“Seeking Subliminal” was an ideal dimension that centered on elevated accomplishment.
However, while the dimension may have fostered the mission in the short term, elevating
mission objectives in ways that overshadowed the “self” may not have been positive for the IC.
Participants left organizations, intentionally truncated careers, and even left the mission. The
next section will examine this dynamic through the consequence of “Don’t Need to Be Here.”
Consequence of Seeking Subliminal— Don’t Have to Be Here. Because intelligence
officers spend approximately one-third of their time in their workplaces, one would expect an
ideal state would include choices contributing to peace in that environment. However, for some,
peace came with an awareness that they did not need to be in the IC anymore:
I was like, well, this dream is dead. It was made very clear to me by a coworker. I was
like, "Well, I don't need to be here anymore then." (Natalie)
However, psychologically separating oneself from the toxic environment had a catch.
When intelligence officers left their areas of expertise, they suffered the loss of separation from
work they valued. Additionally, the IC lost the investment into their experiential development:
When I left there, I completely shut door on that mission. I was done. I was there, had
golden years, had a great time. I felt it was marred by that whole experience with her,
and I didn't want to go back. Ever. (Dana)
Summary. Thus, “Don’t Need to Be Here” marked a turn for “Seeking Subliminal”
because “subliminal” for the participant became incongruent with “subliminal” for the long-term
mission. While “Seeking Subliminal” fostered the mission, resources expended to adapt and
soldier, walk it off, and find others often taxed some to the point where “the game” became “not
worth it.” Thus, while “Seeking Subliminal” functioned as an ideal dimension in context, that
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context was fundamentally suboptimal. This suboptimal condition formed a pathway to the next
dimension, the

inter-dimension of “Seeking-Folding.”

Interim Dimension of Holding Self—Seeking-Folding
Inter-dimensions function as bi-directional transit points between primary dimensions.
“Seeking-Folding” transited between “Seeking Subliminal” and a second primary action
dimension, “Folding In,” to be discussed in a subsequent section. As illustrated in Figure 4.11,
“Seeking-Folding”

Figure 4.11

contained two conditions

Seeking-Folding Inter-Dimension Elements

that functioned as
barriers to responding
effectively to TWB in the
intelligence environment:
“What’s at My Back” and
“Power Dynamics”:
Condition of
Seeking-Folding—What’s at My Back. “What’s at My Back” as a condition framed the
environmental support available to the participant. This condition elevated the psychological
dimensions of Holding Self as participants sought to maintain self-concepts in interaction with
support structures and what they had the capability to do. The condition was also a perceptual
framework in which awareness about the goals of others in the environment became critical:
I'd rather be in a combat zone because at least the enemy on the other side of the wire
doesn't hide the fact that they want to do me harm, right? (Lamar)
Not knowing what was at one’s back facilitated a transition from “Seeking Subliminal” by
way of uncertainty. However, the uncertainty about who had the participant’s “back” consisted of
a confluence of relational and institutional factors. Teammates who were not the source of the
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TWB but who modeled or enabled the behavior from the periphery played significant roles.
Political agendas formed toxic parochialism.
One’s position in relation to structures and others in the environment defined formal
authority:
I was team leader at the time. It really wasn't that difficult because there was no love lost
between these two people. (Rico)
But not necessarily perceptions of power:
I would try to defend our guys a little bit more, but still in the back of my mind, I didn't
have full courage to be able to just completely step up and help people out. (Zeke)
Consequently, formal position did not bestow power. Rather, the meaning intelligence officers
assigned to “What’s at My Back” did. The next condition of “Seeking-Folding” defined how those
perceptions impacted the ability to affect toxic circumstances.
Condition of Seeking-Folding—Power Dynamics. Power in organizations emerges in
various forms of formal and referential power to influence circumstances (French & Raven,
1959; Raven, 1964). Power was present in all dimensions of the mode, most acutely in the
agency of “What I Can.” Like “Sensing Opportunities,” “Power Dynamics” as a condition found
meaning in relation to others:
I did not want to ram heads with the organizational power dynamics of a retired male
[position redacted] versus a woman that had not been embraced. Like I was not
welcome there at all. (Margaret)
Fifteen of the 20 participants held positions of formal power at the time of the interview,
although the toxic experiences they explored commonly occurred earlier in their careers. Only
two had never held “referential power” as a senior or team lead. For those in a position to lead
others either formally or referentially, “Power Dynamics” became a definition for defending
others in the toxic environment and part of the calculus of whether they led well:
This issue isn't just about me. It's about the many others who are also like me, who are
a part of this whole process or this whole community. (Mike)
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Like all conditions, “Power Dynamics” relied upon some element of process to
understand the contextual boundaries. These processes, in turn, offered meaning. The following
section will discuss processes for enacting within “Seeking-Folding.”
Processes of Seeking-Folding. “Seeking-Folding” as an inter-dimension included three
processes: “Being the Buffer,” “Blowing and Walking,” and “Altering Dreams.” Each process
became a pivoting half-measure that emerged longitudinally when participants found the search
for “subliminal” falling short. This section will discuss each process as a catalyst for
inter-dimensional consequences.
Process of Seeking-Folding—Being the Buffer. Participants positioned themselves as
buffers between the toxic personality and others to facilitate collaboration and mission
continuity. This process was particularly acute among intelligence officers who held formal or
referential power. For some participants, the process was a dialogical or psychological wall:
I used my own power to try to keep a positive environment, if you will, and to downplay
the negative things. (David)
I discussed the controversies related to the roles played by toxic buffers or toxic
handlers in Chapter 2. This study did not evaluate the short-term versus long-term effects of
toxic buffering. However, the value of the data here may have illustrated a critical junction point
between the two perspectives. Simply, critical mission environments like the IC experience
significant risk around short-term impacts from uncommunicative team members and hostile
environments, which may balance concerns about the long-term organizational. For Zeke,
buffering was fundamental to the ability of the team to work together:
I was the only person that had to deal with them. So that made it easier for them. I
became a buffer for the rest of the team once that move was made. Productivity and
everybody's attitude and everything like that picked up. (Zeke)
While buffering was primarily the purview of those with formal or referential power to
manage resources, participants who were either subordinate to the toxic personality or
otherwise unable to influence the individual’s behavior engaged in two other processes. These
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processes involved managing the one resource they could control: their engagement with and
attitudes toward the work of being intelligence officers. The next section discusses one of these
processes: “Blowing and Walking.”
Process of Seeking-Folding—Blowing and Walking. In “Seeking Subliminal,”
participants explored “Walking It Off” as processes to temporarily remove themselves from the
toxic environment and recalibrate for a positive outcome. “Blowing and Walking” emerged in lost
composure, often before temporarily exiting the toxic environment. These moments typically
came after extended periods of TWB and the participant could no longer see an alternative:
I started crying because I was so mad about it. It was the blow up. I walked out, and it
was one of the most frustrating things ever. (Dana)
Earlier in this chapter, “Owning the Other” was a core condition of Holding Self in which
sociodemographic status was present throughout the interaction with the toxic environment. In
this inter-dimension, “Blowing and Walking” interacted with “Owning the Other” for African
American males to create a dichotomy so that “Blowing” created risk that “Walking” did not:
I'm a 6'3”, 235-pounds black man. Because of everything that comes with it, now I'm
aggressive. I knew, “If you even move, you're done.” (Lamar)
There are times when someone who is in a majority can say something a certain way,
and it'll be, “Oh, that's just him. That's how he talks.” I can say the exact same thing, and
it could be deemed as hostile. (Ben)
In this way, the power-stripping impact of TWB among intelligence officers interacted
with the perceived power deficit already in the environment from “Owning the Other.” This
confluence conditioned African American male participants to voice anger through silence and
withdrawal. Removing themselves from the environment afforded plausible deniability in place
of the emotional authenticity to which Caucasian counterparts were entitled by not being the
“other”:
I immediately excused myself and left the meeting and stated that the excuse was I had
to go pick up my son. (Mike)
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Participants in each group expressed satisfaction in their choices of response. However,
the use of overt voice, versus silence or absence as voice, illustrated separate dimensions of
empowerment depending on whether the goal was power over something rather than protection
from something. The Caucasian females and males, as well as African American females
expressed satisfaction in the form of regaining power over the source of the behavior.
Alternatively, Mike’s use of “the excuse was” (Mike) was less focused on projecting power over
the toxic personality than projecting power over self-concepts with the least risk.
Like “Being the Buffer,” “Blowing and Walking” was a process that transitioned between
the “Seeking Subliminal” and “Folding In” dimensions. The process functioned as proverbial
highway interchanges as participants responded to fluid circumstances and power that
challenged self-concepts. A final interim process, “Altering Dreams,” presented another process
interchange around career trajectories.
Process of Seeking-Folding—Altering Dreams. Related to the consequence of “I
Don’t Need to Be Here” in “Seeking Subliminal,” “Altering Dreams” is an inter-dimensional
process of recalibrating career objectives due to experiences with TWB. “Altering Dreams”
straddled the consequential line because self-concepts and former career plans became less
compatible:
The biggest thing I've come to peace with, if I never get promoted again . . . it was a
good run. (Ben)
And a source of loss:
From a work standpoint, the two experiences that I've had have altered my dreams and
goals at work. For many years, I stopped caring about career advancement. After you
have a professionally disruptive, hostile experience, you have to think twice before you
want to be part of that club. (Gwen)
Within the “Seeking Subliminal” consequence of “I Don’t Need to Be Here,” participants
found subliminal in leaving for environments more compatible with self-concepts. Alternatively,
“Altering Dreams” was a process of Holding Self that compromised their potential as future IC
leaders. Thus, as “Don’t Need to Be Here” marked a turn in which the subliminal may have
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contributed to negative impacts to mission in the long-term, “Altering Dreams” solidified that
negative turn.
Process for Seeking-Folding—Went to the Boss. “Went to the Boss” activated “Who
and What I Know” into the external environment in the form of decisions to seek redress, either
behavior from senior leaders or compliance organizations within their entities. The process
reflected expectations of organizational support and varied perspectives on the locus of the
TWB.
Seeking support from those with formal power over the toxic personality was a common
first step in “Went to the Boss.” However, participants framed the process as inherently futile or
that only led to more conflict with the toxic personality:
I went to the deputy at the time, and he wanted me to go apologize. I was like,
“Absolutely fricking not. Not happening. Fire me. I don't care.” (Dana)
It was perceived as I was going there to try to either get him to do something about it or
get her fired. Obviously, I didn't get the results I wanted. (David)
Participants also sought redress from various regulatory compliance organizations, such
as the Inspector General’s Office (IG), the Equal Employment Opportunity Division (EEOD), or
Human Resources (HR). As with efforts to enlist advocacy from those in formal power over the
toxic personality, participants framed these choices as unsatisfying:
This guy went out of his way to get back at me. I finally went to the IG and [then] I went
to EEO, and then I still got no relief. (Eve)
I did go to the IG to raise the issue, but I did not get a confidence-building reply. To me,
it seemed like the IG office just didn't want to pursue it. (Loess)
The burden of these processes became a tax on the core mission as redress procedures
dominated time and considerations about what the effort is worth:
It is a horror process and people may not have the resources or the money to do it or
they don't want the headache. Then that becomes part of the issue. But what people fail
to realize is that if you start to action documented behavior or stuff that you have on
paper, then the burden is on them to do otherwise. So, that's where I'm at, people
thought I was going to take the agency to court. I go, “No, this one's not worth it.” (Mike)
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For the participants functioning within the “Seeking-Folding” inter-dimension, perceptions
on whether the responses empowered or diminished the “self” interacted with expectations for
institutional or leadership support in the “What’s at My Back” condition. Therefore, the
experience of going to the boss influenced whether the participant returned to “Seeking
Subliminal” or moved on to “Folding In.” The decision that resulted from this process became
the outcome of the inter-dimension. Returning to “Seeking Subliminal” relied upon the acumen
to understand what would work and the agency to determine a course of action:
A lot of people want to really just stay committed to the certain field they work . . . and
then they put up with stuff like that, even if it is a high level of unnecessary and
unprofessional toxicity. I've kind of dug in my heels but also eventually just departed the
office for another assignment in a new unit being formed. (Loess)
Summary. The tensions inherent in the inter-dimensions centered on choices of
response. Choices to (re)enter “Seeking Subliminal” included decisions to stay and maneuver or
to leave for non-toxic environments. Entering the next primary dimension of “Folding In”
included re-ordering oneself to minimize interaction with the toxic circumstances. As we will see
from the following discussion on “Folding In,” the choice to enter that dimension incurred a
social cost on the participant in terms of relationships that extended beyond that with the toxic
personality into broader relationships. “Folding In” also incurred a cost to the mission because
processes related to “Folding In” reduced participant contributions to the mission. The following
section will discuss conditions, processes, and consequences of the “Folding In.”
Primary Action Dimension of Holding Self: Folding In
“Folding In” is a primary action dimension of Holding Self in which intelligence officers
withdrew from teammates, supervisors, stakeholders, career trajectories, and mission
obligations as a response to TWB. Gwen inspired the name of the dimension when she said:
You just fold in on yourself. (Gwen)
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In 20 interviews supporting the grounded theory and situational analysis segments of the
study, participants used the word “mission” 158 times. These references to the mission indicate
that mission support extended beyond vocation into the realm of life purpose:
I didn’t want my behavior to affect the mission. (Finn)
What is the why? People first. Mission always. (Dana)
I came here for the mission. (Natalie)
Within this mindset, self-concepts and the mission became intertwined so that reducing support
to the mission by “Folding In” was a counterintuitive form of diminishing a part of oneself while
trying to hold onto it.
The following discussion explores “Folding In” as a dimension for responding to TWB in
the intelligence environment. Each participant in the grounded theory portion of the study spent
some time in this dimension,

Figure 4.12

although they may have

“Folding In” Primary Action Dimension and Dimensional
Elements

placed themselves
predominately in the other
two primary dimensions. The
conditions, processes, and
consequences of “Folding In”
are illustrated in Figure 4.12
and discussed below.
Conditions of
Folding In. Earlier in this
chapter, I explored “Owning

the Other” as a core condition of Holding Self in which self-concepts as “the other” influenced
responses to TWB. Within “Folding In,” reflected appraisals of being a woman transpired as a
targeted condition in “Work Wife.” “Lockout” represented interpersonal and institutional barriers.
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“Glass Floors” represented an alternative universe in which subordinates had outsized power
relative to their supervisors. Finally, “It’s Normal” reflected perceptions that TWB had become
normalized. This section will review those three conditions:
Condition of Folding In—Work Wife: Being a “Work Wife” was a segment of “Owning
the Other” among female participants. Within “Folding In,” women felt diminished when men
talked over them, questioned their competence, or shouted them down in ways that male
colleagues appeared exempt. The condition elevated gender as a “support” identity that
intersected with broader self-concepts and institutional power:
I've had two times where, someone called me their “work wife,” and I was livid. (Kit)
There is definitely a sexist culture at [agency redacted] where women have to kind of in
their own way be more demure and polite and ask for permission to participate.
(Margaret)
The dynamic became elevated in meetings and other group forums where acceptance of
the female voice reflected a referendum on the content of the work and her:
He would almost verbally berate one of the young, enlisted military members on our
team. Tell her she shouldn't speak out of turn, on a team where we had never held to
those norms. (Celine)
Male participants positioned themselves as empathetic witnesses to the behavior:
That is more common I think than anything, is just men in our organization speaking over
women. (Ben)
As discussed in Chapter 2, the IC remains a predominately white male ecosystem. The
power of numbers and institutional influence translate into appraisals of expertise as legitimacy.
“Work Wife” conditioned a complex dynamic between female competence as a construct and
whether specific females were competent, even among other women:
I was selected. A number of people tell me that I was only selected because I was a
woman or that my aptitude had nothing to do with it. That had really frustrated me
because of some of the people that it was coming from, most of them were obviously
women. (Celine)
However, “Work Wife” also risked being characterized as a “pushy broad”:
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“She's pushy. She thinks she's a boss.” He felt personally offended by my professional
engagement style. Right in the middle of it, [he] goes, "Hey listen, listen, I need you to
stop talking because you've already talked enough. It was a microaggression because
you were associating the negative stereotype that women talk too much with the fact that
I was doing the recap, which was within my professional purview. (Margaret)
In the intersectionality of identity, African American women experienced “Work Wife”
through African American males who warned them against becoming “pushy black broads.” This
permutation on “Work Wife” catalyzed activation of the “Who I Am” primary psychological
dimension:
He pulled me over and he's older. And he [said], “I'm telling you this because I consider
you to be a friend, but you're killing yourself.” He was basically saying that people in the
class hated me because I was so vocal. I thought about it. At first I was like, “Okay, well
maybe I should just stop talking.” And [then] I was, well, “That's not in my nature.” (Kit)
Thus, “Work Wife” constructed a condition in which female participants experienced tension
between holding the authentic “self” when institutional expectations for their positions
contravened norms. The condition was a relegation of status to some lower place. As a
condition of “Folding In,” “Work Wife” interacted with a second condition: “Lockout.”
Condition of Folding In—Lockout: “Lockout” is a condition of “Folding In” in which
participants experienced interpersonal or institutional barriers to functioning as intelligence
officers amid toxic events.
It would have been the actual, like, “I don't work for you, fuck off. I don't owe you any
information and I'm not going to give it to you.” It's a lockout. It's being locked out from
your work. (Margaret)
“Lockout” traversed complex elements, including feeling disenfranchised, passive barriers, and
perceptions of having to tolerate TWB due to mission requirements. For example, participants
explored locked out of ownership of their contributions to the mission:
It was disenfranchising me because it was my work and research that was being
published by someone else to help someone else. This person has always moved ahead
on the backs of other people. (Christina)
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However, to be disenfranchised, one must have a franchise to lose. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the uncertainty and ambiguities related to functioning as an intelligence officer
manifests in an environment in which:
There is very little we do in the intelligence community that one person does. (Zeke)
Also noted was the impact that a lack of adversarial feedback challenged determining whether
intelligence analysis and operations were “right.” While team and interorganizational
collaboration became integral to intelligence success, intelligence products often carried the
name of a single analyst, which framed a competitive environment within which bonuses and
promotions are determined:
I think the nature of what we do for a living lends itself to inadvertent competition. Your
performance ratings are oftentimes tied to your production, even though supervisors will
make caveats that say, “Oh, we're not bean counting,” when in actuality, in a lot of
cases, they are. (Christina)
In the quote by Christina to open this section, she wrapped gender, referential status of
the female team lead, female senior analyst, as well as the male recipient moving ahead “on the
backs of others” (Christina) before moving the condition into a broader situation that African
Americans perceived as normative in the workplace:
I was being divested of my work, like I would work and other people would get the credit
for it. This whole country is built on the fact that black people work hard, and we don't get
credit for the work that we do. (Kit)
Intelligence officers also reflected upon “Lockout” in the form of passive barriers as a
condition of “Folding In.” In this study, barriers were invisible, but no less insurmountable,
distracting, and time-consuming:
I kept redesigning my project, and it just kept getting shot down. Nothing would work.
Nothing improved the situation. I'm like, yeah, they're just all lying and pretending
because what we do actually really doesn't matter and it's really not that cool, and I just
felt like a complete fraud. (Natalie)
There's a lot of red ink by the clique members to the point [that you get] the sense they
have a deliberate goal of making sure they stop the paper from being published. (Loess)
“Lockout” also surfaced as nail-studded interpersonal exchanges:
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He was talking to himself under their comments, and saying, "We're never going to listen
to that. That's stupid. That's a waste of time. I don't know why I'm here. I'm wasting my
time. It was effectively just stonewalling for three and a half months. (Celine)
Participants also referenced so-called “gotcha games” as passive barriers designed to
ensure victory by highlighting participant failure:
I've seen people intentionally be condescending to folks, play the gotcha game where
they ask you a question that they know the answer to, but they're looking to see how you
are going to answer it. (Zeke)
Anything to damage my reputation. Can’t have an open phone conversation. People are
looking for something. It makes me anxious and alone. (Kelly)
“Lockout” contributed to isolation and fear within teams. However, the barriers were
predominately among colleagues. The next condition of “Folding In” was unique to first-line
supervisory intelligence officers who faced toxic subordinates. The next section discusses this
condition of “Folding In”: “Glass Floors.”
Condition of Folding In—Glass Floor. The ambiguities of referential power,
relationships, and access to intelligence framed by institutional controls have created a
condition within the primary dimension of “Folding In” among supervisors and managers
referred to here as “Glass Floor.” In the simplest terms, intelligence supervisors explored
experiences with toxic subordinates who had outsized power with teammates, senior leaders,
and others due to perceptions of expertise, physical proximity, and special relationships. This
outsized power forced participants into supervising through proverbial glass floors with minimal
influence over the activities of toxic subordinates or others loyal to them because special
relationships formed barriers:
She always used that relationship with the deputy director as an excuse. When she
started working for me, I was trying to figure out, "What are you working on? What are
you doing?" "Oh, well, I can't tell you. I'll get you a one-time read-in.” [She would say,]
“Well, the deputy direct told me to do this. If you have a problem with it, you’ve got to go
to him and talk." She had a lot of influence at the leadership level. (Liam)
Participants did not reference secrecy and compartmentalization as a condition of any
dimension of Holding Self. However, toxic personalities use whatever tools of power they have
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available to achieve their goals. Secrecy is a necessary paradox of intelligence as a business.
As a condition of the environment, segmenting intelligence impedes the collaboration the IC
relies upon to service the mission. However, without that parsing of information, access to
everything by everyone would also risk including U.S. adversaries in the “everyone” class
(Johnston, 2005). Like “coopetition” discussed in Chapter 2, whether secrecy, access, and
relationships fostered or impeded the mission relied upon a counterbalanced focus on team that
was sensitive to intent and leadership modeling:
You can call it out, you can deal with it formally. But when nobody knows who's got the
boss' ear, now all of a sudden, your power is sapped. (David)
The “Glass Floor” was not a condition strictly tied to access to leadership. Frameworks
such as remote and hybrid teams in which senior analysts had more influence with team
members than supervisors also challenged the ability of managers to break through the floor:
It wasn't just me. It was the other managers too. The toxicity between the management
and the teams was so that I felt that I had to tiptoe around and really be choosy with my
words so as to not make people upset. [It was] really ineffective and even more
frustrating. (Finn)
“Work Wife,” “Lockout,” and “Glass Floor” as conditions of “Folding In” catalyzed the
withdrawal from effective response to TWB among these intelligence officers. The next section
will explore experiences from inside the “Folding In” action dimension through the processes of
“Shutting Out,” “Watching Words,” and “Not Affecting Me.” Insights into how the folding process
emerged in the experiences of intelligence officers will be followed with a discussion of
consequences and impact to the intelligence environment from “Folding In.”
Condition of Folding-In—It’s Normal. “It’s Normal” is a condition within the “Folding In”
in which participants framed toxicity within their organizations as normative. Rather than
anomalous or deviant, TWB was a by-product of personality and culture:
You tend to think that it's just normal and the way the organization itself is. (Gwen)
For some intelligence officers, TWB had become so normalized that it was no longer
recognized as destructive. In a permutation of the “Owning the Other” category of “Who and
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What I Am,” participants in two organizations explored ways in which this normalization had
emerged into “Mafia”-like micro-cultures of inclusion and exclusion, particularly for gendered
and ethnic minorities:
There's something that I would like to term the [redacted] mafia. They can be forceful
and aggressive and almost bullying in a way, they're respected more so by the
[redacted] than say, someone like me who can't grow beard. I'm [also] looked down on
because I'm a minority. Further, there was a distinct division between the intelligence
analysts, who were mostly white, and the [redacted] analysts, who were mostly brown.
(Kit)
I laid it out for her, and she said, "Oh, you have met the junior officer mafia. They like to
do this. Especially with civilian employees, especially civilian women. They like to kind of
mess with us. You're just going to have to find a way around it." It happened so often
they had a nickname for it. It had a playbook. (Margaret)
Some participants imagined a long-term impact on the younger intelligence officers
whose workplace behaviors had not yet formed and who would develop anti-organizational
attitudes from seeing TWB unchallenged. However, normalization of TWB also emerged as a
comfortable place for participants who had long histories of defending themselves against
destructive forms of conflict:
If you've done that since you were 11 till you were early 20s, I don't know, maybe it
probably gives you a sense of not necessarily viewing conflict as some abnormal
situation that you just can't endure any degree of, if that makes sense. (Loess)
Intelligence officers functioning within the “Folding In” primary dimension
recognized the destructiveness of “Work Wife,” “Lockout,” and the “Glass Floor” as
conditioning structures for TWB. However, as the next section will illustrate,
normalization created a perception that the phenomenon was accepted by the institution.
In turn, participants developed a set of processes to protect themselves. The following
section discusses processes for “Folding In.”
Processes of Folding In. Processes of “Folding In” included efforts to withdraw
from the toxic circumstances. Rather than physically leaving the organization or team in
with the TWB exists, “Folding In” processes were proximal and psychological:

180
You fold in on yourself because you're not sure if that's going to happen again, and you
don't want it to happen more than once ever. (Gwen)
Four distinct processes emerged among participants within dimension. “Am I too
sensitive?” represented initial questions about whether they were the problem. “Shutting Out”
and “Watching Words” were avoidance measures to shield themselves physically and/or
psychologically. Thus, “Shutting Out” and “Watching Words” began in the psychological realm
and projected onto the operational environment. “Not Affecting Me” represented efforts to justify
avoidance with arguments that their performance never suffered, even as the subsequent
discussion on “Folding In” consequences suggests that it did. Participants “folded into”
processes in various ways in relation to circumstances, tolerance, and agency. “Folding In”
processes also implied a longitudinal progression. This section discusses these processes as
intelligence officer responses to TWB as they “Folded In.”
Process of Folding In—Am I Too Sensitive? Participants described processes of
“Folding In” in which they questioned whether they were misinterpreting the toxic personalities’
intensions and/or behaviors:
It made me wonder sometimes, "Am I the one dismissing something? Am I being too
sensitive?” (Zeke)
Then I would have conversations with my peers, just telling them, “Hey, can you just pay
attention, to make sure that I wasn't going crazy.” I didn't think I was, but they were
paying attention, and they were like, “Yeah, I see it.” (Ben)
“Am I Too Sensitive?” reflected a desire to assume positive motives on behalf of
supervisors and teammates on whom the participant relied:
I really gave it the benefit of the doubt as long as I could. Then you're at an impasse until
somebody goes, "Oh, I must be mistaken," which was usually me during the confusion
phase. I mean, to realize I wasn't crazy. (Natalie)
However, even as they began to resolve conflicts over whether the TWB was merely a mirage,
some intelligence officers reported feeling obligated to abide leaders and others by playing
along:
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I had to listen to him in a professional way because I'm a professional. It was a
challenge. I felt toxic people in the whole mix. (Margaret)
In Ben’s words, these processes elevated the “Folding In” conditions of “He Had Fans”
and “Silence”:
People were made to feel like they didn't experience certain things. People came
forward to complain, share their angst, and a lot of people were silenced. (Ben)
“Am I Too Sensitive” began as an effort to extend positive motives and expectations into
the toxic environment. They became aware but within an environment in which they interpreted
efforts by others to target the participant as the confused outlier. The next set of processes will
explore reactions to this awareness as participants described psychological and action
processes to shield themselves from the toxic environment.
Process of Folding In—Shutting Out. Participants described “Folding In” processes in
which they sought to distance themselves physically, psychologically, or both from the TWB.
The term “avoid” was common as participants described “Shutting Out” processes that were
psychological barriers projected onto the operational space:
I had tried to shut her out. I had tried to avoid and do all the different things. (Dana)
I would avoid him, if at all possible. Once I'd gotten to the building, if I found out he
wasn't going to be there that day, then that day was going to be better. (Zeke)
Psychological barriers formed as they described creating parsimonious sub-processes
for when to “speak” to the toxic personality and when shield with silence:
There were quite a few that I didn't speak to for years after that. Honestly, I only spoke to
them professionally. I never went by their desk to shoot the breeze or to see how they
were doing or anything like that. If I needed something, or if they needed something, we
spoke. (Ben)
The concept of “distance” emerged in complex ways within “Shutting Out” as calculated
efforts to alter work roles from assigned duties became tools for avoidance:
I'll let it flow. I'll just stop talking to them . . .Basically, I chose to do that. I found a way,
and I just did whatever. (Eve)
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Eve never left the team. She merely began working on solitary projects of her choice outside of
the team mission. Thus, her “exit” gave her psychological distance from the toxic environment.
Other participants referenced physical distance from toxic personalities as elements of relief:
It was the one positive that I had. Because of my work role, I could not sit in the office
with the rest of the [organization redacted]. I still had to kind of interact with him.
(Christina)
It was very easy [for me] to avoid that person, extremely easy. Whereas, for the people
on the watch floor now, they work with this person. They're five feet away from him at all
times. That's different. (Joel)
Chapter 2 discussed the common use of hybrid and cross-organization teams to address
fluid intelligence requirements. Additionally, deployments, promotions, Joint Duty Assignments
(JDAs), and a continual flow of job opportunities create a work environment in a continual state
of flux. Consequently, the ability to leverage physical proximity from the toxic environment was a
form of privilege for some participants and not others. The mission does not always allow sitting
apart or long periods of operational breathing space. Those who could not leverage physical
distance chose psychological measures through “Watching Words.”
Process of Folding In—Watching Words. Participants who could not extricate from
the toxic personality reported becoming hypervigilant in their words, actions, and engagement:
I feel like I’m always watched. I have to make sure I don’t mess up. A lot of pressure.
(Kelly)
These responses emerged not only when working directly with the toxic personality but
whenever they were in the environment. Notably, participants linked “Watching Words” with
challenges associated with Holding Self:
Every decision comes with an assumption, and it gets to the point where I try not to be
as outspoken as I normally am because it carries retribution. (Mike)
I try to be careful with my words anyway, but when dealing with him, being even more
careful about what I said and how I said it. (Zeke)
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Within the “Folding In” condition of the “Glass Floor,” participants who were supervisors
managed conflicts with Holding Self by skewing management practices toward avoiding difficult
exchanges with the toxic personalities rather than toward best practices to foster the mission:
I was always apologizing for the way that I worded something, and it's just silly.
I would tend to give better feedback to people I knew wouldn't get mad to receive it. So,
it just snowballed that way. (Finn)
Participants also became hypervigilant in documenting actions to shield themselves from
the toxic personality, and, quite possibly, sources of support they might have within the
condition of “He Had Fans”:
And frankly, it was the one-time in my career where I've had to actually start saving
emails and having other people in the room with me. Because this person was just
constantly not telling me things and saying it was because it was . . . my judgment is she
used those personal relationships too much by using her access to special accesses
and stuff. (Liam)
Not all participants engaged in “Watching Words” or expressed a sense of threat. Rico
was an outlier in his willingness to lean into the toxic environment to protect a junior analyst in
his branch. However, the toxic personality was also located in another city:
I even said this once, I said, "If your person calls and talks to my person this way again,
I'm going to get in the car, drive six hours to [location redacted] and punch both of you in
the head." That was the last time we received a berating phone call. (Rico)
For participants who watched their words, the process was a microcosm of a larger set
of efforts directed toward avoiding mistakes. However, limiting interaction also limits
collaboration. Thus, “Watching Words” raised the specter of having to choose between
self-concepts and the mission. The next section and the closing section on consequences from
the “Folding In” primary dimension will explore the way participants reconciled anti-collaborative
processes and consequences to the IC.
Process of Folding In—Not Affecting Me: Chapter 2 explored empirical research
indicating that collaboration, collegiality, and healthy forms of coopetition further intelligence
objectives. Success in shielding one from the impact of TWB so that performance never
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suffered would be an understandable goal by intelligence officers. This performance was
inseparable from the “self”:
I think your good performers, part of the layer that goes in is their “self,” but I think also
part of it is the protection, the good for the nation that people feel, and to me that makes
a difference in the performance and how much people are willing to give during hard
times. (Gwen)
Compromising performance was not merely a threat to national security. Doing so was a threat
to what they knew themselves to be. Thus, through a process of “Not Affecting Me,” participants
explored ways in which “Folding In” never affected their performance on the job:
I never allowed it to impact my performance. (Christina)
Productivity-wise, it doesn't really seem to affect things because people want to come in,
they want to do what they do. It's just this thing that needn't be there. (Rico)
Whether claiming that “Folding In” never affected their performances were limited to the
interviews, or whether these internal conversations became part of “Folding In” processes
during toxic events were unclear because delineating past events from the retelling is
problematic. However, some doubts about the impact of lost hours, distraction, and broken
collaboration emerged:
From a productivity perspective, I don't think it really affected me too much. Maybe that's
a blind spot that I have, and maybe it did, but I didn't notice that it did. (Zeke)
The following section will explore the consequences of “Folding In.”
Consequences of Folding In. A principal tenet of grounded theory methodology is the
transition that occurs as consequences in one set of events become conditions in the next. I
argue that processes also may become conditions when those processes transform from
systems of action into systems of belief. Participants sought to protect the mission by preserving
their abilities to function in their workplaces. However, those same processes of shutting
individuals out and self-censoring took a blunt-force instrument to collaboration that diminished
the mission in ways that may have become normative over time. These new norms emerged
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through decline in emotional commitment, mission focus, and faith in their IC entity as an
institution that led one participant to proclaim:
At some point, an epic failure is going to happen because of the toxicity. (Zeke)
The following section will explore the impact of “Folding In” through three main consequences:
“Mission Dread,” “Get a Banana,” and “Losing Faith.”
Consequence of Folding In—Mission Dread. “Mission Dread” reflects long-term
emotional impacts from knowing that serving the mission meant working alongside the toxic
personality. However, unlike the onset emotions within the core condition of “I Felt,” “Mission
Dread” became an omnipresent cultural dynamic:
And those days I was dreading going in, being exhausted throughout the day. (Dana)
However, impact was not contained in the office:
There were days I just didn't even want to go into work. It just takes you longer to get
dressed. Everything took longer because of the way that all felt. If you can't go to work
and feel like you can go to work and do your job in a neutral environment, it will affect
you. (Zeke)
Physical manifestations of “Mission Dread” brought the prospect of future behavior it into
the present. Joel empathetically projected himself into the experiences of one of his operational
teams:
It's the fact that I'm looking at my schedule, I see that I have to work with this guy two
days next week, and my stomach starts to hurt because I already know, going in ahead
of time, just how terrible it's going to be. They would be thinking, "What's he going to say
now? What's he going to do now? What kind of garbage is going to come falling out of
his mouth that I have to listen to for 12 hours?" (Joel)
Participants argued that the magnitude of “Mission Dread” was not in the feeling but in
the dynamic it created. “Mission Dread” as a consequence catalyzed a more quantifiable
consequences of “Folding In” as productivity and mission focus declined.
Consequence of Folding In—Get a Banana. Joel inspired the naming of this
consequence, “Get a Banana,” when he examined how unaddressed TWB numbed work
commitment among intelligence officers over time:
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People will do the bare minimum to get their job done because they know that, as long
as they're doing the bare minimum, they can't get reprimanded. They won't go out to try
to solve complicated problems or bigger issues or anything. They'll literally just sit there,
push button, get a banana, go home. (Joel)
As referenced in other sections of this dissertation, intelligence officers do not have jobs.
They have missions. Participants referenced the intelligence mission and their integration into
its purpose as a core value of why they work in the IC—and a value they saw lost amid TWB:
Part of it is the protection, the good for the nation that people feel, and to me that makes
a difference in the performance and how much people are willing to give during hard
times. I could have cared less if I was at work. (Gwen)
There was definitely a lot of trying, and then there was probably a point at which there
was less trying. (Natalie)
For Mike, a years-long battle to address overt racism by a supervisor who continues to
enjoy support from his agency’s leadership has been more than numbing. He is worn down:
I'm at a point where I don't want to focus and say, "What is it that I'm doing? What is it
that I can do better?” On that point, I'm tired. (Mike)
Reflecting back to the “Not Affecting Me” process, intelligence officers argued that they
continued to perform. However, the IC lost their full commitment:
If I was in an environment where I felt fully integrated, I think that I would have
contributed more. (Kit)
If an analyst was going to push hard for their point of view, unless I really heavily
disagreed with it, I wasn't going to push as hard as you would expect from somebody in
the same position. (Gwen)
Intelligence only makes an impact if it produced. Participants who were supervisors had the
most pointed comments on how TWB affected production as the business of intelligence:
Performance suffered. Those behaviors started to have the negative impact on
productivity, which it did. (David)
It was true in this case that the hostility and the low performance were perfectly
correlated. The toxic behavior did have an effect on the bottom line. (Finn)
Links between reduced production and national security also surfaced:
I don't know how it can't impact national security because that's the actual business. It'd
be like me working for a private company, and I'm responsible for the financials and I
could give a shit if it makes any money. (Gwen)
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Consequence of Folding In—Lost Faith. “Losing Faith” is a final consequence in
which TWB led them to question both leaders and the overall institutions within which they
served. For participants, failing to confront toxic personalities and remove enabling structures
emerged from a mixture of a lack of commitment, apathy, and benign incompetence. The
targets of their lack of regard included senior leaders:
This is someone that I have a lot of respect for. It made me wonder if I should hold that
person in the esteem that I did. (Zeke)
Targets also included programs:
It made me lose confidence in, not just the technical development program that I was in,
but in all of the technical development programs because if decisions were made that
put somebody like that in a program that manages new employees, what are we doing?
(Celine)
Participants also noted a boomerang effect in which they believed others perceived them
as incompetent-once-removed because of their inabilities to address the TWB on their own:
All these supervisors now who work for me are coming to me and saying, "Hey, I got this
going on in my department. I need your help to fix this or I need your help to do that." I
couldn't help them. (David)
Intelligence officers have deep family relationships as they recruit children into the IC or
are “legacy kids” in their own rights. Gwen was a career intelligence officer, as was her exhusband. Thus, her son would be ripe for recruitment as a “legacy kid”:
I would never recommend my son. If somebody asked me would I recommend they work
for my agency . . . I don't think I would recommend it. (Gwen)
Others expressed decisions to depart the IC because they have accepted that they cannot
reconcile failures to address TWB with their expectations of what their work environments
should be:
What you would think is [that] the cream would rise to the top. When you find that [is] not
the case, it's disheartening. I’m looking for the exit door. (Lamar)
Summary. As a primary action dimension of Holding Self, “Folding In” departed from the
stabilizing and maneuvering within “Seeking Subliminal” in favor of defensive actions focused on
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fear and withdrawal. Thus, while “Seeking Subliminal” moved the mission forward, “Folding In”
diminished the mission through lost collaboration and commitment. The next dimension of
Holding Self is the Inter-Dimension of “Folding-Reinforcing.”
Inter-Dimension of Holding Self: Folding-Reinforcing
Illustrated in Figure 4.13, the inter-dimension of “Folding-Reinforcing” was a framework
in which participants’ composure in the workplace became significantly challenged. Like the
“Seeking-Folding” inter-dimension, the framework was an interchange between primary
dimensions—in this case, between “Folding In” and the final primary action dimension,
“Reinforcing Style.” Three

Figure 4.13

conditions and four processes

“Folding-Reinforcing” Inter-Dimension and Elements of
Holding Self

bracketed consequences in
which the participant returned
to “Folding In” or moved to
“Reinforcing Style.” The
following section will review the
interdimensional conditions
and processes.
Conditions of
Folding-Reinforcing. Conditions for “Folding-Reinforcing” primarily occurred within perceptions
of lost agency, and even interpersonal safety. TWB became more overt, and the context
became more untenable. Like “Seeking-Folding” as an interim condition, the conditions would
subsequently set up a process along other dimensions of Holding Self in which participants
would pivot between moving onto the next dimension or return to an earlier state. The following
section will discuss this dynamic within the conditions of “The Leash,” “Unmapped Animosity,”
and “Cliques and Factions.”
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Condition of Folding-Reinforcing—The Leash. As the name implies, “The Leash” was
a condition in which participants felt controlled by others in the toxic environment. Distinctions
between “Folding In” conditions and “Folding-Reinforcing” included a heightened awareness
that “Folding In” processes had enabled others to place artificial boundaries on them:
This is a guy that was not assertive at all, and he was confident that I was under his
control for two years. (Natalie)
Like “Stone Walls” as a condition of “Folding In,” participants on “The Leash” existed in
an environment in which they perceived that others sought to limit their agency. However, within
“The Leash,” the loss of agency had become internalized beyond just something being done to
the participant by the toxic personality. A transition from using pronouns such as “he” or “she” to
the generalized use of “they” betrayed an awareness of “The Leash” as a systemic element of
control within a maze that had no exit:
They made it pretty difficult for me. I got selected for another job, and then they blocked
me from taking the job. Then, I just had a tough time with them about it. When I came
back from maternity leave, they had filled my job, so I didn't have a job, and kind of did
the whole, "Well, we thought you were leaving and taken this other job." I was like, "You
denied me going to that job!" (Dana)
Participants saw this systemic “leash” as a concerted effort to limit their success.
In this context, TWB was no longer perceived as one in which toxic personalities sought
to promote themselves at the expense of the participant. “The Leash” was about them:
I was the most senior member on the team, but there was no way in the world that the
leadership was going to allow me to fill in as the branch chief. No way. They actually put
our branch under another branch and dual-headed another person rather than let me
take any leadership function. (Margaret)
I felt like they wanted me to die. I felt like they didn't accept me for who I am, and they
just wanted me to disappear. (Kit)
With this transition from “he” and “she” to “they” the “self” was now inextricably linked
from the goals of others in the environment. Mead’s (1934) interactive “self” now skewed toward
that reflected appraisal of something to be controlled on a “leash” but extended into
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relationships with teammates and stakeholders. A second condition of “Folding-Reinforcing”
discusses “Unmapped Animosity” as this broader extension.
Condition of Folding-Reinforcing—Unmapped Animosity. “Unmapped Animosity”
emerged as a condition in which passive forms of TWB transitioned to overt yelling, slamming,
and verbal assaults such that the team atmosphere began to change. Participant preambles
related to toxic behaviors created inextricable links with the atmosphere surrounding them.
Participants shifted between present and past tenses during these moments closing the
distance between remembering and reliving:
One of these junior men [and I] have a conversation about how much they like me or
don't like me. There was just an unmapped animosity directed at me. I mean, just the
gloves are off. (Margaret)
Their emotions are high and now it's in everyone's face. In my first year here, there was
an Intelligence Officer that was extremely aggressive in an office in front of everyone
towards me. (Lamar)
Additionally, Margaret’s use of the phrase “at me” and Lamar’s reference to “in everyone’s face”
indicated a sense of physical assault and an invasion of space. Others adopted the
depersonalized “you” to reference what would happen if they pulled too firmly on the leash:
He didn't like anybody who didn't see things his way, raised his voice, and you always
knew he was going to talk bad about you if you weren't towing his line. (David)
Trying became futile:
She was toxic. She had one person that was pretty much like her golden child and
everyone knew it. It was defeating to know that no matter what you did, you were never
going to be held on that standard. You were never going to be on that pedestal that that
other person was. (Joel)
Animosity was a standard behavior that participants shared. However, not all
participants who experienced “Unmapped Animosity” embraced the condition as a
reflected appraisal:
Effectively, one of the phrases that he used was, "I regret hiring you. You aren't good
enough to be at this agency. I should never have hired you. I wish you would just leave."
I don't care whether he thinks he's right or not. I don't have to take this. This is ridiculous.
This is unacceptable. This is unprofessional. He's no longer at the agency. (Celine)
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The use of the phrase, “He’s no longer at the agency,” implied triumph as if to say, “He’s gone.
I’m still standing.” Thus, she never entered the “Folding-Reinforcing” inter-dimension because
her self-concept stabilized so that she rejected his characterization of her as a barrier.
Condition of Folding-Reinforcing—Cliques and Factions. “Cliques and Factions”
were integral conditions within “Folding-Reinforcing” as in-groups and out-groups replaced the
collaborative structures built around trust:
It's really individual parts, then, instead of working as one whole unit to try to accomplish
the mission. It really affects . . . I think morale is a big one. Just the whole trust issue.
(Joel)
In these framings, cliques and factions became less about distinctions between perspectives on
how to arrive at the best solution. They were mechanisms to build power around personalities:
One of the worst characters had his own clique. (Zeke)
For some participants, the cliques became micro-organizations themselves:
Even in one or two cases, you'd say something in private to one of the clique leaders.
They would admit there is a clique and tell you that you have an opportunity to join it.
Well, it got creepy. (Loess)
Supervisors stood at the apex of cliques and factions but in complex ways. As
managers, they held formal authority over organizations but also the leadership power to affect
relationships. When they failed in the former, the latter typically contributed to toxic team
environments:
Whenever there were significant issues, events, or meetings, she would always call out
[sick]. We would be sitting there left to represent the organization in her stead, and we
would be unprepared. That led to a lot of infighting, uncertainty, and misdirection within
her organization, within her office. (Jason)
Cliques and factions formed the reactive condition to what Ben referenced earlier in the study in
relation to “co-signing,” in which members of a single ethnic group advocated for each other:
So, there's not a lot of people who look like me. But there's only so much of each other's
offices we're going to go to because people start talking. But what we did was go to
lunch and just talk outside of work. (Ben)
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Like interim conditions, “Folding-Reinforcing” functioned as an interchange between
primary dimensions. Processes included reconciling self-concepts with changes in teams, their
organizational fitness, and coming to terms with their roles in creating circumstances. The next
section discusses processes within “Folding-Reinforcing.”
Processes of Folding-Reinforcing. Participants described four processes for the
“Folding-Reinforcing” inter-dimension. “Wanting Out” was the process of considering departure
from the IC. “You’re Leaving?” referenced their reflection on the camaraderie of seeing other
intelligence officers leave. In all cases, participants perceived these departures to be related
directly to the toxic atmosphere. In “Blaming Self,” participants took some measure of
responsibility for their own circumstances, either by action or lack of action. Similar to “Not
Affecting Me” as a process of “Folding In,” a fourth process of “Talking to a Toddler” was a
process emerging in the interview itself; in this case, the participant placed themselves in an
intellectually or morally superior position relative to the toxic personality.
Process of Folding-Reinforcing—Wanting Out. The “Folding-Reinforcing”
inter-dimension was a place of reconsideration. Participants reconsidered career choices, the
mission, and their fit within the IC. Some participants explored this dimension through the
proverbial rear view of having already left the IC but still turning over events as their lives had
changed course. Others had remained in the IC but left the toxic micro-environment. A third
group continued to mull options even during the interview.
Nuanced differences emerged in “Wanting Out.” Some demanded an exit and their
leadership’s support in doing so as they recognized that conditions within the toxic environment
had challenged their self-concepts in dangerous ways:
I just wanted another job. I wanted out of the environment. I went upstairs to the office
chief and I told her, I said, “You've got to get me out of here.” I was honestly worried that
I was going to do something to get myself fired if I didn't get out of there. (Dana)
As noted earlier, Dana was a “Legacy Kid.” The IC was an extension of her self-concept.
However, there was always another job to be had. Leaving for another at the right time would
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help to ensure she had one. For others, the IC mission had been a dream that became an
unrealized fantasy:
I had really dreamed all my life of that job, and I had a huge, crushing feeling of
disappointment. Literally dreamed all my life. (Natalie)
Despite their different paths to the IC, both women recounted moments in which their
senses of “self” seemed in conflict with remaining:
I did start to question why I was there. Am I in the right job? Am I in the right
organization? If this is what it's like, I don't want to be here. (Dana)
What am I doing here? I came here for the mission. It was pretty much just one day. I
was just like, “All right, we're done here.” (Natalie)
Giving up on coveted career fields was the price to be paid for regaining that “self”:
I felt not supported, isolated. When I realized that, I just needed to let go of being a
[redacted] analyst all together. I kind of just felt like I just needed to vote with my feet.
(Kit)
“Wanting Out” was also a process in which participants compared—compared earlier
careers and former offices for how they imagined things might have been different:
In the . . . military, when an issue is identified as a detriment to the unit or the mission,
it's addressed. Here, it almost feels like there's more of a need for the workforce to
believe that leadership cares to look at an issue, but actually changing anything is not
really important. (Lamar)
Process of Folding-Reinforcing—You’re Leaving? “Wanting Out” was not the private
purview of participants. “You’re Leaving?” referenced reflections on the departures of valued
colleagues:
Then, if you were a decent person and you recognized this, they were done in about
three months. (Eve)
“You’re Leaving” was viewed as a rebellion against the “good old boys club” but also a point of
rejection:
There was a guy who was a mentor of mine. He was brilliant. But he was a younger guy
with more progressive views about diversity and workplace organization and all these
things. They were having none of it. "I see where this is going.” He decided to leave.
(Lamar)
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Participants also received validation from others’ departures. Consequently, “You’re
Leaving?” became reflected appraisals of their own “Wanting Out” fantasies as if to say, “If all of
the good people are leaving, then I am good, too”:
Literally, within a four-week period, four of us gave our notice. (Natalie)
Even as “You’re Leaving?” became a psychological safety “Folding-Reinforcing” also
included self-blaming in which they took ownership of their part in arriving at the psychological
space in time. The next section will review the process of “Blaming Self.”
Process of Folding-Reinforcing—Blaming Self. “Blaming Self” consisted of processes
in which participants blamed themselves for some aspect of their experiences within the toxic
environment. However, the foundation of that self-blame emerged in nuanced ways. Several
blamed themselves for failing to investigate the cultural dynamics of the organization before
taking the position:
This was really going to broaden my portfolio, but I hadn't done the due diligence of
trying to find other people that work there and get what their feel was for the culture.
(Margaret)
“Blaming Self” processes also challenged self-concepts as intelligence people with the
acumen to protect themselves and the agency to control their own circumstances:
I always want to think that people are going to do better, or people are going to do more,
or they're even just going to do their jobs. Every time it happens, I never think it's going
to happen, but it always does. (Celine)
“Blaming Self” was a solitary process that left them isolated. “Friends” always
seemed to be in the place that they left and never where they were:
I felt like I have no allies, I had no friends there. I felt like I made a huge mistake in going
there. (Kelly)
However, blame also shifted in passive ways to the toxic personality in the final process
of “Folding-Reinforcing”: “Talking to a Toddler.”
Process of Folding-Reinforcing—Talking to a Toddler. In the “Folding In” primary
dimension, participants used a “Not Affecting Me” process during the interviews to claim that
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their performance never suffered amid TWB, even as they described ways in which they
engaged in practices that diminished production and overall contributions. The
“Folding-Reinforcing” inter-dimension included a similar reconsideration process in which
participants claimed the intellectually and morally superior high ground over toxic personalities.
As the name implies, “Talking to a Toddler” included infantilizing toxic personalities:
I mean, it was like talking with a toddler in some ways. (Margaret)
[I would say], “So, think about that and you two figure it out, I'm not running an adult
daycare here.” (Rico)
It also included talking about toxic personalities as insignificant minions:
We had a very senior officer who then brought some of his . . . I call them little birds.
And, you know, just other little birds chirping in his ear. (David)
As well-meaning but inept:
It just seemed like all he was focused on was being a glorified a team lead from when
we were back at the [redacted]. Not functioning as a senior. So, I just felt like I was trying
to explain my role and my existence. (Christina)
Or as simply inept without the well-meaning:
The people that stayed are the people that are just incompetent because . . . that's all
they know. (Eve)
I was on a ship of fools. (Margaret)
Or, finally, as just a bunch of “rednecks”:
They want to make it seem like it's this high-tech agency with a lot of high-IQ people, but
really, a lot of the people who work at the agency are just [location redacted] redneckers. (Kit)
Inter-dimensions function as weigh stations between primary dimensions. Explorations
of “Wanting Out,” “You’re Leaving,” and “Blaming Self” processes were places where
intelligence officers weighed options. As with the “Seeking-Folding” inter-dimension,
consequences included the outcomes related to decision points as responses exacted on the
environment that became conditions of the next set of experiences. These consequences will be
discussed as the conditions for the final primary dimension, “Reinforcing Style.”
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Primary Dimension of Holding Self—Reinforcing Style
“Reinforcing Style” is a dimension in which the participant’s responses to TWB remained
on an unproductive path that led to deleterious consequences for the participant and
disengagement from the mission. Notably, participants responded to TWB in ways that engaged
the “Who I Am” psychological primary dimension at the expense of effective uses of “Who and
What I Know” and “What I Can” psychological dimensions. David was the inspiration for the
dimensional name:
I just was going to keep trying to reinforce my style, using my style as a bulwark against
it. (David)
As with the other two dimensions, multiple participants entered “Reinforcing Style” and
remained for various periods. Unlike the “Seeking Subliminal” dimension in which participants
engaged self-concepts, organizational acumen and agentic processes to maneuver around
TWB, and “Folding in” in which they socially withdrew, participants in “Reinforcing Style”
confronted obstacles transparently. Thus, participants in the “Reinforcing Style” dimension
leaned into those environments in ways that centered the “self” within them. Those who
remained within this dimension for extensive periods were either terminated, reposted, or
otherwise experienced career disruptions in which they disengaged from the mission.
Because this dimension was arguably the least effective from which to manage one’s
responses to TWB, more explanation is warranted to understand why participants entered this
path. Some participants never entered this dimension because they perceived that associated
processes would diminish their performance:
I'd probably still done the same thing. I'd probably done it the same way. [However,] I
look at it this way, the government has agreed to pay me to do certain things. I have
certain amount of leave where I also get paid, but otherwise my responsibility is to get up
and come in, do my thing, play well with others, go home and the next day. (Rico)
The destructive impact that the “Reinforcing Style” can best be understood through the words of
someone who avoided entering it:
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I just value the
actual art of
analysis. It was just
like, "Well, I'm going
to do this." For
example, someone
once said to me
decades ago, "Well,
why are you just
burnishing your
credentials, because
you're producing a
lot." There's a lot of
things you do need
to . . . show to
customers. I'm not
saying I'm above
any ego or personal
ambition, but wasn't
it what you're
supposed to do?
(Loess)

Figure 4.14
“Reinforcing Style” Primary Dimension and Elements of
Holding Self

The following sections explore “Reinforcing Style” as a framework for action as
illustrated in Figure 4.14. I begin by exploring conditions instrumental for laying the dimensional
groundwork. I follow with a discussion of processes within the dimension and the consequences
of those processes.
Conditions of Reinforcing Style. Conditions within “Reinforcing Style” catalyzed
escalating conflicts between the participants’ operating environment and their abilities to hold
“self” while contributing to the mission. Within these conditions, a confluence of relationships,
military-civilian tensions, and political environments created a sense of alienation from their
organizations. The following section will discuss the following conditions: “Swirl of Unhealthy,”
“Name and Rank, Please,” and “Almost Like Politics.”
Condition of Reinforcing Style—Swirl of Unhealthy. “Reinforcing Style” can be aptly
described through Gwen’s characterization:
It becomes a swirl of unhealthy. (Gwen)
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The “swirl” that she described spiraled through all relationships. However, in the complex
operational framework for the IC, relationships could be hybrid organizational forms,
interorganizational, and support-customer relationships. In this dynamic, the swirl revealed itself
in wedges formed between teammates and expectations of trust:
I think it broke down trust at a lot of different levels because nobody knew who was
telling what to whom. (David)
However, the “community” framework of the IC removed traditional boundaries on what
constituted a “team” or a “group”:
You have a circle of people—that's a team. One person of that team is the leader, and
he's part of another circle. He's part of the circle of leaders. That starts now to come
apart. (David)
The porous boundaries extended severed relationships in the micro-environment into broader
relationships of stakeholders and colleagues:
If I'm someone that has to work with you as a stakeholder, and I need to bring you in to
do a task, I don't want to bring your toxicity into my environment because it could
possibly corrupt what I'm doing over here too. It affects everything that you touch. (Zeke)
Severed relationships impacted more than team comity. Participants linked TWB to impacts to
the mission through loss of trust in the analytic work but also fear to challenge:
[If] people stop trusting each other, you don't trust judgments, right? If I'm looking at a
product, and I say, "I see five tanks," and you're sitting next to me and you're part of the
other clique and whatever your reasons are, [you say], "This guy's stupid. You're going
to be less likely to say, "Look, Ma'am or Sir, I really don't think that's what you're seeing,"
because you were afraid of what is going to happen to you. (Zeke)
Participants described emotive responses to dysfunctional operational frameworks within
the dimension:
It just kept getting more and more explosive. (Eve)
Say somebody reads an email, and it makes them mad, and they fire a response. Now,
you got just this escalating rhetoric, (Finn)
Status imbalances between the toxic personality and the target exacerbated the emotive effect.
Participants reported perceiving that they had less value to the team and backdoor
communications as witnesses in the environment began to realign to remain on the right side of
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power. Thus, the swirl not only gathered up power. The condition also reoriented standard
operational norms:
In a normal world or a normal organization, this would be one conversation. I, as a
government employee would come forward and say, "I don't feel comfortable with the
text messages that I've received from this contractor," and he would be gone. That's not
how this organization was wired. It was like a bad training movie. (Margaret)
Condition of Reinforcing Style—Name and Rank, Please. As noted in Chapter 2, the
missions for the 18 IC entities span national-level intelligence, combat support, and hybrid
combat support with national-level missions. Personnel range from civilian, military, and
contractors, who must navigate ambiguous boundaries between the multiple organizations with
which they associated. Culturally derived expectations for relationship management, authority
and rank, and interactional norms can challenge relationships. Within in this dynamic,
participants who were members of combat support and hybrid entities perceived that tensions
between civilian and military personnel were significant contributors to TWB within “Reinforcing
Style.” Perceptions that civilians were the “help” created referential ranking systems where
civilian intelligence officers felt less valued and targeted by military personnel. However, Joel, a
civilian supervisor and former U.S. Army combat veteran argued that the issues reflected a
different military versus civilian attitude toward TWB:
Especially being in that military environment, people are so willing to kind of just brush
things off . . . to accomplish the mission, whereas people should be standing up and
pushing back against that toxic leadership. (Joel)
Even civilian leaders within military IC entities reflected this cultural mindset, which surfaced as
a form of “closing ranks” against those who challenged the power dynamic, including attempts
at intimidation:
He said, “Once this investigation kicks off, if you've done anything administratively that
might expose you to risk, you won't be protected, and that risk might be up to and
including removal from federal service.” (Margaret)
Condition of Reinforcing Style—Almost Like Politics. As discussed in Chapter 2,
participant politics does not play a positive role in intelligence analysis. In fact, intelligence
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officers emphasize efforts to remove political influences from the intelligence environment.
However, partisanship is only one permutation on the role of politics in organizations. Political
gamesmanship as a resource distribution process (Leftwich, 2015), or more basically, as a
means to choose winners and losers (Lasswell, 2018) challenged intelligence officers who did
not understand the rules of the game.
The “Seeking Subliminal” dimension elevated the importance of acumen as a tool of
leverage to sustain self-concepts and the mission. Alternatively, “Folding In” reflected a sense of
victimization by toxic personalities with more political power. In “Reinforcing Style, politics
emerged as condition in which participants contended with political environments that
challenged self-concepts as “non-political.” These self-concepts translated into delayed
realizations that organizational acumen mattered:
I thought of myself as somebody who wasn’t into office politics, but I think the office
politics were affecting me. (Kit)
Politics was an alien condition for participants who evaluated themselves, others—and
themselves in comparison to others—through merit and accomplishment. Following espoused
rules gave way to a lack of transparency. Some were left unaware, while others became
resistant to playing the game. Additionally, the rules for gamesmanship differed according to
organizational norms. Thereforce, as JDAs and other rotational opportunities brought outsiders
into formerly cohesive organizations, participants who were less comfortable with politics felt
cultural shifts for which they were not prepared:
I experienced it almost as politics. It was not something I really was well prepared for. It's
just not my nature. (David)
Confronting a new set of operational rules catalyzed a series of unproductive processes in
which they rebelled by projecting values and contextually incongruent approaches onto the
environment. Those processes are discussed in the next section.
Processes for Reinforcing Style. Intelligence officers in the study explored four
processes for responding to TWB within the “Reinforcing Style” dimension. Each was a process
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of pressing forward in toxic environment and against the conditions referenced in the previous
section. As conflicts between processes emerged, participants departed from the maneuvering
processes of “Seeking the Subliminal” to support self-concepts and rebelled against the
withdrawal processes of “Folding In.” Rather, they followed behavioral chalk lines that elevated
self-concepts but undervalued acumen and accurate perceptions of agency.
Processes for Reinforcing Style—Being Me. Participants functioning within the
“Reinforcing Style” dimension elevated commitments to treasured self-concepts. The more that
TWB challenged their abilities to hold “self,” the tighter their grips became:
I can only be who I can be. (Kit)
I am who I am. (Mike)
For these intelligence officers, elevating the “self” into their operational environments
overshadowed the maneuverability and acumen of “Seeking Subliminal” because, to do
otherwise, would tarnish important aspects of authenticity. Within this framework, participants
embraced that sense of “self” even as they reflected upon its limitations as intelligence
environments shifted.
I am who I am. I got comfortable in my skin many years ago, and frankly, it's served me
well. My style and my approach has served me well up until GS-15. (David)
It really bothered me because I guess I'm the type of person that what you see is what
you get. (Christina 2020)
In this way, processes for Holding Self within the “Reinforcing Style” were parallel
sources of pride and frustration. Within this dilemma, Holding Self processes remained static,
even as intelligence officers recognized the challenges those self-concepts would pose to their
ability to engage in them. Responding to TWB and the “self” were indivisible because their
contributions to the mission were a function of a confluence between self-appraisals and
reflected appraisals. As discussed in Chapter 3, clear distinctions between self-appraisals and
reflected appraisals are difficult because they inform each other. However, unlike “Seeking
Subliminal” where self-appraisals relied upon personal value statements regardless of what
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others perceived, “Being Me” required that others saw the version of “self” that the participant
valued:
It wouldn't be a surprise to anybody who knew me. People knew me when I came over
to the department, it wasn't like I was somebody they hadn't seen before. (David)
It was stark. It was naked, it was on display. (Margaret)
This static reinforcement process in which the “self” was imposed on an unwelcoming
environment catalyzed a second process in which participants became confined to behavioral
loops.
Processes for Reinforcing Style—Looping. “Looping” described a series of
sub-processes within “Reinforcing Style” in which participants became confined to repeated
patterns of unproductive actions and thought patterns. “Looping” was a process designed to
hold “self” even in circumstances in which they stood little chance of success. Participants
revealed spiraling effects in which compromising, redirecting, and even quitting became
synonymous with self-defeat. They perceived that moving any direction but forward was
tantamount to victory for the toxic personality and their enablers:
You either jump on the bandwagon or you just steer clear. Just shut up and do your
thing. That was how I chose to react to the situation, and I didn't have any recourse.
(Eve)
Organizational structures and Kusy and Holloway’s (2009) “power protectors” played
significant roles within the political conditions of “Reinforcing Style.” While “Looping” kept
participants on unproductive trajectories, senior leaders and redress organizations dispensed
with opportunities to diffuse escalating dynamics. Rather, participants reported mobbing
dynamics in which these elements coalesced around the toxic personality:
He [her supervisor] leaned across the table and said, “You better be a 100% sure that
you're ready to withstand what [will] happen in this investigation.” I leaned in and I said,
"A 100%, open the investigation.” (Margaret)
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However, “Looping” was not merely a framework for action. The process was a
framework for one-way conversations in which participants assigned valuable time away from
the mission to ruminate on conversations and interactions with the toxic personality:
Yeah, it takes up space in my head. I think I could get more done. So, my mind gets
caught up in, "How can I handle that better? How can I get this problem solved with this
individual?" I could move on faster probably. (Kelly)
However, “Looping” was not always an internal process. When the toxic environment was
directed at multiple members of a team, distraction became projected onto the environment so
that collaboration became more about how to manage the toxic personality than the mission:
We would talk about it constantly. [It’s a], distraction [from] doing the mission because
you're busy talking about what you think is going on or what shouldn't be going on. (Joel)
Consequently, the process became one of sorting, shifting, and compartmentalizing the mission:
You're bring parts of your agenda that aren't about building up the team. The stress that
they feel should be the stress of work, not the stress at work, if that makes sense. (Zeke)
Processes for Reinforcing Style—Becoming Ill. Within “Becoming Ill,” participants
reported declines in physical and mental health due to the toxic environment. I noted earlier that
distinguishing conditions from processes was challenging because the latter could establish a
framework for the former. “Becoming Ill” created one such analytical predicament because,
while this state was a condition, it manifested itself as a response to TWB. Additionally, one
could also argue that “Becoming Ill” is a consequence of the toxic environment. However, my
research question is primarily concerned with how and why people respond to TWB in the ways
they do; consequences of concern are those that emerge from their responses, not the
consequences of the toxicity. I explore “Becoming Ill” as a set of processes.
Participants reflected upon periods in which they experienced the physical
manifestations of toxic stress. For some participants, health impacts were more confined and
acute, such as stress-related gastronomical or weight problems. In some cases, just the
“knowing” that they would have to work with the toxic personality triggered the manifestation:
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When they see that they have to work with this certain individual, that they actually get
physically ill. (Joel)
Some participants explored “Becoming Ill” within the context of ongoing experiences with
toxic personalities. Within the primary dimension of “Reinforcing Style,” their inabilities to
leverage the TWB, maneuver around it, and exit the team led them to manage their emotional
states at the same time they were managing their work:
It's taxing from a health perspective. Whether it's anxiety or, unfortunately even
depression, those things lead to suicide. I've had issues with anxiety . . . of late because
of the relationship that I've had with my leadership. (Mike)
I don’t feel supported, and I feel like a sense of anxiety sometimes. Like social anxiety in
different situations, that I just feel there's a pressure. (Kit)
As the behavior escalated, so did “Becoming Ill”:
I ended up having a panic attack. I had thoughts of hurting myself, and I don't want to
hurt myself. It's not me. A thought came into my mind, ‘Well if you killed yourself, maybe
they'd have something to answer for’. (Margaret)
Subprocesses for responding to “Becoming Ill” differed among participants. Some
sought counseling when they recognized the impact of the dynamic:
I have to find something, whether it's going to counseling to address those. (Mike)
Some fell more deeply into the spiral through excess drinking and poor sleeping habits:
I mean, that was the worst of the worst where I was physically sick. I would cry every
night. I mean, every day I'd cry. I’d go home, and I drank because just waiting until the
next day to pass my woes. I asked [the psychiatrist], I said, “Please, you gotta give me
something so I can make it through the day where I don't, I don't react to these ridiculous
situations.” (Eve)
The effects of “Becoming Ill” lingered after leaving the toxic environment:
This is the most fit I've been in a while because I was so stressed. Some people don't
take to workplace bullying or passive aggressive behaviors. (Christina)
“Becoming Ill” was a culmination of attempting to match self-concepts to
incongruent work environments so that, ultimately, the participant’s poor health matched
the poor work environment. The responses were not terminal. Rather, they were an
interim set of processes to the final response within the dimension: “Shutting Down.”
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Processes for Reinforcing Style—Shutting Down. The “Folding In” primary dimension
included “Shutting Down” processes in which intelligence officers became beholden to the toxic
dynamic. “Shutting Down” differed from the withdrawal processes in “Folding In.” In the former,
participants erected barriers to protect themselves, which also diminished support to the
mission. However, in “Shutting Down,” participants rebelled against the mission itself:
I just took it upon myself and said, “Oh, I'm not doing that anymore. I'm doing 100% this.”
I made the decision [that] I'm no longer going to do that type of work. I kind of shutdown.
(Eve)
Some “Shutting Out” processes were ambiguous efforts to regain voice by
compartmentalizing interaction with the toxic personality so that all sharing occurred in one
direction:
We really stopped having conversations about the organization, and more, it was me
passing information to her about what was going on as I saw it. (David)
Participants were deliberatively selective on whom they “shut down.” However, in a form of
toxic flow, the process ultimately affected the broader work environment. They became
singularly self-reliant and directed the distrust they had toward the toxic personality toward
others, including those who might have been trying to help them:
The messengers that were known for subversive behavior, the people that I trusted, I
would take action on what they told me. So, yeah, it's not just important about your small
group, but it affects everything that you touch. (Zeke)
Intelligence officers function within classified environments. Therefore, the opportunities
that enable professionals in non-compartmented environments to work from home are less
available to intelligence officers. For intelligence officers to work, they must be at work. “Shutting
Down” interrupted this dynamic so that participants sought opportunities to be anywhere else:
Hundreds of hours [of annual leave] less. Even after I moved on, I used hundreds more
sick hours and took more annual leave in about a two-year timeframe than I had when I
had a baby. Just didn't want to be there. (Gwen)
If I knew that I had an appointment with something outside of the building, I would call
and say, "Look, instead of coming in, I'm going to go straight to this, and then I'll be in
afterwards.” (Zeke)
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Consequently, “Shutting Down” was a transition from “Shutting Out.” However, reflecting
upon the process also transitioned them from the “Not Affecting Me” process of denying work
impacts within “Folding In” to one in which they acknowledged their disengagement from the
mission. The following section will explore disengaging consequences from “Reinforcing Style.”
Consequence of Reinforcing Style—Disengaging the Mission. As intelligence
officers explored the consequences for “Reinforcing Style,” their insights categorized into one
consequence: disengagement. Within “Seeking Subliminal,” disengagement was tactical and
instrumental to sustaining the mission. Within “Folding In,” diminishing the mission became a
form of “exiting in place.” In “Reinforcing Style”, “Disengagement” emerged differently among
participants but never really on their own terms. Holding Self within “Reinforcing Style”
counterintuitively disengaged them from the very self-concepts they sought to protect and
separated them from the mission:
Whether I realized it or not, I'm sure it did affect my performance on some level. (Zeke)
To have me come in and sit on my ass and scroll to the end of the Internet every day for
eight and a half hours and then go home is not the fair deal that I signed up for to deliver
to national security. I wasn't worth the money that they were paying me, and I knew that.
(Margaret)
As discussed in “Looping” as a process, “Reinforcing Style confined participants to a
steady course that significantly limited the field of view they needed to respond effectively.
Intended consequences often failed to align with actual results as they chose courses of action
based on expectations for what the rules should have been rather than responding to the rules
as they were. These disconnects often led to permanent disengagement when they were
reposted or terminated:
Here was a guy who I respected, who I went to, and I think it just didn't go the right way.
He just basically said, "Well, you need to talk to your boss." It wasn't long after that that I
was moved along. I only found out about it late, because, as I said, politics is not a
natural state for me. (David)
For some, departing the team became voluntary but in true “Reinforcing Style” form:
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I put in my two-weeks’ notice [but] not to my boss. He doesn't give me respect and notify
me of things. So, I gave it to the personnel section and that was it. I walked out with
every single ID. (Eve)
As noted earlier, the longitudinal nature of response encumbers the interview as
participants continue to reconsider past actions and decisions. For those who were contending
with toxic events at the time of data collection, the interview became woven into ongoing
decision processes for what to do. These decision process became merged with consequences
as they reflected on the conflicts inherent in not wanting to leave but knowing they could not
remain:
They wanted to offer me a different position. Why is it that I have to give up something
that I've worked for my career on to get to a point and be established and to be
beneficial for not only the agency but myself? (Mike)
At its termination point, the desired consequence was to hold on to self-concepts, which
demanded authenticity within all directions. Holding on to that authentic “self” enabled a sense
of peace even while disengaging:
Nothing would have changed for me. I don't know that knowing it would have changed
much, except I might've gone looking for a different job. (David)
Summary. “Reinforcing Style” emerged as the most unproductive dimension for
responding to TWB, as evidenced by the outcomes of those who spent significant time
operating within its boundaries. Responses spiraled onto paths in which careers were
significantly disrupted or prematurely ended. This consequence followed a logical trajectory.
“Seeking Subliminal” was an ideal state because participants balanced organizational acumen,
agency, self-awareness, and interpersonal agility to thrive rather than survive. In some cases,
thriving meant using the TWB to the participant’s advantage. As its polar opposite, “Reinforcing
Style” formed an alternate reality of rigidity and unwavering determination to follow practices
that yielded no benefit, often to the detriment of the participant’s professional life and,
sometimes, health. “Folding In” became a professional purgatory in which efforts to shield
themselves from the impact of TWB also shielded them from the positive aspects of their work.

208
As participants explored their experiences and perspectives on TWB, the impacts to the
mission from the three dimensions emerged early. “Seeking Subliminal” sustained the mission
by incentivizing creativity in how to maneuver and leverage to push requirements forward.
However, the ever-present focus on strategies and tactics within “Seeking Subliminal” were too
cunning or too exhausting for some participants, who chose the “Folding In” dimension for much
of their interview. The constant attention to remaining out of the toxic personality’s line of sight
within “Folding In” also exhausted participants and diminished their focus on the mission.
“Reinforcing Style” disengaged the mission because the singular focus on efforts to reel in the
toxic personality and their enablers to complement the style of the participant left little energy or
time to focus on the mission and had a Newtonian reaction on others who were determined to
resist. Therefore, where one consequence of “Seeking Subliminal” was “The Mission Wins,”
“Reinforcing Style” was a dimension in which nothing won.
Conclusion
This chapter’s focus on how and why intelligence officers respond to TWB differently
focused the investigatory lens on personal meaning. The findings framed the cognitive work of
sizing up the “self”, which shaped an image for participants around who they were relative to the
toxic personality and others in the environment. “Who” they were emerged concurrently with
assessments of agency and acumen to manage the toxic events. The alignment between this
image and existing self-concepts became a tableau from which they established strategies for
response. Strategies and choices shifted longitudinally as the cognitive work within the
psychological dimensions reshaped elements of that tableau, necessitating other choices. The
inter-dimensions became pathways for agility between the primary dimensions.
The core condition of Holding Self and the underlying core conditions of a passively
hostile environment, unproductive emotions, and a sense of being alienated from their own work
environment were consistently “there.” However, the tableau from which they operated to
sustain those self-concepts reference another critical element in why intelligence officers
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responded in different ways: context. In this way, the theoretical model in development would be
incomplete without a parallel exploration of the situational or broader ecological influences
constitutive of the phenomenon. The next chapter will recenter the lens on this broader
framework to understand the role of social, relational, and positional factors on the research
question.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS FOR SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS SEGMENT
Grounded theory research identifies conditions as elements that catalyze a
phenomenon. In this form, conditions identify pathways for causality or, at least, incentives for
action (Dey, 2007). Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) established two forms of “conditional
matrixes” to identify the contextual elements impacting individual meaning. Similarly, Clarke
(Clarke, 2005; Clarke et al., 2017) developed a situational matrix within situational analysis to
identify the broader ecological factors relevant to the phenomenon. As discussed in Chapter 3,
research studies combining the two methodologies are common. However, using them as
multi-methods requires being able to delineate between the situational and conditional elements
they are individually designed to identify.
This chapter conceptualizes the situation constitutive of, within, and surrounding how
intelligence officers respond to TWB. These concepts will be conveyed in a series of situational
social arenas that broaden the lens from mere individual meaning toward the broader forces as
play. As already discussed, TWB emerges when power is used in destructive ways. While the
IC is a complex macro-environment, U.S. citizenship and other requirements associated with
gaining employment in an intelligence entity indicate that most employees were raised in an
American culture in which power stratifications are less assumed (“Hofstede Insights—Country
Comparison,” 2019). Conversely, the breadth and complexity of the 18 entities made
understanding the IC situation relevant to TWB response a challenge. Therefore, I make no
effort to explore the IC situation in its entirety. Instead, I have limited the discussion to elements
of the IC situation that influence and/or are influenced by intelligence officer response to the
behavior. Some methodological processes within situational analysis methodology dominate the
discussion, while others will not be major areas for exploration.
Situational analysis draws upon social worlds/arenas theory to understand how
universes of discourse intersect, divide, and negotiate (Clarke, 2005). The next section will
evaluate the IC “situation” relevant to the research question by identifying the elements in the
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broader context constitutive of, in, and surrounding response to TWB in the IC. I begin by
identifying the factors related to response in the form of two maps. An “unordered” situational
map provides a display of each element that is relevant to the phenomenon. An “ordered”
situational map structures this raw data into human, nonhuman, discursive, unarticulated,
temporal, and spatial categories to inform the following discussion on social worlds/arenas. The
IC’s size, sensitivity to external events, and the contradictions between identifiable structures in
parallel with ambiguous networking subsystems qualifies it as a complex system (Cilliers, 1999,
2001). Every element is related to every other as a component of that system.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Foucauldian theories of power inform situational analysis
because identifying discourses indicate the locus of power. Foucault’s (1980) “discursive fields,”
as the material demonstrations of accepted social “truths” in the form of images, symbols, and
texts, are the primary methodological tools in my analysis. In conducting the analysis for this
study, specific social worlds and arenas emerged. However, so did forms of messaging uniquely
coherent to specific social worlds in relation to each other. This reflection aligned with theory by
Phillips and colleagues (2004) arguing that institutions are socially constructed through
language. To understand this dynamic, I needed a conceptual framework to enable me to
analyze the discursive fields within social worlds, how they aligned, and the inherent language
and messages within them. King (2007) paraphrased the concept of discursive fields as
collections of discourses around ideas of movement and conceptualized discursive repertoires
as the messages that define them. I use King’s framework to explore and map three social
worlds in the IC, their discursive fields, repertoires as critical themes, and other critical
elements. I add an additional category—sites of dissent—representing decisions by social world
actors to reject dominant discourses.
Situational analysis depersonalizes the research question in favor of understanding a
collective and social context in a constant state of flux (Perez & Cannella, 2011). However, the
focus on the individual intelligence officer cannot be entirely discarded, nor should be for this
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study to be useful in practice. To maintain this link between the situation, the phenomenon, and
those affected by them, I present insights from the grounded theory segment in these
discussions when relevant. By including revelatory insights from the grounded theory portion, I
hoped to blunt tendencies to begin seeing TWB as some abstract phenomenon in the situation
without meaningful consequence to the very global environment under study. Additionally,
availability of data places boundaries on research. The classified nature of the IC suggests that
meaningful data that might have informed the situational analysis was not be available. This
likelihood enhances the value of insights from those individuals experiencing and constructing
the situation.
Mapping the Social Environment for Response to TWB in the IC
In Chapter 3, I discussed the major mapping processes that researchers use in
situational analysis to understand the social environment around a phenomenon. Similar to the
fracturing processes in grounded theory, situational analysis instills rigor by fracturing the
discreet elements of the situation before reordering and conceptualizing them in a visualization
of interactions, negotiations, and boundaries between them (Clarke et al., 2015). This section
begins this mapping process by designing unordered and ordered situational maps.
Unordered Situational Map
Unordered maps represent all elements that are analytically relevant to the phenomenon
under study. As the name implies, these initial maps are unordered lists of each articulated
element; unarticulated elements that are relevant by their absences are also captured in
unordered maps. Unordered maps provide rigor because elements are visually equal in the
presentation. This lack of order enables researchers to make no initial assumptions about the
relative importance or relationships of elements to each other that might contribute to premature
disclosure. Researchers typically will produce multiple iterations of unordered maps as data
collection and analysis continue (Clarke et al., 2015, 2017). While the production of unordered
maps remains common across studies, the research question drives the data collection and
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analytical focus. Different studies produce unordered maps with elements with varying degrees
of scope (Khaw, 2012; Newberry, 2011).
I produced unordered maps in three stages prior to the final map constructed at Figure
5.1. I constructed an initial map at the start of the grounded theory segment to ground
assumptions that I held. This process was similar to the statement of sensitizing concepts
identified in Chapter 1 at the beginning of the grounded theory portion. Using an Excel
spreadsheet that I updated throughout the study, I produced a second map at the conclusion of
the grounded theory portion to capture the situational elements that participants identified as
relevant to their responses to TWB. The initial map included 56 elements; the second
post-grounded theory map had grown to an unwieldy 230 elements. At the conclusion of the
situational analysis segment, I reduced the elements in Figure 5.1 by combining some elements
that were thematically synonymous and eliminating others that did not emerge as significant in
the broader situation.
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Figure 5.1
“Unordered” Situational Map of Response to TWB Among Intelligence Officers
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Ordered Situational Map
Ordered situational maps initiate conceptualization by organizing the elements identified
in the unordered map within human, nonhuman, symbolic, discursive, sociocultural, and spatial
categories (Clarke et al., 2015). They are particularly useful for identifying the second- and
third-order elements that may not directly relate to responses to TWB in the intelligence space
but influence them from a distance. In this way, the process surfaces elemental relationships,
relational fissures, complexities, implicated “others” in the dynamic, and impacted “other”
systems (Newberry, 2011).
Ordered maps also add value in their ability to reveal analytical gaps in the form of
nuanced, unarticulated, and silences absent from the discourse. In this study, these “sites of
silence” (Clarke, 2003, p. 561) stimulated questions in relation to what elements identified by
research as critical factors in how individuals responded to TWB in other contexts did not
emerge in the intelligence situation? Who are the implicated actors—others in the situation who
are not directly related to the toxic events but who might have influence over or be influenced by
the responses (Clarke, 1991; Strauss, 1978)? What knowledges are relevant to how intelligence
officers choose to respond? Who controls the creation of and access to that knowledge (Clarke
& Montini, 1993; Haraway, 1988)? Control of knowledge forms a convenient mask for
inconvenient power (Foucault, 1990). Where does power reside in the situation? How do
relational significance and power intersect? How does the inherent power of hierarchy compare
to the ambiguities of relationally fleeting influence in the IC? How might power relate to the
stability and instability of responses over time?
The ordered situational map in Table 5.1 began the analytical process around these
questions by establishing relationships between elements identified in the unordered map. The
focus at this point in the analysis was structuring the data within these categories. I noted
emerging cross-relationships between categories but did not reference them in the ordered map
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to maintain integrity within this segment of the analytical process. However, categorizing the
various elements shifted the lens further away from the individual and into the conceptual.
Table 5.1
“Ordered” Situational Map of Responses to Toxic Workplace Behavior among Intelligence
Officers
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I had created an ordered map based on the initial unordered map I compiled at the
outset of the grounded theory segment. That early iteration did not reflect the depth of the
political/legal/economic elements represented in the final map below because I had not
anticipated the impact of those compliance frameworks as they would emerge the situational
analysis. Similarly, I had underrepresented the human elements within these frameworks and
the important role they would play. These critical roles would ultimately emerge around actions
they took in toxic circumstances, and equally important, actions they did not.
Researchers analyze extant sources to understand the situation. Like the unordered
map process, I produced multiple ordered maps as additional sources to provide more robust
data. I had created an ordered map based on the initial unordered map I compiled at the outset
of the grounded theory segment. That early iteration did not reflect the depth of the
political/legal/economic elements represented in the final map below because I had not
anticipated the impact of those compliance frameworks as they would emerge the situational
analysis. Similarly, I had underrepresented the human elements within these frameworks and
the important role they would play. These critical roles would ultimately emerge around actions
they took in toxic circumstances, and equally important, actions they did not. The individual
human elements/actors category remained consistent in the various iterations.
I briefly considered not factoring in temporal elements in the maps for two reasons. First,
they did not emerge in the extant sourcing relative to the data I collected during the situational
analysis segment. Second, they only emerged in the grounded theory segment in abstract terms
(such as fleeting comments by Gwen in relation to the “political climate” and Jason’s reflections
that IC entities reflect the larger society). However, Clarke (2005) references “sites of silence” to
reflect elements that may be tangentially influential to the situation, although they are silent in
the data. Therefore, I referenced those temporal elements most salient during the time of the
data collection and analysis as potential silent elements.
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This expanded collection and map production had two purposes. One purpose was to
view the intelligence situation from different perspectives to add depth to the analysis. Various
elements had subtle, but important, nuances. For example, the concept of accountability
surfaced both as a value in the discourse but also as accountability measures in structured
systems of redress. A second example would be expertise, which might be categorized into the
“Nonhuman Elements/Actants” frame or the “Discursive Construction/Nonhuman” frame. These
nuances informed their locations on the ordered map. A second purpose was to address a
fundamental data point in situational analysis related to identifying unarticulated elements in the
situation, as well as implicated and silenced actors (other individuals) and actants (structures,
systems, technologies, and other nonhuman factors affected by the situation; Clarke et al.,
2017).
While Foucault (1972) argued that one cannot infer meaning from the situation, one is
not necessarily excused from attempting to understand the situation’s influence when the
phenomenon under study is firmly rooted in a social process around meaning. While structures,
processes, and symbols framed the situation constitutive of TWB, discourses reflected different
linguistic forms by collectives constructing them although they shared the situation with other
collectives. These “linguistic” variations in the discourse manifested in similar variations in
messaging about what mattered in relation to response to TWB in the situation. The next
section explores social worlds and arenas in the form of discursive fields in the IC using extant
resources and confirming data from the grounded theory portion of the study.
Social Worlds in the IC
In its most simplistic form, Foucault (1980) conceived discourse as the truth that power
creates by controlling knowledge. To understand the origin and positioning of discourse is to
understand who holds power in a social environment. Discourse is an abstraction that reveals
itself in “discursive fields” consisting of collections of symbols, structured texts, statements,
processes, and rules that represent universes of discourse (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992;
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Foucault, 1972; Parker, 1992). Discourses are slow to change (King, 2007). However, they are
not necessarily still. Actors within the social environment may compete and conflict through
arenas. Conflict takes on nonhuman traits in the form of incongruent discourses and actants that
blunt each other’s impact (nonhuman elements critical to the social arena; Clarke, 2005). The
relevant discourses in a phenomenon combine to create social worlds that can be mapped and
bounded (Clarke, 1991; Strauss, 1978).
The following sections map the social environment relevant to response to TWB among
intelligence officers by identifying major social worlds, discourses, and structures in the
situation. As conveyed in Figure
5.2, I explore primary social worlds

Figure 5.2
Conceptual Framework

through fields and repertoires.
Responses to TWB are
fundamentally social phenomena.
Within this framework, “discursive
repertoires”, as messages that may
enable or hinder movement within a
social world (King, 2007), will figure
heavily in the analysis. King
conceptualized discursive
repertoires to track change in social
movements. I argue that the
complexity in which the U.S. IC macro-environment responds to internal and external influences
makes the construct relevant here. Additionally, framing social worlds through an analysis of
discursive fields is consistent with the intent of situational analysis to understand elements
constitutive of a phenomenon because the fields align with specific social collectives vying for
power over the messaging.
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Figure 5.3
Social Worlds of Response to TWB in the IC

Figure 5.3 illustrates the complex social environment in relation to the research question.
Three primary social worlds relate to responses to TWB among U.S. intelligence officers: the
Core relating to the core mission; the Archetype relating to culture shaping and standard setting;
and the Compliance Five framing around legal and regulatory frameworks defining redress.
Each of the social worlds are sized in Figure 5.3 to reflect their relative size weightings in the
social environment. As illustrated in the image, the Core would be the largest social world,
followed by corporate elements in the Archetype, and Compliance Five as the smallest. While
the graphic represents the macro-environment, these relative weights would correspond to
individual entities as well.
The naming convention for Compliance Five has unique parameters in comparison to
the other two social worlds. Each social world has standards for legitimization (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966) in the form of certifications, training, and expertise. However,
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micro-organizations, teams, and other collaborative structures within the Core and Archetype
are fluid in response to global requirements. Conversely, the Compliance Five has a unique
level of rigidity in five micro-organizations that do not shift with global requirements: the Office of
the Inspector General (IG), Human Resources/Human Development (HR), the Equal
Employment Office (EEO), the Office of General Counsel (OLC), and the Ombudsman. Each
organization is required either by federal statute or a mixture of entity or U.S. government
policies. Therefore, while an assumption behind situational analysis is that structure and
discourse align with each other as symbols for power (Clarke, 2003, 2005), this reflection is
particularly transparent in Compliance Five because rigid, externally driven mandates legitimize
boundaries.
Other elements noted on the graphic are also key. Each social world has primary actors
associated with it and use discursive repertoires as messages about its goals and values.
Teams, the complaints process, and the “ambassadorship” of pop culture and former IC
members form arenas of negotiation. Complaints function as a boundary object, or junction,
between them, although the process may contain separate meanings for each. The Archetype
contains a site of silence as a gap in the discourse related to senior leadership development
(Clarke, 1991, 2005; Star & Griesemer, 1989). Compliance Five has a site of dissent, a term I
have conceptualized as a form of rebellion by actors against the discourse within their social
world. Actors typically follow the repertoires of their respective social worlds. However, as will be
discussed in subsequent sections, impediments within Compliance Five influenced efforts by
actors within that social world to adopt the repertoires of the Archetype to mitigate these
challenges. I discuss each of these and other elements in the following discussion. I will also
identify a taxonomy for each social world.
An understanding of how the situation intersects with the “self” is critical to understand
the importance of the remainder of this chapter to the research question. Just as individuals
have a reflexive “self” that immerses who they are with who they perceive others to think they
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are, the “self” becomes reflexive of the situation. In fact, in her narrative research, Archer (2003)
found that these reflexive conversations were forms of sensemaking to create images of
ourselves in the social situation. These reflexive conversations calibrate our awareness of
constraints on our power (Snow, 2001), which also function as enabling queues for what we can
do (Cilliers, 2001). In turn, this sensemaking of the “self” in the situation shapes our perceptions
of agency so important to Holding Self. Consequently, understanding the social situation is to
understand the ecological conditions constitutive of responses to TWB.
Table 5.2
Core Social World Taxonomy
The Core Social World
Social
World

Core

Primary
Actors

Discursive
Field

Discursive
Repertoire

Arenas

Analysts

Protecting
the Nation

Tip of the
Spear

Ambassadorship

Operations

Relational
Ambiguity

Situational
Peer

Organization,
Leadership,
& Agency

Team

Families

Supervisors

Implicated
Actors

The Core Social World (Core) contains a discursive field, actors, repertoires, and arenas
constitutive of the core mission. I have developed a taxonomy for the Core at Table 5.2 to give
structure to the discussion. The primary actors within the social world are the analysts and
operations personnel who are the focus on my study, as well as their front-line supervisors. The
discussion begins with an explanation of relevant social worlds through its discursive field. While
each component is critical to understand, some are better understood as complementary rather
than divided into their own sections and will be explored in tandem.
Situational analysis decenters the focus away from the individual toward understanding
how they are represented in their social, institutional, political, historical, and material positions
(Aldrich & Laliberte Rudman, 2016). The fundamental purpose of analyzing discourses is to
understand who and what holds power in the social world (Foucault, 1972). However, the
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accessibility of data naturally affects the analytic field of view. The challenge for analyzing
discourse within the Core has been that most texts, documentation, and even utterances,
remain classified under Title 18 of the U.S. Code (Title 18 U.S. Code, 1948). One might
conclude that the analysis in this section will be made partial because the conclusions rely upon
unclassified sources even though the TWB addressed by the research question occurred in the
classified domain. However, researchers rarely have access to every bit of data. They assess
phenomena based on what they have available. Additionally, my constructivist leanings force
me to value the interpretive nature of truth and power by those actors that produce the
discourse. Therefore, narratives from actors represented in the grounded theory portion will
provide valuable insights into where power lies. I begin the discussion with a brief exploration of
primary actors in the Core.
Primary Actors. As discussed in Chapter 2, a full discussion what is meant by “analyst”
extends beyond the scope of this study because how they represent the occupation relies upon
their entity’s mission, “INT,” and skill requirements. For example, an intelligence operations
specialist at DHS analyzes digital devices to support intelligence and law enforcement.
Alternatively, an analytic methodologist at the same agency trains other analysts in
methodologies and tradecraft. An “all source analyst” partner at ODNI focuses on regional or
functional geopolitical threats (Career Fields | Intelligence Analysis, 2021). However, the
unifying element for all analysts within the IC is a shared role to manage raw intelligence and/or
mentor others in how to do so; analyze the data for meaning, significance, and gaps; and
produce finished intelligence to provide strategic warning as a decision space for policymakers
(Fingar, 2011a). In this way, they are positioned at the center of the core mission.
I chose the generalized term operations personnel to define a broad array of intelligence
officers who provide critical graphical, administrative, scientific, collection, and production
services to support the core mission. As with the analytic occupation, the breadth of operations
personnel and their functions across the 18 IC entities goes beyond the scope of this study.
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What is significant to this discussion is the way they become implicated within the core mission,
which depends on entity mission and the needs of the analysts they support. A collections
requirements officer at DIA researches and reviews all-source collection and exploitation
requirements across multiple INTs (Career Fields | DIA, 2021). Their source strategies
counterpart at NGA assigns GEOINT tasking requirements, as well as reviews the performance
of prior strategies. Conversely, a technical counterintelligence officer at NGA supports the core
mission through surveillance operations to prevent unauthorized penetration of the agency’s
infrastructure (NGA | Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), 2021). The next sections discuss two
levels of discourse within the Core—Protecting the Nation and Relational Ambiguity—and their
repertoires.
Protecting the Nation as Discourse. The Core is bound by structures, processes, and
actors associated with the IC’s core mission to produce timely, accurate intelligence for
stakeholders as a warning against foreign and domestic threats (Davis, 2003). The field spans
collecting (often in challenging conditions), then analyzing intelligence by actors in the situation.
These actors then transmit that intelligence through briefings, discussions, and technologies.
The social world spans office towers and war zones but with a common goal of level of
discourse: Protecting the Nation. The following section discusses Protecting the Nation through
its repertoire of “tip of the spear” and “ambassadorship” as an arena.
Tip of the Spear as Repertoire. Repertoires are forms of messaging designed to
achieve goals. However, the discursive fields within which those repertoires function may foster
or limit their effectiveness (King, 2007). Protecting the Nation contains a single repertoire of “tip
of the spear” as a linguistic tagline for the IC’s positionality at the forefront of danger, innovation,
and national security. The repertoire gives symbolic and (emotive) energy to what is
fundamentally a federal bureaucracy bound by structure, rules, and processes. However, the
reflective nature of “self” and social context cannot be delineated as two separate processes
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because webs of relationships (Snow, 2001) that collectively protect the nation reflect the
messaging back onto each other and into other social worlds.
Figure 5.4
“Tip of the Spear” as Repertoire

As illustrated in Figure 5.4, the “tip of the spear” has become a discursive representation
to describe the Core’s operational environment from “big data” to tracking terrorist financing
(Brown, 2015, para. 8; Gillis, 2019; Goldstein, 2018). The American Bar Association has
declared that intelligence is residing at the “tip of the spear” in protecting U.S. national interests
(Borene, 2010, p. 498). Pop culture is also an arena of romantic “ambassadorship” for “tip of the
spear.” In the final season of the iconic spy series, Homeland, a naïve U.S. Senator Paley
achieves self-awareness as he realizes he has been the “useful idiot” 7 in an elaborate hoax by
the Russians to destabilize American democracy: “Unless the White House has concocted a
truly epic web of lies, which is, of course, always a possibility, I am the tip of the spear of one of
the most insidious attacks ever perpetrated on the institution of American democracy”
(Homeland, 2018).

The term useful idiot is contemporary slang for what is more formally known as an unwitting agent of a foreign
power.

7
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As an underpinning of social worlds/arenas theory, arenas are sites of negotiation,
tension, and action between collectives within social worlds (Clarke, 1991; Strauss, 1978).
“Ambassadorship” formed an arena in which symbols and images of the Core interact with
discursive fields and repertoires within two other social worlds: the Archetype Social World in
which discourses shape cultures and standards; and an external social world including the
public, stakeholders (such as policymakers and foreign partners), and even adversaries. The
Archetype Social World will be fully explored in a subsequent section.
Former IC officials and so-called “line” intelligence officers also carry the repertoire into
the “ambassadorship” arena with post-employment memoirs and engagements. Thus,
“ambassadorship” embeds the Core within another social world of which Core actors are also
members in their capacities as U.S. citizens: the public. The “public” as a social world also
constitutes a set of implicated actors who are recipients of the messaging. However, because
protecting the public is inherent in the IC mission, the public also emerged as an implicated
actor in each of the primary social worlds.
Former insiders function as a realistic counterbalance for the public against pop culture
“tip of the spear” messaging. Nada Bakos published her memoirs as a CIA “targeter” who aided
in catching Iraqi insurgent Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi (Bakos, 2019). Former Deputy Director of the
CIA Michael Morrell (2021) hosts a podcast called Intelligence Matters in which he interviews
former intelligence officials and other notable guests in the wider national security arena. For
example, in his episode from March 3, 2021, he conduct an in-depth interview with Adam Schiff,
the chairman of the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) on the
impact of the politicization of intelligence and the need to de-politicize the committee (Morell,
2021, 41:00) On December 29, 2020, he interviewed veteran CIA officer, Marc Polymeropoulos
in relation to declassified intelligence operations in which he had been involved (Morell, 2020,
32:00). In 2018, Gen. James Clapper (USAF, Retired) became the first director of national
intelligence to publish his memoirs (Clapper & Brown, 2018). In the first of two books, former
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NSA and CIA Director Michael V. Hayden (Gen., USAF, Retired) opened with a dramatic story
of a day in 2004 in which a massive failure of NSA’s IT architecture created a system-wide
outage. With its own pop culture repertoire as “America’s ears” (Bamford, 2002; Joint
Document, 2004; Powers, 1983), NSA’s IT failure that day left the country deaf and potentially
vulnerable for several hours. Hayden had managed to make an IT failure exciting because of
NSA’s position at the “tip of the spear.”
For the purpose of the Core, “ambassadorship” functions as a site in which actors
convey “tip of the spear” to the public through experience and negotiated reality. However, if
Protecting the Nation is a form of collective identity, then “ambassadorship” may also function
as messaging for insiders to remain relevant. A 2020 research study found that a need to
maintain a purpose-driven life guided post-retirement career choices for retired, baby
boomer-era intelligence officers (Kramer, 2020). In this way, the repertoire may serve a dualsided market to shape the narrative around the IC and a platform for former intelligence officers
to hold on to self-concepts as central to the mission at the “tip of the spear.”
As noted, structures, rules, and processes within the discursive field for the Core
bureaucratizes the “tip of the spear” repertoire. However, even the repertoire shapes differently
within micro-IC social worlds. For example, the FBI describes its analytic role as a generalized
support function for special agents on counterintelligence and other requirements within their
purview (Mission and Priorities, 2021). Their version of the repertoire becomes elegantly
simple—"We support the agents.” Alternatively, living at the “tip of the spear” at DHS places one
across six possible missions ranging from border security, counter-terrorism, cyber, immigration
enforcement, infrastructure protection, and disaster response (DHS Careers, 2021).
Consequently, the repertoire may carry nuances according to the micro-collective engaging the
narrative.
While a full determination lays beyond the scope of this study, simplicity of mission may
have a material relationship to TWB in the intelligence situation because of its impact on how
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power is framed in the discourse. Kate, a senior HR official in the IC, had worked in three IC
entities ranging from expansive, complex missions to those with narrowly defined areas of
focus. She emerged from those experiences with a perception that the entities with narrow
missions were less toxic because the lack of mission ambiguity contributed to fewer combative
arenas in which positions had to be fought and won:
[A large IC entity] has always struggled with its identity and what it's there to do. They,
too, are spread so thin. [A second large entity] is spread thin, but that's only because
they want everything. Probably the most collegial agency that I was ever at was the
[narrowly defined entity], and I think it's because their mission is so simple. But yeah, at
the [smaller, more defined entity], everybody knew and understood why they were there.
(Kate)
Kate’s anecdotal theory has empirical merit. Research studies have found relationships
between toxicity and complexity (Dagless, 2018), as well as role ambiguity and bullying
behaviors (Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Hauge et al., 2007).
The repertoire conveys to the public a model of an intelligence officer who transcends
ordinary without troubling that same public with the ambiguities that challenge function. The
enormity of the intelligence task is given further romanticism by the secrecy within which
operations occur. Consequently, “tip of the spear” extends a cloak around the IC situation so
that the pop culture ideal of working there often leaves little room to understand that ordinary
human beings carry the burden of doing extraordinary things. This awareness revealed itself in
Zeke’s (2020) warning in Chapter 4 of an “epic failure” if TWB was not addressed. Mike (2020)
linked his ongoing efforts to confront a racially-tinged toxic situation to his sense of patriotism
and being part of something larger than himself. Multiple participants assured themselves that
their escalating absenteeism and withdrawal never affected their performances—even as many
would later admit that their contributions must have declined during ongoing toxic events.
Holding Self at the “tip of the spear” created its own ambiguities in toxic events as intelligence
officers sought to traverse the dynamic.
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Strauss’s (1978) description of arenas as microcosms of debate and negotiation reveal
hidden complexities when a seemingly straightforward and unifying discursive framework also
occurs within a mission environment framed by ambiguity. In fact, the complexities related to
“missions within missions” surfaces the potential for a debate over what constitutes a social
world in the IC. One can argue that the IC is a contained, macro-social world of multiple social
worlds. However, the distinctiveness of missions bound by a larger discourse around Protecting
the Nation could also be framed as multiple social worlds within a larger discursive universe.
The following section will explore ambiguity in relation to another level of discourse within the
Core: Relational Ambiguity.
Relational Ambiguity. A second discourse emerged in which relational significance
explored at the end of Chapter 4 surfaced as tangential, situational, and negotiated. This
discourse has significant implications for findings in Chapter 4 in which TWB broke both the
desire and process of collaboration and sharing for IC officers functioning within the “Folding In”
and “Reinforcing Style” primary dimensions. The following section will elevate tensions in the
discourse related to bifurcations of power that challenge accountability structures.
Sourcing for this Section. A brief discussion about sourcing for this section is relevant
here. Situational analysis recenters data collection away from narrative interviews in favor of
extant sources of structured texts, rules, and practices. This discursive focus is designed to
minimize analysis of individual meaning in favor of broader explorations of knowledge as an
indicator of where power resides in the situation (Clarke, 2005; Hook, 2001). Nevertheless, this
section relies heavily on interview data. Those narratives are symbolic of Foucault's (1980,
2002) conceptualization of true power within tacit structures and micro-level processes in ways
unavailable in structured discourse appearing in his later works. In fact, no extant sources frame
Relational Ambiguity even though the framework is dominant in the narratives.
I might have treated Relational Ambiguity as an overwhelming “site of silence”—an
element probably there but not referenced in the discourse (Clarke, 2003, p. 561)—except that
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the dynamic is in the narratives as a reflection of where true power resides in subtle and tacit
ways. Therefore, its aggregation across the narrative frame makes that distinction hard to
support. Rather, Relational Ambiguity as a form of tacit power exerts itself as Foucault’s
“gaze”—a source of power that no one can see, and may even be absent at times, but exerts its
presence by sheer knowledge of its existence (Foucault, 1977). To relegate the dynamic as
unimportant would have been inauthentic to the situation and would have marginalized my main
objective, which was to understand the situation constitutive of responses to TWB among
intelligence officers. The following section explores Relational Ambiguity through the narratives
and extant sources where they exist.
Defining Relational Ambiguity. I define Relational Ambiguity as an interpersonal
dynamic that devalues formal rank in favor of relational status so that who people are in relation
to each other is conditioned on organizational requirements in the moment:
So, you've got a director, deputy director, chief of staff, and then below you have what
are called associate directors [AD]. There's one for operations, one for capabilities, and
then they have deputies. A person who I mentored, who I was team lead [over] is now
deputy AD. I don't work for her now, but she's technically above me in the block and
chain chart. Then, there's another woman that I worked with as a peer, and then I did
end up working for her for two years, two and a half years. (Liam)
Ridgeway and Walker (1995) defined status as the degree to which one is liked.
However, Liam depicts status in the Core as situational rather than hierarchical. Thus, being
“liked” may be conditional as well. Strauss theorized status as a playing field in which members
of social worlds claim status, make counterclaims, and compete for power (Strauss, 1969). Hall
(1989) followed with his conceptualization of low-context (clear forms of status) and high-context
(ambiguous forms of status) cultures, with the latter elevating the importance of tacit structures,
tone, and interpersonal interactions. Ambiguity of status emerges within high-context cultures
and into broader aspects of Relational Ambiguity at the foundation of those power relationships.
The dynamic reduces the “guardrail” function normally played by formal rank as a situational
queuing structure and balances it with a shape-shifting social arena in the Core where
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referential status of expertise, long-term relationships, and longevity (French & Raven, 1959)
form the context.
I argue that Relational Ambiguity is a by-product of the IC’s ability to maintain structural
flexibility to meet rapidly changing strategic requirements. Within this construct, rank, status,
and what separates a peer from a superior are not only fluid but often unclear:
Now, at the senior level, it's very interesting because how quickly things can shift. The
person that you work with could be the person that works for you, could be the person
that you next work for, depending on who gets what position and who's promoted and so
forth. (Jason)
I could identify no documentation establishing Relational Ambiguity as a goal. Rather, IC
wide strategy guidance (National Intelligence Strategy, 2019; Human Capital Vision 2020,
2014), former senior intelligence officials (Clapper & Brown, 2018; Hayden, 2016, 2018;
McConnell, 2007), and Congressional overseers (Schiff, 2020) have applauded structural
designs to enable rapid organizational flexibility and transformations. However, in the narrative,
individuals and their teams become relegated to implicated actors and actants, respectively, as
silenced recipients left to manage the resulting relational challenges. Individuals merge old
grudges, experiences, and expectations into the new relationship so that distinguishing between
them is complex. The following section will explore Relational Ambiguity as a level of discourse
through its repertoire of “situational peer.”
Situational Peer as Repertoire. Rank in the IC is bestowed in the form of grades
through federal pay schedules (Salaries & Wages, 2021). However, even the equalizing nature
of federal general pay and grade schedules are situational because where team members
reside determines the numeric value of that formal pay grade (2021 General Schedule [GS]
Locality Pay Tables, 2021). Functional position, reputation, and other forms of referential power
balance formal titles. The dynamic emerges into a repertoire of the “situational peer” that
challenges members to continually negotiate their status relative to others in the situation,
especially when rank and grade do not align:
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My boss was a peer of mine, [but] he was not ahead of me in rank. (Gwen)
I think she was one grade below me at the time, but we were at that same sort of point.
(Maria)
Like a graduate-level academic cohort, intelligence officers may enter service as equals
but then experience individualized career trajectories (Civilian Careers in U.s. Intelligence and
National Security, 2021). Even as they progress at different paces, they anchor onto early
relational frameworks in ways that minimize divergent career trajectories later in career:
We are friends, and we've been friends way before we became branch chiefs. He used
to be in the Army as a warrant officer, and that's where we first met when he came to
[location redacted]. (Mike)
Situational analysis is designed to locate sources of conflict and tension in the discourse
(Clarke, 2005). Rank bestows authority but in ways that rely upon complex assessments of who
one is to another. This positional relativity bestows authority onto expertise and seniority even
when individuals equal each other in organizational rank. “Situational peer” also emerged as a
source of discursive conflict in structures that bifurcate power over operations from the power to
influence the individuals who conduct them:
I'm in charge of the overall mission, but because of the way that the agency is
constructed, I am not a supervisor yet of anyone. I don't have any formal supervisory
roles. I can't punish them. I can't admonish them. (Joel)
Proximity to the relationally significant could be physical or perceptual. For example,
being physically or relationally close to those perceived to be significant to power derives power
(Follett, 1924):
Even though he was not as senior at that time, that was a senior position because of the
seniors that he interacted with daily in [redacted]. (Christina)
Distance from authority is its own enabler:
When you're away from headquarters, when you're away from the “flagpole,” the chief is
the king. He controls everything. If you question, "Hey, wait a minute, that's not the way
the regulations say.” It's like, "I'm the chief, I'm going to break the rules. If you're
standing in my way, it's because you don't understand how things are in the field."
(Maria)
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Relational privilege from ambiguity becomes particularly vivid when 24x7 and remote teams
physically separate managers from personnel, but team leads are physically present:
I didn't have the opportunity to speak face-to-face, so people were getting their very best
communication from, in this case, their team leads who are there face-to-face with
them all the time. (Finn)
The “situational peer” repertoire becomes a more vivid message when the
operational lead is lower in rank than those they are leading. This messaging projects
into the mission and forms tensions within formal structures:
I was the operational team lead. I think most of division leadership was either [higher in
rank] and I was [lower in rank]. I maybe felt intimidated just by the mere fact that I was
lower in grade than they were. So, I did not intentionally seek out “face time” with
division leadership. (Kit)
The IC encourages intelligence officers to grow their careers and enhance
community-wide perspectives through interorganizational rotations, short-term crisis teams, and
research sabbaticals. This goal supports broader IC-integration goals to streamline operations
and foster cross-entity collaboration (Strickland & Whitlock, 2016; Vision 2015, 2008). However,
the goals also offer opportunities for meso-ambiguities to “go macro” as movements reshape
internal cultures through outsiders. For example, according to 2018 data from DIA’s public
website, the entity had personnel posted to 160 countries and country teams revealing a
complex meso-cultural dynamic. The agency also had four integrated intelligence centers that
were regionally aligned with the Americas, Europe/Eurasia, the Middle East, and Asia Pacific.
Three directorates oversaw analysis, science and technology research, and operations. Twelve
“mission enablers,” such as the Chief Information Office and the Office of Partner Engagement,
provided support to the core mission (Defense Intelligence Agency Strategic Approach, 2018).
Opportunities for intra-DIA rotations and postings were supplemented by the IC-wide Joint Duty
Assignment (JDA) program, which enabled personnel to complete two-to-three years in another
IC or affiliated entity (ODNI, 2020); external programs, such as the Presidential Innovation
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Fellows program as a government-wide technology incubator (Presidential Innovation Fellows,
2021); and the Military Fellows one-year intensive research program (Military Fellows, 2021).
These opportunities echo “situational peer” across entities through longitudinal relational
dynamics that sustain as intelligence officers recycle through each other’s professional lives.
Structures, which are roles, responsibilities, and relationships designed to accomplish the core
mission (Burke & Litwin, 1992), make relationships in the IC conditional because these same
structures value stability and instability in equal measure. For her unclassified doctoral
dissertation, Nolan embedded as a CIA Fellow within the DNI’s National Counterterrorism
Center, where she observed this “stable instability” first-hand:
DI [Directorate of Intelligence] analysts routinely undertake assignments in war zones
and other dangerous places and put themselves at great risk. People rotate in and out,
from six months to two years. Thus, continuity is rare, impacting relationships, trust, and
expertise (Nolan, 2013, p. 26)
Members who function within the Core straddle complex tensions between individualistic
career goals versus those of the wider organization. They must also navigate when to function
independently versus as a member of a team (Hastie, 2011). However, social identity emerges
from a sense of being part of a collective whole (Rousseau, 2016; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The
navigational arena is the team.
Cohen and Bailey (1997) defined a team as a group with visible boundaries that function
interdependently toward shared outcomes. While the team’s cohesion is observable to others, it
functions within a wider system and manages relationships that span organizational boundaries.
Within the IC, the “team” functions within the Core as a staging arena for negotiating, debating,
and driving the mission forward.
Figure 5.5 is a word cloud that I produced using NVivo software to determine aggregate
word usage among members of the Core primary social worlds and available texts. I delimited
the 500 most commonly used words. I also removed non-substantive references, such as yeah,
yes, well, and hey; interviewee names; articles, such as a, and, and the; pronouns; and other
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words that might be more singularly used or used in multiple ways so that they did not help
frame critical elements (e.g., walked or phone). In the aggregate, team was the most used word
in the discourse.
Within the repertoire of “situational peer,” teams formed arenas for cross-entity
relationships, collaboration, and production between social worlds. Co-located teammates and
cross-agency partners and rivals
drafted proposed findings into

Figure 5.5
Core Discursive Themes

intelligence “cycles” that spanned
meso- and macro-social worlds to
be negotiated and reformed into
products that contained
consensus support (Richards,
2010). However, IC integration
goals have actively promoted
opportunities to meld cultures and
skills by forming routine, initiativebased, and crisis teams across IC entities with shared equities (Mellers et al., 2015; Zenko,
2015). Therefore, “situational peer” emerged as a repertoire within traditional and virtual teams
in which status is based on the team and in the moment.
Research indicates that teams have physical, dialogic, and functional rhythms (Jackson
et al., 2011). Co-located teams in the IC were referenced as extended families of individuals to
sit, commiserate, and argue with each day. However, in these IC families, the self-censorship
normally required to protect sources and methods from uncleared family members and friends
no longer applied. Cross-entity teams were promoted as opportunities to span boundaries
across cultures and skills, as well as to spawn career opportunities to create new sets of
“situational peers.”
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Disruptions caused by the global Coronavirus-19 (COVID-19) pandemic beginning in
late-2019 to early-2020 changed the “team” arena. IC organizations formed new rhythms as
entities sought the legal permission and technological capability to expand the classified
environment to uncleared environments (Eversden, 2020). However, physical connections
between formerly co-located teammates became limited because they were isolated in their
homes (Ogrysko, 2020). For actors in toxic situations, this liberation from the traditional
environment may have had individualized benefits. However, a new permutation on Relational
Ambiguity surfaced in which the operational boundaries for the IC expanded in innovative ways
while relational boundaries simultaneously expanded and contracted.
Implicated Actors and Actants. Implicated actors are those who are present but
silenced in the situation and those who are as discursively constructed in the situation by others
for their own purposes (Clarke, 2005; Clarke & Montini, 1993). Because Core discourse centers
on the IC’s core mission, the array of actors implicated by the field are potentially significant.
However, I identified two primary implicated actors and actants in the situation constitutive of
response to TWB: “Organization, Leadership, and Agency” as a collective set and “Families.”
Organization, Leadership, and Agency as Implicated Actants. Chapter 2 provided a
review of secondary discourse on the IC core mission, including analysis, analytical methods,
operational challenges, and the impact of reform efforts on the core mission. This discourse
reflected the perspectives of IC scholars (both those who had served in the IC and those who
had not) as well as the former IC personnel mentioned earlier in the section. A comparison of
212 secondary sources with the findings in this study indicates that “organization, leadership,
and agency” bifurcated across the two discursive fields.
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“Leadership” as an IC category includes intelligence officers who have achieved the rank
within one of the three tiers of Senior Intelligence Service (Benefits & Pay, 2021). Seniors hold
power over recognition, opportunities, pay, promotion. They wield that power by using analytic
standards as implicated actants for evaluation
(ICD 203, 2015) and performance
management systems (DCIPS Performance

Table 5.3
Organization, Leadership, and Agency
in Secondary and Core Discourse
Term

Management, 2021). 8
As illustrated in Table 5.3, “leadership”
within secondary discourse is tangential.
However, in this study, “organization,

Total
Sources
Organization
Leadership
Agency

Secondary
Discourse

Primary
Narrative
Data

212

20

26
9
38

285
212
194

leadership, and agency” were central to the situation constitutive of response to TWB among
intelligence officers. Simply, these frameworks emerged as implicated actants for positioning,
justifying, and blaming. They also raised significant implications for how those observing the
Core as outsiders image “what goes on there” and how actors within the Core image
themselves.
The frameworks represented power in different ways in this study. “Agency” represented
benign positionality within the larger situation and, in comparison, to other actors:
I’m the best candidate at my agency. (Gwen)
“Agency” also became a symbol for who belonged, who did not, and as a collective vulnerability:
My experience with it [TWB] was from people who came from another agency. There
was one [senior] individual who just had a very aggressive nature, and he came over
from another agency. (David)

DCIPS governs occupational structure and performance management for the ten IC entities that are governed by
the U.S. Department of Defense (DCIPS Frequently Asked Questions, 2021). Other entities have separate
performance management systems that I could not locate in the public domain.
8
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“Organization” reflected a tension that simultaneously bestowed power, pride, and
burden. However, “organization” also had a collective voice that simultaneously reduced other
voices:
It bugged me when the organization tried to say, “We're going to go to the servant
leadership model,” not because I'm against servant leadership, but it's not just
something you can say, “Now, go be a servant leader.” (Dana)
“Leadership” was reflected as a symbol of position, collective accountability, and
functional empowerment:
I'm in a position of leadership. (Christina)
“Leadership” was also discursively constructed as a source of poor modeling and
accountability:
It's the organizational structure and the organizational leadership that just reinforces the,
“Well, that's how we've always done it.” (Celine)
Thus, “Organization, Agency, and Leadership” discursively constructed standards for
“leadership.” This construction extended to the individuals within those structures as implicated
actors. “Leadership” transitioned from “it” to “they” as implicated actors who had dominion over
progress or stagnation:
I'm trying to get leadership to recognize risk of [intelligence disclosure] or whatever, and
there are some things that they're not recognizing. (Liam)
As implicated actors, they are discursively constructed but they also wield considerable power
over how they are represented through perceived action, response, and attention.
Families. A second set of implicated actors in the Core was “Families.” I expected
“families” to emerge more transparently in the situation because Core primary actors experience
work demands in the form of long hours, crises, deployments to danger zones, and postings,
which implicate the intelligence officer and family members alike. Unlike “leadership,” which was
significant in the situation, “families” emerged as tangential in the passing mention of husbands,
wives, children, parents, and “exes.” Consequently, while they were not entirely voiceless
(Clarke, 2005; Clarke & Montini, 1993), their voices were muted and in the background:
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I think my husband heard a lot more than he wanted to because I would go home and
complain every day about just how toxic that work environment was. (Christina)
However, “families” were not entirely without power in the situation because career choices
became a collective decision by family members, friends, and significant others:
I came here because of my wife. She's a [physician]. So, it goes back to family, and she
has family close by. (Mike)
No data was available in the open domain on the number of IC personnel who are
related. However, the minimization of “families” in the Core is more remarkable given the
commonality of “intel families” discussed in Chapter 4. Intelligence officers recruit children as
legacy into the “family business.” Also, intelligence officers marry, divorce, and remarry each
other, which blurs boundaries between home and work:
Like a hill family. Like an Appalachian family. They even inter-married. [Agency
redacted] employees not only married each other, they divorced each other, and then
married colleagues. You never quite knew who was connected to whom, so you were
always careful. (Kate)
Summary. The “tip of the spear” repertoire situates Core actors within a high-stakes
arena in which the “self” becomes embedded in abstractions of what it means to serve a
mission. Fluidity and unpredictability related to global events and the way in which pop culture
perpetuates images of life at the “spear” function as supports to the repertoire. Taken together,
Core discourses, discursive repertoires, and implicated actors and actants frame a paradoxical
social world. Actors support the core mission while receiving support and subjugation from
processes and structures designed to assist them. Thus, Relational Ambiguity and its repertoire
of “situational peer” have a reductive quality when these dynamics become frameworks for how
to respond effectively to TWB.
The importance of structure—even when ambiguous—permeates discourse constructed
within the Core around organizations and their human representatives in other social worlds.
This misalignment may have transpired because of the power that actors primarily functioning
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within a second social world have to influence Core discourse. The following section will discuss
the Archetype Social World through its discourses of Culture Shaping and Standard Setting.
The Archetype Social World
A second social world in the situation constitutive of response to TWB among
intelligence officers is the Archetype. Within the Archetype, power emerged within a discursive
field designed to construct the ideal archetype for intelligence officers and their organizations.
Unlike the Core, the unclassified discourse available within the Archetype was diverse and
robust. The primary discourses, Culture Shaping and Standard Setting, surfaced in policy
documents, workforce plans, Congressional testimony, media interviews, and speeches. While
IC leadership does not discuss reasons for making so much information about its operations
publicly available, I argue that the availability and context for information form more than window
dressing. Within its discursive repertoires of “You are the Model” and “A Place for You,” the
archetype shapes internal culture, informs possible recruits about what that archetype is, and
attracts a workforce consistent with long-term strategies. Table 5.4 is a taxonomy of the
Archetype. The discussion begins with an exploration of the primary actors in the social world.
Table 5.4
Archetype Social World Taxonomy
Social
World

Archetype

Primary Actors
Senior
Leadership
Public
Communications

Discursive
Field
Culture
Shaping
Standard
Setting

Discursive
Repertoire
You are the
Model
A Place for
You
Managers
Set the Tone

Site of
Silence
Training the
Leaders

Implicated
Actors
Analysts
Operations
Personnel
Supervisors

Primary Archetype Actors. The primary actors governed by the Archetype are senior
leaders, as well as those representing the internal IC and its public “face.” They sculpt ideal
images for functioning within the community, standards for advancement, and avatars for
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personnel. While the Archetype as a social world includes multiple occupations, senior
leadership cultivates the discourse to convey internal avatars and preferred culture, while public
communications and corporate communications personnel craft and target messages at
external stakeholders and potential recruits.
As actors, leadership “manages the managers” who most directly oversee the Core and
other segments of the IC. They have a core mission of their own to execute macro- and
meso-level policy, guidance, and goals (Senior Executive Service, 2021). However, they also
build archetypes within preferred behaviors, standards, and ways of operating through
modeling, accountability, and guiding others (Clapper, 2012). In this way, they shape the
internal image for their organizations and the broader IC.
I use the term “public communications” to encapsulate actors with responsibility to shape
the public image of intelligence officers and IC organizations. For example, graphic designers
might construct images for displays, social media, websites, and other publicly available
discourse designed to visualize the IC. Editors might write the content to align with these visual
messages. Communications specialists might perform outreach services to dignitaries and other
visitors, such as liaison and protocol. Simply, in collaboration with senior leadership (and even
the “ambassadors” discussed in the previous section), they craft a public image that the IC
wants to project to the public but also internally. When crafted images diverge from internal
perceptions, they can paradoxically shape responses to TWB. The following section will explore
how these actors intersect with the field by discussing two levels of discourse: Culture Shaping
and Standard Setting.
Culture Shaping. I adopted the term Culture Shaping from “A Pledge to Our People,” a
document released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in 2019 (Coats et al.,
2019) as a renewed commitment to address sexual harassment and other forms of
discrimination in the IC. The document, posted on the ODNI’s website, begins with an identity
statement about who the IC leadership was and represented: “We shape our culture, mission,
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and workforce” (para. 1) While the intent behind the document was clear, the document’s power
emerged from the signature page showing the names of the directors of each of the IC entities,
which depicted the “Pledge” as the unified force of an entire community.
Chapter 2 reviewed theory and empirical research on the “self” as a concept that
emerges individually and relationally. Chapter 4 demonstrated the role that maintaining selfconcepts played in choices of response to TWB. However, research demonstrates that the “self”
is a triplicate of individual, relational, and collective selves that are separate (Ellemers et al.,
2002; Spears, 2001) and ranked (Nehrlich et al., 2019). As this section will show, IC entities
leverage Culture Shaping discourse to craft the internal and public narrative about the IC around
an archetypical constructed “self” as an intelligence officer.
Culture Shaping discourse includes speeches, intelligence sanitized for unclassified
release, recruiting sites on unclassified websites and career consortiums, and publicly released
value statements. In a 2012 speech to newly inducted members of the SIS ranks, then Director
of National Intelligence James Clapper unveiled an 11-point directive of what would be expected
of them in these new leadership roles. The list was expansive and explicitly aligned to
organization building, leading people, and courage (Clapper, 2012). Critically important, this
speech was published on the ODNI website as a statement to the rest of the workforce and the
public about his archetype for the IC senior leader. Within this discursive field, two repertoires
emerged: “You are the Model” and “A Place for You.”
You are the Model as Repertoire. In the first of two books on his experiences in the IC,
former NSA and CIA Director, Mike Hayden (2016), recounts a speech he gave to newly
inducted CIA intelligence officers before issuing them their oaths of office:
You may be the only face of America that the people you recruit will ever see. And when
you have recruited them, they are placing their fate and their family's fate in your hands.
Don't ever forget that. (p. 272)
In these two sentences, Hayden (2016) described Culture Shaping in a discursive field that
permeates the archetype. One does not merely work in the IC. Being an intelligence officer
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assumes a commitment to an ethos that everyone in the situation sees. Geertz (1957) defined
ethos as the tone and quality by which individuals live their lives. Ethos is more than a value
system. Ethos is a manner of living that includes forethought, emotional attachment, and a
justification for following a particular course of action (Voronov & Weber, 2016). In Hayden’s
statement, the ethos carried a moral burden of commitment to foreign recruits as implicated
actors—as extant individuals in the situation who may be on the periphery of the social world
but implicated by the events unfolding within it (Clarke, 1991). His call to “never forget” implied a
burden that imposed an unrelenting power over the intelligence officer.
Former deputy Attorney General and FBI director James Comey (2018) also established
the role of ethos in his decision to rebel against perceived efforts by U.S. President Donald J.
Trump to demand loyalty to him over his sworn duty a larger set of loyalties to uphold the U.S.
Constitution:
I learned from those around me and tried to pass on to those I worked with that there is
a higher loyalty in all of our lives—not to a person, not to a party, not to a group. The
higher loyalty is to lasting values, most important the truth. (p. xii)
Hayden’s, Clapper’s, and Comey’s words crafted an archetype model for leadership that
triangulated Rowe's (2001) distinction between visionary (values- and beliefs-setting), strategic
(viability influencing), and managerial (stability holding) leadership. They also communicated
tacit acceptance of the model put forth by Ashforth and colleagues (2016), which frames
leadership as theater in which personnel watch, learn, and identify with their leadership. This
identification helps to align the individual and collective “self” so that Culture Shaping becomes
symbiotic within two images. One image establishes the archetype for what their leaders expect
from them to advance in the career; the other as an archetype for what they may expect from
their leaders.
When the messaging for what the model intelligence officer is finds synergy with
perceptions of ground-level culture, the Archetype thrives and services the IC’s goals. However,
the marginalizing effect of TWB sends a different message: “You are the anti-Archetype.”
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Alternatively, one senior IC leader framed a darker perspective on “You are the Model” that
emerges when TWB becomes ingrained in the collective discourse:
Some people are willing to learn it, and then they're willing to repeat it. It becomes the
proving ground, and this is the culture. So, it becomes ingrained in what is to be
expected if you're a young analyst. It’s almost like it could be like a hazing—the hazing,
then you're part of our tribe. (Vickie)
I discuss social media as a platform for culture shaping within a subsequent section.
However, the topic of how IC websites are used within the field is relevant here. Public websites
are a critical tool for culture shaping within the Archetype. Each IC entity maintains an
unclassified website as a storefront for organizational identity represented in taglines. NGA, as
the IC lead for GEOINT analysis, lays claim to being the “nation’s eyes” (Nga Director Presents
New Vision at GEOINT Symposium, 2010) and “showing the way” (NGA—Careers, 2021). DHS,
which partners with the FBI against domestic threats, touts honor and integrity as it “safeguards
the American people, our homeland, and our values” (Mission | DHS, 2021). The FBI stays
“ahead of the threat” (Mission and Priorities, 2021).
Culture shapes values and norms, which in turn shape organizational climate (Burke &
Litwin, 1992). TWB destroys organizational climates by way of severed relationships. Kusy and
Holloway (2009) found that performance solutions to address TWB were more effective when
respectful engagement was integrated into the organization’s value system. As Chapter 4
demonstrated, TWB poses a direct threat to sensitive collaborative structures fundamental to
the core mission. To support this model, the IC uses its web presence to convey more than its
archetypical vision. They also shape the cultural values they seek to promote. The CIA
promotes “service” to country, agency, and self (in that order), integrity to speak the truth, and
excellence in the highest standards (Core Values—Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). The
Office of Naval Intelligence touts “honor, courage, and commitment” (Office of Naval Intelligence
| Who We Are, 2020, para. 3).
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As noted, the IC makes no discernible distinction between culture shaping efforts
directed at its existing workforce or potential recruits. However, the visible links between pages
touting mission and values and those that enable individuals to apply for intelligence officer
positions are notable. For example, the NGA recruiting page shown in Figure 5.6 aligns its core
values and recruiting goals in subtle but unmistakable ways. The message is clear: You would
not have a job but a mission. However, something else becomes notable in the image: the faces
on display. The two women—one African American and one Caucasian—and the African
American man are avatars

Figure 5.6

for culture shaping within an

Recruiting for Mission

agency that is actively
seeking greater diversity in
its technical “big data” ranks.
The 2019 National
Intelligence Strategy directly
links greater diversity with
national security and lists the
goal as number three of
seven enterprise objectives

NGA – Careers [Image]. 2021. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
https://www.nga.mil/careers/1595879126287_Your_Career.html
Used by permission.

(National Intelligence Strategy, 2019). The progress has been uneven. Women made up 41.2 %
of new hires across the IC in 2018, the latest period for which numbers are available. However,
they remain overrepresented at lower pay grades. Ethnic minority hiring increased by less than
two % during the same period. Also, attrition rates for minorities and women remained only
slight lower than the numbers hired during the same period for both groups. Peoples with
disabilities (PWD) comprised only 10.7 % of the new hires in that period; the attrition rates were
nearly even at 10.3 % (Annual Demographic Report, 2018). Consequently, culture shaping
efforts need a willing partnership with those they seek to shape. As I write this paragraph, the IC
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has unveiled a new direction in its efforts to reshape the diversity of its workforce. I explore this
topic through the messaging of its discursive repertoire: “A Place for You.”
A Place for You as Repertoire. In her 2020 testimony to the U.S. House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the ODNI’s director of
Equal Opportunity and Diversity (EEOD), Rita Sampson (2019), testified about the IC’s uneven
progress on recruiting women and others from historically marginalized groups. For Sampson,
the problem was the message: “We need to educate minority communities that there is a place
for them in the IC.”
Figure 5.7
Representation of “A Place for You”

We are the nation’s first line of defense [Image]. (2021). Central Intelligence Agency. cia.gov.
Used by permission.

Although this recruitment effort is IC-wide, the CIA’s effort has been notably transparent.
The CIA launched a revamped website in January 2021 designed to change the discursive
repertoire of its archetype. As depicted in Figure 5.7, the homepage of the site shows an African
American woman in all-black against an all-black background and framed by the message, “We
are the Nation's first line of defense” (CIA, 2021). Refreshing the page reveals an image of an
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individual of a different ethnicity each time, each conveying the message that “they” are the first
line of defense for the country.
The revamped website designed to boost minority recruitment complements a wider
discursive repertoire that has emerged in IC social media campaigns. IC agencies have shaped
culture through social media messaging that conveys “belonging” through the words of
employees already there. The message extends beyond minority recruitment back to the wider
archetype for the culture they seek to shape. In the collage in Figure 5.8, an intelligence officer
who identifies with the LGBTQIA community talks about the sacrifices that others made before
him. The image subtly titillates with the mystery of working there by hiding his identity (Humans
of CIA—I’m Comfortable Being Out, 2020). However, the rainbow flag on his shoes as a
common emblem of the LGBTQIA community is central in the image. DIA’s Director (DIA on
Instagram—Just Imagine, 2020) draws on ethos by asking the viewer to “Just imagine” waking
up every day to defend the Constitution. A Navajo employee at NSA talks about her heritage
and its contribution to the NSA mission (National Security Agency on Instagram—Navajo
Heritage, 2020).
The challenge for the IC is ensuring that recruiting images mirror the experiences on the
ground. Ethnic minority participants in the grounded theory segment explored micro-political
environments that conveyed a different message. These experiences were particularly vivid
among the intelligence officers posted to offsite centers away from headquarters. They reported
that employees in these entities tended to be from the local area, where racial and gender
imbalances were more significant, and employees rotated to other IC entities less frequently.
Local norms in conflict with diversity and inclusion goals often overshadowed IC objectives in
ways that became transparent in practice. In particular, they objected to recruiting efforts
implying that diversity would be welcome before a normative shift occurred among the working
population. They also interpreted this dynamic as an effort to shift the responsibility for changing
minds to those victimized by them—a problem they associated with leadership:
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It's just a different mindset, how part of the problem is being used to find the solution.
Because the reality is, some of these seniors are in a seat knowing that they are the
problem. (Lamar)
Figure 5.8
IC Culture Shaping Through Social Media

Just imagine [Social Media]. (2020). Defense Intelligence Agency on Instagram.
https://www.instagram.com/p/CFPpobfpuhU/
Used by permission.
I am grateful [Social Media]. (2020). Central Intelligence Agency on Instagram.
https://www.instagram.com/p/CDUOiSsgXsm/
Used by permission.
I am full Navajo [Social Media]. (2020). National Security Agency on Instagram.
https://www.instagram.com/p/CIPeZcCAq8N/
Used by permission.

This bifurcation of the Archetype ideal and the micro-political frame in some segments of
the IC converge with another permutation on the repertoire of the IC as a home for patriots. The
message links “self,” entity, and patriotism. As an example, DIA’s (2018 )promotional video on
YouTube constructs this narrative of the “patriotic self.” The 6:59-minute video opens at dusk,
where the sun gleams off the DIA headquarters’ glass frame. Ten seconds into the video the
viewer sees the DIA flag flying next to the U.S. flag. The two flags appear to be the same size
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and fly at equal heights. The power behind the message lies in its implicit nature: “DIA is
patriotism.” Forty-five seconds into the video, the link between the archetype of the “patriotic
self” and the viewer’s “self” completes when a frame emerges to say, “We are DIA.” The video
then transitions through a series of frames to show ordinary people doing extraordinary things.
However, the extraordinary people depicted in the video are not operating in war zones. They
are sitting at computers. 9
Research suggests that messages around patriotism may have countervailing effects
that conflict with diversity and inclusion goals. Individuals carry multiple identities and images of
the “self” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Collins, 1998). Sorting and compartmentalizing these “selves”
(Ellemers & Rink, 2005) helps them to make sense of where they belong in organizations and in
society at large (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Hogg et al., 1995;). Patriotism as an ethos may represent
conflicting ideals among groups depending on whether they perceive that they are stratified in
the dominant or subordinate group. For example, research in one study found that the range of
views on patriotism and degrees of what W. E. B. DuBois referred to as “double consciousness”
(DuBois, 1903) aligned with ethnic identity among African American, biracial, and multiracial
students (T. Shaw, 2013).
This conflict is not the private purview of ethnic minorities. Research has also found that
group dominance and patriotism correlated so that Caucasians who valued social stratification
into superior and inferior groups also demonstrated higher levels of patriotism (Peña & Sidanius,
2002; Sidanius et al., 1997). Thus, the IC may consider whether patriotism as a laudable
recruiting value could also impede overall diversity and inclusion goals in the current polarized
political environment without efforts to link a generalized set of positive values.
“A Place for You” also includes discourse around another archetype emergent in the
discourse—seeking the “big data” technical expert. Within the Archetype, discourse centers on

9

The full video may be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmjMW8ffXho%20.
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constructing an ideal that will be attractive to top technical talent, during a time when the IC
seeks to maintain a competitive edge over U.S. adversaries (Reilly, 2015; Symon & Tarapore,
2015) and in an environment when Silicon Valley may be the biggest adversary of all. To make
intelligence careers more attractive as alternatives to “big tech” when Silicon Valley
compensation outstrips government salaries, the IC promotes the Right, Trusted, Agile
Workforce program to increase skill interchangeability with industry (Van Sloun, 2020).
However, ethos is an inducement with which the IC has a competitive edge over industry: “A
Place for You” to serve your country.
Public engagements within “A Place for You” intersect with the Core repertoire of “tip of
the spear” in its culture shaping. Like former IC officials and intelligence officers as
ambassadors for the profession, current IC officials engage in public events to convey
messages about the archetype IC mindset. NGA recruits for creativity, critical thinking, and
writing skills even within that highly technical, analytic missions (Thornton, 2016). A 2017
promotional video placed on YouTube by CIA proclaims that, whatever your skills, they have a
mission for you (CIA, 2017).
However, the “place” must have a climate that is as attractive as the mission. Sherry Van
Sloun (2020), the ODNI’s Assistant Director of Human Capital, recently discussed what kept
intelligence officers engaged: the feeling that their work is important; good engagement and
feedback from supervisors; and an inclusive environment where leaders built a strong culture
around the mission. As discussed earlier in this section and in Chapter 4, the distance between
Archetype ideals at the institutional level and their use in practice may be further than Archetype
actors perceive. The result may be reflected in the higher rates of attrition among ethnic minority
intelligence officers referenced earlier (Annual Demographic Report, 2018) and subpar
accountability measures found in Chapter 4. The following section will discuss “standard setting”
as a discourse designed to manage and promote this engagement through structure, rules, and
process.
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Standard Setting. The Archetype also includes a second discursive frame: Standard
setting. As a discourse, Standard Setting includes stated and documented metrics, procedures,
rules, and processes for conduct. As a framework, the discourse includes standards that senior
leaders set for others as symbols and representatives of their entities.
The previously-mentioned “pledge” signed by each of the entity directors in 2019 was
intended as a discursive “force” for culture shaping. The document embraces standard setting
directly: “We create standards and govern the workforce” (Coats et al., 2019, para. 1).The
document established IC-wide standards for each IC employee, regardless of rank or position.
Establishing “shared accountability” and “transparency,” the document pledged a commitment
by the collective to explore proactively the extent of harassment and discrimination within their
organizations and hold managers accountable for addressing the behavior.
IC leaders use a variety of discursive methods for standard setting. Like mechanisms to
promote culture shaping, performance objectives and strategies for accountability are published
on public platforms (Joint Strategy; 2020). However, as the situational center of gravity for the
IC, most publicly available documentation can be found on the ODNI platform. Public
statements and documentation emphasize competencies and training for middle managers and
others on a leadership trajectory as the focus (Sampson, 2019) while holding them accountable
for “empathy” and accountability in real time (Coats et al., 2019; Joint Strategy to Advance
Equal Employment Opportunity, Diversity, and Inclusion within the United States Intelligence
Community 2020–2023, 2020). The IC may use a multiplicative approach in tightening
standards to confront TWB. However, the focus is on one collective: middle managers.
The term manager is broad in scope, and at times, ambiguous. The “National Strategy”
delineates “Functional” (managers of disciplines), “National Intelligence” (the DNI’s principal
advisors), “Program” (IC element heads), and “Enterprise” (align entity-specific and business
functions) managers (National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America 2019,
2019). Most of these positions have operational management responsibility, even if they have
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the rank of senior leaders. However, in the IC, mid-level managers have operational
management responsibility for organizations even as they are also expected to perform like
senior leaders.
Like senior leaders, manager positions in the IC exist within tiers that designate rank and
concomitant responsibilities. The tiers span first-line supervisors to middle, organizational-level
managers. For example, for the ten DoD-led IC agencies, DCIPS is the prevailing performance
management infrastructure and outlines three management tiers. Work Level 4 includes
mid-level managers who oversee the fiduciary health of the organization, make strategic
decisions, and oversee first-line supervisors. Work Levels 2 and 3 include first-line supervisors
who oversee units of personnel. The distinction between levels 2 and 3 is the size of the unit
and the complexity of the work. The document does not define “complex” (DCIPS Occupational
Structure, 2020).
A full review of the literary trajectory underlying foundational leadership theories lies
beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, what constitutes a “manager” versus a “leader”
remains a source of debate, although the literature has evolved from the “great man” theories of
the nineteenth century (Carlysle,1866). In 1985, Bennis and Nanus carved a rhetorical cut-line
between leaders and managers: managers do things right, while leaders do the right thing. By
2007, Ford and Harding Hs fostered identity-based theories. Uhl-Bien and colleagues explored
leadership as a relational phenomenon not centered on one actor in the dynamic but in the
social interaction between them (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; M. Uhl-Bien, 2011; Uhl-Bien &
Marion, 2009).
The significance of foundational literature on leadership to the IC is that the community
appears to have adopted a hybrid approach between management and leadership. An analysis
of documentation establishing scope and competencies for IC mid-level managers makes no
meaningful distinction between managerial and leadership responsibilities for the roles.
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 651 (2019) establishes six competencies for IC
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managers: accountability, communication, critical thinking, engagement and collaboration,
leadership and integrity, and management proficiency. Additionally, organizational managers
hold a core responsibility for the units under them, while they are also responsible for furthering
community-wide goals for IC mission integration (ICD 900, 2013). In the IC, managers are
expected to manage down, lead up, and vision across.
Standard Setting Repertoire—Managers Set the Tone. The discursive repertoire for
culture shaping discourse in the IC centered on the modeling role that senior leaders played.
The repertoire of “Managers Set the Tone” shifted the focus to managers and those aspiring to
be senior leaders. The focus on mid-level managers as the touchpoint to address TWB,
discrimination, and other destructive workplace dynamics permeates the messaging. “Middle
management competencies are a major focus in setting the tone,” said Sampson (2019) during
her HPSCI testimony. The implicit message was that standards for managers who set the tone
also shape the culture.
The effort cuts a wide swath. The aforementioned “Joint Strategy” on diversity and
inclusion (Joint Strategy, 2020) and the “National Intelligence Strategy” (National Intelligence
Strategy, 2019) cross-reference efforts to empower managers to confront diversity and inclusion
shortcomings in their organizations. However, the documents tacitly imply that the power to
confront the problem has not existed in the past. The documents in tandem with the
aforementioned “Pledge” target enhanced training coupled with more stringent accountability
measures for mid-level managers as measures to drive meaningful change.
Tangential to the repertoire is the state of flux for managerial and leader competencies
in the IC. The path to leadership in the IC has traditionally been strong technical expertise and
supervisory experience. However, technical expertise has not always yielded the best leaders of
people—or even managers who wanted to lead:
The word culture, at first, was anathema. Nobody wanted to talk about culture. We had
the hardest time getting anybody interested. I had a senior leader . . . I mean, a very

254
senior leader, who said, "Yeah, no . . . I don't do that. I don't get involved in that stuff."
(Lisa)
Current promotion systems in the IC permit either a managerial or technical path, which allows
top technical talent to compete for specific issue-related positions that do not require personnel
or programmatic experience. However, the IC has begun to realign standards away from
promoting into managerial and senior ranks based on technical expertise in favor of identifying
strong leaders early (Long, 2017).
They're also coming clean that a lot of the people they promoted to leadership positions
are technically proficient but can't pick their folks out of a lineup. And they're also
learning that doesn't change even as the complaining workforce becomes the leaders.
(Chris)
Elements within the situation can be sources of contradiction and tension (Foucault,
1972). Others can be sites of silence as elements that should be there but do not reflect in the
discourse (Clarke, 2003). One source of tension emerged within the repertoire of “Managers Set
the Tone”: whether the discursive focus is misplaced.
The IC emphasizes training in emotional intelligence and empathy for managers (Coats
et al., 2019). However, some participants questioned where the managerial focus remains in
practice, particularly in overseeing interpersonal behavior in an environment where managers
believe the mission needs them more than the people do:
We value mission over leadership. And the “we” isn't just supervisors. You have people
who won't do anything [about TWB]. Bystanders. In some cases, they won't do anything
because they don't see anything, even though if they were paying attention, if they had
any eyes open or any ears open, they would've seen it. But, what they'll say to you when
you investigate it, either with an EO hat, a culture executive hat, an Ombudsman hat, is
they'll say, "Look, I get it. Somebody was offended by something someone said, they
brushed it off. I get it. Yeah, I guess if I had heard that I probably would have done
something, but it's not like we're paid to be watchman." (Chris)
Tensions also emerged in relation to the efficacy of the overall effort. Senior executives
interviewed for this study argued that downstream leadership development is not a new
repertoire. My research indicates that leadership development, managerial training, and
competencies have been key initiatives since at least 2006, the earliest document I could
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identify for this study (Five-Year Strategic Human Capital Plan, 2006; Five-Year Human Capital
Plan Annex, 2006):
Leadership development programs have been implemented by previous directors, and
it's meant to help educate leaders on how to be leaders, not just managers. There's also
been more training to bring awareness to the situation but changing culture is slow.
These are things that have been happening, I would say, over a 10-year period, I would
have anticipated us to have made more progress if we were actually serious about
changing that culture. (Jason)
Like the complexities associated with Relational Ambiguity explored during the Core
Social World discussion, the line between “management” and “leadership” does not easily align
with rank and position. Additionally, when distinctions emerge—such as when mid-level
managers transition to the senior executive ranks—the leadership mindset may develop more
slowly than the redesignation of title. “Moving from being a doer to an overseer, from being
developed to being the developer, from being the follower to the leader of followers” (Long,
2017, para. 15). Therefore, the transition carries a set of expectations that may exist in an ideal
that may not be materialize early:
We tell ourselves, once someone makes senior, it changes. But they were just [GS]-15s
on a Friday. What really changes? (Chris)
Sites of Silence—Training the Leaders. I could identify no discourse related to
leadership training for senior leaders. This absence was particularly notable because the Core
repertoire of “organization, agency, and leadership” reflected an equity in continued
developmental focus for leaders. Additionally, given that the transition toward leadership
development programs emphasizing the ability to lead over technical expertise are relatively
new, I considered that discourse might promote sustaining leadership development for those
senior executives who moved into the ranks prior to the transition in repertoire. I asked one
senior IC-level executive if the focus on mid-level managers stemmed from a presumption that
senior leaders were fully developed as leaders of people:
The focus or emphasis is on that mid-level manager because that is where most people
have the highest touch points on that day-to-day. If you look at the organization sort of
as a pyramid, very few people are on a day-to-day touch with the senior most official.
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And I think there are different initiatives that we could certainly work on for the seniormost leadership. They're [the managers] the ones that are setting the tone (Vickie)
The Archetype’s focus on culture and standard setting centered on an ideal of
intelligence officer ethos of mission, people, diversity, and inclusivity through a framework of
building better managers as leaders. This focus raised contradictions to the challenges that
emerged in Chapter 4 regarding diversity and inclusion, as well as the discourse in play within
the Core with its focus on senior leadership as a repertoire. Simply, the importance of senior
leadership as a discursive repertoire within the Core and its emergence as a site of silence
within the Archetype suggest a significant disconnect between two discursive frameworks.
Chapter 4 referenced levels of confusion and disillusionment by intelligence officers with
contradictions between institutional ideals and practice. These contradictions formed conditions
as they moved among dimensions of response to TWB in efforts to hold “self.” The following
section explores a third social world and discursive field in this contradictory framework. The
final social world and discursive field in the study moves the debate away from culture and
standards to a more rigid discourse around law, regulations, and policy. The next section
discusses the Compliance Social World.
The Compliance Five Social World
The final social world relevant to response to TWB among intelligence officers is
Compliance Five. The Compliance Five contains a level of discourse centering on the legal and
regulatory governance. Unlike Core and Archetype, micro-discourses align with and legitimize
five micro-collectives within Compliance Five, although they partner under the same discursive
field. Consequently, this section is structured somewhat differently than the other sections. I
begin the discussion by briefly identifying the single discourse within the field: Obligation. I
segment the initial part of the discussion by the five collectives. Then, I explore the Complaint
Process as a negotiated arena. Finally, I discuss “I Work for the Agency” as the primary
repertoire within Obligation.
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Table 5.5
Compliance Social World Taxonomy

Social World

Compliance
Five

Primary
Actors

Discursive
Field

IG

Obligation

HR
EEO
IGC
Ombudsman

Discursiv
e
Repertoire

I Work for
the
Agency

Arenas &
Boundaries

Complaint
Process
(Arena)
Complaints
(Boundary
Object)

Site of
Dissent

Implicated
Actors

Leave,
Don’t
File

Seniors
Managers
Analysts
Operations

Obligation. Compliance Five includes a discursive field related to legal, policy, and
regulatory frameworks governing IC operations and redress. Because of the classified missions
for the 18 IC entities, the applicability of specific federal requirements is both entity dependent,
and in some cases, classified. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) tracks
workforce data across the executive branch of the U.S. government. However, CIA, NGA, DIA,
NSA, and ODNI are exempt from OPM tracking infrastructure in the open domain because
workforce totals at those agencies are classified (FedScope, 2021). An analysis of every
governing structure lies beyond the scope of this paper but is also not directly relevant to the
research question. Rather, the alignment of specific collectives, discourses, and how they
interact is relevant. The following section will explore each of these social worlds and their
legitimizing frameworks:
Inspector General. The Inspector General’s (IG’s) office for each IC entity has
investigatory oversight of federal programs. Within that function, the IG conducts audits,
inspections, and investigations of suspected programmatic abuse. Within the ODNI, the IG has
designated responsibility within that entity but also a larger coordination role across the IC
(Intelligence Community Oversight, 2020; Office of the Inspector General, 2020). The IG would
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play a role in cases in which toxic events included abuse of federal programs, funding, and
facilities.
IGs across the federal government are statutorily mandated by Title 5a (U.S. Code,
1978). The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 authorized IC-wide
responsibilities for the ODNI IG (M. K. Atkinson, 2020). IC entities structure their IG
organizations in compliance with codified reporting structures and federal mandates. For
example, while NSA is under DoD’s reporting authority, it functions as an independent IC entity
with its own IG (National Security Agency Office of the Inspector General, 2021). Conversely,
the “bureau” status for the FBI and the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (State/INR) place those organizations under the IG responsibilities for their parent
agencies (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2021; U.S. Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General, 2021).
Human Resources. Human Resource (HR) officers in IC entities mirror those of their
counterparts in other federal agencies. Their responsibilities are broad and cover five core
functions: staffing, development, compensation, safety and health, and employee and labor
relations. Under these responsibilities, they work directly with seniors, managers, and
employees to align agency prerogatives and employee responsibilities, oversee employee
wellness programs, provide mediation, and manage adverse actions (OPM, 2020).
An array of federal, as well as public, regulations govern each HR segment separately.
State laws and regulations also govern IC entities located in those jurisdictions. This
segmentation constructs multiple micro-worlds within the HR function. For example,
Northeastern University has compiled 12 federal laws under five responsibility segments to
which the HR function is obligated (Joubert, 2009). Even within adverse actions, the context of
the grievance guides which regulatory framework applies. For example, grievance procedures
for instances of TWB involving incidents covered under Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act
(1964) would fall under that regulatory umbrella. However, instances not covered by Title VII
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would fall under OPM conflict grievance processes dependent upon occupational “class,” the
origin of the complaint (e.g., performance or conduct), and other defining factors (Employee
Rights & Appeals, 2021).
Equal Employment Office. The Equal Employment Office (EEO) has the responsibility
for monitoring, tracking, and reporting compliance with agency diversity and inclusion progress
for the IC. Within these responsibilities, EEO also oversees compliance with the mandates
established in the overarching plans and strategies to achieve diversity and inclusion goals
(Equal Employment Opportunity Strategy, 2016; Joint Strategy, 2020). They form a tracking
function for the IC but also a remedial function when covered events emerge.
The predominant federal mandate governing EEO in the IC is Title VII (1964), which
establishes the regulatory framework for antidiscrimination laws in the U.S.. Title VII covers
specific classes under which the law applies, including discriminatory practices related to
race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, or gender identity), national
origin, age (40 or older), disability, and genetic information (including family medical history;
EEOC, 2021). While EEO is significantly invested in diversity and inclusion initiatives across the
IC, offices with routine management of those programs are subsumed within the HR framework
rather than EEO. Other frameworks governing EEO responsibilities in the IC include the
NoFEAR Act to protect those reporting violations from reprisal (NoFEAR Act, 2002);
Management Directive 715, which establishes policy guidance for EEOs across the U.S. federal
government (EEOC, 2020); and 29 CFR 1614.102, which provides oversight guidance for each
entity’s responsibilities to build affirmative programs promoting diversity and inclusion
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 2020). ICD 110 sets out antidiscrimination policy and
procedures for the IC (ICD 110, 2009).
Office of General Counsel. IC entities maintain Offices of General Counsel (OGC) as
their primary legal representatives or have access to OGCs in their parent agencies. OGCs
function in an advisory capacity and represent entities in litigation. Additionally, OGCs will play
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this advisory role for policymakers in an IC oversight role (Legal Careers in the IC Flyer, 2020).
IC websites promote mandates covering each programmatic aspect of the entities they serve,
including fiduciary, contract, acquisitions and procurement, employment, ethics, intellectual
property, international law, and legislation (Legal Careers in the IC Flyer, 2020; Office of the
Intelligence Community Inspector General—Who We Are, 2020). OGC attorneys represent
entities on issues related to Title 18 and other legal aspects related to national security law.
Additionally, the ODNI’s “Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book” (2020) lists at least 42
additional federal laws, regulations, guidelines, and policy memorandums governing all or part
of IC programmatic responsibilities. As noted in other sections, state and local ordinances also
govern aspects of the IC entities physically located in those areas.
Ombudsman. Intelligence agencies include an office of the ombudsman as a neutral
arbiter for investigations, complaints, and conflict resolution. The ombudsman fields questions
and complaints from employees, whistleblowers, and customers when those issues do not
normally fall within the normal redress procedures governed by one of the other compliance
actors. They also coach employees on problem resolution and partner with HR in mediating
disputes. Therefore, while they partner with others actors in Compliance, they function as
neutral arbiters and function within strict confidentiality rules (Position Announcement—ODNI
Ombudsman, 2017).
The office of the ombudsman has no designated statutory authority. This lack of legal
mandate is significant because no law requires that IC entities have an office of the ombudsman
or staff them at minimum levels. However, they play critical roles in streamlining and managing
disputes so that they are resolved outside of litigation and formal redress. A 2016 study found
that ombudsmen across the federal government had quantifiable impacts on reducing legal
costs and improving organizational morale (Houk et al., 2016).
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I have placed the collective actors within IC offices of ombudsmen in Compliance Five
because they partner in constructing the discourse. Additionally, actors within other Compliance
Five collectives who I interviewed for this study considered the ombudsman as partners:
In the IC agency, most of them have an ombuds [ombudsman] that an employee can go
to. They also have the EO office, the IG. (Kate)
The only organization, and it's not really an organization, usually it's two or three people,
no matter how big the agency, the only organization that didn't serve the agency [over
the employee] was the ombudsman. (Chris)
While they are aligned with separate statutory mandates, the social worlds function as
partners in the Compliance Five Social World. For example, OGC offices within the IC offer
opportunities for positions that one might expect to find within a law firm, such as staff attorneys,
paralegals, and law clerks. However, they also include auditors and EEO investigators, creating
intra-field boundary objects with IG and EEO offices, respectively (Legal Careers in the IC Flyer,
2020). Additionally, non-IC entities, such as the Government Accountability Office, partner with
the U.S. Congress to perform independent monitoring functions for IC entity against specified
goals; these activities also act as boundary objects with the U.S. Legislative Branch and broader
federal government (GAO, 2020; U.S. GAO—About GAO, 2021).
Complaints as Arenas and Boundaries. I will use complaints as a term to represent a
generalized set of processes in relation to formal grievances and informal requests for
assistance in toxic events. Complaints symbolize a threat to power structures within Compliance
Five because they inhibit efforts to protect IC entities. Thus, the “Complaint Process” forms a
negotiated arena where parties assert competing equities for redress. The complaints,
themselves, function as boundary objects between Compliance Five, Archetype, and Core as
basic social processes that address interacting, but conflicting, needs for each party in the
arena (Star & Griesemer, 1989).
Grievances are generally defined as formal claims by an employee that they have
experienced adverse impacts by an organization’s policy or action (SHRM, 2019), which are
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typically related to performance or the inability to perform designated duties. However,
employees may also grieve harassment and other adverse behaviors by coworkers as
representatives of those organizations (NoFEAR Act, 2002). Compliance Five also has equity in
informal complaints that do not result in formal grievances because they support the
micro-mission of that social world: avoid litigation and protect the entity. In this way, the
complaint process, to include both formal grievances and informal complaints, functions as a
contested arena when one or more parties brings (or threatens to bring) legal action. Within the
arena, the complainant seeks a satisfactory resolution. For Compliance Five, the goal is to
negotiate a solution outside of the legal process:
Being a partner to the degree that you can partner with different dimensions of the
Office of General Counsel . . . we can't be a partner with the litigating branch because
there would be a conflict of interest of when we're in partnership with those five. [Within]
the HR function, we can creatively design solutions to employee concern. (Vickie)
A general explanation of procedures confronting IC personnel when considering a
grievance is necessary to understand the situation constitutive of response to TWB. When
employees file grievances related to TWB or other counterproductive workplace behaviors, they
might approach any of the collectives within the Compliance Five depending on their own
understandings of the jurisdictions for those organizations. Each has their own set of
investigatory procedures based on statute and/or agency policy. Grievance standards,
guidelines, and procedures are posted on unclassified entity websites (e.g. DIA, 2020; CIA
Equal Employment Opportunity, 2020). However, a critical assumption built into this segmented
authority is that intelligence officers understand the various micro-missions sufficiently to know
how to seek assistance and from whom:
I finally went to the IG, and I went to EEO. When I still got no relief and when an attorney
is telling me like some craziness, and the commander’s basically, “Go fuck yourself.” I
mean, that was the worst of the worst where I just didn't know what to do. (Eve)
Grievance procedures vary according to statutory and regulatory authority for the
redress arm, as well as entity policy. By way of example, an intelligence officer filing an EEO
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complaint will be assigned a counselor, who determines whether the infractions fall within the
confines of EEO’s statutory mandates. If they do not fit within EEO’s purview, the EEO
counselor will refer that individual to the appropriate office. The individual might be offered
counseling, mediation, or another tailored solution falling under the umbrella of an alternative
dispute resolution (ADR; Employee Rights & Appeals, 2021). Employees must contact EEO
within 45 days of the last infraction. However, the EEO counselor must provide the employee
with permission to file a complaint, after which the employee must file within 15 days (Overview
of Federal Sector EEEO Complaint Process, 2021).
The alignment between statutory authority as a system of knowledge (and therefore,
power) creates a complex duality of clarity and opaque confinement. Legal clarity binds the
Compliance Five to the intent and letter of law, which the ODNI’s Director of EEO addressed in
her HPSCI testimony:
The majority of EEOD cases go against the complainant because the burden of proof is
on the complainant, and the standard is high. Early conflict resolution and intervention is
critical. Trials take long and just lets it fester. So, we focus on prevention. (Sampson,
2019)
This rigid compliance framework elevates the important or alternative processes:
Once in a while, the evidence was there. If anywhere along the process my staff thought
that there was such evidence, we would reach out to general counsel and to
management to attempt to resolve the situation. (Lisa)
Functions in practice may emerge into arenas of negotiation (Strauss, 1978, 1982) when
multiple organizations have segments of responsibility; these contested arenas may emerge
even when they share a goal to identify a solution at the lowest threshold. Complaints threaten
power structures within Compliance Five because they inhibit efforts to protect IC entities. The
complaint process, which includes lodging, informing, preparing, and negotiating a solution to a
complaint, forms a negotiated arena where parties assert competing equities for redress.
The actual complaints form boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) between the
Compliance Five and the Core when grievances impact the core mission. They junction with the
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Archetype as threats to culture-shaping or standard-setting discourses. In this role, complaints
challenge equities and roles within the arenas. As discussed, the primary actors governed by
the Core are analysts, operations personnel, and those with supervisory responsibility.
However, managers and senior leaders normally associated with the Archetype function within
Core discourses and repertoires when supporting the core mission. In this manner, actors
normally functioning within the Archetype can adopt Core equities in the arena. Actors within
Compliance Five may also be seniors who set standards and take ownership of culture shaping
in their collectives as part of the Archetype.
The complexities and obstacles built into systems of redress are significant and best
understood through the experiences reported by participants in the grounded theory portion of
the study. Ten of the 20 participants reported that they either contacted, or considered
contacting, one or more of the Compliance Five during their experiences with TWB. Which office
they contacted depended upon what they perceived to be the fundamental origins of the
behavior and where they thought they would likely receive the best result. Each reported a lack
of success. For example, as of this writing, Mike (2020) continues to work with EEO on charges
of discriminatory behavior. Eve (2020) approached HR, IG, and EEO at different junctures.
Loess (2020) contacted the IG at his entity in response to a senior leader and her allies, who he
believed were filing false security infractions to target him. The senior official in Loess’s case
was eventually reposted to another IC entity. However, he perceived that his interactions with
the IG were more resistant than collaborative:
I did go to the IG to raise the issue. I did not get a confidence-building reply by them
because they were asking me if I felt physically threatened, or was the person trying to
physically coerce me when the executive is probably half of my size and from another
gender. I am essentially an ex-football jock from many, many decades ago. It was
almost absurd. I didn't feel threatened by this individual physically, which to me seemed
like the IG’s office just didn't want to pursue it. (Loess)
Analysis of data collected for this study indicates that Loess’s perception has merit and reflected
within a primary Compliance Social World repertoire: “I Work for the Agency.”
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I Work for the Agency as Repertoire. As a discursive message, “I Work for the
Agency” represents a collective identity around a mission to shield the organization. The
following passages from three interviews with actors associated with Compliance Five frame the
message:
Interviewer: If I were to ask you, “Who does your office represent, the employees or the
agency?” what would you say?
The agency. (Kate)
I am not there to advocate on behalf of the EO complainant. (Lisa)
I was a director of HR. I was told on numerous occasions, "You serve the organization,
not the people." (Chris)
The agency takes on a persona as something, or a collective someone, to be cared for
and shielded. The threat is litigation:
They are in place to meet legal regulations, or legal requirements, and to reduce risk on
the part of the agency. I do have a responsibility to give employees guidance on how
they can be the most productive, and make the greatest contribution, but at the end of
the day, my job is to advise management in a way that they reduce risk to the agency.
(Kate)
The segmented statutory limitations within the discursive field are nonhuman actants
that place boundaries on who they can assistant and how. An aggrieved party who believes
TWB is related to some form of bias may perceive that their circumstances are unique.
However, that uniqueness may bar them from receiving a resolution unless those circumstances
fit a proscribed set of parameters and/or the aggrieved party can be assigned to a protected
class:
The first thing that happens is, if you're saying that you feel you have been discriminated
against, what makes you feel like you have been and then we take a look at the
categories that apply because not all of them do, you know? I am in a bit of an awkward
position because later down the road in the process, I have an adjudication type of role.
And so, this is an example where it might've been a little bit frustrating for someone to
come into my office and tell me all their woes, and then I say, "I'm going to now take you
to another office here. My staff officer is going to do an intake. Well, here, tell your story
again to my director of complaints," who is an absolute expert in the process, but, right
there, you've had a little bit of a “runaround.”. And, why is that? Because I have to stay
as impartial on the specific complaint as possible. (Lisa)
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In this way, interests between the employee and Compliance Five actors diverge along equities
and perceived roles.
In Chapter 3, I explored the way in which situational analysis uses Foucault’s theories on
discourse as a reflection of power in the situation as a root metaphor (Clarke, 2005). Within this
framework, structures along with what is said about them, what discourse says versus what
actors do, and the roles of nonhuman elements also construct a tableau of power through what
is known and who knows it. I could identify no documentary evidence to reflect this bifurcation of
agency versus employee interests. Rather, the agency and IC-wide-level discourse encourages
a veneer of obligatory kinship with employees toward identifying and addressing TWB and other
forms of counterproductive behavior:
If you witness harassment or discrimination, you must act by stopping it or reporting the
behavior immediately to your supervisor or EEO representative. In both situations, you
have my assurance that I and my senior leadership team will not tolerate any acts of
reprisal. We will hold all managers accountable for living by and promoting our zerotolerance policy (Zero Tolerance of Harassment and Discrimination at CIA, 2018).
We insist that all managers uphold their responsibility to prevent harassment and
discrimination and model a culture of civility and professionalism. This, then, extends it
to everyone (Coats et al., 2019).
To protect the organization from litigation, the aggrieved must either face fewer
incentives to sue or be given useful alternatives. They must also understand the system.
However, as the previous section outlined, half of the grounded theory participants sought
assistance from Compliance Five and received a different response than what they expected:
That's a real interesting distinction because everyone thinks that when they go to EO.
Yes, our overall arching purpose in life is to try to prevent discrimination, through
fostering diversity and inclusion methods, and also to conduct the EO complaints
process when discrimination has allegedly occurred. But it is not to be an advocate in a
complainant’s particular situation. It's not an advocacy role, per se. And so, that's
something that's hard for employees to understand and leaves them believing that we
don’t care about them. (Lisa)
This incongruence between what personnel expect and what Compliance Five can provide
creates another situational element around trust. Trust may be a nonhuman actant as an
atmospheric, but one that takes on an expressly human form. This impact to trust may be
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worsened by the operational effort required to maneuver around regulatory barriers and steps
built into social World structures:
When someone comes to me and asks for advice on whether or not they should go
formal with something, whether formal be a grievance, an appeal, an EO complaint, an
IG complaint, what I always lay out for people is, first thing I ask is if they have the
energy for the process. (Kate)
The complexity of structures, processes, and rules functioning as a counterweight
against a positive resolution for the aggrieved are carried along by something else skirting under
the discourse: reputational branding from deciding to file:
Someone has filed a complaint, so they've caused management problems, and now
they're labeled as one of those EO people, right? We don't respect the process enough.
We don't respect the process enough to give it validity and value, and so, we criticize
anyone who goes through it. (Lisa)
This fear of being “branded” factored into the decisions by some grounded theory participants
not to file a formal complaint when subjected by TWB:
I should have walked over to the EEO office and filed. I likely would have been
successful. But it creates a culture of fear, and everybody feels it just a little bit. I knew
that if I filed, everybody in my leadership chain, including the person, would know that I
did it. I believe the person would have gotten, at a minimum, probably some form of
disciplinary action for the behavior. But, whether I could have a career with any potential
I feel would be really different, because one of the things, at least in our agency, it's
really small and bad news travels faster than good news does. So, I think my career
would have been over with advancement opportunities. Even if I still had a job, I wouldn't
have been able to do anything. (Gwen)
A previous section outlined laws and regulations governing responsibilities for
monitoring, tracking, and reporting progress against anti-harassment and discrimination goals.
Thus, structures within Compliance Five require a collaboration with those who observe, have
knowledge of, or have been targeted by covered events. Simply, individuals must be willing to
comply with management directives to report. However, I argue that the rigid boundaries
between shielding the agency and protecting the employee inhibit the ability of Compliance Five
structures to function effectively. The ODNI’s Director of EEO, Rita Sampson (2019)
acknowledged the point of irony in her testimony to the HPSCI: “Underreporting is a challenge.
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We address them when we know. Sometimes, it's not popular. Workforce confidence rides on
it”.
Therefore, while complaints form boundary objects, that junction may not be positively
functional unless supported by efforts to eliminate the barrier in favor of the potential litigant:
If we can shape the organizational culture, during period of time, where we're trying to
resolve the complaint and advise the person that their rights and remedies, if we can
take this initial contact and really use that to help people understand the various optics of
both the person who's aggrieved and the person that is causing the perceived conflict,
then I think that's where the real value outside of the formal filing the complaint with the
state, the questionnaires and whatnot. (Vickie)
Vickie is rhetorically assigning herself an advocacy role in alignment with the covenant
relationship that stewardship theorists argue is necessary to build trust (Caldwell et al., 2008;
Caldwell & Karri, 2005). By reaching into the arena in which cultures are shaped, she is also
adopting the culture shaping repertoire of Archetype. This interaction between Compliance Five
and Archetype join at the focus on managerial training (Joint Strategy to Advance Equal
Employment Opportunity, Diversity, and Inclusion within the United States Intelligence
Community 2020–2023, 2020) and empowerment (Van Sloun, 2020) as the most effective way
to impact the workforce and create boundaries with the Core.
Organizational change theorists Stacey (2001) and D. P. Shaw (2002) argued that
driving change is partially reactive to external forces in a constant state of flux. D. P. Shaw
(2002) furthered that large, complex environments (such as the IC) remove control from socalled change agents and relegate them to participants rather than drivers. This complexity
relegates culture change in the IC as unpredictable in outcome and timing, leaving some actors
taking a different approach to stewardship in ways that allow them to cross between social
worlds, discourses, and repertoires. This concept emerged in a site of dissent discussed in the
next section.
Site of Dissent—Leave, Don’t File. In their model of emergent leadership, Fairhurst
and Zoller (2010) argued that dissent is a form of leadership through resistance. They based
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this model on a case analysis by Graham (1995) who studied control transitions from managers
to teams in an Indiana Subaru-Isuzu plant. When workers noticed contradictions between vision
and practice (Argyris & Schon, 1974), as well as cultural incongruities between what
management wanted from them and what they were accustomed to, they began dissenting
overtly but also taking up small acts of resistance. The workers essentially acted out Foucault's
(1990) micro-politics as forms of power in practice.
Dissent in this framework extends beyond Strauss’s (1978) definition of “authenticity” as
related to how one fit within a social world. Dissent is outright rebellion against the discursive
norm. To reflect this action, I have termed a site of dissent as a framework in which primary
actors actively rebel against the dominant discourse constructed by their social world.
Compliance Five included a single site of dissent referred to here as “Leave, Don’t File” in which
actors advocated that complainants avoid playing in the complaints process arena.
So, if I were to be giving a friend or one of my children advice, it would be to not file, but
leave. (Kate)
I don't steer them anywhere even if I knew the next place to go was either the
ombudsman, HR, general counsel, or the inspector general. I know for a fact that four
out of those five offices don't work for you. They work for the agency. That's factual.
(Chris)
Obligation as discourse includes processes, structures, and rules designed to ensure
that, like a Las Vega casino, the “house wins.” In this form, dissent functions beyond emotional
scaffolding as a mechanism to leverage empathetic support for a better solution (Fairhurst &
Zoller, 2010). Rather, “Leave, Don’t File” extends that strategic empathy into a form of emotional
subterfuge to shield IC personnel from an arena in which they face inherent disadvantages:
This is just my own cynicism; it might have so many steps and processes to discourage
people from using it. (Kate)
In the words of one grounded theory participant:
We have this burden of trying to describe or articulate a whole sort of institutionalized
way of life that's not geared towards us. I just kind of feels like the whole agency . . . for
us, like we're trying to buy into a construct that wasn't even meant for us is what I'm
trying to say. If that makes sense? (Kit)
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Unlike ADR, which is designed to find a solution that satisfies the complainant outside of
litigation that harms the entity, “Leave, Don’t File” is turning the shield around to protect the
complainant from the legal and regulatory frameworks designed to protect the institution.
Chapter 4 explored the passive nature of TWB in the IC, which consists of subtle and
covert behaviors that emerge longitudinally. In fact, when asked for her definition of TWB, one
senior actor within Compliance Five defined a solely passive dynamic:
I think it is conduct or nonverbal cues, because I think there's a larger dimension of not
just what is done or said, but how people [engage in] physical positioning. Or two, a
signal to a person that they should not feel safe in that space, that they have to be on
guard, that they are certainly not viewed with a highest esteem, and that there will be
consequences based on the offender's behavior or thoughts or vantage point in relation
to that other person. (Vickie)
However, Vickie was describing a dynamic in which, if she were a victim, the institutional
frameworks within her own social would likely be unable to provide her with a remedy because
she would be relegated to relying on a system of evidence designed not to acknowledge what it
could not prove:
It's all about compiling the evidence that supports your allegation. (Kate)
They would struggle. It was almost like they saw it as a foregone conclusion, but they
didn't give us a lot of evidence. (Chris)
“Leave, Don’t File” exists as a pocket of resistance within the “grievance” arena in which
dissent imposes conditions on the institution’s imperative control (Weber, 1968). Thus, dissent
emerges into discursive positioning as a framework for micro-leadership in which a social
world’s actors reject this imperative institutional control to shield the institution in favor of a
holding onto a values framework centering on what it means to be human. A choice designed to
shield others is also reflective of the Holding Self processes identified in Chapter 4 as being
critical to responding to TWB effectively.
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Summary
This chapter has attempted to understand the situation constitutive of how and why
intelligence officers respond to TWB in different ways. I have restricted the analysis to those
discourses, discursive repertoires, arenas for action, processes, and actors central to my
research question. Therefore, many situational elements that would be of great interest to
understand in the IC were not reflected here because they did not emerge in the data as
instrumental to the phenomenon.
While primary actors construct the discourse in a social world, the boundaries are
primarily discursive rather than structural—meaning, membership is defined by speaking the
“language” of the discourse rather than organizational wiring diagrams. Three primary social
worlds align with three power frameworks related to the question. The Core reflects relationally
ambiguous micro-politics surrounding the core mission and an outward focus on organizational
frameworks for action. The Archetype shapes the culture and standards to bound the core
mission into an ideal for what it means to be a U.S. intelligence officer. The ideal may or may
not reflect micro-cultures within the Core. The Compliance Five establishes the legal and
regulatory guardrails that enable institutional order within a core value that managers are the
key. However, these enabling structures available within Compliance Five also inhibit
meaningful action to confront TWB because, in the IC, the behavior typically falls into
interpretive gaps not covered by these structures.
Although situational analysis attempts to decenter personal meaning in favor of
understanding broader institutional, symbolic, and processual elements, the research inevitably
flows back into that personal space because the research question relates to a human dynamic
of abusive power. For example, complaints related to toxic events form the boundary between
the three social worlds; however, complaints are human pleas for help in structural form. The
complaint process stages an arena in which a chorus of discursive repertoires emerge;
however, these repertoires reflect human prerogatives, even if collectively. Consequently, this

272
situational analysis segment reflects the collective action as the sum total of competing levels of
personal meaning in relation to how and why intelligence officers respond to TWB in different
ways.
The next chapter concludes with a discussion of the study’s findings. This analysis
includes a section that offers added coherence to the discursive disconnects and contradictions
between the three social worlds that emerged in this chapter. The chapter centers the
discussion on a theoretical model of response to TWB among intelligence officers in the IC. The
model serves as a framework for future empirical research. Following the explanation of the
model, I present propositions to guide future areas of exploration. I conclude with a brief
discussion on implications for leading responses to TWB in the IC.

273
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study examined how intelligence officers respond to toxic workplace behavior
(TWB) in different ways, the sociopsychological reasons for those responses, and how
responses operationalize into the mission. Segment 1 of the study used qualitative data from 20
interviews with current and former intelligence officers, and grounded theory methodology to
explore experiences with TWB and their impacts. The primary focus was the longitudinal
trajectory of conditions and responses. Segment 2 used extant data and supplemental
interviews with social world actors to map the intelligence situation relevant to response. The
outcome was a theoretical model of operationalized response that will serve as an empirical
foundation for future research.
The model to be discussed in this chapter is complex. The 18 entities within the
Intelligence Community (IC) are a web of micro- and meso-cultures, which contribute to a
macro-environment that would be challenging enough to understand if the working environment
were relatively static. However, the IC is in a constant state of flux as structures, goals, and
requirements shift along with world events. This state of flux is by design and by default.
However, this shifting environment is grounded by the humanity of those who work there.
Although the analysts and operations personnel in this study functioned under unique work
circumstances and had specialized skills, the data showed that they were vulnerable to the
same reactions to toxic power identified in studies of TWB in other critical mission
environments. As intelligence officers, they may have been extraordinary. As people, they were
ordinarily human.
This chapter reviews the theoretical model of response within a graduated structure. The
first section reviews the elements of the model constructed from the grounded theory segment. I
briefly review the six primary dimensions and two inter-dimensions, along with their conditions
and consequences. In the section to follow, I examine the situational elements relevant to the
research question and explore how the personal meaning and situation interact. Then, I discuss
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five propositions based on the study’s findings. Because the findings have significant impacts to
intelligence practice but also have complex relationships, I decided to include future research
possibilities within each proposition section rather than in a separate section, as is common. A
section on implications for leading change follows before concluding with a brief discussion on
areas for limitations and future research.
The Pathway Model of Holding Self
Toxic behavior is a systemic phenomenon that manifests itself in human behavior
centering on counterproductive expressions of power (Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Padilla et al.,
2007). This study is the first identified effort to understand how intelligence officers respond to
TWB. The study found that TWB in the intelligence context challenged self-concepts so that
responses became reflexive efforts to hold “self.” Holding Self became individualized within
personalities, and the significance of and longitudinal ambiguities around relationships, status,
and organizational dynamics. Responses were inconsistent and emergent within eight
dimensions. Further, Holding Self became a series of strategies and tactics to maneuver in the
pathways between divergent social world

Figure 6.1

discursive repertoires. Subsequent sections

Primary Psychological Dimensions of Holding
Self

will describe and explain the Pathway Model
of Holding Self.
Primary Psychological Dimensions
As illustrated by Figure 6.1, three
primary psychological dimensions were
platforms for the cognitive work around
preserving self-concepts. “Who I Am”
represented naming and claiming the “self”
(S. D. Rose, 2002) as activated within what they believed they were, how they believed others
saw them, and personal values as guardrails on response. “Who and What I Know” was a
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mechanism to assess the power of mentors and relational networks as support systems for how
to respond. “What I Can” reflected their perceptions of agency—the power they believed that
they had to affect their own environments.
The three primary psychological dimensions functioned as frameworks for imagining
possibilities. Intelligence officers relayed stories of imagining how responses might impact
self-concepts. Imagined risks spiraled into games of “what if . . .” and whether the job was
“worth it.” The imagining processes included reflecting on how early mentors helped build selfconcepts and provided valuable lessons they would later draw upon during toxic events.
Broader networks provided a place to transition as they imagined leaving the toxic environment.
Agentic power and “self” were inextricably linked in that their value in the environment was at
least partially tied to what they could do for themselves—and to—others.
The identification processes within the psychological dimensions functioned as
grounding assessments for gains, losses, and risk. Additionally, responses evolved as toxic
events continued and as pasts folded into Holding Self processes under subsequent toxic
experiences. The cognitive work of these dimensions was no guarantee of a preferred outcome.
When outcomes emerged from ineffective responses, self-concepts, support structures, and
personal values as critical elements misaligned.
Primary Action Dimensions
In Figure 6.2, the three grey circles represent the three primary psychological
dimensions. The three intersecting rings represent the primary action dimensions. The arrows
represent continual movement as these dimensions became seed beds for choices for
intelligence officers to consider a range of responses to express hold “self” within the toxic
environment. In this way, these dimensions functioned as continual loops in which they acted,
reacted, and adjusted in interaction with the psychological dimensions. Two inter-dimensions as
junctions between the primary dimensions functioned as interchanges for moving into more
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favorable response trajectories or receding into less favorable ones. The consequences to the
mission for each dimension are represented inside of each ring.
“Seeking subliminal” sustained the mission by enabling the intelligence officer to adapt
and maneuver so that they could simultaneously hold onto self-concepts and fully support
mission requirements. The

Figure 6.2

dimension emerged as an

Primary Psychological and Action Dimensions of Holding
Self

ideal state of opposites
because an awareness of
and commitment to
personal values coexisted
with a cunning use of
acumen and agency.
Intelligence officers in this
dimension did not project
values onto the external environment. When the organizational values misaligned with theirs,
participants made choices that enabled them to hold onto self-concepts. Careers, coworkers,
and organizations were tangential and expendable.
“Seeking Subliminal” emerged differently among participants. For example, Ben elevated
values for what he would tolerate in the workplace but maneuvered to ensure those choices into
his work. Aedan elevated ongoing efforts to redirect himself and others but within a process
designed around one value: the mission. The result was a scaffold for response in which
participants shielded self-concepts either by maneuvering around the behavior or leveraging it
to the participant’s advantage. Within these choices, Holding Self sought the subliminal in the
form of what worked rather than within a preexisting set of expectations for others in the
environment. This divestiture translated into outcomes that sustained the mission.
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“Folding in” diminished the mission because the withdrawal processes intelligence
officers engaged in to hold onto self-concepts reduced their support to the mission, albeit in
sporadic measure. Separation defined the dimension—from teammates, supervisors,
colleagues, and redress—as they sought to shield themselves from the toxic environment.
Gwen (2020) described the intelligence “space” as a web of small towns, where everyone
knows everyone and everything about everyone. Fear over lost reputations and careers
represented heavily in the dimension. Research indicates that emotional distress elevates focus
on short-term gratification and dampens forethought (Tice et al., 2001). Therefore, this
dimension revolved around minimizing interactions with the toxic personality and withdrawal
from collaboration. They also refrained from engaging help because wider networks risked
betrayal or embarrassment. Seeking institutional help through redress procedures risked being
“labeled as one of those EO [equal employment opportunity] people” (Lisa). If they sought help
from redress offices within the Compliance Five social world, they interpreted the rigid structures
and evidentiary procedures as another toxic layer.
Intelligence officers in the “Folding In” dimension were physically present but not fully
engaged in the intelligence dialogue. As Chapter 5 discussed, the “situational peer” repertoire
problematized identifying the focal point for influence due to a relationally ambiguous operating
framework. As team members, intelligence officers are embedded in an intact social group
within a larger social system (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). Thus, experiences with the toxic
environment surrounding one set of team members penetrated relational boundaries in the fluid
collaborative space so that they also folded in on distal networks and relationships.
Finally, “Reinforcing Style” disengaged the mission because efforts to impose the “self”
on an increasingly unreceptive toxic environment overwhelmed time, attention, and energy
available to support the mission. As with the “Seeking Subliminal” dimension, values played a
significant role. However, participants in “Seeking Subliminal” showed heightened levels of
adaptability and used values as mechanisms to ground those choices within a set of limits on
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their own behavior. Intelligence officers in “Reinforcing Style” believed “fixing” the toxic
environment was their responsibility. Maneuverability was tantamount to capitulation and an
acceptance of organizational norms they perceived as antithetical to what was right. Imposing
one’s will on an unreceptive environment depletes energy and emotional resources (Baumeister
et al., 1998; Baumeister et al., 2000), which distracts from performance by redirecting attention
toward individuals and away from outcomes (Simons & Peterson, 2000). Therefore, reinforcing
one’s style on the toxic environment confined participants to one, unproductive course that, for
many, placed them on a path to declines in physical and psychological health.
Rather than an object, Foucault (1972, 1977, 2002) theorized power as a set of tacit
processes that confine both ruler and subjects, alike, in a form of “gaze” that impacted them
even when the source of power was not visible. His interest was not in how individuals amassed
power; he was interested in how they became subjugated to it. He rejected the idea that
discourse conveyed meaning. However, in a lean toward the constructivist underpinnings of this
dissertation, he argued that discourse conveyed systems of power that the ruler and subjects
interpreted as meaningful.
I argue that Foucault’s theory was relevant to responses surrounding TWB, albeit with
an important nuance. If one extends his argument about interpretation and meaning to how
intelligence officers respond to TWB, then the source of the “gaze” emerged as a question
within the dimensions. Within “Folding In,” the micro-power of the toxic personality, the
institutional power of redress procedures, alienation from external networks, and relational
complexities subjugated intelligence officers by minimizing them into a professional stasis. By
comparison, the inherent power that self-concepts in “Reinforcing Style” afforded to intelligence
officers as they confronted TWB also became a form of subjugation when the “self” could not be
paired with organizational acumen and agency. Alternatively, intelligence officers within
“Seeking Subliminal” only subjugated themselves to the gaze of self-concepts, personal values,
acumen, and agency. This confluence made playthings out of organizational impediments and
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toxic personalities when they challenged Holding Self processes. In this way, “Seeking
Subliminal” was subjugation to trajectory of response patterns but to an internal eye.
The Situation
The intelligence officers in this study were primarily within a singular social world
(Strauss, 1978) bound together by a shared culture and discourse. Social worlds connect,
collide, and diverge, particularly in a fluctuating macro-environment. In this way, social worlds
become sites of action but also control (Shibutani, 1986, 1987). Arenas of negotiation and
tension join social worlds and constitute the situation (Clarke, 2005). As discussed, this analysis
of the situation is narrowly confined to the research question rather than a generalized view of
the IC social environment.
This approach intensified the focus onto three primary social worlds impacting Holding
Self processes and represented in Figure 6.3. In the figure, the three white circles represent the
relevant social worlds. The intersecting rings depicting dimensions of response placed between
the social worlds represent the situation that intelligence offers must navigate as they choose
how to respond. The blue arrows represent the gaps between contradictory discursive
repertoires (discussed below) that complicate these choices. Thus, the ability of intelligence
officers to maneuver between the three worlds and competing repertoires while sustaining
self-concepts influenced how they responded to TWB.
The Core. The Core is a social space for the analysts and operations personnel central
to this study. The Core is iconic through pop culture and former intelligence officers peddling
their experiences. Social worlds construct discursive repertoires to convey messages (King,
2007). Repertoires framed heroism within relational ambiguities, and preoccupations over
institutions and “leadership” as the focal points for the origins and solutions behind TWB. In the

280
Core, responding to TWB became a simultaneous commitment to Holding Self and flexibility in
both function and goals.
Figure 6.3
Pathway Model of Holding Self Amid TWB

The Archetype. The Archetype was a social space for senior leaders and other actors
who promoted the ideal intelligence officer. While the Core was more integral to the core
mission, the Archetype seeded the field by shaping the cultural ideal. While the Core
communicated internally, the Archetype delivered repertoires internally and externally. These
repertoires were invitations to join the Archetype model and a commitment that one would be
valued upon arrival. Holding Self processes to respond to TWB threatened one’s authenticity
within the Archetype ideal (Strauss, 1978) and one’s right to function (Berger & Luckmann,
1966) at the “tip of the spear.”
Standard-shaping formed a separate, but complementary, discursive field. This
discourse structured norms aligned with the ideal, established boundaries, and assigned
managers as the focal point for action to support the Archetype model. Thus, while the
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Archetype model shaped the image of the intelligence officer; standards set the boundaries on
how far one could stray from that ideal. They also established a promise of effective redress to
hold accountable those who strayed from model.
Compliance Five. The Compliance Five constituted the most compact social world
because its five micro-worlds and discursive field around legal and regulatory obligation were
distinct. Structures and pathways for redress represented forms of power. Even messaging
occurred within a singular repertoire: “I Work for the Agency.” Actors external to the Compliance
Five became implicated as collaborators through standard-setting (Archetype) or problems to
solve (Core).
“I Work for the Agency” became a rhetorical drumbeat during data collection. However,
legitimacy in this social world required established training, education, and certification so that
belonging there was more than a repertoire. Legitimization emerged within the formal
complaints-filing process as an arena and complaints, themselves, as boundary objects.
Additionally, the discourse was constructed around a set of provable behaviors and defined
remedies only partially relevant to the taxonomy of behaviors intelligence officers described.
Therefore, Holding Self amid TWB when interacting with this social world required that
intelligence officers bound expectations around possibilities rather than need.
Divergence and Contradiction. I chose King's (2007) discursive repertoires as a
framework to analyze the IC situation relevant to responses to TWB because I began to detect
divergent and contradictory messages between the social worlds. The social worlds implicated
each other through cross-world references that developed organically within each but that
shared meaning (Maag Merki et al., 2020). As symbols for value through language (Milliken &
Schreiber, 2012), these references betrayed levels of subjugation to each other to achieve goals
but in ways that also revealed reportorial contradictions that complicated those linkages.
Effective response required that intelligence officers maneuver in the pathways between these
contradictions.
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Referring again to Figure 6.3, within the Core, “Situational Peer” made rank ambiguous
among intelligence officers and an element of relational significance that defined whether
behavior was toxic. This repertoire diverged from the Archetype’s “Managers Set the Tone” and
its hierarchical focal point. Simply, intelligence officers did not perceive that managers set the
tone when more relationally significant toxic personalities with referential status stood between
the target and the manager, or when ambiguous peer/status relationships upended the clarity of
hierarchy.
Similarly, the Core’s repertoire of “Tip of the Spear” in which the mission subordinated
the institution, diverged from the Compliance Five’s single repertoire of “I Work for the Agency,”
in which the institution was central. Zeke’s (2020) warning of “epic failure” if TWB was not
addressed placed the behavior directly in the mission path. However, redress procedures
framed around obligations to protect the agency and not the intelligence officer carrying the
spear created a contradiction between the two repertoires. By extension, the Archetype’s “A
Place for You” and “You are the Model” repertoires were affirming and people-centric
messages, but that also diverged from the institutional focal point of “I Work for the Agency.”
Responses to and solutions for TWB also diverged. The Archetype discourse around
shaping cultures and setting standards were directed at fixing other social worlds. In this way,
the middle manager-focus for the Archetype seemed disconnected from the Core’s implication
of senior leaders and institutions as central to the dilemma. Thus, the Core represented
managers as mere conduits for senior leader values frameworks. To “fix” the managers, the IC
first need to remodel senior leadership:
You start asking a lot of leadership questions [in climate surveys], [which say] they don't
like who they work for. That's not actually true. They don't like the levels above that.
(Gwen)
Summary
Divergent and contradictory messaging frameworks raised significant implications for
effective responses to TWB. The constellation of psychological and action dimensions, along
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with the two inter-dimensions facilitating movement between them function within these
contradictions. Intelligence officers had to maneuver along pathways between the social worlds
as they deciphered a web of compliance procedures not designed for them, while finding a way
to fit an archetypical model of legitimacy that did not denigrate self-concepts. Embankments of
unproductive choices formed either side of each pathway. Therefore, the effectiveness of
response depended upon how nimbly they maneuvered in the breach.
Theoretical Propositions
This section will discuss five propositions to guide future research, which center on
findings that informed the model for how intelligence officers respond to TWB and the
sociopsychological underpinnings the variations in those responses. The model reflects
delineations between responses that sustain, diminish, and disengage support for the mission.
The study showed that responding effectively to TWB relied upon understanding, leveraging,
and remaining on pathways that navigate three social worlds. Thus, the propositions are
foundations to design generalizable solutions. Because each proposition raises questions
related to intelligence as a practice, I have chosen to integrate possibilities for future research
into the discussion for each proposition rather than consolidate them into a separate section:
Proposition 1: Passive forms of TWB are more prevalent in the IC than
overt bullying and abusive behaviors, which challenges the effectiveness
of legal and regulatory mechanisms designed to address more transparent,
less interpretive behaviors.
In his definition of workplace aggression, Beugre (1998) distinguished between overt
aggression and more passive forms as distinctions in form but not in impact. This study
validated those comparisons, most vividly in the core conditions of Holding Self in which
intelligence officers described the effects of TWB through metaphors of physical assault. More
interpretive forms of TWB are simply more easily dismissed and harder to address (Holloway &
Kusy, 2010).
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The theoretical model in this study provides an opportunity to understand the nature of
toxic experiences in the IC. Intelligence officers in the study validated research on the
destructiveness of passive forms of TWB to targets, witnesses, and learners, as well as the
presence of systemic actors and enablers that facilitate the behavior over time. As identified in
prior research, passive TWB was related to withdrawal, misdirected attention, and loss of valued
personnel (Cortina et al., 2001; Kusy & Holloway, 2009; Padilla et al., 2007; Pearson & Porath,
2005; R. A. Taylor & Taylor, 2017, 2018). However, this study cultivated new ground in rejecting
the generalizability of many of the standard behavioral taxonomies developed within this
research and explored in Chapter 2. While the study validates the existence of toxic behaviors,
it problematizes identifying them in the abstract and outside of the relational significance of the
parties involved. Additionally, the study validated the role of power in TWB but problematized
whether power can be understood by anyone outside of the relative importance that individuals
placed on the relationship.
While Beugre (1998) and these participants made no distinction between the impact of
both forms of TWB, the formal mechanisms designed to address counterproductive behavior do
distinguish them. Institutional controls are designed for transparent, provable allegations and to
address them in such a way that the risk to the agency is minimized, if not eliminated. Conflict
management and mediation as stopgaps were also inadequate when the source of the behavior
was sociodemographic marginalization, and thus, existential for the target. Finally, the study
revealed a fundamental disconnect between what participants expected from these regulatory
frameworks and what they were bound to provide.
I went to EEO, and then when I still got no relief, and when an attorney is telling me
some craziness. I mean, I just didn't know what to do. (Eve)
In his earlier works, Strauss (1969) separated the external rule-driven interactions
between institutions and the claiming and reclaiming interactions between less formal personal
interactions. These findings suggest an institutional-individual third frame in which the person
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became subsumed by procedures designed to address TWB and other counterproductive
behaviors through regulatory frameworks or litigation around provable action. Passive behaviors
could only be addressed through prevention or alternative means that were designed for more
mundane operational conflicts. Intelligence officers were expected to use procedures, rules, and
structures not designed for them, their problems, or to provide solutions that were
anti-institutional.
Future Research for Proposition 1
The conditions catalyzing TWB examined in Chapter 4 serve as a foundation to design a
large-scale study to understand the nature of TWB in each entity and the IC, overall. What
behaviors are more prevalent? What are their impacts? Are segments of the IC more prone to
TWB than others? Are certain response patterns more commonly associated with specific
behaviors? Alternatively, are the complex individual and situational dynamics identified in this
study replicated on a wider scale?
Research might indicate that TWB was not a significant challenge for the IC. If so, how
might those findings inform other critical mission environments attempting to address the
phenomenon? Alternatively, are segments of the IC less prone to toxic dynamics than others
and why? For segments of the IC that have successfully addressed toxic behaviors, what
mechanisms did they use?
Balancing competing interests is inherent in leadership. However, individual dissent that
emerges into collective action can change norms (Fairhurst & Zoller, 2010). Like the intelligence
officers who exercised their own sets of values, acumen, and agency to maneuver around TWB,
actors within Compliance Five exercised similar decision frameworks to encourage intelligence
officers to avoid redress. These sites of dissent formed loci of tempered radicalism (Meyerson,
2001) to protect the employee even if the institution also benefited from the choice not to file.
These revelations occurred so often during data collection that they began to resemble informal
structures for action. What implications does this “everyday” tempered radicalism raise about
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the overall health and effectiveness of the IC’s ability to address TWB and other forms of
counterproductive behavior? What actions might IC entities take to formalize dissenting actions
into more proactive structures to address passive TWB? Simply, what possibilities for crafting
meaningful solutions to TWB as a collective might be overlooked because actors within the
Compliance Five feel compelled to maneuver around the norms of their own social world?
Proposition 2: Intelligence officers whose self-concepts are highly
integrated and do not need significant external validation for those
self-concepts to remain stable will respond more effectively to TWB in
support of the mission.
As of this writing, this study is the first to link dimensions for response to TWB as
processes for Holding Self in support of the mission. When responding to TWB, they defined
self-concepts by framing who they were, who they perceived the toxic personality and others in
the environment thought they were, and what they wanted others to see. Then, they constructed
longitudinal response patterns to hold onto those self-concepts. Holding Self processes among
intelligence officers aligned with three theoretical constructs:
Reflexive Self
A significant body of literature links satisfaction of the “self” to goal attainment.
Responding to TWB for intelligence officers began by ascribing meaning to those events in
interaction with who they believed they were. This social process created self-concepts that
were socially constructed (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934)—that is, compilations of internal and
external re-framings of “self.” In expanding Blumer’s symbolic interaction theory to practice,
Snow (2001) argued that self-concepts could not be understood outside of the “web of
relationships” (p. 369). Thus, in the relationally significant and ambiguous IC, self-concepts were
not only created within this web. The web conveyed a reason for that self-concept to exist.
The selective way in which intelligence officers decided which relationships were useful
in sustaining self-concepts challenged Holding Self processes. Simply, reflected appraisals
partially form our self-concepts; however, some reflected appraisals are more useful than others
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because the appraisal process either supports some aspect of who we want to be or some
aspect of the “self” we fear we are (Cooley, 1902). An appraisal that fits neither framework will
be rejected. Further, the former supports self-concepts in healthy ways, while the later inhibits
healthy self-images. Additionally, social network theory links this appraisal process to cognitive
work related to positions taken related to an ideal “self” (N. E. Friedkin, 2011; Noah E. Friedkin
& Johnsen, 2011). Therefore, intelligence officer self-concepts that remained stable and nonreliant on external validation in toxic events responded in ways healthier for themselves and the
mission.
Dana and Maria were unaffected by toxic peers because relationships with prized
mentors helped develop self-concepts as intelligence officers, lessons they relied upon
throughout their careers. However, when Dana’s toxic supervisor marginalized her from
participating in her perceived area of expertise, this rejection of her self-concept as the expert in
field triggered efforts to hold onto that self-concept. Others witnessing her treatment intensified
the impact and increased her desire to reassert her “self.” Similarly, Maria’s self-concept as an
African American woman of power and accomplishment became challenged through the
reflections of young, female, African American mentees as they struggled against similar toxic
behaviors to those that Maria had once devalued. Consequently, intelligence officers calibrated
the relational significance of the toxic personality, but also, witnesses.
Holding onto self-concepts is a relatively abstract process of claiming the “self.”
However, the process also plays an ordering function so that we know how we intersect with the
others, what they can expect from us, and what we can expect from ourselves. This process
also intersected with a related aspect of the “self”: what they wanted.
Self Determination Theory
During the grounded theory interviews, intelligence officers explored the goals they had
in their toxic experiences, which became indistinguishable from their goals in participating in this
study. Loess, an analyst, wanted to produce—a lot—and be unencumbered by toxic supervisors
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and coworkers; he also wanted me to know his successes in maneuvering around the behavior.
Aedan, who functioned within physically dangerous environments, wanted to fulfill the mission
with no loss of life; he also wanted me to know that he had successfully managed toxic
dynamics. Natalie wanted to live her lifelong dream of serving in the intelligence community; she
also wanted me to know how TWB destroyed that dream. Eve and Margaret, still recovering
from their experiences, wanted respect in their workplaces and from me. Mike wanted the
opportunity to grow his career equally to his Caucasian counterparts and for me to know that
this effort was ongoing. By claiming these goals, they also revealed aspects of the “self.”
Self-determination theory differentiates between goal attainment and the “self” (Deci &
Ryan, 1985, 2000). Within this theory, intelligence officers activated their innate psychological
needs to shape motivation around expected rewards. Desired rewards might have been
external (e.g., financial), introjected (e.g., self-esteem), identified (e.g., response patterns
chosen for their intrinsic nature), or integrated (e.g., responses consistent with how one
behaves as a father or friend in a holistic self-concept). Responses were framed as authentic
reflections of the “self” (Kernis, 2003) and autonomous (freely chosen; Ryan & Deci, 2006).
Empirical research has linked intrinsic and integrated goals, authentic responses, and
stable self-concepts (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Alternatively, adopting responses under
duress—such as the withdrawal processes in “Folding In” or the unproductive forcing processes
in “Reinforcing Style”—either diminished the “self” or reframed it as incongruent with the
workplace (Ryan & Deci, 2006). This study demonstrated that those who departed the
organization (or, the IC) to escape the dynamic also described “self-concepts” more resistant to
the destructive impacts from TWB.
Values as “Believed Selves”
Social identity theory argues that human beings hold multiple identities that emerge
contextually as a set of values. Within groups, multiple identities converge tacitly as a set of
values related to what aligns and what does not (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Values may be more
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salient in some contexts than others and force group members to choose among them.
Therefore, within-group values can play a synergistic role or be a source of conflict (Ellemers et
al., 2002; Ellemers & Rink, 2005). Findings in Chapter 4 demonstrated the role that values
played in forming “believed selves.” Simply, when intelligence officers did not require others in
the environment to share or acknowledge their personal values, those “believed selves” formed
critical aspects of stable self-concepts that became less vulnerable to challenges from toxic
environments. However, Chapter 5 showed that the Archetype’s institutional-level
culture-shaping may not manifest into meaningful solutions when its repertoires diverge from
those in other social worlds and in practice.
Future Research for Proposition 2
While the IC has an interest in establishing norms and standards to prevent TWB, it also
has an incentive to ensure that intelligence officers adopt productive responses to the behavior
when it emerges and before the dynamic impacts the institution. Chapter 4 demonstrated that
the most effective responses emerged from a complex mix of cunning and personal values.
Values bounded both the participant’s own behavior and what they were tolerate from others.
One question the IC might consider is the overall cost in time and effort in managing
TWB and responses to it among those whose values do not align with the Archetype cultural
ideal. Simply, should IC resources be targeted at attempting to reshape values frameworks
among its personnel or invest in identifying possible recruits already in alignment? Research
demonstrates that hiring for values rather than trying to realign values post-recruitment is more
efficient to support missions (Gully et al., 2013; Patterson et al., 2016). While the IC’s efforts to
embed an ideal culture from the institutional frame is laudable, something can be said for
solidifying those values at the practice level in early recruitment practices to drive them upward.
How might the IC evaluate its recruitment practices to emphasize hiring for values “fit”
pre-recruitment to minimize the need for cultural realignment after misaligned values have
created a toxic environment? Intelligence officers commonly referenced late-career senior
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analysts and team leads as contravening IC cultural change goals. What are the impacts of socalled “lifetime hire” cultures, practice-level norms, and tacit structures on the IC’s cultureshaping efforts if valued personnel do not support those efforts?
Crafting these changes at the macro-level requires an acknowledgment that some
entities may benefit from tailored approaches incompatible with the challenges that other IC
institutions are experiencing. Values misalignments at the micro-political level emerged in their
most extreme form in regional entities away from the IC center. In these locations, personnel
commonly were constructed as being “homegrown” in those local areas, having remained in
positions for longer periods of time than typical in the fluid IC environment, and in the clash of
values referenced above, chose antiquated norms rejecting cultural diversity over IC norms
promoting them. Micro-institutions either supported this framework directly or merely enabled it
through inaction. What specialized challenges may the IC confront in reshaping cultures in this
complex array of micro-organizations? What norms in practice support IC cultural goals and
which norms conflict? Which micro-institutional mechanisms function as supports to these
ideals, and which ones function as impediments?
Proposition 3: Intelligence officers with an awareness of personal power
(agency) and superior organizational acumen (political skill) will respond to
TWB more effectively in support of the mission.
The findings in Chapter 4 demonstrated a link between organizational acumen (political
skill), agency, and the effectiveness of response. Simply, participants who maneuvered
pathways to engage networks, knowledge of culture and practices, and awareness of power so
that personal and mission interests aligned responded with less disruption to their support to the
mission. This dynamic combined two theoretical constructs critical to managing operations
within complex organizations: agency and political skill (organizational acumen). While these
two constructs are separate, scholarship and this study link them in a symbiotic relationship—to
have one requires ownership of the other. The following section will discuss them as separate
constructs but within a combined conceptualization.
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Agency
Giddens (1991) defined agency as an expression of one’s will onto the environment. In
this framework, agency is not only an awareness of goals but the willingness to act on them.
“Agency” and “acting” are separate in that actors are governed by rules while agents execute
power (Karp, 1986). Emirbayer and Mische (1998) argued that agency is a social engagement
in which experience and present capacity enable an imagined future. Thus, agentic response to
TWB required identifying the “self” in the situation.
Knowing the “self” also requires being able to use it as an influencing factor. Intelligence
officers’ use of voice and opportunities for action reflected their sense of agency. I use the
phrase sense agency because assessing power requires cognitive work around sensemaking
for what is happening in the environment; who other agents and actors are who can help or
hinder one’s goals (Creed et al., 2019; Weick, 1995); what is one’s power to influence the
sensemaking of others; and act (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). In this way, agency required
understanding the “self” in combination with goals, available resources, and limitations.
In his structuration theory, Giddens (1991) also argued that the same complexities that
allowed organizations to grow also restrained them. The effectiveness of response formed
around perceptions of boundaries as inhibiting or merely informative. Intelligence officers
functioning within “Seeking Subliminal” found boundaries to be guardrails for safe action and
less as restraints. They either maneuvered to shift the boundaries or left. Intelligence officers
within “Folding In” and “Reinforcing Style” only perceived restraint. Within “Folding In,” those
restraints froze intelligence officers in time and space. Within “Reinforcing Style,” they fought
against those restraints; however, unrealistic expectations for the ability to affect their
environments contributed to unproductive response patterns.
Organizational Acumen/Political Skill
Agency is fundamentally about action. A tenet of social network theory is that one must
first understand the positions of oneself and others to influence the environment (Balkundi &
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Kilduff, 2006). By extension, organizational acumen requires a sense of governance, key
processes, direct and tacit decision-making processes, and culture (Morton, 2015). However,
organizational acumen—like its symbiotic partner of power—is temporal and situational
(Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001). As power shifts, organizational acumen may emerge in
complementary or divergent ways. Intelligence officers who responded most effectively to TWB
sensed the difference.
I have chosen to frame these traits as organizational acumen rather than political skill to
avoid misinterpretation of what the term means in context. Partisan political considerations are
incompatible with the intelligence environment. Additionally, the polarized political environment
in which this study has been published could lead to further misinterpretation. However, a
significant body of literature conceptualizes and measures organizational acumen within the
construct of political skill in ways that this study validated.
Political in this context is defined as an arena for action, sizing up, and making choices
(Mintzberg, 1985) necessary to influence others toward a set of goals (Perrewe et al., 2004; J.
Pfeffer, 1981). Findings in this study validated the research related to acumen in other contexts.
Although awareness of agency also played a role, intelligence officers who leveraged superior
acumen reported stabilized self-concepts that enabled them to confront toxic circumstances with
more agility, personal acceptance, and a sense of peace:
I've come to terms with that now. It's the beast that is working in [issue redacted],
especially working across different agencies and across different mission sets and
across different career tracks. In the greater scope of things, I know that these are things
that happen. And, I don't think if I had pushed back more it would have changed. (Maria)
The findings validated Perrewe et al.'s (2004) conclusions that political skill effectively buffered
physical and psychological stress from TWB . Gwen’s (2020) argument that she had the power
to hold her toxic personality accountable but not the certainty that her career could survive the
scrutiny validated Treadway's (2018) findings that effective response required both political skill
and agency. Finally, Ben’s (2020) and Loess’ (2020) effective use of networks in their response
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choices validated the socially constructed way in which agency and skill emerge through social
networks (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003).
The Pathway Model of Holding Self conceptualizes the problematized environment for
choosing how to respond effectively to TWB in the intelligence environment. They transitioned
through assessments of power vis-à-vis the toxic personality (agency). They also had to choose
the most effective response within an environment in which status was fluid, ambiguous, and
elastic across multiple actors in the environment (organizational acumen). To return to Balkundi
and Kilduff (2006), power was not only in the relationship but in awareness of what that
relationship was, its placement in the situation, and how others perceived the dynamic
differently.
Future Research for Proposition 3
Organizational acumen, agency, and their roles in managing relationships effectively
suggest opportunities for the IC to understand how they impact response to TWB.
Organizational acumen is more critical on a broader level than simply in how to respond to
TWB. The IC’s embeddedness in an uncertain global environment expands the need for
organizational acumen to understand how to leverage entities during challenging times (Denis
et al., 2010; Morgan, 2005). What builds these skills at various levels of the workforce? Y. Liu et
al. (2007) found relationships between affability and political skill. However, research also
shows that TWB is less related to personality traits than perspectives on power (Kusy &
Holloway, 2009; Pearson & Porath, 2005; Yamada, 2000). Therefore, what mitigating skills
redirect organizational acumen and agency toward positive goal orientations?
These interrelationships also raise questions about where the “self” ends and where the
institution begins. How might one measure these dynamics? How do intelligence officers
recognize them? Because agency, acumen, and self-concepts intersected with relational
assessments in the study, how do intelligence officers assess them as resources? Relating is a
longitudinal and ambiguous process in the IC as structures designed to build systemic flexibility
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often bring toxic personalities and targets back together so that positions may be different but
old resentments remain. What factors contribute to relationship building in the IC? How might
agency and organizational acumen be identified in recruits to build a cadre of intelligence
officers who seek the subliminal rather than fold in or reinforce unproductive styles?
Proposition 4: Intelligence officers with healthy mentoring networks that
steward them over time will respond more effectively to TWB in support of
the mission.
In a 2011 essay, leadership theorist Marco Tavanti argued that the first step in
challenging a toxic leader was a conversation with a coach or mentor. This study supported his
argument in that intelligence officers who had meaningful mentoring networks typically
responded in ways that supported self-concepts and sustained their contributions to the
mission. However, mentors played longitudinal and multiplicative roles. This section reviews
mentoring by reviewing relevant theory and research, along with the significance of these
findings in the intelligence context. I could identify no other research on the nature and function
of mentorship in the IC. Consequently, this research is the first to examine the relationship of
mentoring to any dynamic within IC operations.
Mentors as Stewards
Kusy and Holloway (2009) argued that effective mentoring enables mentees to
understand themselves in relationship to others. Consequently, a sense of “self” plays an
integral role for both mentor and mentee. Additional research in non-IC settings has identified
relationships between positive mentoring experiences and increased career growth, job
satisfaction, socialization (Chao, 1997), productivity, self-efficacy (Paglis et al., 2006), and
career longevity (Higgins & Thomas, 2001). Research has (not surprisingly) also found
relationships between mentoring networks, learning cultures, and increased organizational
performance (Škerlavaj et al., 2007). Therefore, mentors play a holistic stewardship role in
advising mentees on how to protect effort, capabilities, growth, and choices (Resnik, 2019).
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Early theoretical modeling and research by Kram (1983, 1988) identified an arc for
mentoring across four phases: the initiation phase when the relationship begins; the cultivation
phase as the mentor and mentee learn about others’ capabilities; the separation phase as the
mentee becomes more independent from the mentor; and the redefinition phase in which the
mentor and mentee relationship terminates, ushering in a new phase to their relationship as
peers. The critical aspect of each phase is the relational shape of the dyad; information and
tradecraft are transferred, but so are norms, trust, and comity. Chao (1997) found that the most
impactful period was the cultivation phase in which the psychosocial impact of the mentor onto
the mentee was most intense. Additionally, Wanberg et al. (2006) found that this psychosocial,
cultivation phase was a critical juncture in which mentees learned how to manage relationships,
function within the larger organizational context, and grow their careers.
This study validated the importance of positive mentoring relationships in building
self-concepts as valuable contributors to the mission, as well as playing educational, advisory,
psychosocial, relational, and modeling roles. However, this study was the first to theorize these
relationships as integral to the intelligence mission. More critically, the study was also the first to
identify a relationship between early mentoring experiences, ongoing relationships with mentors,
and longitudinal responses to TWB. Maria (2020), an African American woman, talked at length
about the positive role that her older, Caucasian male mentors played in her self-concept as a
valued intelligence officer. This validation by “white men in power” overshadowed early fears
that she would be marginalized. Similarly, Dana (2020), a Caucasian, female intelligence officer,
explored the role that mentors played in building a sense of self-efficacy that minimized the
impacts from toxic peers as her career progressed. Ben (2020), an African-American male,
perceived that a long-term mentoring relationship with his entity’s director benefited from the
mutual influence between both the mentor and mentee.
The study diverged from the Kram (1983, 1988) model on mentorship phases in an
important respect: for the intelligence officers in this study, these relationships never entered the
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redefinition phase. While the relationships evolved longitudinally to remove the status difference
between intelligence officers and their mentors, these mentors sustained their mentorship roles
over time:
I will say that I had some pretty awesome mentors that would literally take my call any
day or any time of day or night to listen to me [just] trying to make sense of this person's
behaviors. (Christina)
While an exact conclusion is undetermined, this sustained relationship may be related to
the relational ambiguity discourse and related “situational peer” repertoire that emerged in the
study. The study found that relational status between intelligence officers and other early
relationships remained relatively stable over time. Mentors as titular superiors early in the
relationship sustained a longitudinal advisory role, even as the status between them became
more peer-related.
The role of “trust” in this study also emerged as a link to Kram’s (1983, 1988) research.
He found that the cultivation phase identified a psychosocial role for mentors in which trust
deepens. In the sensemaking role that Christina (2020) ascribed to her mentor, a sense of trust
likely would have been required for her to value the advice she received. In the relationally
significant IC, extreme contexts lend an outsized impact to low-probability events (Hannah et al.,
2009; Hastie, 2011). Consequently, the quasi-leadership role that mentors play (Godshalk &
Sosik, 2007) might have elevated the significance of trust so that Christina and her mentor
found mutually beneficial reasons for sustaining the mentor-mentee relationship.
Who Mentors Whom?
The relationship of mentoring to effective response to TWB also surfaced in relation to
potential impacts on the IC’s diversity and inclusion goals discussed in Chapter 5. Specifically,
intelligence officers surfaced perceived impacts from the low availability of ethnic and gender
minority mentors. They also discussed whether having mentors of the same gender or ethnic
group was significant.
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The extant research on same-cultural/cross-cultural debate is mixed. In a study of
Caucasian and African American children, Oyserman et al. (1995) found that achievement
among African American students relied heavily on the imagining of possible “selves,”
particularly among males. Consequently, a possible assumption would be that mentors who
understood the unique circumstances and experiences of mentees would be most beneficial.
Similarly, Burt (2009) argued that women and ethnic minorities are at a disadvantage for
mentoring relationships in the private sector because of the intense relational aspects of
mentoring in male-dominated organizational structures. This research might align with the
experiences of intelligence officers in the male-dominated IC. Alternatively, research involving
doctoral students at U.S. universities found that African American students identified the
greatest impact from advisors who showed a genuine interest in their research, regardless of
that advisor’s sociodemographic identity (Felder, 2010).
The findings in this study also were mixed. Gwen (2020), a Caucasian female, explored
the ironic impact that having so few female senior leaders as mentors at her IC entity was
having on the institution’s ability to prepare female middle managers for promotions to the
senior ranks. Jason, a situational analysis participant, who shared experiences with TWB,
recalled being a junior, African American analyst struggling to win the attention of potential
Caucasian mentors. However, as already noted, Maria partially ascribed her success in
managing TWB to her Caucasian male mentors. Another African American female participant in
the situational analysis segment, Vickie identified significantly positive experiences with a
Caucasian male mentor who she originally resisted because he was from a different
sociodemographic group.
The availability of cross-cultural mentoring in the IC has been linked to broader issues of
diversity and inclusion. In Congressional testimony, the ODNI’s Equal Opportunity Director, Rita
Sampson (2019), argued for more formal and cross-cultural mentoring programs in the IC to
boost better career development, promotion opportunities, and retention among employees
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within marginalized groups. However, research suggests that formal mentoring programs may
yield less positive results than informal programs that are relationally driven (Eby & Allen, 2002;
Ragins et al., 2000). Alternatively, in Vickie’s example from the previous paragraph, that positive
mentoring relationship with a Caucasian male was formally assigned, not chosen. The
integration between these perspectives may lie in Jason’s reflections on the importance of
intelligence officers having different mentors who fill different mentoring needs.
The distinction between these various findings may relate to why individuals mentor.
Research indicates that mentor proactivity—in other words, mentors who seek opportunities to
mentor—is related to positive mentoring results (Wanberg et al., 2006). Additionally,
compatibility of learning orientations between mentors and mentees have been linked to more
positive outcomes (Egan, 2005; B. Ragins et al., 2000). Mentors who found those relationships
rewarding in their own rights were more willing to mentor in the future (Eby et al., 2006). The
longitudinal role that IC mentors played in this theoretical model raises the significance of
creating the mechanisms for positive mentoring opportunities that mutually reinforce.
Future Research for Proposition 4
The positive and longitudinal role that mentorship played in responding to TWB would
seem to support a formal mentoring concept. However, research cited above would also
suggest the importance of ensuring that mentors are willing participants in such a program and
that participate for prosocial reasons. How do intelligence officers choose mentors and for what
reasons? Are there benefits to hybrid forms that encourage formal and informal mentoring
networks? How might career development include incentives to mentor and accept mentoring?
How might the IC play a gate-keeping role so that those choosing to mentor are good stewards
of the culture-shaping ideal and can foster effective approaches to TWB? How do tendencies
toward higher organizational acumen and agency relate to efforts to build mentoring networks?
Mentoring relationships and networks played complex roles among African American
participants of both genders. References to minority “co-signing” formed mechanisms for
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sponsorship that transcended ordinary professional networks and mentoring relationships.
These sponsorships emerged as resources for ethnic minority intelligence officers to increase
collective strength during toxic events, as well “vouchers” to boost careers. Alternatively, female
intelligence officers in this study referenced fewer such resources. When they had them, they
were more likely to fear betrayal or embarrassment at using them. What are the sources of
these distinctions? What might Caucasian females learn from the experiences of their
African-American female counterparts about how to safely nurture and leverage co-signing
opportunities?
Proposition 5: Solutions for TWB designed around better training for
managers without equal focus on the role of referential power, relational
significance, and relational ambiguity will fall short of IC goals.
Archetype discourse centered on middle managers as critical junction points for
addressing TWB. During the situational analysis segment of the study, actors normally
functioning with the Compliance Five also adopted this repertoire as a mitigator for the more
interpretive toxic behaviors that legal and regulatory remedies were not designed to address.
The also adopted the repertoire in relation to the importance of culture-shaping as a
preventative measure to avoid redress shortcomings. In this refrain, discourse referenced
middle management training programs to enhance empathy and broader levels of emotional
intelligence. However, as shown in the Pathway Model of Holding Self, this discursive field
diverged from Core, which framed managers as reflective of the seniors they represented.
Seniors were implicated as parallel problems and solutions. Most critically, Core discourse
elevated relational ambiguities related to tacit forms of power outside of hierarchy as equal
partners to formal power.
Emotional Intelligence
Middle managers emerged as critical junction points for culture-shaping and
standard-setting in the study. These efforts centered on enhanced training, with an emphasis on
increasing emotional intelligence (EI) for middle managers (Coats et al., 2019; Joint Strategy,
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2020). EI “refers to the ability to process emotion-laden information competently and to use it to
guide cognitive activities like problem-solving and to focus energy on required behaviors’’
(Salovey et al., 2001, p. 159). While many practice-based theorists have embraced EI to
improve individual and organizational performance, theoretical models and empirical research
vary in usability and rigor (McCleskey, 2014).
I have identified no research related to EI in the IC or that substantiates a benefit to the
IC mission. This study cannot evaluate the methodological validity of the IC’s emphasis on EI for
middle managers as a response to counterproductive workplace behavior in general, nor
specifically TWB. However, research on the relationship between EI and performance in other
settings is mixed. Data supports a positive link between EI and influencing goals and objectives,
instilling employee enthusiasm, organizational identity building (George, 2000), as well as
benefiting task and relationship-oriented leadership (Wirawan et al., 2019). Particularly relevant
to the relationally ambiguous IC, research has found relationships between EI and emergent
leadership behaviors among those outside of formal hierarchy. However, benefits may accrue
more to the organization and have benign effects on the employee (Côté et al., 2010; Côté &
Miners, 2006). Kilduff et al. (2010) cautioned that skills differ from intent, so that EI skills absent
organizationally positive goals may promote personal interests over that of the organization.
Further, a case analysis of one private sector organization found that whether someone rates
highly on EI may depend on who is rating them; peers and supervisors typically rate EI skills
more highly than subordinates (Cavallo & Brienza, 2002).
Intelligence officers likely would applaud efforts to build relational skills among middle
managers. However, the data in this study suggest that they would reject a singular focus on
middle management without a complementary focus on senior leadership and ineffective
redress. Also, increased EI skills only become relevant when managers can use them to solve
problems. Participants varied in their choices to engage managers as well as senior leaders
when they experienced toxic environments. For those who did, the feedback they received also
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varied from positive action to hostility to indifference. How participants responded typically
weighed on complex considerations of likely success versus anticipated impacts. Even asking
for help carried risk in which higher levels of EI on the part of managers would not address.
Relational Significance and Relational Ambiguity
Participants reflected a complex array of power sources in the IC. Senior leaders and
managers held formal power. Senior analysts and team leads held referential forms (French &
Raven, 1959; Raven, 1964) bestowed by perceived expertise (power over knowledge), renown
(how extended their networks were), and reputation (how extended networks perceived their
power). Senior analysts and team-leads used control over account assignments, mentoring, and
tradecraft to benefit some over others. Quasi-formal power over travel, production, briefing
opportunities, and specialized clearances expanded their reach in ways that often usurped
formal leaders.
The study validated prior research on behavioral taxonomies and the ways that
perceived power differentials influenced how intelligence officers responded (Kusy & Holloway,
2009; Pelletier, 2010, 2012; K. R. Williams, 2018). Additionally, Kusy and Holloway’s (2009)
“power protector” model played a significant part. For example, Ben and Liam treaded softly
with toxic subordinates who had special favoritism relationships with more senior leaders.
Christina examined the way in which a non-senior colleague’s functional role in working with
senior leaders elevated him to informal senior status; in turn, challenging his toxic behavior
became too risky. Therefore, how to respond relied not only on expected reactions from the
toxic personality, but also on how one expected powerful “others” to react.
This study identified a nuance not available in prior research, however. As noted in
Proposition 1, “toxic personalities” were not defined by a context-neutral set of behaviors.
Rather, behaviors were evaluated as toxic or non-toxic depending on who the personality was to
the target. For example, Dana perceived behaviors by her supervisor (formal power) as toxic;
those same behaviors by colleagues and peers were benign jealousy. Jason perceived little
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impact when supervisors (formal power) engaged in behaviors typically considered to be toxic;
those same behaviors in teammates felt like a betrayal. Power differentials remained within the
calculation for response. However, power emerged from what the participant expected, wanted,
and needed from that individual. Simply, the power was vested in the relational dynamic as a
third entity in the relationship that diminished the relevance of more transparent forms of power
attached to the individuals.
The study identified a second nuance not addressed by prior research: the relationally
ambiguous nature of power in the IC so that the influence of position was diluted by interactions
of the “self” and others in relation fluidity. Simply, power differentials depended on context and
time, but not in linear ways. A supervisor might be perceived as a peer if they were “in charge”
but did not “outrank” the participant (Gwen). An intelligence officer might have responsibility for
the mission but not the people executing it (Joel). Toxic team leads might one day become
subordinates (Zeke). Senior leaders might have limited power over subordinates who use
special clearances and relationships to control information (Liam). The one constant is the
memory of the experience because TWB freezes relationships, even as intelligence officers
enter, exit, and reenter each other’s lives (Kelly).
Future Research for Proposition 5
Relational ambiguity and significance ran like a current through the study. They emerged
in discussions on the importance of mentoring, their power in framing toxicity, and perceptions
of agency. They also made boundaries between formal and informal power more porous.
However, IC scholarship is silent on the role of relationships even in their most basic form, much
less more complex discussions around how they are interpretive constituted, maintained, and
passively emergent. The IC’s focus on collaboration without a concomitant understanding of the
complexities of relationships is tantamount to having an interest in high-rise construction without
a parallel interest in where to place the nails.
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Relational significance and relational ambiguity problematize designing solutions that
focus singularly on middle management to address TWB. Formal positions indeed have power
through span of control. However, this study showed that behavior becomes toxic when needs
surrounding self-concepts become threatened. This risk emerged within both formal and
informal power relationships. How do relational significance and relational ambiguity intersect?
What might an organizational ethnographic study tell us about how they emerge and function in
practice? How might these frameworks differ in routine versus crisis environments? How might
one measure relational significance and relational ambiguity? In what contexts might their
impacts as conditions of response to TWB vary? How might IC managers and senior leaders
moderate the impact of these frameworks on response?
Research Opportunities in Other Frameworks
Research on TWB within other complex operational environments is robust, including
the critical mission environments of health care and military organizations. The units of analysis
in the preponderance of this research relates to manifestation and impact. Response is one
impact. However, neither variations in those responses nor the influence of complex relational
factors have been a significant source of research in those frameworks.
Just as research in other industries informed the research question and the design of
this study, these findings may lend some benefit to non-IC industries in which leadership must
traverse complex boundaries to manage TWB and other counterproductive workplace
behavioral constructs. For example, the role of sustaining self-concepts amid TWB may present
additional research avenues for scholarship on team psychology, power in practice, and how
various work relationships amass value. Leadership scholars seeking new questions on
relational leadership might find value in the implications within the relational ambiguity concept.
Organizational psychologists specializing in public institutional frameworks might also find value
in understanding how these ambiguities intersect with alignments and misalignments at the
organizational messaging level.
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Implications for Leading Change
In Chapter 1, I explained my rationale for conducting this study. I do not argue that TWB
within the IC is less or more problematic than in other industries. No research has explored this
question. Rather, I chose the topic because the lack of research on TWB in the intelligence
framework was anomalous in comparison to other critical mission industries. Because my
interest is in leading and change as a psychological process, I chose a topic that would enable
me to understand the sociopsychology of response. This analysis has added to the
understanding of the systemic dynamic constitutive of TWB in the IC and the situatedness of
behavioral evaluation. The study also surfaced critical divergences and contradictions within the
social environment that may negatively impact the IC’s ability to lead the change efforts that will
address TWB.
The model developed within this study illustrates the longitudinal trajectory of response,
but also the lack of linearity to the process. Responses tend to be emergent but within a
framework in which individual meaning around otherwise innocuous terms like “peer” and “rank”
challenge definitions outside of the personal experiences of those involved. These complexities
challenge benign notions of leadership aligned to title and role (Bennis, 1994; Bennis & Nanus,
1985; Ford & Harding, 2007) in favor of models that embrace leading as influence transcending
formal hierarchy (Bolden et al., 2008; Lukes, 2005). Consequently, senior leaders may reflect a
category of employment in the IC but not leadership in practice.
The interaction between formal and referential status in the IC are more representative
of distributed (Gronn, 2002) or shared leadership theories in which all team members are
engaged in leading within their sphere of influence (Pearce, 2004; Pearce & Sims, 2002). Thus,
leadership reflects less a singular role and more of an accumulation of parts into a hybrid social
whole (Gronn, 2011). Research indicates that perceptions of empowerment (Wood, 2005), the
team environment, and the availability of external coaching (Carson et al., 2007) correlate to
success in shared leadership paradigms. Notably, rather than proactive empowerment, shared
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leadership models in the IC may reflect size and context-driven limitations on the span of control
over mission by designated senior leaders. In this manner, leadership emergence (D’Innocenzo
et al., 2016) is minimized by TWB’s voice-stripping impact, which undermines the collaborative
flexibility needed to foster the IC mission.
Organizational structures settle institutions into organizational scripts (Barley & Tolbert,
1997). Scripts become heuristics that become tacit and resistant to challenge, even when they
no longer meet organizational needs. Institutional leaders may anchor to rigid, misaligned
patterns that actually inhibit change (Kegan & Lahey, 2009). In his adaptive leadership theory,
Harvard psychiatrist and leadership theorist, Ron Heifetz (2006; Heifetz et al., 2009), argued
that a primary reason that organizations fail is that they apply technical solutions (e.g., new
training programs) to problems that require adaptation in fundamental values, cultures, norms,
and structures. This organizational misfire typically emerges from top-down solutions that do not
reflect the perspectives of those experiencing the problem, and thus, lose fidelity to what the
problem is in practice. To be truly adaptive toward addressing the problem in practice, solutions
must be developed by the intelligence officers experiencing the problem rather than driven from
the institutional level.
Findings in this study related to the significance of the relationship to decisions about
what constitutes TWB and relational ambiguity as a Core repertoire. These challenges will likely
grow as the IC continues to integrate and its complex array of micro- and meso-cultures interact
to create new conditions for TWB if not managed appropriately. A practice-based perspective on
leadership as a social influence process (Uhl-Bien, 2006), enacted through partnerships (Graen
& Uhl-Bien, 1995) and a trifecta of enabling, administering, and adapting leadership forms
(Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Marion & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien & Arena, 2017; Uhl-Bien & Marion,
2009) would be optimal for the adaptive challenges confronting the IC.
The application of technical solutions to adaptive problems in the IC emerged in two
elements of the study. First, institutional-level leaders obligate intelligence officers at all levels to
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report incidences of TWB to management teams and the appropriate redress organizations
(Coats et al., 2019; ICD 651, 2019; Joint Strategy, 2020). However, this study demonstrated the
misalignment between the design and intent behind redress processes and more interpretive
forms of the behavior and its impacts. Sites of dissent emerged among Compliance Five
personnel to dissuade targets from utilizing those “high-bar” frameworks rather than relying on
processes designed to help the entity and not them. While laudable in their goals to obligate
intelligence officers to use them, the boundaries around these processes nevertheless confine
them to a narrow set of the problem and prevent change.
Secondly, this study identified commitments at the institutional level toward enhancing EI
training and accountability for managers (Joint Strategy, 2020). Fitzgerald (1992) delineated
between training and development according to orientation toward present skills (training), and
future growth and enrichment (development). Improved EI skills may provide a technical
improvement for less relationally oriented managers. However, that approach likely will not
address the experiences referenced in this study in relation to non-supervisory/high-referential
status toxic personalities. This approach may be particularly weak when those with referential
status believe they are acting according to senior leadership models and prerogatives. The
dynamics contributing to ineffective response patterns may not change because intelligence
officers in this study cast a wide net of responsibility for unaddressed TWB to the toxic
personality and senior leaders, even when the latter were not directly implicated in the events.
Consequently, while culture-shaping focused on a mission ideal, Core actors idealized senior
leaders, not as individuals, but as a construct for blame that outweighed the managers closely
tied to the toxic environment.
Even though the leadership construct was idealized, the perception of the “club”
atmosphere surrounding senior leadership referenced in the study may also be an inhibitor to
adaptive change. An example from this study is anecdotal but illustrative. Sub-senior
intelligence officers functioning within the Core and seniors functioning within the Compliance
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Five social worlds readily participated and brought invaluable insights to the findings. However,
only one senior leader more aligned with the Archetype social world agreed to participate. In
fact, most did not respond to my inquiries. A lack of response negates a firm conclusion about
why no response was forthcoming. However, these silences may validate observations in this
study about the perceived resistance among senior leaders to address TWB—an uncomfortable
subject in any environment— when solutions may disrupt the “club.”
One long-term remedy may be in the emerging narrative among some current and
former IC leaders who are promoting a transition away from senior-level promotions based on
technical expertise in favor of promotions based on superior leadership ability (Long, 2017,
2021). If aligned in institutional structures, processes, and practices (i.e., not merely rhetorical),
then this paradigm would likely drive the type of adaptive change that the IC needs by elevating
strong leaders who can culture-shape and model behavioral norms. However, just as solutions
to TWB must be designed at the level of impact, this “leadership track” to assist those solutions
must begin below the management level. Otherwise, middle managers that have been
promoted based on technical expertise will bias the selection pool toward those promoted under
the old model. Likewise, intelligence officers who may have superior potential as leaders but
who are not promoted to middle management due to less technical proficiency will not be
considered. While these strong leaders likely would leverage that acumen through shared
leadership structures at the practice level, their abilities to influence IC’s goals might be blunted.
Limitations of the Study
This study explored how and why intelligence officers responded to TWB in different
ways, what conditioned those responses, and how they operationalized into the work of being
intelligence officers. The small sample size and qualitative design in this study precludes
generalizable conclusions. However, the absence of empirical research on this topic in the IC
made a more generalizable study premature because no IC-based theory was developed to
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support a design. Therefore, this research was designed to develop such a model to drive future
research and actionable measures for the IC.
This study demonstrated that choosing how to respond to TWB was deeply personal,
fluid, and situational. The multi-method design using grounded theory methodology and
situational analysis was structured to identify how this personal meaning in the situation
manifested. Despite this individuality, 20 grounded theory participants from nine IC agencies
showed significant alignment of perspective and contributed to a coherent theoretical model
much earlier in the data-collection process than expected. Eight primary dimensions of
response emerged within a dynamic shaped by self-concepts. Holding Self relied upon
leveraging networks and acumen to maneuver around the toxic personality and systemic
enablers; conflicting and contradicting messaging frameworks between three social worlds
about what was available to them and what they should do defined the situation.
The design accomplished its objective to develop a theoretical model as a foundation for
future research. As theory grounded in data, findings anchor conclusions in the experiences of
the intelligence officers who chose to participate. Consequently, this level of meaning reflected
only two sociodemographic groups. LGBTQIA, Latin, and disabled intelligence officers did not
participate and leave questions about how their voices might have further shaped the model.
Additional studies designed to reflect a wider array of voices would benefit the research by
exploring how responses to the behavior manifest more broadly, in which contexts, and the
degree of impact to specific mission outcomes.
Time also functioned as a limitation in the situational analysis segment of the study. As
noted, I made no effort to provide a thorough map of the complex social worlds within the IC.
Rather, I confined mapping processes to those ecological representations relevant to the
research question. Even within these design boundaries, that segment of the study was
impeded by financial and practical circumstances limiting the time available to peel back
proverbial layers within each social world so that I could make these maps more intricate.
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Future research might find value in adding depth to this analysis so that these social worlds
integral to understanding ecological forces constitutive of how and why intelligence officers
respond to TWB in various ways may be further understood.
Conclusion
I began this study with an interest in peer-related TWB but quickly determined that
responses to the behavior centered on complex assessments of relational significance, holding
onto self-concepts amid longitudinal relational ambiguities, and status. This realization drove a
change in my research question and enabled the development of the Pathways Model of
Holding Self around variations in how intelligence officers respond to TWB. Prior research
surfaced the personal meaning associated with how TWB affected individuals and the relational
underpinnings of toxic behavior as a systemic phenomenon. This study added to the discussion
by establishing questions about whether a toxic personality can ever be called as such when the
qualification of behaviors as toxic depends on how significant the relationship is to those
affected by the behavior. However, focusing solely on what fosters effective response to TWB
does nothing to eliminate the dynamic; for that, one must study the divergent embankments
through which the pathways form and find ways to close the gaps. My goal has been to design a
map for setting out on that journey by developing a model to support future research.
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Appendix B: Member Organizations of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Acronym

Agency
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Central Intelligence Agency

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DOE
DHS

Department of Energy/Office
of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence
Department of Homeland
Security/Office of Intelligence
and Analysis

DOT

Department of Staff/Bureau
of Intelligence and Research
Department of
Treasury/Office of
Intelligence Analysis

DEA

Drug Enforcement
Administration/Office of
National Security Intelligence

FBI

Federal Bureau of
Investigation/Intelligence
Branch

NGA

National GeospatialIntelligence Agency

NRO

National Reconnaissance
Office

NSA/CSS

National Security
Agency/Central Security
Service

DOS

Mission
National security intelligence
for U.S. policymakers
Finished military intelligence
to warfighters, policymakers,
and force-protection planners
Protects safety and national
security around DOE
laboratories and plants
against foreign intelligence,
terrorist, and cyber threats.
Identifies and assesses
threats related to U.S.
territory
Focal point within the agency
for finished intelligence on
global threats based on allsource, diplomatic reporting
Analysis and dissemination of
foreign intelligence related to
the global financial system
Operational measures and
finished intelligence related to
illicit drugs and related
entities
Oversees intelligence policy
and guidance related to
national, transnational, and
counterintelligence threats
Geospatial-intelligence to
support civilian and military
national security objectives
Designs, builds, and
operations nation’s
reconnaissance satellites in
support of operational and
finished intelligence
Performs cryptologic
activities to protect U.S.
information systems and
produce foreign signals
intelligence
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Appendix B: Member Organizations of the U.S. Intelligence Community (continued)
Acronym

Agency

USAF ISR

Office of the Director of
National Intelligence
U.S. Air Force Intelligence,
Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance

USA G-2

US Army Intelligence (G-2)

USCG

U.S. Coast Guard
Intelligence

USMC

U.S. Marine Corps

USN

U.S. Naval Intelligence

USSF

U.S. Space Force

ODNI

Mission
Leads intelligence
integration, communication,
and planning across 17 IC
agencies
Finished intelligence derived
from airborne, space, and
cyber sensors.
Overall coordination of
GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT,
MASINT, and
counterintelligence for the
U.S. Army
Finished intelligence related
to maritime safety, maritime,
security, and maritime
stewardship to support
homeland security
Tactical and operational
intelligence in support of
battlefield operations
Provides finished maritime
intelligence to policymakers
and other stakeholders in
support of U.S. naval
operations
Organizes, trains, and equips
space forces in order to
protect U.S. and allied
interests in space and to
provide space capabilities to
the joint force.

Adapted from Members of the IC. (2021, March 11). [Government]. Office of the Director of
National Intelligence. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic.
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Appendix C: Recruitment Letter
Hello –
My name is Greta Creech and I am a Ph.D. candidate within Antioch University’s Leadership
and Change graduate program. I am conducting research to support my dissertation on how
and why members of U.S. intelligence analytic and operational teams respond to toxic
workplace behavior among peers, colleagues, and team mates and how these responses
operationalize into the work of being intelligence officers.
I am contacting you because your name was provided to me as someone who may have
experience in this phenomenon as a government civilian in the intelligence community and
because I am hoping you might be willing to support this important research.
For your background information, no identified research has been conducted on this issue in
unclassified channels. I am using the Kusy and Holloway (2009) three-pronged model for toxic
behavior, which includes (but is not limited to):
•
•
•

Efforts to shame or embarrass others
Hostility, including overt (e.g., aggression) or passive (e.g., marginalizing others,
silent treatments, etc.) behavior
Team sabotage, such as hoarding information, engaging in over-surveillance of
colleagues or teammates, and demonstrating high levels of distrust

An interview would be conducted and recorded over Zoom conferencing (for transcription
purposes, only), using a pseudonym, and only your audio would be maintained. No
organizational identifiers or actual participant names would be used.
If you have experiences and insights to share and you meet the criteria set out in the first
paragraph, I would enjoy the opportunity to interview you. If you would like to participate or have
further questions, please contact me at gcreech@antioch.edu or at 240-643-8334.
Thank you.
Greta E. Creech

.
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Appendix D: Participant Interview Consent Form
Introduction
I am Greta E. Creech, a Ph.D. candidate enrolled in the Leadership and Change graduate
program at Antioch University. Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to interview
you as part of my research. I intend to complete my dissertation on why members of U.S.
intelligence community (IC) analytic and operational teams respond in to sustained toxic
workplace behavior (TWB) among colleagues and peers and how those responses impact how
they function as intelligence officers.
Purpose of the Research
A significant body of literature has explored TWB in other contexts, including other critical
mission environments, such as the U.S. military and health care. However, no unclassified
research has explored how intelligence officers respond to TWB or how it operationalizes.
Because research indicates significantly detrimental impacts to life and safety from TWB in
other critical mission environments, the absence of understanding about its impact among
colleagues and peers within an operational intelligence environment constitutes an intelligence
gap. The goal of the study is to develop a theoretical model to spur further research into the
question and assist IC leaders to address the phenomenon.
Participant Selection
You were chosen to participate because you have indicated you have experienced TWB as a
civilian government employee while on an analytic or operational team in a U.S. intelligence
environment. You should not consent to participate if you do not want your perspectives
included in the study’s findings.
Project Activities
This consent form involves your participation in a single, one-hour interview over Zoom
conferencing. In keeping with methodological practice and to maintain anonymity, all
interviews will be conducted under pseudonym. You may choose your own pseudonym, or I
can select one for you. You will be asked to share experiences with TWB as an analyst or in an
intelligence operations environment and how you responded to those behaviors.
Confidentiality
To ensure accuracy, the interview will be recorded. However, as a former intelligence officer, I
understand the necessity of ensuring your anonymity and security. If you prefer, the recording
can be limited to audio-only. The interview will be professionally transcribed. Transcribers will
have only the audio recording and the interviewee’s pseudonym. If I have follow-up
questions post-interview, I will provide those over email for you to answer at your leisure. I,
alone, will have access to the stored recording, notes, transcripts, or other documentation
stemming from the interview. This data, including any recordings, will be kept in a secure,
encrypted location.
I will provide a full, final transcript to you within one week of the interview. You will have five
days to provide corrections or to delete comments you prefer not be included. If I do not
receive a response from you within five days, I will consider the material to be approved for use.
I will automatically strike any reference to a specific organization, program, or initiative
that might identify an IC entity or individual.
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Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may choose not to participate.
You may withdraw at any time. You will not be penalized for your decision not to participate nor
for your contributions during study.
Risks
Your experiences will not be included as whole stories. Rather, elements will be fragmented and
represented in the study as themes in support of a theoretical model of responses to TWB by
U.S. intelligence officers. I do not anticipate that you will be harmed or distressed as a result of
participating in this study. However, the subject matter may be uncomfortable and resurface
past traumatic events.
Benefits
There will be no direct benefit to you. However, you will play a critical role in developing a
theoretical model associated with an under-explored subject as it pertains to the U.S.
intelligence community.
Reimbursements
You will not be provided any monetary incentive to take part in this project.
Limits of Privacy Confidentiality
Generally, I will keep confidential any information you request that I keep private. However,
there are times where I cannot keep information confidential. I will not be able to maintain
confidentiality if I determine that:
•
•
•
•

a child or vulnerable adult has been abused
a person plans to hurt him or herself, such as commit suicide
a person plans to hurt someone else
laws governing the use of classified information or national security are or have been
violated.

Laws require many professionals to act if they believe a person is at risk for self-harm or are
self-harming, harming another, or if a child or adult is being abused. In most states, this
information must be provided to the appropriate government agency. Please ask any questions
you may have about this issue before agreeing to be in the study. It is important that you do not
feel betrayed if I cannot keep information related to these safety requirements private.
Future Publication
I expect your insights to be included in Chapter 4 of my dissertation. However, you will be
identified only by pseudonym and insights represented as part of over-arching themes, not as
whole stories.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw
You are not required to participate in this study, and you may withdraw from participation at any
time.
Who to Contact
If you have any questions at this time or during the project, you may contact me, Greta Creech,
at gcreech@antioch.edu.

362
If you have any ethical concerns about this study, please contact Lisa Kreeger, Ph.D., Chair,
Institutional Review Board, Antioch University Ph.D. in Leadership and Change, Email:
lkreeger@antioch.edu.
Participant
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY:
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me. I have had the opportunity to
ask questions about the form. Any questions I have asked were answered to my satisfaction. I
consent voluntarily to participate in this project.
Name of Participant ___________________________________
Signature of Participant ____________________________________
Date ___________________________
Day/month/year
CONSENT TO BE RECORDED AS PART OF THIS STUDY:
I voluntarily agree to be recorded for this study. I agree to allow the use of my recordings only
as described in this form.
Yes, video & audio (pseudonym) _________
Yes, audio only (pseudonym) _________
Name of Participant___________________________________
Signature of Participant ____________________________________
Date ___________________________
Day/month/year

REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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Interviewer
I confirm that the participant was given an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and that
all of the questions asked by the participant have been answered correctly and to the best of my
ability. I confirm that the individual has not been coerced into giving consent, and the consent
has been given freely and voluntarily.
A copy of this Informed Consent Form has been provided to the participant.
Name __________________________________
Signature _______________________________

Date ___________________________
Day/month/year

364
Appendix E: Copyright and Other Permissions
Permission to use Figure 2.1 – The Toxic Triangle and Figure 2.2 -- Voice, Power, Actors, and
Actants in the Toxic Triangle

365
Permission to use Figure 3.1: Holloway and Schwartz’s Emergent Flow of Grounded Theory
Research
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Permission to Use Figure 3.3: Strauss and Corbin’s Original Conditional Matrix
Craig Myles commented:
Hello Greta,
Thank you for your reply. As posting to these platforms is a requirement of your institution, SAGE
Publishing is happy to grant you gratis permission on this occasion to reuse the figure from '**
Basics of Qualitative Research' as part of your dissertation.
Please accept this email as permission for your request as detailed above. Permission is
granted for the life of the dissertation on a non-exclusive basis, in the English language,
throughout the world in all formats provided full citation is made to the original SAGE
publication. Permission does not include any third-party material found within the work.
Please contact us for any further usage of the material.
If you have any questions, or if we may be of further assistance, please let us know.
Best regards,
Craig Myles
Senior Rights Coordinator
SAGE Publishing
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, CA 91320
USA
www.sagepublishing.com
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Permission to Use Figure 3.4: Strauss and Corbin’s Revised Conditional Matrix

Rights and Permission Requests <permissions@sagepub.com> Tue, Sep 8,
to me

2020, 5:37
PM

—-—-—-—
Reply above this line.
Thank you for your inquiry. Your query "Request for Permission to use one graphic in Basics of
Qualitative Research" has been logged under ticket number RP-2669.
Your ticket will be reviewed as soon as possible. Depending on the volume of requests we are
receiving, it may take up to four weeks to receive a response.
Thank you,
The SAGE Permissions Team
View request · Turn off this request's notifications
This is shared with Greta Creech.

--------------------------------------------------------Mary Ann Price <permissions@sagepub.com>

to me

Wed, Sep 23,
2020, 6:26
PM

—-—-—-—

Reply above this line.
Mary Ann Price commented:
Dear Greta Creech,
Thank you for providing this information. I am pleased to report we can grant your request without a fee as part of
your thesis or dissertation.
Please accept this email as permission for your request as you’ve detailed below. Permission is granted for the
life of the edition on a non-exclusive basis, in the English language, throughout the world in all formats
provided full citation is made to the original SAGE publication. Permission does not include any third-party
material found within the work.
Please contact us for any further usage of the material.

368
If you have any questions, or if we may be of further assistance, please let us know.
Kind regards,
Mary Ann Price
Rights Coordinator
SAGE Publishing
2600 Virginia Ave NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
USA
T: 202-729-1403
www.sagepublishing.com
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Permission to Use Figure 5.6 – Recruiting for Mission and Figure 5.8 – IC Culture Shaping
through Social Media
Images are non-copyrighted and in the public domain.
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Permission to Use Figure 5.7: Representation of “A Place for You”
CIA Copyright notice:

